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Drastic changes have taken place in UK electricity policy over recent years as government 
has sought to address the challenges associated with energy security, affordability and 
commitments to reduce carbon emissions. This study investigates the underlying policy 
changes between the year 2000 and 2012, particularly the Electricity Market Reform, as the 
most fundamental transformation in the British power market since liberalisation, almost 
three decades ago. It illustrates that although this policy had revised the long legacy of 
market-based and technology neutral electricity policymaking, it was yet to be claimed as a 
wholesale paradigmatic shift, because, as of 2012, it still suffered from a form of paradigm 
ambivalence and socio-technical lock-in. Furthermore, this research identifies an 
accumulative process of policy change explaining how a complex set of dynamics 
transformed the UK electricity policy mix. The thesis relies empirically on conducting 53 
semi-structured interviews as well as scrutinising policy documents and relevant secondary 
studies.  
 
The thesis draws relevant approaches within policy studies that attend to address continuity 
and change in policy frameworks, in particular the Advocacy Coalition Framework (Sabatier 
1999) and Policy Paradigm (Hall 1993) perspectives. The study contributes to this literature 
in three distinctive ways. First, it questions the adequacy of existing frameworks for 
conceptualising policy change in ‘large-technical’ and ‘techno-centric’ subsystems, such as 
electricity policy. In return, it introduces technology preference, as a policy component 
capturing the socio-technical elements of electricity policymaking. Second, to explain why 
and how such significant changes had been undergone, it forms a bridge between the 
characteristics of policy change and the extent that existing policies are perceived as 
irreconcilable policy failures. By this, it, albeit, moves beyond the conventional typology of 
change drivers in policy literature. Third, this research extends the emerging concept of 
negotiated agreement and policy compromise as a pathway to evolutionary changes (Sabatier 
& Weible 2007). Inspired by Institutional Change theory (Mahoney & Thelen 2010), it 
proposes that compromised policies are often at the risk of policy reversibility and 
retrenchment, subject to any shift in the contextual conditions they have originated in. 
Overall, the thesis provides an understanding of one of the very complex and contemporary 
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1. Chapter One: Introduction 
 
1.1. Thesis Introduction 
 
This thesis analyses electricity policy changes in the United Kingdom (UK) from the 
year 2000 to 2012. It particularly seeks to provide an understanding of and an 
explanation for the introduction of Electricity Market Reform by the Department of 
Energy and Climate Change (DECC) in the early 2010s. Conceptually, this research 
draws upon the literature of policy studies as an analytical framework informing 
contextual explanations as well as facilitating theoretical contributions.  
 
This introductory chapter aims to open up the discussion over the thesis subject, its 
analytical importance and the background literature. It shows why studying recurrent 
alterations in the UK electricity policy is academically interesting and how significant 
the potential contribution of this research is for policy knowledge. As such, it outlines 
the main research questions that this study has set out to answer and provides an 
overview of the structure of the thesis and further chapters.  
 
1.2. The changing nature of UK electricity policy  
 
While debates over energy policy, in general, have been intrinsically intertwined with 
the long history of the industrialisation process, electricity, in particular, has 
increasingly positioned itself at the heart of modern societies. It is, nowadays, 
characterised as the life blood of a wide range of daily activities, insofar as it is ‘taken 
for granted’ in all developed economies. As Patterson (1999: 1) describes, during the 
last century the power industry has improved the ‘course of human history’ and has 
made ‘modern industrial society possible’. From a policy studies point of view, 





policy change theories. In fact, it has shown an analytically 'prima facie relevance' to 
policy studies (Szarka 2010: 838)
1
. It represents an essentially complex policy 
subsystem comprising a conflicting confluence of interests, ideas, values, politics and 
technologies. This is reflected in what Thomas Hughes (1983) points to as a 
combination of technology, institution and politics. As such, electricity systems 
‘incorporate not only technical and physical things…, but also utility companies, 
electrical manufacturers and reinforcing institutions such as regulatory agencies and 
laws’. Therefore, different approaches about how such a complex system should be 
governed and what socio-economic role it is expected to play have historically been 
the subject of highly politicised disagreements and policy discussions. Despite that, in 
the post-privatisation context, energy policy generally remained ‘under-represented’ 
in policy literature, due to the predominance of a technocratic and de-politicised 
perception of energy at that period of time (Kuzemko 2011: 17).  
  
In recent years, studying policy changes in the electricity sector has arguably attracted 
a higher level of political involvement and academic interest in Britain, due to several 
reasons. Firstly, as the result of the electrification process, electricity is increasingly 
assumed to form a large part of the UK future energy mix as the ‘dominant source’ 
and the ‘focal point of competition’ (Butler 2013; see figure 23 in Appendix B, the 
Exxon Mobil Energy Outlook to 2040). Consequently, it is expected to play a much 
wider role across the whole economy and it is mentioned as potentially the main 
driver for meeting UK energy targets (DECC 2009b; CCC 2010). Secondly, as an 
early mover, for several decades the UK has inspired the global pattern of 
liberalisation and privatisation in the energy and electricity sector (IEA 2006: 9; 
Henney 2011; Kuzemko 2011: 16). Unsurprisingly, recent developments in electricity 
policy have been widely understood as the reverse signs of the ‘British model’. In 
particular, Electricity Market Reform (EMR), introduced by the DECC in 2011-2012, 
was seen as ‘the biggest transformation to Britain's electricity market since 
privatisation’ (Davey, the then DECC Secretary of State, in Harvey 2012). Such 
substantial shifts and their international implications have become interesting research 






Furthermore, since the early 2000s, the UK Government has shown a high political 
ambition to lead international climate policies and agreements. Such aspiration has led 
to a series of ambitious domestic climate obligations and international renewable 
commitments. This puts the power sector at the centre of political attention and 
academic analysis, given the fact that in all lead scenarios, the role of electricity has 
been thought crucial for meeting those legally binding targets. In addition, the UK 
electricity system has witnessed a period of intense security challenges, due to a 
combination of geopolitical and domestic factors. Security of supply has thus been 
raised as another national priority that the energy and power sector is expected to fully 
consider.  
 
The fifth element in the significance of electricity policy relates to the technological 
characteristics of the UK power industry and infrastructure
2
. Given the central role of 
technological choice in meeting electricity targets (IPCC 2007: 147; IEA 2007: 176; 
DTI 2007: 216; Foxon et al 2008: 1), it is widely understood that Britain needs a ‘far-
reaching technological change’ to fulfil its obligations. It becomes even more of a 
challenging policy change with regards to the legacy of technology-neutral 
policymaking in the UK. Finally, it has always been evident that there is a correlation 
between changes in energy and electricity policy and changes in wider political and 
economic debates. The coinciding of energy liberalisation and overall economic 
strategies for privatisation and marketisation in the 1980s is one clear example. Thus, 
policy analysts might consider any fundamental shift in electricity policy as a mark 
for a paradigmatic shift in broader political and economic governance.  
 
As the most recent emanation of electricity policy, all those dimensions of policy 
significance were arguably represented in EMR. Indeed, EMR was supposed to bring 
about a wide range of policy implications for the electricity system and other related 
policy sectors. It had challenged the predominant market policy paradigm that the UK 
introduced to the world of electricity policy in the 1980s. It was also supposed to 
actualise multiple ambitious and rather diverging sets of policy objectives comprising 
security, emission reduction and affordability. Likewise, it was designed to 





generation towards the low carbon family of technologies. Finally, EMR was 
expected to attract a level of financial investment in the next decade which would 
outweigh investments in almost all other economic sectors (Harvey 2012). 
Surprisingly, there are still some aspirations among UK policymakers that if EMR 
goes well, the UK could potentially continue the legacy of the liberalisation era by 
inspiring a new generation of electricity policymaking across the world (cf. Interview 
47, Former member of DECC ministerial team, Conservative MP, February 2013).  
 
Overall, if there was only one fact to highlight from the overview of UK electricity 
governance since the early 2000s, it would be the changing nature of electricity 
policymaking. Albeit from different viewpoints and for diverse reasons, it has been 
widely acknowledged that the then electricity system was in ‘crisis’ and in an urgent 
‘need of change’ (Kern 2009: 2; Kuzemko 2011: 27). That is exactly where the 
starting position of this thesis originates. Therefore, it begins by addressing specific 
questions about to what extent, why and how the governance of the British electricity 
system has changed over the period of 2000-2012. Based on an empirical analysis of 
this case study, this thesis contributes most directly to the broad literature aiming at 
either characterising or explaining policy shifts undergone in the context of British 
energy and electricity governance (see Helm 2003, 2005, 2007; Mitchell 2008; Scrase 
& MacKerron 2009; Kern & Mitchell 2010; Rutledge 2010; Scrase et al 2010; Szarka 
2010; Kuzemko 2011; Henney 2011; Skea et al 2011; Pearson & Watson 2012; Kern 
et al 2013). Methodologically, new empirical findings come from either the 
application of improved analytical frameworks, or the expansion of the analysis scope 
to cover all components of electricity policy, including technological dimensions, or 
even the extension of the analysis timescale to the end of 2012, when the process of 
EMR was already taking place but has never been analysed in the reviewed literature. 
 
In order to inform those contextual observations, this study then returns to the 
literature of policy change. This is where the thesis suggests a set of conceptual 
contributions to diverse policy frameworks seeking to theorise the characterisation 
and the explanation of policy change. Amongst a wide range of policy theories, this 





Oliver & Pemberton 2004; Kuzemko 2011; Kern et al 2013: 2), the theoretical field of 
Advocacy Coalition Framework (Wieble et al 2009; Nohrstedt & Wieble 2010; 
Wieble et al 2011; Nohrstedt 2011; Albright 2011), and the concept of Negotiated 
Agreement as a path to gradual transformation (Sabatier & Wieble 2007; Nohrstedt 
2008; Mahoney & Thelen 2010; Ingold 2011).  
 
1.3. Outlining the research questions 
To analyse and explain the extent and dynamics of policy shifts in UK electricity 
governance between 2000 and 2012, this thesis has set out to answer three specific 
research questions. They are phrased as simply as possible in order not to bias the 
direction of answers and to remain open to in-depth contextual explanations. The first 
one is substantially a descriptive research question aiming to provide an in-depth 
understanding of what exactly had changed during a period of more than a decade. 
Particularly, it investigates those policy components of the UK electricity policy mix 
representing a form of policy shift, and the degree of change profundity. 
Conceptually, it is built upon a theoretical field dealing with conceptualising and 
defining what different meanings of policy change are and how they relate to each 
other. The literature aims to clearly determine under which circumstances a wholesale 
paradigmatic shift could be identified. The first research question is formulated as 
follows:  
• With particular respect to EMR as the most recent reform in electricity policy, 
how could one characterise and measure changes undergone in the UK 
electricity policy between 2000 and 2012? Did EMR represent a significant 
policy change? If so, what were the extent and aspects of the change? Did it fulfil 
the characteristics of a wholesale paradigmatic shift? 
Following the conceptualisation of what changes occurred from the early 2000s to 
2012, the second research question aims at explaining why and how such significant 
changes emerged. This is an explanatory question seeking to provide an 





policy mix, as identified in response to the first research question. As will be 
discussed later, there is a specific focus on the evolving role of the market policy 
paradigm in UK energy governance, from when it was seen as a complete orthodoxy 
to the period of massive market displacement under EMR. Below is a formulation of 
the second research question this thesis aims to answer: 
• Having conceptualised what changes had occurred, in the previous question, 
we now ask why had those changes emerged? In particular, why did that process 
lead to the formation of EMR in 2011-2012? Which policy dynamics influenced 
its characteristics, and how? How could one explain the process of major shifts in 
the UK electricity policy mix?  
Given the choice of technology at the heart of contemporary electricity policymaking, 
this is where this thesis turns to the last research question. It is another explanatory 
question that is assumed as a subsidiary of the second question. Whilst the previous 
one seeks to broadly explain major shifts in the UK electricity policy, the third 
research question provides an in-depth explanation of alterations in the technological 
dimensions of the electricity policy. Particularly, it focuses on gradual transformations 
in the role of nuclear and renewable technologies in the final low carbon generation 
mix.  
• Given the choice of technology as central to the UK electricity policy debates 
in the early 2010s, why did the role of low carbon generation technologies, i.e. 
nuclear and renewable, alter over the period of the study? Which were the policy 
dynamics and how did they turn the divergent nuclear-renewable balance to a 
convergence and then a deep tension under the EMR policy process? How could 
one explain the gradual transformations in the low carbon electricity technology 
policy? 
Answering these questions may perhaps be inextricably intertwined with conceptual 
discussions about what the policy literature offers to inform contextual explanations 
and to theorise empirical observations. Therefore, this thesis is also expected to draw 





those conceptual implications, the next chapter develops four analytical propositions 
that this thesis is to examine by applying them to the case of UK electricity policy.  
 
1.4. An overview of the thesis structure and contributions 
 
The principal intention behind this thesis is to provide a deeply contextual 
understanding of the UK electricity policy evolution. Therefore, answering the 
empirical research questions is the main factor in structuring the thesis’s chapters. 
They are thus respectively represented in three empirical chapters of which they are 
chapters four, five and six. Although this study is an empirically oriented piece of 
work, the findings are by no means theory-free observations. This fact guides us to the 
importance of theoretical propositions, developed in the next analytical chapter, as the 
second element of the thesis structure. Throughout this thesis, each research question 
is investigated in a separate chapter by applying one, or occasionally two, conceptual 
propositions shedding light on empirical explanations and paving the way for 
theoretical contributions. The final feature that this thesis is structured around is 
different time frames within the whole period of the analysis. While all three 
empirical chapters analyse the years between 2000 and 2012, albeit with different 
research purposes and from diverse analytical lenses, they have been divided 
internally into several sections mainly on the basis of shorter pieces of time 
representing a form of policy change. Besides those three principal chapters, this 
thesis, as usual for all PhD works, also includes four extra chapters discussing 
analytical and methodological issues as well as highlighting introductory and 
concluding points. This structure will be elaborated in more detail below. 
 
The next chapter is devoted to providing a conceptual lens and analytical framework 
for answering each research question. It thus comprises three main sections that 
respectively focus on the three main questions by bridging the gap between empirical 
observations and alternative theoretical explanations. As such, one section theorises 
how to define the changes undergone in the UK electricity policy between 2000 and 





how those changes emerged. The last section discusses the literature of gradual policy 
changes to suggest how one could theoretically explain the shifts in nuclear and 
renewable policies. Through a review of the contemporary policy change literature, 
those sections provide an overview of what current theories offer to address various 
aspects of UK electricity policy evolution represented particularly in Electricity 
Market Reform (EMR). They then problematise the explanatory power of existing 
literature in capturing the complexities of this particular case study. Eventually, 
building upon developing a set of theoretical propositions, the second chapter not only 
facilitates analysing empirical findings and informing contextual explanations, it also 
provides an analytical base for examining new conceptual developments.  
 
The third chapter is another introductory chapter discussing the overall design of the 
thesis and the methodologies this research is built upon. It briefly discusses the 
rationale behind approaching a case study for conducting this research. It then moves 
to determine the choice of case and the unit of analysis in the next section. The source 
of data, methods of data gathering and data analysis are the subjects of further two 
sections of chapter three. Finally, it clarifies the methodological limitations and 
challenges this thesis has encountered. 
 
The fourth chapter is expected to provide an in-depth understanding of the UK 
electricity policy change from the early 2000s to 2012. By applying an improved 
framework developed in the analytical chapter, it shows that, as of 2012, the main 
changing features of UK electricity policy, manifested in EMR as a ‘politically 
determined’ and ‘technology specific’ policy package, still did not represent a 
wholesale paradigmatic shift. This is where the chapter points to analytical 
shortcomings of current literature in tracing shifts in technological features of 
electricity policymaking. As existing frameworks conceptualise, policy change is 
taking place upon a variety of four policy components and governance levels: policy 
paradigm, objectives, institutions and instruments. To cover this analytical gap, 
proposition 1 adds a fifth policy component, so-called technology preference, to the 
framework of characterising policy changes, at least in ‘large-technical’ or ‘techno-






Building upon the findings of the previous chapter in characterising the UK electricity 
policy change from the early 2000s to 2012, chapter five aims to explain overall why 
and how such significant changes occurred. In particular, it focuses on the evolving 
role of the market policy paradigm from when it was seen as a complete orthodoxy to 
a process of gradual displacement that eventually led to paradigm ambivalence in the 
period of EMR. It shows that throughout more than a decade of very complex policy 
process, there has been always a relation between the level and the nature of 
perceived policy failures and the actual policy changes on the ground. The chapter 
points to a widespread recognition of electricity market failure in low carbon 
technology delivery as the main driver of EMR
3
. Theoretically, it moves beyond the 
conventional typology of change drivers in policy literature based on the distinctive 
origin and nature of impetuses. It claims that policy failure is a relative concept to 
previous policy legacies which is imposed by policy salient drivers and is socially and 
politically constructed and strategised by competing advocacy coalitions.  
 
Given the fact that the choice of low carbon technology, largely nuclear and 
renewable, was at the heart of UK electricity policy debate particularly under EMR, 
chapter six investigates how and why the nuclear-renewable balance had gradually 
shifted throughout the period of study, 2000-2012. It shows how already divergent 
nuclear and renewable advocacy coalitions compromised on an agreement as the 
result of an inevitable process of policy negotiation. It then explains how the 
ambiguous and complex design of EMR left the UK electricity policy fraught with 
policy tensions derived from intensive lobbying and contestation. As of 2012, it 
displays a reduction in the political significance of nuclear technology and a form of 
nuclear relapse. The chapter refers this either to the post-Fukushima context with the 
emergence of shale gas or a fall in political support of the Conservative party. Finally, 
it highlights an interrelation between nuclear-renewable reconciliation and a form of 
internal defection of extreme members of both advocacy coalitions. By examining 
proposition 4, it also expands the explanatory power of the ACF-originated concept of 
negotiated agreement. It suggests that compromised policies are often associated with 





claims that those policies are in constant risk of policy retrenchment or even 
reversibility following any contextual shift or new coalitional balance. 
 
The concluding part of this thesis summarises the main empirical findings and 
theoretical contributions of the research. Having deeply analysed the UK electricity 
policy change over a period of more than a decade up to 2012, chapter seven briefly 
reviews answers to the research questions based on empirical findings and rich 
observations. It also clarifies the challenges this case study brings into the literature of 
policy change and, in return, which theoretical contributions it proposes to policy 
scholarship. For this purpose, it returns in more detail to the conceptual framework 
and propositions developed in chapter two. Furthermore, it suggests some analytical 
lines that this research has not tackled but that potentially represent avenues for 
further research. Finally, the chapter closes with an account of some methodological 













2. Chapter Two: Analytical Framework and 




This chapter aims to provide a conceptual lens and analytical framework for further 
empirical chapters. Each further section focuses on the theoretical aspects of one of 
the main research questions. Respectively, section two facilitates answering what 
changes had been undergone in the UK electricity policy between 2000 and 2012, 
whereas a further two sections provide a theoretical platform to explain why and how 
those changes had emerged. Through a review of the contemporary policy change 
literature, they provide an overview of what current theories offer to address various 
aspects of the UK electricity policy evolution, particularly the Electricity Market 
Reform (EMR). They then problematise the explanatory power of existing literature 
in capturing the complexities of this particular case study.  By developing a set of 
theoretical propositions, this chapter finally facilitates the analysis of empirical 
findings and informs contextual explanations as well as examining new conceptual 
developments. As an analytical framework, it is expected, overall, to form a bridge 
between research problems and alternative theoretical solutions (Yin 2003). It should 
thus not only pave the way of a selective process of data collection, by avoiding being 
overwhelmed by a huge amount of irrelevant data, but also needs to provide a 
conceptual base for further analytical generalisations.  
2.1.1. Electricity system as a subject for policy studies  
Electricity is central to modern societies and Britain has for decades led the world of 
energy and electricity policy towards liberalisation and privatisation. Nevertheless, 
recent developments in the UK electricity policy have marked a substantial shift from 





2012) is seen as ‘the biggest transformation to Britain's electricity market since 
privatisation’ and a ‘once-in-a-generation opportunity’ (Davey, the then DECC 
Secretary of State, in Harvey 2012).  This is because EMR is assumed to bring a wide 
range of policy implications for the electricity system and other related sectors: it 
challenges predominant market policy paradigm; it is supposed to actualise multiple 
ambitious policy objectives, i.e. security, emission reduction and affordability; it is 
designed to change the energy technology mix; and it is expected to attract a level of 
investment in the next decade which outweighs investments in almost all other 
economic sectors (Harvey 2012). Consequently, the controversies over EMR have 
transcended the boundaries of conventional policy actors such as civil servants and 
interest groups to a heterogeneous range of players including civil society idealists, 
interest-oriented businesses, political parties and academic scholars.  
Basically, there is a conflicting confluence of interests, ideas, values, politics and 
technological innovations that eventually shapes energy policy rather than each of 
them separately. Therefore, to analyse such a complex and fundamental shift in the 
UK electricity policy as EMR, this study needs an analytical framework that pays 
significant attention to the process of policy change and its interplay with contextual 
factors, technological innovations and ideas. To conclude, regarding the nature of 
research questions, this study links up theoretically with the broad literature of public 
policy process in general and policy change frameworks in particular. 
2.1.2. Policy studies and change frameworks  
 
Nowadays, public policy influences ‘almost all aspects of our lives’ (Cairney 2012: 
22). It has been defined overall as the ‘sum total of government action’
4
. In reality, 
policy is made through a complex process where hundreds of participants interact in 
the context of interdependent political environments with nested institutional 
arrangements, uneven power relations, and uncertain scientific and technical 
information about problems and alternative solutions. Thus, policy studies typically 
try to theorise and inevitably simplify the complexities of policy process, analyse 
policy contents, and explain causally the drivers of policy changes
5
 (Howlett & 






Regarding the characteristics of UK electricity policy recounted before, the shifting 
nature of contemporary policy theories is generally seen as compatible with the 
analytical requirements of this study. Firstly, they reflect a clear departure from a 
scientific perspective to policy analysis, so-called ‘policy optimism’ based on two 
conventional metaphors of ‘comprehensive rationality
6
’ and ‘policy cycles
7
’. Instead, 
the modern literature provides a complex, controversial and highly politicised 
perception of policymaking with the involvement of rationally bounded 
policymakers
8
. Secondly, there is a move away from centralised and government-led 
policymaking towards a diffused form of ‘governance’. Modern policy environments 
assume a much broader participation of heterogeneous policy actors, within and 
outside the government, in an interactive-collective process of policymaking and 
policy change. Such a complex process is characterised by a ‘blurred boundary’ of 
formality
9
 and a form of ‘public-private interdependency’. It has thus switched the 
role of modern states, in Cairney’s (2012: 154) term, from ‘rowing’ towards 
‘steering’
10
. Finally, the ‘technocratic’ (Hajer 1995: 275) understanding of 
policymaking ‘as usual’, based merely on material interests and institutions, is no 
longer inspiring modern policy frameworks
11
. Instead, the ideational explanation of 
public policy puts ideas
12
 at the centre of influencing policy change, albeit in a 




However, there is ‘no single unifying theory applicable to public policy as a whole’ 
(Cairney 2012: 282). In fact, the world of policy is ‘too complex to allow for 
parsimonious and universal explanation’. Policy frameworks differ based on their 
different analytical focal points
14
 and diverse questions they are supposed to answer 
within the complex realm of policy process. Therefore, a specific function that this 
chapter is expected to fulfil is to briefly review the literature of the main policy 
change theories and develop an analytical framework that sheds lights on empirical 








2.1.3. Outline of the chapter 
 
With respect to the trinity of research questions, the next section focuses on the first 
descriptive question about how one could characterise and measure changes in the UK 
electricity policy between 2000 and 2012, particularly the most recent changes 
represented in the case of EMR: Did EMR represent a significant policy change? If 
so, what were the extent and aspects of the change? To facilitate answering this 
question, section two starts with a review of recent developments in policy change 
literature aiming at measuring and characterising policy and governance changes. 
Based on an analysis of early empirical results from the EMR case study and the most 
recent critical developments in the literature, the section then problematises current 
frameworks and points to analytical shortcomings in tracing shifts in technological 
features of electricity policymaking. It continues with developing the first proposition. 
Building upon the incorporation of insights from transition literature into policy 
change studies, this proposition provides a framework that paves the way for a more 
comprehensive understanding of the UK electricity policy change from the early 
2000s to 2012. 
 
To provide a theoretical platform for the conceptualisation of why and how those 
changes had emerged and, in particular, why that process led to the formation of EMR 
in the UK context, the third section reviews the literature of significant policy 
changes. While that literature provides an understanding of the different nature and 
origins of change drivers, it does not say anything about specific parameters 
conditioning the impact of a particular change impetus on public policymaking. To 
cover this theoretical gap, it moves beyond the conventional typology of change 
drivers in policy literature by developing the second proposition. Furthermore, by 
developing the third proposition, this section highlights the role of subsystem context 
and coalitional balance in imposing a particular meaning on as well as framing the 
policy impact of change drivers. 
 
A further section also aims to facilitate answering the third research question about 





carbon technological balance of electricity policy under EMR. In order to theorise 
such incremental policy change, the fourth section is built upon the concept of 
‘negotiated agreement and policy compromise’ (Sabatier & Weible 2007). Inspired by 
recent developments in ‘Institutional Change’ (see Thelen’s works in 2005, 2009), the 
fourth proposition theorises that compromised policies are always ‘vulnerable to shift’ 
following alteration in contextual conditions that policies have rested on. Finally, 
section five reviews and summarises the main theoretical lines that this study is 
founded upon.  
 
2.2. Measuring and characterising policy changes  
 
Policies function as a socio-political institution, once they get fully institutionalised 
(Clegg 2012). They potentially shape institutions, ideas, alliances, and other aspects 
of the policymaking arena (Skocpal 1995 cited in Silberberg 1997: 372). 
Consequently, they then reflect signs of ‘path dependency’, ‘policy feedback’ and 
‘status quo advantage’ and thereby imply inertia and impose the challenge of 
‘changeability’. However, different modes of change in terms of the ‘degree’ 
(continuous or disjuncture); the ‘process’ (gradual or radical); and the ‘type’ (aspects 
and dimensions) are likely to occur in public policies
15
 (Streeck & Thelen 2005: 9; 
Kuzemko 2011: 24). Given that change is seen as an intrinsically ‘diachronic’ and 
‘relative’ concept (Hay 1999: 30), it is analytically difficult and disputable to 
rigorously assess. Nevertheless, there is a literature that seeks to provide an account of 
policy change, its different features and various levels. To provide a theoretical 
framework for dealing with the first descriptive research question as conceptualising 
UK electricity policy changes between 2000 and 2012, particularly EMR, this section 
starts with a literature review of various ‘methods of assessing policy change’ in 
terms of both type and degree
16
. The first concept refers to the characterisation of 
policy change, whereas the latter points to the measurement of its profundity. Having 
critically scrutinised previous works and early case results, this section eventually 





2.2.1. Literature Review: The typology of policy change  
 
Policy change is defined overall as change in the policy aspects of a 'governmental 
program'. Such a broad definition of public policy imposes several ambiguities on the 
way of a precise understanding of policy change17. Therefore, clarifying what public 
policy means and which components it comprises is crucial in characterising change 
typologies. As Cairney (2012: 24) points out, any definition of public policy should 
analytically differentiate between what policymakers say; what they actually do; what 
they do not do; and what consequences their decisions bring about.  
• The Policy Paradigm Theory and change orders 
As the starting point for characterising policy change, the original work of Peter Hall 
(1993: 278) offers a four-layered hierarchical model of policymaking. From his 
viewpoint, a ‘policy mix’ or ‘governance regime’ (Kern & Howlett 2009) consists of 
four distinctive analytical levels called ‘policy components
18
’. They include policy 
settings, policy instruments, policy goals and policy paradigm.  Although the first 
three components had been already mentioned in policy literature, the introduction of 
policy paradigm as the fourth overarching policy component is something new that 
Hall has brought into the field.   
 
Building upon the ‘Kuhnian
19
 image of scientific paradigms’, Hall (1993: 279, 290) 
conceptualises policy paradigm
20
 as an ‘interpretive framework’ of ideas and ‘one 
feature of political discourse’. It not only influences 'numerous levels', from policy 
objectives to policy instruments and relevant settings, but also frames the fundamental 
understanding of policy problems. It shapes the key philosophy behind policymaking; 
frames the ‘very problem’ that needs to be addressed; cognitively ‘filters 
information’; and ‘focuses attention’ on a particular range of solutions. In other 
words, the policy paradigm interpretively ‘circumscribes what is feasible, possible 
and desirable’ (Kern & Mitchell 2010: 6). In reference to the emergence of a pro-
market liberalised paradigm in the UK energy policy since the 1980s, Mitchell (2008: 
2) argues that it functions as a ‘band of iron’ holding together a framework and 





creating a form of academic and political ‘orthodoxy’ over a period of decades
21
 
(Kuzemko 2011: 17).  
 
Having conceptualised multiple levels of policymaking, any policy change could be 
embodied in different forms of alteration in policy components. Respectively, 
depending on how many and which policy components have shifted, policy change 
could eventuate in various degrees of profound consequences.  It is exactly what Hall 
suggests to bridge between the characterisation and the measurement of policy 
change. With respect to the hierarchy of policy components, Hall (1993: 278) simply 
conceptualises different orders of change. ‘The first order change’ implies adjustment 
in the level or setting of current policy instruments, whereas change in policy 
instruments and techniques themselves is labelled as ‘second order change’. Together 
they reflect ‘normal policy making’ and ‘incrementalism’. He then characterises a 
‘third order change22’ entailing a shift in policy goals and their priorities and 
hierarchy. Once all policy components alter simultaneously, there is a status of 
‘radical’ change in the governance system called a ‘paradigmatic shift’. 
  
In addition to Hall's original policy components, a group of scholars have recently 
introduced another dimension to characterise a paradigmatic shift more precisely 
(Kern & Mitchell 2010: 4; Kuzemko 2011; Kern et al 2013: 2). Building upon the 
work of Oliver and Pemberton (2004) and Mitchell (2008), they argue that ‘the 
structure of governance institutions’ also allows or constrain the new policy 
paradigm’s embeddedness: ‘the movement from one policy to another is likely to be 
preceded by significant shifts in the locus of authority over policy’ (Hall 1993: 280). 
In other words, what provides ‘legitimacy and credibility’ for policy paradigm is the 
‘political authority’ it enjoys (Bernstein 2001: 30). Therefore, they offer four
23
 inter-
related policy components and ‘constituent levels of governance’, visualised in figure 
1: ‘1) policy paradigm (interpretive framework of ideas about the subject and how it 
should be governed), 2) policy goals, 3) policy instruments and 4) governance 
institutions’ (Kern et al 2013: 5). Altogether, they constitute a ‘governance system’ or 
a ‘policy mix
24
’. A fully-fledged paradigmatic shift thus could be identified, once a 







Figure 1: The four-layered model of policy mix and governance level 
 
Regardless of such precise characterisation and measurement, the concept of policy 
paradigmatic shift generally implies a ‘clear break’ in previous framework of 
practices, which is rather ‘complex’ to define and ‘difficult to assess’. This is what 
Kuzemko (2011: 14, 18) points out as a common problem in the application of policy 
paradigm literature in policy studies. To some extent, it is also the case for a few 
studies about UK energy governance that have applied the concept of policy paradigm 
and change (Helm 2005; Mitchell 2008; Kern 2010; Kern & Mitchell 2010; Kuzemko 
2011). In his seminal works, Dieter Helm (2005, 2007) has focused mainly on 
objectives and less clearly on policy instruments. From his point of view, 
paradigmatic shift is analogous with an alteration in 'context' and 'ideas' and is 
embodied in new policy 'objectives' and 'instruments' (Helm 2005: 1). Consequently, 
the linkages between energy policy and the wider system of economic governance in 
his work are overlooked. By contrast, the role of an ‘overall socio-economic 
paradigm’ has been acknowledged by the work of Mitchell (2008). She argues that 
neo-liberal ideas have dominated ‘both energy and wider macroeconomic 
policymaking in the UK and beyond’. Subsequently, the four-folded model of policy 
paradigmatic shift, albeit with small changes25, has been applied in a series of recent 
studies of the UK energy policy evolution (Kern & Mitchell 2010; Kuzemko 2011; 
Kern et al 2013).  
 
With regards to other forms of policy change, the contribution of policy paradigm 
literature is still limited to the typology identified initially by Hall’s change orders. 
While there is a tendency in recent policy literature to ‘measure varying degrees of 
change’ which ‘fall outside a paradigmatic shift’ and significant change (Kuzemko 
Policy objectives 










2011: 257), new developments have just acknowledged them vaguely, albeit with 
neither clear definition nor characterisation.    
• The Advocacy Coalition Framework and the minor-major dichotomy  
There is another change typology proposed by the Advocacy Coalition Framework
26
 
(ACF) (Sabatier 1999). To measure different forms of policy changes, it provides 
‘clear-cut dimensions’ through a major-minor dichotomy. This model of measurement 
is characterised in a clear analogy with the ACF’s proposed hierarchy of policy 
beliefs
27
. A minor policy change represents an alteration in just secondary aspects of a 
policy proposal, implying empirical settings and specific designs, whereas shifting the 
policy core aspects of a 'governmental program' forms a major policy change 
(Nohrstedt 2008: 109). As the ACF defines, the policy core aspects refer to a set of 
subsystem-wide features of a policy like the policy objectives and values, main 
challenges, their causes and overall solutions as well as policy proposals. Overall, this 
typology is analytically compatible with other definitions found in the literature (e.g. 
Cortell & Peterson 1999; Rose & Davies 1994; George 1979; Hall 1993; Howlett & 
Ramesh 2003). 
 
What is analytically missing in the ACF policy change typology is the role of the 
deep-normative aspects of policies. Given that such deep-normative features are 
highly embedded and widely cross-sectoral, the ACF conceives them as rather ‘non-
negotiable’ and ‘unchangeable’, particularly through a process of sub-system wide 
policy change. Nonetheless, having compared two analytical concepts, Hall’s 
definition of the policy paradigm fits arguably well with what Sabatier acknowledges 
as ‘deep-normative beliefs28’. 
• The Policy Paradigm theory and the ACF as complementary  
Regardless of epistemological and explanatory differences that exist, the ACF and 
Policy Paradigm theory could synthetically complement each other in characterising 
and measuring policy change. On the one hand, there is an overall compatibility 
between the concepts of policy components and what the ACF refers to as policy 
aspects. On the other hand, while the introduction of paradigmatic shift could cover 





deep-normative policy aspects, the minor-major dichotomy would offer a conceptual 
tool to the Policy Paradigm theory for detecting other, less significant levels of 
change. Governance change, as such, is understood as taking place upon a variety of 
levels and through a set of policy components. Accordingly, this chapter 
conceptualises a hierarchical three-layered change typology, which is well consistent 
with both the Policy Paradigm and the ACF frameworks. Table 1 summarises this 
conceptual relation.  
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2.2.2. The problematisation of policy change literature: Technology is still 
missing  
 
Having applied the synthetic model of change typology on a decade of UK 
electricity policy evolution, it has gradually become apparent that policy-driven 
models, i.e. those derived from merely policy literature, are analytically unable to 
characterise all features of a policy change. Although in early studies, technical 





to other policy components
29
, recent developments have critically pointed out that 
the current model of policy mix does not fully capture actual ‘practices and 
outcomes on the ground’ (Lockwood et al 2013: 12).  Central to this set of policy 
impacts is technological change. In a direct challenge, Kern et al (2013: 20) argue 
that policy paradigm theory has ‘little to say’ about ‘how the energy system 
operates’ and ‘deliver technologies’ and what the ‘characteristics of socio-
technical system’ are. In a similar statement, Bolton and Foxon (2013: 11) 
highlight the central role of technology in analysing ‘contemporary energy 
governance’. 
 
This fact has theoretical roots in a long history of criticising policy studies for 
ignoring ‘socio-materiality’ and ‘physical machinery’ in their analysis (Joerges 
1996: 3-4). By presenting the electricity system as a typical example, Thomas 
Hughes (1983) introduced the concept of ‘large technical systems’ characterised 
by ‘high technology intensity’ and ‘hierarchical complexity’ (Hodbay 1998: 5; 
2005: 1115). From his point of view in such mixed systems of material and non-
material components, ‘technical and social systems are inextricably inter-linked’ 
and ‘societal functions’ are being fulfilled largely through ‘technical objects’ 
(Joerges 1996: 3). In other words, ‘shift in technological base’ is ‘central to’ and 
‘corollary of’ overall electricity system change30 (Winskel 2012: 5; Winskel et al 
2012: 5). The following developments then came to the conclusion that generally 
social science, including policy studies, should take ‘technical rationality’ and 
‘techno-structure’ more seriously into consideration (Joerges 1996: 4-5). 
 
Given the ideological stance of neo-liberal energy paradigm not to ‘pick a winner’ 
and not to decide about ‘technology portfolio’ (Scrace et al 2010: 25), so-called 
‘technology neutrality’, the analytical lack of policy frameworks in detecting the 
technological component of policy mix has arguably been less visible during 
recent decades. Nonetheless recently, with respect to the substantial shift in the 
nature of UK energy policymaking, this problem became increasingly 
challenging. Particularly, the initial findings of the EMR case study demonstrate 





setting’ and ‘institutional reforms’ towards ‘technology specific’ and ‘delivery 
focused’ policymaking. As a former member of DECC ministerial team said: 
 
Well EMR is obviously a big policy change, yes, the main mechanisms is first of all it 
provides for the first time a serious way of encouraging all three of the low carbon electricity 
generating families, so gives us the means to deliver decarbonisation of the power sector... It 
is a technical solution to a policy objective, which at the last election we shared by all three 
major political parties... So EMR is substantially about practicality and delivery, as a vehicle 
for policies it shows change in means and direction of policy delivery…(Interview 46, Former 
member of DECC ministerial team, December 2012) 
 
  
The central role of technology in contemporary electricity policymaking is also 
reflected explicitly in a quotation from an interview with an ex-member of DECC 
ministerial team that ‘the main distinctive factor in the EMR is the structure of 
technology’ (Interview 47, February 2013). This fact is in clear contrast with a 
long period of ‘technology-neutral’ policymaking in the UK liberalised electricity 
system. The following comment from an interviewee illustrates how current 
policy debates are largely centred on competing approaches to technological 
dimensions of electricity policy. 
 
Opinions differ about the mix of technologies, fuels and other measures that should be 
prioritised. The differences of opinion are partly due to technical and economic uncertainties, 
and partly due to social and political preferences of different advocacy groups. (Watson 
2013)  
 
2.2.3. Socio-technical transition as a complement to policy change 
literature 
To bridge the gap between material and non-material components of large 
technical systems, there is a tendency in the policy field to incorporate insights 
from Science and Technology Studies (STS). The main rationale behind this 
synthesis is that STS provides a systematic approach to the electricity system in 
which components including technology or policy ‘are not studied in isolation’ 
(Bolton & Foxon 2013: 3). Such systems consist of both ‘technological system’ 
and ‘policy regime’ (Geels 2004; Kern & Howlett 2009: 392). In other words, 
while there is still, in theory, a ‘little cross-over’ between technology studies and 





wider electricity policy change (Winskel et al 2012: 1, 2, 25). In short, technology 
preference is a ‘central matter’ for contemporary electricity policy31.  
 
As a specific theory, several recent studies suggest that the literature of Socio-
Technical Transition (STT) is supposed to provide a complementary ‘useful 
framework’ in explaining policy change in complex socio-technical systems 
(Bolton & Foxon 2013; Kern et al 2013; Kuzemko 2013). While early versions of 
this theory were highly criticised for a form of ‘de-politicised’ and ‘technocratic’ 
account of technological transformation (Shove & Walker 2007; Smith & Stirling 
2007; Kern & Smith 2008; Meadowcroft 2009, Kern & Howlett 2009; Kern 
2012), recent developments in turn have tried to interconnect the two separate 
analytical worlds of policy and technology studies (Kuzemko 2013; Geels 2013). 
In consistence with Hughes (1983) characterisation of electricity system as a 
‘seamless web’ incorporating a ‘combination of technologies and institutions’, 
STT introduces a socio-technical configuration composed of a ‘heterogeneous 
web of relations’ (Law 2009) amongst technologies, actors, rules, policies and 
fuels (Kern 2010; Pearson et al 2012; Bolton & Foxon 2013). STT aims to provide 
a ‘holistic’ understanding of how policies change and technologies diffuse derived 
from the co-evolution of material and human actors (Lovel 2007: 2500). In figure 
2, Kern (2010) has displayed a typical configuration of the electricity socio-
technical system32.    
 
 






One important consequence of such a complex socio-technical configuration is the 
logic of ‘lock-in’ and ‘path dependency’ (Unruh 2000). It means that once a specific 
combination of technologies and institutions dominates, it tends to favour 
particular technological options and solutions (Watson 2013). In other words, 
socio-technical ‘interdependencies’ like ‘institutional lock-in’, ‘societal 
acceptability’ and technical characteristics constrain the possibility and direction 
of change. As a clear instance, the ‘dominant design’ of the UK electricity system, 
like other mature electricity systems, has a set of specific features like centralised 
fossil-fuel generation, dominated by large-scale technologies and vertically 
integrated utilities33. Unsurprisingly, any new technology that is not fully matched 
with this set of characteristics and institutional arrangements is supposed to be the 
subject of system resistance or adaptation. This path-dependence feature is 
embodied in the design of ‘long-lived electricity infrastructures34’, the portfolio of 
investments, and the configuration of incumbent regime players and actors35. In a 
scenario-building study, Pearson et al (2012) illustrate how different design of the 
socio-technical system and actor configuration could lead to a set of diverse 
technological results and generation mix (See figure 20 in Appendix B ). 
 
To summarise, on the basis of early findings of the EMR case study, it seems that 
the choice of technology in the electricity system is associated with policy 
dimensions about how ‘power supply is organised, designed, structured, operated 
and controlled’ (Wolsink 2012). In other words, the dominant design of the 
electricity socio-technical system36 depends heavily on inherited preferences and 
policy directions in terms of a set of institutional arrangements like the level of 
centrality, scale, structure and generation-mix.   
2.2.4. Proposition 1: technology preference as a policy component 
 
Building upon the incorporation of insights from transition literature into policy 
change studies, this sub-section aims to provide a theoretical framework by 
developing a clear proposition. In order to answer the first descriptive research 





expected to empirically examine the applicability of that framework in more than 
a decade history of the UK electricity policy change.    
 
Arguably, there are some theoretical complementarities between technology 
studies and policy change literature. On the one hand, regarding the nature of the 
electricity system as a ‘large-technical’ and ‘techno-centric’ subsystem, measuring 
and characterising policy change exclusively on the basis of current policy 
frameworks as shown in table 1, results in an analytical shortcoming in taking 
‘socio-materiality’ and technological preference of electricity policies into 
account.  On the other hand, transition literature and Socio-Technical System 
theory have received long-standing criticism in failing to capture well the political 
complexities of the transition process (Shove & Walker 2007; Smith & Stirling 
2007; Kern & Smith 2008; Meadowcroft 2009, Kern & Howlett 2009; Kern 
2012).  
 
Together, the policy change framework and STT could open up an analytical 
possibility of characterising policy changes, more rigorously, in ‘large-technical’ 
and ‘techno-centric’ subsystems such as the electricity system. The main 
argument here, encapsulated in proposition 1, is that without considering shifts in 
the characteristics of socio-technical systems, the full characterisation of policy 
changes is yet analytically incomplete. In fact, this new definition of change 
implies ‘wider transformations’ than just ‘normal policy regimes’ that includes 
socio-technological systems37 as well. Accordingly, table 2 provides a visualised 
summary of an improved framework that this section proposes for both 
characterisation and measurement of change in techno-centric subsystems.   
 
Proposition 1: In ‘techno-centric’ policy subsystems, the characteristics of socio-
technical systems constitute a significant component of policymaking. They should 
be taken as an independent policy component in characterising and measuring 















































2.3. Explaining major policy changes 
 
The process of policy change is characterised by a complex, messy, lengthy and 
evolutionary nature (Kuzemko 2011: 223). Thus, policy change frameworks deal 
conceptually with the question of 'how can we explain periods of relative stability, 
even inertia, which are then succeeded by often dramatic policy change?’ 
(Meijerink 2005: 2) With regards to the complexity of change process, any 
attempt to understand how policies change requires simplifying assumptions and 
buildings clear theories. The challenge is how to simplify, what to emphasise, and 
what to ignore. Thus, as Wison (2000: 255) points out 'the problem of the policy 
change literature is that different studies focus on different dimensions of change 






With respect to the shifting nature of UK electricity policy by late 2012, 
particularly a substantial distance from market policy paradigm in EMR, this 
research aims at explaining why and how those major changes have emerged and 
which policy dynamics have influenced their characteristics. To answer this 
explanatory question, this section relies on the literature of policy change and 
seeks to provide a convincing account of the main change drivers. Then it bridges 
the gap between what is already recounted in the literature and the policy mix 
framework developed earlier in section two. As such, it points to theoretical 
shortcomings that the current literature suffers from and tries to cover them. 
Finally, it will develop a proposition for empirical examination in further chapters.  
2.3.1. Literature review: policy change frameworks and change drivers  
 
For more than two decades, three major ‘reference approaches’ have clearly 
dominated the field of policy change: the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) 
(Sabatier 1987, 1988; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1993), the Punctuated 
Equilibrium theory (PE) (Baumgartner & Jones 1993), and the Multiple Streams 
approach (MS) (Kingdon [1984] 1995). Since all frameworks belong to the 
modern generation of policy theories
38
, they have been proved to offer 'widely 
contrasting and accepted accounts' of policy change. Nevertheless, there is still a 
remarkable criticism that they have been developed separately and without 
sufficient mutual theoretical interaction and cross-boundary synergy (Real-Dato 
2009: 117). There are also other policy process frameworks dealing partially with 
the notion of policy change
39
. Amongst them, the Policy Paradigm theory (Hall 
1993; Campbell 1998; Hay 2001, 2004; Kuzemko 2011) with an exclusive focus 
on paradigmatic shift level has hardly tried to explain policy change. It has been 
largely utilised to measure the level of policy change, as shown in the previous 
section. In terms of explaining the process of change, the Policy Paradigm theory 
primarily addresses why policies are path-dependent, continuous, and cognitively 
resistant to substantial shifts more than instability and change. Therefore, this 






With regards to the application of policy change theories in explaining UK 
electricity policy changes and EMR in particular, none of the theoretical 
frameworks above has been tested precisely in this context. There are a few partial 
applications in a limited time frame, mainly before EMR by 2010. Helm (2005, 
2007) has used a version of policy paradigm; Mitchell (2008) is concerned with 
sustainable energy policy; Kern (2010) has exploited discursive institutionalism in 
innovation policy; Szarka (2010) has focused on wind policy in the Europe 
through the lens of the ACF; and Kuzemko (2011) has developed policy paradigm 
to explain UK overall energy policy change by 2010.  
• The Punctuated Equilibrium Framework 
The Punctuated Equilibrium Framework (PE) seeks to address both policy 
stability and change under one framework through a generalisable 'common 
pattern'. It recognises the existence of 'an institutionalised policy monopoly
40
' as 
the main mechanism behind long-term policy stability. Monopolistic policies 
could remain stable for a long time and 'dampen pressures for change' (Meijerink 
2005: 9)
41
. Once pro-change actors become able to redefine issues, convey a 
'newly fashioned policy image' and find the 'venues' to institutionalise the new 
policy image, a form of significant and non-incremental policy change
42
 is 
brought about (Meijerink 2005: 10). This implies that PE sees policymaking as ‘a 
continual struggle between the forces of balance and equilibrium and the forces of 
destabilisation and contagion’ (Jones & Baumgartner 2012). As is normal for 
almost all policy change frameworks, PE points to external ‘focusing events’ as 
the main driver of such radical change
43
 (Nohrstedt 2008: 9).  
• The Multiple Streams Framework 
The Multiple Stream framework (MS) is built on three rather independent 'streams 
of actors and processes' in problems, policies and politics (Kingdon 1995). Central 
to its explanation for major policy changes is the concept of 'windows of 
opportunity'
44
.  This means that a combination of 'compelling problems', 'available 
solutions' and  'receptive political climate' facilitate the situation of 'fixing subject 
into decision agenda' (Nohrstedt 2008: 10). Windows of opportunity here are also 





entrepreneurs’ through facilitating the coincidence of these three streams 
(Meijerink 2005: 9)
45
.   
• The Advocacy Coalition Framework as a policy change framework 
The ACF is seen as a ‘progressive theory’
46
 and ‘the most widely discussed 
contribution’ to the field of policy studies in the past two decades
47
 (Fischer 2003: 
1). As a broad conceptual framework, the whole idea of the ACF comprises 
multiple theoretical strands and has been quite widely used to shed light on 
diverse aspects of the complex and puzzling process of policymaking
48
. It has also 
borrowed several concepts from other scholarly fields and disciplines
49
 leading to 
its ‘growing complexity’
50
 (Weible et al 2009: 132; Nohrstedt 2011: 481). 
Nonetheless, since inception in the 1980s, the aim of explaining policy change has 
increasingly attracted remarkable attention in ACF scholarship. The most recent 
versions (Sabatier & Weible 2007; Weible et al 2009; Weible et al 2011) have 
encouraged ACF studies 'to intensify efforts to specify the theory of policy 
change'
51
. From a policy change perspective, other fundamental concepts of the 




 and belief systems
54
 are 
conceptual bases for providing a credible explanation of the policy change 
process: ‘as means for that end’ (Weible et al 2011: 355)
55
. As Szarka (2010: 839) 
describes, the ACF is not merely a 'taxonomy for cataloguing species of coalition', 
but a theory proposing causal drivers for coalition formation and policy change. 
This is a framework that provides an explanation for both continuity/stability and 
change/instability simultaneously (Cairney, 2012: 219).  
 
The ACF contribution to the policy change literature rests on answering some 
important questions paving the way of a more concrete understanding of change 
dynamics: How is the policy change within a subsystem conditioned and framed 
by a wider political context and external change drivers? What are the main 
characteristics of the policy subsystem which are important in policy change 
explanation? How do actors, categorised into advocacy coalitions, interpret the 
policy change drivers through their 'belief-driven conceptual lenses' (Nohrstedt & 
Weible 2010: 9)? And, which mechanisms do link drivers to actual policy 












; and negotiated agreement
59
 (Sabatier & Weible 
2007; Weible et al 2009). Amongst them, the impacts of learning and negotiated 
agreement are exclusively limited to minor/incremental policy changes. It directs 
us to the main contribution of the ACF for ‘non-incremental changes’ which is the 
introduction of ‘external-internal dichotomy’. Though for several decades and 
inspired by neo-institutionalism
60
, major policy changes have always been 
conceptualised as occurring ‘external’ to policy subsystem boundaries (Nohrstedt 
& Weible 2010: 19).  
2.3.2. From policy proximity to policy saliency 
 
For a large number of policy studies, the conceptual distinction between external 
and internal change drivers has proved analytically useful (Weible et al 2009; 
Nohrstedt & Weible 2010: 19; Albright 2011: 507). It provides an understanding 
of different origins, either exogenous or endogenous, of change drivers and moves 
beyond the assumption that an external change impetus is the only prerequisite for 
non-incremental policy alteration. But this dichotomy has its analytical limits as 
well
61
. A series of critical studies points out that there are variations in the post-
crisis changes, from wholesale paradigmatic shift to minor policy responses, or 
even no change at all (Boin & ’t Hart 2003; Nice & Gross 2001; Birkland 2006; 
Boin et al. 2009; Nohrstedt 2008). It means even quite similar events could cause 
different policy impacts when they come to different contexts. It shows the fact 
that to stimulate a major policy change, the emergence of an (external/internal) 
event might be ‘crucial’ but it is not necessarily ‘sufficient’ (Cairney 2012: 210).  
Consequently, it is seen then as critical to have more rigorous theories regarding 
the factors conditioning the impact of events on policymaking (Hall & Taylor 
1996; Legro 2000). Particularly, Nohrstedt and Weible (2010: 6) suggest that new 
studies should address how factors like the nature of events and the characteristics 
of subsystems affect final policy outcomes.   
 
In terms of the nature of change drivers, inspired by the ACF’s external-internal 





clarification for those ‘broadly conceptualised’ events
62
.  They introduce the 
concept of ‘policy proximity’ implying the degree that a change driver potentially 
affects existing policy components (Nohrstedt & Weible 2010: 20). This means 
that close proximity will increase the likelihood of a widespread policy change. 
As Boin et al (2009: 98) describe, some events ‘hit at the heart of existing policy 
domains’. Combining the scale of an event with the level of proximity, this 
section suggests the concept of ‘policy saliency’ to clarify better differences in the 
nature of change drivers. It means a ‘policy salient’ impetus is one that not only 
has sufficient magnitude for change, but also enjoys the privilege of policy 
proximity and impact on a wide range of existing policy components. 
2.3.3. Proposition 2: policy failure as an essential driver for a major policy 
change 
 
However, the relationship between policy saliency and final policy change is not 
simply straightforward. Critics point to a ‘phenomenological’ distinction 
(Nohrstedt & Weible 2010: 19) between the origin of events on the one side, and 
what actually causes shift in policies on the other side. In other words, what 
ultimately stimulates shift in existing policies is a series of ‘political processes’ 
and ‘societal reactions’ triggered perhaps by policy salient events rather than 
merely events themselves (Birkland 2006; Cortell & Peterson 1999; Kingdon 
1995). Given that policies are ‘path-dependent’ and display ‘trajectories’, those 
societal processes result from ‘meaningful reactions’ to previous ‘policy legacies’, 
once they adjust to new contexts
63
 (Weir & Skocpol 1983; in Hall 1993). Policy 
literature calls such situations the status of policy failure implying ‘periods of 
disorder’ and 'momentums of breakdown' that question and discredit established 
policies, practices, and institutions and increase receptivity to new ideas (Alink et 
al 2001; Boin et al 2005; Cortell & Peterson 1999; McConnell 2008: 557). In 
other words, a mixture of the ‘accumulation of anomalies’ and the perception of 







Building upon the concept of policy saliency, the main argument here is that there 
is a relationship between the level and type of challenges and anomalies that 
change drivers impose on existing policies on the one hand, and the features of 
final policies on the other hand. Actual changes are framed by the extent that 
existing policy components are ‘de-institutionalised’ and what they are expected 
to reform against. From this perspective, the saliency of change drivers should 
imply the level of disruption they could bring about into existing policy 
arrangements
64
:  The higher the level of policy saliency, the greater the likelihood 
of widespread perceptions and allegations of policy deficiency and failure. As an 
example, it will be elaborated in chapter five that as of 2012, there was a common 
belief that the existing electricity market no longer works and it will meet neither 
ambitious policy targets nor new contextual requirements.  In fact, it seems that 
the ‘accumulation of anomalies’ and the emergence of a broad ‘dissatisfaction 
with policy failures’ (Hall 1993: 280) are crucial prerequisites for any major 
policy change. By developing the proposition 2, this section seeks to bridge the 
gap between policy failure and the policy mix framework developed in section 2. 
 
Proposition 2: The characteristics of ultimate changes relate to the degree and 
the nature of ‘deficiencies’ and ‘failures’ that salient change drivers present to 




2.3.4. Proposition 3: coalitional balance and framing contestations 
 
But policy changes do not occur in a ‘political-administrative vacuum’ and ‘the 
effects of [exogenous/indigenous] shocks cannot be understood in isolation from 
internal subsystem affairs' (Weible et al, 2009: 128). Instead, the level of policy 
failure perception, as the ultimate change impetus, is also affected by the 
characteristics of subsystem context and ‘pre-existing policy conflicts’ and 
debates66. The policy impact of change drivers is thus mediated not only by the 
nature of the change driver, so called policy saliency here, but also through a 
process of ‘strategic social construction’ and ‘contest framing’ by advocacy 





recent developments in the literature argue that change drivers, e.g. crises, are 
neither ‘self-apparent’ nor ‘knowable’ nor even ‘certain’ and ‘unambiguous’ 
(Kern & Mitchell 2010; Kuzemko 2011). Therefore, they are always subject to 
‘interpretation’ (Jones & Baumgartner 2012) by competing coalitions. Whether a 
policy salient event will result in major policy change depends, to some extent, on 
the capability of pro-change coalitions to ‘seize the moment’ by intensifying 
efforts for achieving greater influence (Mintrom and Vergari 1996). They 
strategically exploit the occurrence of an event and employ ‘persuasive tactics’ to 
impose meaning on it in terms of causes, the level of failure, implications and 
policy alternatives
67
 (Boin et al. 2009; Widmaier et al. 2007).  
 
In the absence of a pro-change advocacy coalition, as Nohrstedt and Weible 
(2010: 13) predicted, it seems quite unlikely that any new problem definition or 
credible solution could gain sufficient policy prominence, even notwithstanding 
an intrinsically policy salient change impetus
68
. Given that the perception of 
policy failure is crucial for major policy shifts, a pro-change coalition is assumed 
to frame a widespread contestation and to blame existing policy components as 
the main strategy for policy change
69
. This was evident in the case of the Climate 
Change Act in 2008 when the low carbon advocacy coalition was able to frame an 
accumulative perception of policy failure in meeting both insecurity challenges 
and climate objectives. Consequently, climate policies were conceived as common 
solutions for all energy policy challenges and objectives. Drawn from these 
insights, this research develops the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 3: The level of policy impact of a change impetus is conditioned not 
only by its policy saliency, but also by coalitional balance, in favour of or against 








2.4. Understanding gradual transformations  
 
As discussed earlier, any attempt to understand how policies change requires 
simplifying assumptions and creating clear theories. The challenge is, albeit, how 
to simplify, what to emphasise, and what to ignore. To provide an analytical 
framework for explaining major and non-incremental changes in the UK energy 
policy between 2000 and 2012, the previous section reviewed three ‘major 
reference approaches’: the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) (Sabatier 1987, 
1988; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1993), the Punctuated-Equilibrium theory (PE) 
(Baumgartner & Jones 1993), and the Multiple Streams approach (MS) (Kingdon 
[1984] 1995).  
 
Nevertheless, it became apparent that most policy change theories have focused 
exclusively on explaining discontinuous and significant forms of change. The 
introduction of concepts like ‘Windows of opportunity’ (Kingdon 1984), 
‘Punctuated equilibrium’ (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993), and Paradigmatic shift 
(Hall 1993; Kuzemko 2011) are some examples of such significant changes. 
Arguably, they draw a ‘rather sharp conceptual line between [continuity] and 
discontinuous change’ (Thelen 2009: 474).  Given that they are always driven by 
an ‘external factor’, Nohrstedt and Weible  (2010: 3) think that ‘over-emphasising 
the role of external factors’ (Fischer 2003: 7) in policy change frameworks and the 





However, to address incremental changes evident in the last decade of UK 
electricity policy, such as shifting the technological balance of low carbon 
generation between nuclear and renewable, this study requires an analytical 
framework that could provide an explanation of such ‘gradual transformations’, 
perhaps based on endogenous drivers. Theoretically, there is a tendency in recent 
policy literature to ‘measure varying degrees of change’ which ‘fall outside of 
paradigm shift’ and significant change (Kuzemko 2011: 257). Hall’s Change 





minor-major policy changes are two examples. To explain why diverse forms of 
change occur, the original version of the ACF introduced ‘policy-oriented 
learning’ as an additional driver to external shocks
71
. In recent developments, 
Sabatier and Weible (2007) have conceptualised two other endogenous change 
drivers: ‘internal subsystem shocks’ and ‘negotiated agreements’. In terms of 
internal shocks, as discussed in the previous section, although its conceptual 
distinction from external shocks might be helpful for a clearer explanation of 
‘shocks-policy change linkage’, their overall definitions and impact pathways are 
almost the same (Albright 2011: 506). Instead, that section proposed the concept 
of policy saliency. By contrast, the introduction of the concept of ‘negotiated 
agreement and policy compromise’ is rather new in the field of policy change 
literature. 
2.4.1. Literature review: the concept of negotiated agreement  
 
Building upon previous ACF works on the ‘conditions facilitating cross-coalition 
learning’ (Jenkins-Smith 1990) and 'the alternate dispute resolution literature' 
(Bingham 1986; Carpenter & Kennedy 1988; O’Leary & Bingham 2003), Sabatier 
and Weible (2007: 206-7) have defined negotiated agreement as a policy 
compromise amongst competing coalitions after a long period of ‘deadlock status’ 
that stalls public policymaking. In order to counteract the risk of ‘escalating 
uncontrollable value conflicts’ under the condition of contradictory or mutually 
exclusive demands for policy change, policies could often change through an 
incremental ‘middle-way’ solution (Nohrstedt 2008: 49).  
 
Following the introduction of ‘negotiated agreement’ in 2007, the main ACF 
scholars arranged a review of almost 80 ACF-based studies between 1986 and 
2009. As one of the conclusions, they pointed to the fact that some components of 
the ACF, including negotiated agreement, have yet remained ‘largely unexplored’ 
amongst reviewed applications (Weible et al 2009: 132). Therefore, they 
encouraged further research to examine theoretical propositions relevant to 
overlooked components of the framework, particularly negotiated agreement. 





2011, several ACF intellectuals have highlighted negotiated agreement as a major 
component of the ACF that has remained ‘minimally addressed’ (Weible et al 
2011: 357). Overall, it seems that the concept of negotiated agreement is still 
theoretically under-specified and empirically under-scrutinised. 
2.4.2. The empirical applications of negotiated agreement 
 
Since then, the notion of negotiated agreement has been mentioned in at least two 
ACF-based studies. Nohrstedt (2008: 91), in his analysis of Swedish nuclear 
policy change, pointed to the role of negotiated agreement among the three 
political parties involved. The final compromise on nuclear policy took place 
eventually to avoid ‘another referendum’ as the only way of unfolding ‘policy 
stalemate’ and ‘paralysing debate’ around the timing of the nuclear phase-out. He 
also argued that negotiated agreement and political compromise has a natural 
tendency towards ‘incrementalism’ (Nohrstedt 2008: 49). Generally, to avoid 
escalating uncontrollable and mutually exclusive value conflicts, such as what he 
calls ‘the dichotomous relationship between proponents and opponents of nuclear 
power technology’, it would be ‘less difficult’ for policy coalitions to agree on a 
continuous ‘middle-way solution’ (Nohrstedt 2008: 49). Nevertheless, what 
Nohrstedt has concluded is just another reconfirmation of ‘the importance of 
negotiated agreements as one important path to policy change’ (Nohrstedt 2008: 
91). Despite these contributions, what is still missing is the incorporation of 
negotiated agreement in new theories and the empirical examination of those 
theories, as recommended by Weible et al (2009, 2011).  
 
Another application of this concept was undertaken by Ingold (2011) through 
studying Swiss climate policy. In contrast to Nohrstedt’s work, she has developed 
a clear hypothesis about the role of policy brokers in negotiated agreement. 
 
‘Hypothesis: If coalitions are in a hurting stalemate, policy change is more likely to be the result 






To examine this proposition, Ingold has defined ‘hurting stalemate’ as ‘a situation 
[of escalated conflict] in which neither side can win, but neither side want to back 
down or accept loss either’ (Rubin, Pruitt & Kim 1994). In ‘policy stalemate’, the 
status quo is ‘unacceptable’ any more and ‘no alternative is also available other 
than negotiation’ about a ‘reasonable solution’. In her study, she shows how a 
policy broker ‘abandoned its preferences’ to reach a mixed ‘political compromise’ 
preventing a winner-loser dichotomy (Ingold 2011: 450). The important role of 
the policy broker there was to actively suggest an innovative ‘policy solution’ 
covering a minimum preference of both coalitions.  
 
Beyond the theoretical borders of the ACF, the concept of policy and political 
compromise has also been frequently evident in addressing incremental changes in 
UK energy policy. Steven Bernstein (2001) pointed to a form of ‘liberal-
environmental compromise’ in the early 2000s. What he nominated as a 
compromise was a combination of climate ideas and neo-liberally informed policy 
instruments. At that time, the Labour government became convinced that market-
based policymaking would efficiently deliver climate targets. This fact has also 
been acknowledged by Kuzemko (2011: 155, 235), who describes vague climate 
objectives in the 2003 Energy White Paper as a ‘weak compromise’ from New 
Labour to ‘quell political opposition’ and to ‘defuse climate calls for change’. 
Nevertheless, she argues that this strategy to ‘compromise opposition’ is not 
necessarily stable. It would become increasingly of higher risk, as adopting those 
targets left the UK government open to yet more scrutiny and critique. Similarly, 
Kern (2012a), in his analysis of UK electricity innovation policy, has concluded 
that the narrative of ‘developing low carbon technology’ embodied in the Carbon 
Trust in the early 2000s was partially successful, because it was ‘complementary 
to existing market-based dominant discourse’. In his view, being compromisingly 
‘in-line’ with incumbents could facilitate partial influence but, in turn, would limit 







2.4.3. Compromised policies and vulnerability to shift  
 
Founded on the seminal work on ‘Institutional Change’ by Streeck and Thelen 
(2005), there are some new developments, led by Thelen, that have focused on 
theorising incremental-continuous institutional changes, a so-called ‘gradual 
transformation’. Given the point that ‘policies themselves are institutions
72
’ 
(Skocpol 1995; Silberberg 1997: 372), Thelen’s work has been widely used even 
within policy change literature as well (Kern & Howlett 2009; Clegg 2012). To 
differentiate from the broad literature of neo-institutionalism, she has tried to 
demonstrate how endogenous change drivers could cause incremental-
evolutionary changes alongside exogenous sources of change (Mahoney & Thelen 
2010: 4).  
 
From Thelen’s point of view, policymaking, and more generally ‘institution-
building’, is often, to some extent, a matter of ‘political compromise’ between 
conflicting coalitions behind each policy (Thelen 2009: 491). This argument is 
based on the fact that policies always reflect the ‘coalitional balance’ behind them. 
Given that, she pointed out that in the real policy making arena, there are ‘new 
categories’ beyond the ‘simple dichotomy of winners and losers’ in the process of 
policymaking (Mahoney & Thelen 2010: 14): ‘The losers don’t always go away. 
They may find some ways to occupy or redeploy policies’ (Thelen 2009: 491). 
Therefore, compromised policies do not necessarily reflect the beliefs of any 
particular coalition involved. Instead, they may be ‘unintended consequences’ of 
conflict or the result of ‘ambiguous compromises’ among differentially motivated 
actors and coalitions (Mahoney & Thelen 2010: 8). 
 
Accordingly, to explain a path to incremental policy change, Thelen has focused 
on a set of ‘policy gaps’ between the original design and the actual outcome of 
compromised policies that open up some spaces to ‘different interpretation and 
implementation
73
’ (Mahoney & Thelen 2010: 10). The rationale behind this 
nomination is that those inherited tensions keep compromised policies always 





legacy of internal contestations and resource politics.  In fact, ‘policies create 
politics’ (Skocpol 1995) because they are not ‘power neutral’. They inevitably 
have ‘distributional consequences’ and ‘political implications’. This characteristic 
of compromised policies culminates once they are used to allocate and ‘mobilise’ 
‘highly valued political-economic’ resources and institutions, such as this research 
deals with in the case of energy policy. Furthermore, compromised policies often 
suffer inevitably from ‘conceptual ambiguities’ in their design. These types of 
policy gap would allow competing coalitions to impose their own interpretations 
on vaguely-designed policies.  
 
In sum, Thelen and her colleagues argue that highly negotiated and compromised 
policies are not always ‘self-reinforcing’ and ‘self-perpetuating’. They are 
‘fraught with tensions’ and internal fragmentations. Consequently, they are 
practically often ‘vulnerable to shift’ once their design represents any form of 
policy gaps like ‘political compromises’, ‘contested settlements’ and ‘institutional 
ambiguities’ (Thelen 2009: 477; Mahoney & Thelen 2010: 8). Built on her 
‘political-coalitional theory’, Thelen highlights the role of two dynamics in using 
policy gaps to change policies. Firstly, the emergence of new realities and 
‘contextual shifts’ could simply trigger a process of conceptual re-interpretation 
and practical modification within compromised policies which could potentially 
lead to change in the current design of policies (Mahoney & Thelen 2010: 11). 
Secondly, any likely shift in the ‘balance of power in coalitional base’ behind 
policies could drive change endogenously in some aspects of the original design 
of the policies, either in their forms or functions. However, Thelen’s approach in 
taking agency and coalitions as central to the analysis of policy change is 
consistent with this research’s overall framework inspired largely by the ACF. 
2.4.4. Developing proposition 4 
 
It is noteworthy to remember that this section, alongside the previous section, 
aims to theoretically facilitate answering the overarching research question of 
explaining how and why UK electricity policy has changed since the early 2000s. 





this section has specifically focused on theorising the role of negotiated 
agreements and policy compromises. Building upon a literature review of theories  
for gradual policy change and policy compromise, this section seeks to develop a 
theoretical proposition as a basis for empirical examination and testing. Having 
showed the substantial ‘importance’ of negotiated agreement as a pathway to 
‘gradual-evolutionary’ changes via ‘often mixed policy solutions’ in previous 
studies (Nohrstedt 2008; Ingold 2011), this thesis theorises what happens next, 
once a policy has changed through a mutual compromise. 
 
Proposition 4: Compromised policies often suffer from ‘contested’ arrangement 
and ‘ambiguous’ design which keeps open a space for ‘continuous tension’ and 
‘re-interpretation’. Therefore, they are always ‘vulnerable to shift’ following 
‘contextual change’ or new ‘coalitional balance’.    
 
2.5. Summary and conclusions 
 
As of 2012, the UK electricity policy has witnessed a series of substantial shifts in 
different policy aspects and components. Following several decades of overall 
stability, albeit with gradual alterations, under the dominance of a liberalised and 
marketised electricity system, those changes have recently culminated in a 
distinctive policy package called EMR, proposed by the DECC in 2011 and 2012. 
As is common with almost all types of public policies, EMR has resulted from a 
lengthy, complex and evolutionary process of change and alteration. To analyse 
such convoluted mix of interests, ideas, values, politics and technologies, this 
study needs an analytical framework primarily based on policy studies to shed 
light on those complexities and provide a ground for likely theoretical 
contributions. 
 
With respect to the research questions, section two has aimed at theorising a more 
concrete conseptualisation and definition of the extent and the aspects of changes 





socio-technical shifts, it has moved beyond the disciplinary boundaries of policy 
studies. Inspired by the Transition literature, section two has proposed technology 
preference as the fifth policy component alongside policy paradigm, policy 
institutions, policy objectives and policy instruments.   
 
Section three has been designed to theoretically facilitate an explanation of causes 
and dynamics of major shifts particularly in the role of market policy paradigm in 
all aspects of electricity policy. Building upon analytical foundations of the ACF 
like policy subsystem and advocacy coalitions, this section has tried to illustrate 
why different change drivers, either external or internal shocking events, show 
different levels of policy impacts. By introducing the concept of policy saliency, it 
has suggested that the characteristics of final policy changes are the function of 
not only the magnitude and proximity of a change driver, but also the extent of 
disruption and failure perception that it imposes on existing policy components. 
Furthermore, the contribution of this section reaches further than merely clarifying 
the nature of change drivers. To identify factors conditioning policy impacts of a 
change driver, it offers important additions to social constructivist approaches of 
“framing contests” (Boin et al. 2009; Widmaier et al. 2007). It emphasises the role 
of actor constellations in constructing the widespread perception of deficiency and 
failure by highlighting the notion of coalitional balance of pro-change advocacy 
coalitions.  
 
Finally, section four has moved beyond the traditional metaphor of policy change 
literature in focusing on major policy changes following the emergence of an 
external change driver. In order to explain gradual shifts in the balance of low 
carbon technologies in the UK electricity system, it has aimed to enhance the 
explanatory power of negotiated agreement and policy compromise, introduced by 
recent versions of the ACF (Sabatier & Weible 2007). By incorporating insights 
from Institutional Change theory (Thelen 2009), it has assumed that compromised 







Theoretical analyses of this chapter and developed propositions will be 
respectively examined in further empirical chapters by being applied to the case of 
UK electricity policy between 2000 and 2012. The process of electricity 
policymaking in general and EMR in particular may be too complicated and 
messy to be fully captured and analysed. Given that there is no single universal 
solution for dealing with the world of policy, any likely analytical framework is 
inevitably unable to investigate some particular aspects of such a complex policy 
process. Therefore, this chapter by no means claims that it has provided a 
comprehensive analytical framework explaining all aspects of the studied case. By 
contrast, it is committed to a selective approach, within the scope of a PhD thesis, 
by focusing on certain theoretical strands that on the one hand are supported more 
visibly by empirical evidence, and on the other hand are more likely to contribute 


















This chapter aims at discussing the overall design of the thesis and the 
methodologies this research is built upon. A research design is understood as an 
overall plan bridging between initial questions and drawn conclusions (Yin 2003: 
20). There are various ways of designing research depending on specific 
characteristics of the study like the type of research questions; normative values 
and beliefs of the researchers and their audiences; and, the amount of research that 
has been already conducted in the field (Clegg 2010). This might be seen simply 
as a 'research blueprint' of different research steps like: outlining research 
questions and objectives; designing a research strategy; discussing ontological and 
epistemological issues; developing analytical propositions; selecting data sources 
and the unit of analysis; defining methods of data gathering and discussing how to 
analyse data. Given the research questions and analytical propositions already 
outlined, this chapter addresses how to answer those questions and examine 
correspondent propositions. Throughout the chapter, it also clarifies 
methodological limitations and challenges this thesis has been encountered with. 
 
3.2. Strategising the research as a case study  
 
Given a research strategy as an overall approach of answering research 
questions
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, this thesis relies on the case study strategy to provide a rich contextual 
analysis of the UK electricity policy change between 2000 and 2012. The case 
study design is understood as a useful strategy for a research intending to provide 





contemporary social phenomenon that is indistinctively embedded in the context 
(Yin 2003: 2, 13). This definition fits well with the nature of policy subject this 
thesis aims to deal with and the triple research questions it is expected to answer 
to. Amongst different research strategies and methods acknowledged in the 
literature
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 (Yin 2003: 5; Lijphart 1971; Clegg 2010), the case study is widely 
suggested for specific modes of empirical research dealing with why and how-
type explanatory questions, investigating experimentally uncontrollable social 
phenomena, examining theoretical propositions, using diverse data sources and 
developing ‘analytical generalisation’ instead of statistically generalisable 
theories.  
 
Almost all of these characteristics are, to some extent, represented in the subject 
of this study. This justifies, in fact, why the case study could be an appropriate 
approach for conducting this thesis. Firstly, EMR, as the most recent emanation of 
electricity policy, is a very contemporary and ‘over-complex’ policy package that, 
at the time of analysis and writing in 2012-2013, was still on the process of 
reviewing and modification. Secondly, while this thesis involves a descriptive 
enquiry about what policy changes had identified by 2012, it also deals with two 
further why and how-type research questions requiring deep explanation and rich 
empirical recognition of causes and dynamics of undergone shifts in electricity 
policy. It is noteworthy that perhaps such intrinsically nested and intertwined 
arrangement is too complex to be neatly de-contextualised and become the subject 
of an experimental control. This exactly what makes case study an advantageous 
research strategy when it comes to historical explanation of causal mechanisms in 
a particular context (George & Bennett 2005: 6). Furthermore, previous chapter 
developed a set of analytical propositions based on theoretical literature to inform 
empirical observations. They not only frame the process of data collection and 
analytical stages, but also create a basis for theoretical generalisation (Yin 2003: 
22, 33).    
 
Another feature that supports case study as the choice of research strategy is the 





explored. In addition to 53 semi-structured interviews conducted, this research 
relies on a variety of different data sources including policy document analysis, 
the review of stakeholder responses to policy consultation and a wide range of 
secondary materials. Altogether, they shed light on various aspects of this 
complex subject, albeit in answer to three different research questions, and 
provide a holistic understanding of electricity policy over the period of study. 
Finally, the nature of outlined research questions indicates that this thesis is more 
an empirical piece of the work looking for a detailed analysis of underlying 
contextual dynamics than a theoretical research leading to universal 
generalisation. In other words, the main research objective of this thesis is 
primarily drawing a rich description of and a meaningful ‘real-life’ explanation 
for an intensively changing period of UK electricity policy. This contribution fits 
well with what is so-called differently in the literature as either ‘contingent 
generalisation’ (George & Bennett 2005: 8) or ‘middle-range theory’ (Kern 2010: 
62) or ‘analytical generalisation’ (Yin 2003: 48). It implies that such analysis is 
analytically verified and reliable, but subject to the existence of certain conditional 
elements. This is exactly what Cairney (2012a: 4) argues about the overall 
tendency of policy literature, in general, to provide ‘thick descriptions’ through 
applying case studies rather than suggesting contextless and simplified policy laws 
(Cairney 2012a: 31). Epistemologically, for contingent generalisation, a case 
study requires to also specify ‘bounds of applicability’ of developed theories. It is 
perhaps different from overall ‘generalisability’ that means theoretical findings 
are always fixed and applicable, simply across different social and political 
contexts (Nohrstedt 2008: 18). 
 
To avoid concerns about the validity and robustness of the abstract findings of 
single unified case studies (Yin 2003: 45), this thesis applies a form of multiple-
embedded case study design. By dividing the whole period of analysis into shorter 
time-frames, this research paves the way of 'longitudinal' comparisons between 
different policy stages. As such, to answer the first research question, policy 
changes have been identified in five different time-scales. Altogether, they draw a 





between the year 2000 and 2012. It is similar for chapter five when it comes to 
explain underlying dynamics of those policy changes. This also provides an 
understanding of rather separate, but albeit interrelated and accumulative, 
processes of policy change leading to different modes of electricity policy mix in 
each sub-period of analysis. Therefore, the conclusion about the crucial role of 
policy failure perception in driving policy changes is, in fact, underpinned by such 
internal comparisons and multiple replications rather than generalising based on 
merely an analytically ‘vulnerable’ individual case study. However, even 
multiple-embedded case studies by no means suggest ‘statistical’ generalisations. 
In the case of this thesis in particular, it is neither sufficiently replicable nor 
represent a typical sample of a population to follow the logic of statistical 
generalisation. 
 
3.3. Determining data sources: the choice of the case and 
the unit of analysis  
 
The selection of the case and unit of analysis are, on the one hand, analytically 
interrelated with the nature of the research questions and theoretical propositions, 
and on the other hand, empirically affected by methodological considerations and 
practical restrictions
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 (Yin 2003: 24). As discussed in thesis introduction, this 
research investigates the case of UK energy policy change in a certain period of 
time. The rationale behind this selection is based on ‘strategic sampling’ 
perspective (Pettigrew 1990). It means, instead of simply representing a particular 
category or population, this case displays a high level and strategic characteristics 
of the subject as an ‘extreme’ and a ‘critical’ case for studying policy change (Yin 
2003: 40). It is, to some extent, an extreme case of policy change regarding the 
significance and the scale of undergone shifts away from liberalisation and 
priviatisation of power industry, in which the UK has played the role of an 
international classical model for several decades. Thus, such profound policy 
change potentially brings about a wide range of theoretical and policy 





seen as an extreme subject to be studied in the sense of the scope of change in 
which it represents an alteration in a broad set of  policy components including 
technological dimensions of electricity policy.  
 
It also reflects some features of a critical case study. The British electricity 
governance is a contemporary and complex policy subsystem that is influenced by 
a confluence of interests, ideas, values, politics and technologies. It is reflected in 
the level of technical and political disagreements over policy discussions about 
how power sector should be governed and which socio-economic function it needs 
to fulfill. Different pieces of policy literature (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999: 
125; Szarka 2010: 838) describe energy and electricity issues as 'prima facie 
relevant' to policy change scholarship
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.  Therefore, analysing such complicated 
case study requires covering a wide range of policy theories and concepts. It also 
seems critical for policy studies respecting the crucial role of power sector in the 
whole economy. It increasingly becomes an inextricable part of the modern social 
life and an indispensable driver of economic growth. Consequently, any shift in 
electricity policy could trigger remarkable policy changes in other sectors as well 
and stimulate shifts in the wider framework of macro-economic governance.  
 
Those practical and analytical features, altogether, make the UK electricity policy 
an attractive subject for an academic policy research. It is worth noting here that 
in the beginning of this research, I was thinking about comparing the case of UK 
electricity policy with what is happening in Scottish level. Soon after, due to some 
analytical and practical reasons I moved away from the idea of a comparative case 
study. It was not only because I found the UK-level case as a unique and strategic 
sample, but also with regards to the fact that there was no comparable case of 
Scottish electricity policy. Indeed, this is a particular policy arena that yet has not 
been devolved to Scotland and is ruled centrally from the Whitehall. Though that 
at the time of writing in 2013, Scotland has authority over some other policy 
subjects like economic growth or environmental issues that potentially affect 
energy and electricity policies, albeit indirectly and from different perspectives. 





and multiple-embedded policy package which involves several avenues for 
internal comparisons, as discussed before.  
 
In terms of defining the unit of analysis, this thesis relies on the concept of ‘policy 
subsystem’ introduced by the ACF and applied by a wide range of modern policy 
frameworks. A policy subsystem, as such, is a 'semi-autonomous’ system in which 
'the vast majority of policy making occurs’ within its functional/substantive and 
territorial/geographical boundaries (Sabatier & Weible 2007: 193; Albright 2011: 
486; Nohrstedt 2011: 462; Weible et al 2009: 134).  This is, in fact, an analytical 
construct and artificial partitioning that simplifies the analysis of a wide range of 
heterogeneous policy players within and outside the government. From the ACF 
point of view, a policy subsystem comprises a manageable number of informal 
networks of stakeholders called 'advocacy coalitions' in which they participate in 
an interactive-collective process of policymaking. However, policy subsystems 
are neither 'immutable' to the wider context nor practically independent from other 
policy subsystems. Policymaking, in reality, happens through nested and 
interconnected relations between overlapping policy subsystems.  
 
This thesis, as such, analyses the UK electricity policy subsystem over the time 
period between the early years of 2000s, when new generation of energy and 
climate challenges began to arise and the State came back to energy policy, and 
the end of 2012, when EMR was manifested in the Energy Bill and the last 
interviews for this research were conducted. The minimum period of a decade for 
analysing policy changes is fully endorsed by policy literature (Sabatier & Weible 
2007: 192). It allows examining theories more strategically over a wider context 
of policy evolution and with ‘smoothing out short-term fluctuations’ (Szarka 
2010: 837). However, this timeframe, particularly with respect to the yet ongoing 
process of EMR at the time of writing in 2013, characterises this thesis as a very 
recent and contemporary research.  Consequently, despite some research 
advantages like the availability of data and the accessibility to experts and main 
policy actors, this characteristic has constrained the possibility of a comprehensive 





analyse EMR’s policy implications and practical consequences. For a case study 
research, it would be less challenging to analyse a policy change phenomenon 




In terms of geographical boundaries, this study focuses on UK-wide policies and 
correspondent policy actors involved. Whilst the emergence of different 
‘supranational’ and ‘sub-national’ levels of governance, like respectively the 
European Union and devolved areas, have left Britain with only a ‘blurred 
boundary’ of the sovereignty
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, the specific case of energy and electricity policy 
have still remained under the strategic control of Westminster and Whitehall 
(Helm 2007; McGrown 2009; Kern 2010). However, it by no means reflects the 
characteristics of what is so-called ‘old Westminster’ and ‘majoritarian’ political 
system in energy policy
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 (Lijphart 1999). This is where brings us to a 
‘fundamental ontological question’ about whether or not we could apply policy 
theories originated in different, largely plural, political systems, e.g. the ACF as 
an American theory, in policy context of the UK. In response to this question, 
Cairney (2011) points to the concept of ‘post-parliamentary UK policy style’. As 
such, he argues the real characteristics of UK policymaking
81
 no longer represent 
the ‘majoritarian reputation’ of ‘British political tradition’: ‘the traditional model 
of Cabinet and parliamentary government is a travesty of reality’ (Richardson & 
Jordan 1979: 4). In practice, most of the ‘humdrum’ policy decisions are made 
outside Parliament based on ‘consultative machinery’ of ‘civil servants and 
interested groups association’ rather than merely ‘ministerial and senior civil 
servant involvement’ (Jordan & Cairney 2013: 2, 5). Particularly in energy policy, 
while there is a growing pattern of the State revival in ‘making strategic decisions 
and creating accountability’, the strong legacy of privatisation has substantially 
‘hollowed the State out’ from full executive power over energy industry (Cairney 
2012: 160). It has led to a form of ‘groups-government’ partnership in electricity 
policy that disperses the process of policymaking outside the boundaries of the 
Government, whilst still keeps a certain degree of strategic national authority. 
Such UK-wide electricity policy is evident even for some multinational giants and 






By contrast, the status is rather different when it comes to defining functional 
borders of the UK electricity policy subsystem. This is an extremely ‘nested and 
overlapping’ policy subsystem. Vertically, it is difficult to make a clear-cut 
analytical distinction between electricity and overall energy policy subsystem. In 
particular, they are hardly discernable in the first stages of analysis in the early 
2000s, whereas a form of electricity-specific policymaking becomes clearer 
throughout the late 2000s and the early 2010s. It is the case also horizontally with 
other overlapping policy subsystems like climate, industrial, economic and 
innovation policy (Scrase et al 2010: 3). It means, a large proportion of policy 
actors in power industry are at the same time the policy stakeholders of other 
interrelated subsystems.  
 
To exemplify the wide range of participants involved actively in the process of 
electricity policy making, this section overviews a contemporary sample of 233 
organisations who responded to the DECC call for EMR consultation in 
December 2010 (DECC 2010). The functional diversity and remarkable quantity 
of this sample reflects, albeit to some extent, the breadth and the multiplicity of 
policy actors involved in the process of electricity policymaking
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. It fits well with 
the wider definition of policy subsystem in modern policy literature beyond the 
formal boundaries of governmental departments.  As such, a general typology of 
actors here includes four distinctive organisational bodies: 
 Industrial companies, businesses and trade associations which their 
activities are affected directly or indirectly by EMR
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; 
 Different types of governmental departments and public institutes84;  









Table 3 proposes an overall classification of actors who submitted their responses 





albeit regardless of their diverse policy positions. Perhaps, this is not the only way 
of classification and they could be categorised in substantially different ways. 
Appendix D also displays another list of participants in a similar important policy, 
the BETTA, in the early 2000s. Although the BETTA is not fully comparable with 
EMR, a longitudinal comparison between them could raise some general ideas 
about two different ranges of policy participation. A dramatic increase in the 
number of participants and a more remarkable role of renewable industries and 
environmental NGOs are two important shifts that are evident in EMR 
consultation process.  
 
 
Table 3: A typology of actor involved in the EMR policy process 
 The category of stakeholder The quantity of actors 
1 Industrial companies and trade associations 161 
2 governmental departments and public institutes 20 
3 academia, research institutes and consultancies 25 
4 civil society activists and NGO's 33 
 
 
3.4. The methodology of collecting data from multiple 
sources  
 
The research questions posed in this case study require different methods of data 
collection to draw a comprehensive picture of electricity policy changes and a rich 
explanation of underlying dynamics driving them. The multiplicity of data sources 
not only sheds light on different aspects of such complex process, but also 
triangulates, to some extent, between diverse analyses from different points of 
view. In addition to ‘completeness’ and ‘explanation’, in Bryman’s term (2006), 
as two rationales behind mixed-method strategy, this thesis also uses some sources 
of data like document analysis and secondary literature to develop interview 





recommended strategy in research method literature (Yin 1994; George & Bennett 
2005) for enhancing the reliability and explanatory power of a case study 
research
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. Before outlining the main data sources, it is noteworthy to remember 
that in this thesis, as usual in case study approach, the analytical importance of 
qualitative methods outweighs probable contributions of quantitative sources. This 
characteristic reflects the nature of studying policy change that requires a detailed 
social and political examination of a specific context rather than a statistical 
generalisation of selective samples over a large population. For such complex and 
deep analyses, as Fischer (2003: 108) argues, ‘quantitative methods have to take a 
back seat to qualitative research’. This fact is underpinned by a historical study of 
almost 80 policy research, largely based on the ACF, undertaken by Weible et al 
(2009: 127). It shows that qualitative methods like semi-structured in-depth 
interviews, document analysis and a mixture of them have been used in more than 
two-thirds of all policy studies between 1990 and 2010. 
 
There are five different sources of data that this thesis largely relies on. Firstly, it 
analyses the main policy documents throughout the period of study. They 
includes, but by no means are exclusively limited to, two Energy Reviews in 2002 
(PIU) and 2006 (DTI), two Energy White Papers in 2003 and 2007 (DTI), the 
Climate Change Act in 2008 (HMG), the Low Carbon Transition Plan and the UK 
Renewable Energy Strategy in 2009 (DECC) and finally the Coalition Agreement 
in 2010. Most importantly, this research focuses on a series of EMR policy 
documents published over the period of 2010-2012 by the DECC in which they 
reflect different stages of EMR policy process. They started with EMR 
consultation call in December 2010, the EMR White Paper in July 2011, the 
Technical Update in December 2011, the draft of Energy Bill in May 2012, the 
pre-legislative Parliamentary hearing in July 2012 and finally the Energy Bill 
published in November 2012.   
 
The second source of data is reviewing the literature that have analysed some 
aspects of the UK energy and electricity policy in a part of the research timeframe.  





over the whole period of the study. Particularly, this research has never reviewed 
any academic publication investigating EMR policy process. Nevertheless, there 
are several pieces of literature that this thesis has used to complete the puzzle of 
this research particularly in the beginning stages of the analysis and for the period 
of early 2000s. Amongst them, this section highlights two seminal works of Dieter 
Helm in 2003 and 2005, a book from Catherine Mitchell (2008), a collected 
edition of Scrase and MacKerron (2009), a conference paper of Kern and Mitchell 
presented in IRSPM 2010, a SPRU working paper co-authored by Scrase et al in 
2010, a PhD thesis from Florian Kern (2010) at SPRU, the University of Sussex, a 
historical book of Alex Henney published in 2011, a chapter of co-authored by 
Paul Ekins, Jim Skea and Mark Winskel in Energy 2050 (Skea et al 2011), a PhD 
thesis submitted to the University of Warwick by Caroline Kuzemko in 2011, a 
paper presented in Parliamentary Group for Energy Studies by Pearson and 
Watson in 2012 and a joint paper co-authored by Florian Kern, Caroline Kuzemko 
and Catherine Mitchell published in 2013. 
 
Analysing published comments and responses of different stakeholders to 
electricity policies is the third source of data collection for this research. It means 
I have reviewed a large number of policy advices or working papers that main 
stakeholders have drafted in order to convey their perspective on a particular 
policy. For example, before EMR there was a series of publications from different 
institutions like Ofgem's Project Discovery (2009), the Treasury's Energy Market 
Assessment (2010), the CCC’s Step Change (2009) and the CBI’s Decision Time 
(2010) that paved the policy way towards EMR. The most intensive analysis I 
have done was on 233 stakeholder responses to the DECC call for EMR 
consultation in December 2010. This clarified the position of every stakeholder on 
EMR and gave me an idea about which advocacy coalitions were shaped within 
EMR’s specific policy subsystem. It was not albeit the ending point for analysing 
policy actor’s perspectives. I continued that by reviewing publications from main 
stakeholders reflected in media and newspapers or presented in the list of energy 
research institutions over the period of 2011 and 2012. For that particular purpose, 





KTN weekly newsletters, the monthly newsletters of STRN and SDRN, and IGov 
publications. As such, I was receiving the most important news and recent 
publications in the form of daily, weekly or monthly newsletters.  
 
The fourth specific source of data was the participation in policy seminars and 
conferences that were mainly held in London. It was one of the advantages of 
researching on a contemporary and rather hot topic that left me with this 
opportunity to attend in some very high profile policy events, particularly about 
EMR. By this, I not only was being informed of the most updated stakeholders’ 
perspective on electricity policy issues and particularly EMR, it also became 
possible for me to get in touch with several big names in the field, either from 
senior politicians and policymakers or from main stakeholders’ representatives or 
even high profile energy experts and academics. Practically, those events provided 
an excellent platform for my research to get access to a group of important people 
that otherwise it would be very difficult and time-consuming for me to meet and 
to conduct interviews with. After the approval of my research proposal in August 
2011, I participated in two events in the rest of that year: The InCluESEV 
conference on ‘Energy justice in a changing climate’ in November 2011 and 
subsequently, the Westminster Energy Forum on ‘the UK’s emissions reduction 
strategy’ in December 2011. Unsurprisingly, 2012 was the main year for data 
gathering. Therefore, I attended several high profile events in London. It started 
with the Cornwall Energy event in April called ‘Electricity Market Reform: 
Playing out the Middle Game’. Then continued with two important events from 
the Westminster Energy Forum: ‘the UK’s Renewable Energy Strategy: count 
down to 2020’ in May 2012 and, albeit most importantly, ‘Transforming the UK’s 
electricity market: one year on from the Reform White Paper and the Ofgem 
Review’ in June 12
th
 2012. It culminated with another seminar held in 
Westminster July 2012 called ‘Annual Ministerial Review of UK Energy Policy, 
Regulation & Delivery’. That year was ended by the closing conference of Energy 
Security in Multi-polar World project which was held in the Royal Society in 
December 2012. While I entered the writing stage since the early 2013, I 





process. The first one was a workshop organised by the Exeter IGov on 
‘Theorising Governance Change for a Sustainable Economy’. It took place in 
April at British Library. I also participated in annual conference of Westminster 
Energy Forum on EMR in July 2013. The theme for this year was ‘Delivering 
Electricity Market Reform’. The last event of the year was another Cornwall 
Energy review of EMR process which was held in October under the title of 
‘Electricity Market Reform: Moving towards the End Game’. The detailed 
programs of those events could be found in Appendix C. 
 
Finally, the last but not least original source of data was conducting 53 semi-
structured interviews. There were what exactly put this research at the point and 
revealed what is going behind the scenes of formal policy documents. They were 
largely conducted between November 2011 and December 2012, with a few 
complementary interviews during 2013. I started by interviewing academics and 
energy experts in a more flexible structure. It albeit, by no means, points to a non-
structured method of interviewing. I always was using a list of questions, shown 
in Appendix A. However, I was applying different degrees of openness and 
flexibility in the structure of discussion based on interviewee’s background and 
policy stance. While there was a risk of being biased with particular academic 
points of view, I ultimately came to a contextualised overview of the UK 
electricity policy change by contrasting diverse perspectives. Academic interviews 
also were thought a good starting position for a ‘snowballing sampling’ method
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aiming at identifying the key strategic actors of the process (Tansey 2007: 765). 
The question about other important people whom I need to hear their viewpoints 
was a permanent part of my closing questions. Eventually, I stopped the chain of 
interviews, once I found most of the recommended names are somebody I have 
already interviewed. Though that I tried to prevent from being biased with a list of 
similar position interviewees by asking about somebody who completely oppose 
them as well. Having shaped a background analysis of the subject and a good list 
of interviewees, I moved to the next phase of more structured enquiry by 
interviewing the main policy players from politicians, former and current senior 





policy advisors of the main non-governmental organisations involved in electricity 
policy process and somebody from important think-tanks and influential energy 
research institutes and consultancy sectors. The list of interviewees in Appendix A 
suggests a good portfolio of important people in policy filed including the former 
DECC Secretary of State and Energy Minister, several MPs of DECC Select 
Committee from different political parties and the main civil servants involved in 
the EMR policy process. It also reflects the perspectives of very important figures 
in the history of UK electricity policy, which are analytically very worthwhile. 
Figure 5 in Appendix A shows an overview of the mixture of interviewees in this 
research. Though that all interviews were being recorded, noted, transcribed, 
coded and systematically analysed in conjunction with the findings from other 
research sources.  
 
A challenge I was facing with throughout the interview phase was the need for 
finding multiple interviewees, even within retired civil servants, to accomplish 
one specific aspect of the analysis. In fact, as the result of rapid structural changes 
and the legacy of civil servants’ job rotation, there was a lack of knowledge about 
the history and the background of policies within existing departments. It became 
clear when I was asking some questions about previous policies and the context 
that current policies are resting on. Most of the times, I was being replied by such 
answers that we are new in this department and you need to contact former 
members. Another difficulty referred to a politically conservative nature of British 
civil servants. Those interviews thus were indeed as the least analytically 
productive ones. I characterise most of currently in place civil servants I 
interviewed as somebody who were seen very cautious in answering the questions, 
extremely neutral about policies, and also very concerned about their anonymity 
and probable consequences of their responses. By contrast, I found retired 
policymakers and some academic energy experts as the best interviewees in terms 
of precision and explicitness of their, albeit diverse, perspectives. The status was 
entirely different with politicians and business representatives. It was seen that 
they were primarily trying to justify their political or commercial position by 





societies as I found them, albeit in different levels, in a rather ideologically biased 
and analytically normative stance. Overall, one of the main concerns I had in 
analysing those interviews was about how to re-contextualise what interviewees 
said, based on their diverse background and motives, in order to interpret what 
they exactly think
89
.  Nevertheless, something that surprised me was the good 
level of access to high profile policymakers in the UK. As an overseas PhD 
student, there was no unbearable barrier, perhaps except a longer waiting time, on 
my way for interviewing the Secretary of State or the Energy Minister. It was 
totally different in my previous research experiences outside the UK. The situation 
was rather opposite with interviewing high positions in energy giants, mainly the 
Big Six. It was for me as one of the most time consuming and uncomfortable parts 
of this research. Most of the emails requesting an interview did not get replied and 
few set appointments were suddenly cancelled. Inevitably, I got a practical 
strategy by interviewing some lower level representatives either before or after 
some Westminster events or alternatively over the phone. All interview 
characteristics including the date, the format and the position of respondent are 
also indicated in Appendix A. 
  
One thing that it worth noting here is that all five sources of data does not enjoy a 
similar analytical weight throughout the whole study. In fact, based on the nature 
of research questions and the period of study, they reflect various levels of 
importance and accessibility. For example, there was no secondary literature 
available about the policy process of EMR. Therefore, as analysis proceeds 
towards the period of EMR, the greater analytical weight is attached to the 
original evidences like interview materials. Whereas, the analysis of policy 
changes in the early 2000s, by contrast, is largely based on policy documents and 
some secondary studies.  Likewise, analysing the consultation responses is the 
best method to characterise EMR in chapter four. Unsurprisingly, it does not work 
well for the purpose of explaining underlying dynamics behind the official 
features of those changes. It requires a rich observation that is only embedded in 
personal experiences of main policy players involved. This is something that 





means that throughout the whole thesis, the analytical weights of different units of 
analysis and sources of data have been inevitably evolved.  
 
3.5. Data analysis methods  
 
Having developed a set of correspondent theoretical propositions for each research 
question, they are expected to play the role of an overall strategy in the way of 
analysing empirical evidence. As such, they not only frame the process of data 
collection either by specifying which evidence is required or by preventing from 
being overwhelmed by irrelevant data, they also direct the process of analysis by 
providing alternative answers to the research questions. Without a clear set of 
theoretical propositions, there is always a risk for case studies to end up with 
purely descriptive findings (Kern 2010: 81). From this viewpoint, analysing 
empirical findings would largely mean examining to what extent they support or 
reject theoretical propositions. This definition is practically reflected in both the 
design of interview questions and the coding guideline of interview materials. In 
addition to such deductive part of the research, there are also some rooms for 
inductive elements in this thesis, what is so-called by Yin (2003) as ‘explanation 
building’. In the case of the lack of theoretical explanation for some specific parts 
of empirical findings, this study suggests some lines of conceptual extension for 
existing theories, which ultimately enhance their explanatory power.  
 
In order to analyse the relationship between empirical findings and theoretical 
propositions, this thesis relies on the process tracing method (George & Bennett 
2005). It is defined in the literature as a method ‘to reconstruct a process and 
identify causal mechanisms in a complex phenomenon’ (Kern 2010: 63). It 
investigates, mainly deductively, whether or not empirical findings of the process 
fit well within research hypotheses
90
 (George & Bennett 2005: 7). As such, it is 
highly applicable in a qualitative research aiming at providing contingent analysis 
of the causalities within a complex policy process
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 (Yee 1996: 102; Campbell 





a prima facie relevance to the case study approach (George & Bennett 2005: 6; 
Kern 2010: 65). Particularly, when it comes to explain causal mechanisms behind 
policy changes, it requires drawing a rich understanding of contextual interactions 
between policy players and change drivers. For this purpose, process tracing needs 
to recreate circumstances under which the policy change occurred, based on 
different empirical evidence particularly transcripts of interviews with the main 
policy players. However, as an analytical shortcoming for policy studies, it is 
noteworthy to remember that process tracing method is disadvantageous in 
providing clear policy implications and prescriptive findings (Kern 2010: 83). 
  
Practically, the findings of this research have been drawn from a systematic 
process of recording, transcription, coding and categorisation under theoretical 
themes related to each research question. To ensure compatibility and consistency 
of the analysis, all stages were done manually throughout this thesis and without 
relying on mechanical analysis by any machinery or software. Findings from 
various sources have been then triangulated, compared and contrasted to enhance 
their conceptual reliability and robustness. This analytical journey has eventually 
led to a set of integrated-holistic pictures in response to the research questions 
through a repetitive process of reviewing and adapting empirical findings with 
hypothetical theories.  
 
3.6. Summary and conclusions 
 
Having outlined the research questions and analytical propositions respectively in 
chapters one and two, this chapter aimed to discuss other elements of the research 
design addressing how to answer those questions and examine correspondent 
propositions. It started with the notion of research strategy. Throughout the second 
section, it explained why the multiple-embedded case study approach is a 
reasonable choice for undertaking this thesis. It then described which case is 
selected and why it is analytically important to be studied. Likewise, what the 





functional boundaries. The further section was dedicated to address the 
methodological package has been used in this research to shed lights on different 
angles of the complex case of UK electricity policy. It revealed the analytical 
rationales behind each method including analysing policy documents, reviewing 
secondary literature, investigating stakeholders’ comments and consultation 
responses, participating in high profile policy seminars and conferences and 
conducting 53 semi-structured interviews. Finally, the fifth section displays how 
empirical evidence are analysed and what is the role of process tracing method in 
reconstructing a rich understanding of British electricity policy process and causal 
mechanisms driving shifts in those policies. Overall, throughout five sections, this 
chapter draws a holistic picture of the analytical journey this thesis has 

























4. Chapter Four: Conceptualising UK Electricity 
Policy Change  
 
‘And so the UK energy policy saga continues. …Each step is presented as the answer – 
definitive and final – but behind that rhetoric is the slippery suggestion of another review of 
the policy, which makes everything decidedly temporary’ (Butler 2012) 
 
4.1. Introduction  
 
This chapter aims to provide an understanding of the UK electricity policy change 
from the early 2000s to 2012. By applying the framework developed in the 
analytical chapter for assessing governance changes, it claims that current features 
of the UK electricity policy still do not fulfil all the characteristics of a wholesale 
paradigmatic shift. It is the case notwithstanding the introduction of Electricity 
Market Reform (DECC 2011,12), as a ‘politically determined’ and ‘technology 
specific’ policy ‘transformation’. Theoretically, this chapter problematises current 
policy change literature. The chapter points to analytical shortcomings in tracing 
shifts in technological features of electricity policymaking. By examining the first 
Proposition, this chapter offers a fifth policy component92, so-called technology 
preference, for characterising policy change in such ‘large-technical’ or ‘techno-
centric’ subsystems. By answering the question of what changes have occurred, 
this chapter paves the way for further empirical chapters in explaining why and 
how those changes emerged.   
4.1.1. The problem of assessing the UK electricity policy changes 
 
Our analysis of the UK electricity policy since the early 2000s has revealed a 
continuous process of change which recently culminated in the introduction of 
Electricity Market Reform (DECC 2011, 2012). This chapter aims at providing an 
understanding of the extent and features of changes manifested in EMR. 





the latest stage in what seems likely to remain an inherently unstable process. This 
is reflected in an observation by an experienced energy expert, a board member of 
Energy UK:  
 
...That’s a common perception. I've seen young people in my office that think energy policy 
has always been stable and, it is now rarely going to be changed and it will be like that forever 
or at least for the rest of my working life. No, it blooming well won't. It gets changed pretty 
frequently and at the end of this interview you might conclude that the real question is, ‘I 
wonder how long EMR would actually exist?’ How long will it be before somebody says this 
needs to be revised again? (Interview 27, July 2012) 
 
While many have drawn attention to the continued change in the UK electricity 
policy, there is no common understanding of either the level of ‘profundity’ or the 
‘type’ of those changes. This is reflected in diverse ways of labelling different 
changes. On the one hand, a range of approaches measure the level of changes 
from a ‘profound change’ (Blair in DTI 2003: 3) to a ‘new energy paradigm’ 
(Helm 2005, 2007) and a ‘ground breaking change’ (FoE 2008). Similar accounts 
of far-reaching change have been characterised by the vague term ‘energy 
transition’ (DECC 2009) as well as ‘the biggest transformation’ and ‘once-in-a-
generation fundamental reform’ (Ed Davey in Harvey 2012).  
 
Others have rejected these accounts of a fundamental shift in the UK electricity 
and energy policy. They highlight the existence of a ‘remarkable resistance’ and 
‘bands of iron’ that have ‘locked in’ the UK electricity policy from actual 
transition (Mitchell 2008; Kern 2010; Kern & Mitchell 2010; Kuzemko 2011). 
These arguments are manifested under such statements as ‘still no paradigm shift 
has happened’ (Mitchell 2008; Kern 2010; Kuzemko 2011). Similarly, a group of 
interviewees, mainly from a STS perspective, insist that there is yet ‘no actual 
reform’ and ‘still very little has changed’ (Interviews 2, 4, 6, 7, 8). Consistently, 
Pearson and Watson (2012: 2) point out that, despite several changes, ‘to some 
extent, we have been here before’.  
 
Whether or not changes are measured as significant, there are other types of 
labelling focusing on characterising policy changes. Instead of just measuring the 





viewpoint, the changes in the UK electricity policy could be characterised based 
on a set of analytical features. They range from conventional IPE questions about 
‘state-market’ ideas (Helm 2005; Rutledge & Wright 2011) to debates about 
change in policy objectives and their hierarchy (Mitchell 2008; Helm 2005). 
Similarly, issues like shifts in the socio-economic role of energy (Pearson & 
Watson 2012; Kuzemko 2011) and the alterations in energy technology and 
innovation policies (Kern 2010; Winskel 2012) have also been taken separately 
into consideration.  
 
Indeed, changes in the UK electricity policy have been described in a wide range 
of different and even contrasting ways. Such diversity reveals varying, albeit 
ambiguous, models of change assessment. A common problem in such statements 
is that it is rather unclear what they overtly mean by policy change and what are 
the criteria they have measured policies against. Though, all statements do 
acknowledge that there are some changes in the UK energy and electricity policy, 
what is, albeit, one of the thesis presumptions. Indeed, in the absence of a clear 
definition of policy change, it seems that such conclusions are mainly based on a 




4.1.2. The chapter proposition: technology preference as a policy 
component 
 
To cover this theoretical gap, this chapter examines the first proposition developed 
in the analytical chapter. Building upon the incorporation of insights from 
transition literature into policy change studies, this proposition provides a 
framework facilitating a more comprehensive understanding of the UK electricity 
policy change. Further sections are expected to empirically examine the 
applicability of that framework in more than a decade of history of the UK 
electricity policy change.  It is noteworthy to remember that this chapter is 
primarily to answer the first descriptive research question about how one could 
characterise and measure changes in the UK electricity policy between 2000 and 





of EMR: Is EMR a policy change? If so, what are the extent and aspects of the 
change? The explanation of why and how such changes have come about is the 
subject of other empirical chapters.   
 
As discussed in the analytical chapter, there are some theoretical 
complementarities between technology studies and policy change literature. On 
the one hand, based on the original work of Hall (1993) and the Advocacy 
Coalition Framework (Sabatier, 1999), current policy literature presents a four-
level model of policy components to characterise policy changes. It includes 
policy paradigm, objectives, institutions and instruments. Nevertheless, regarding 
the nature of the electricity system as a ‘large-technical’ and ‘techno-centric’ 
subsystem, current policy frameworks suffer from an analytical shortcoming in 
taking socio-materiality and the technological preference of electricity policies 
into account. This problem is even more challenging with respect to a shift in the 
substance of UK electricity policymaking. In particular, EMR represents a clear 
move from a ‘technology neutral’ electricity policy to a ‘technology specific’ and 
‘delivery focused’ generation of policy.  
 
On the other hand, the Socio-Technical Transition literature (STT) is supposed to 
provide a ‘comprehensive account’ of technology change in complex socio-
technical systems. It points to the logic of ‘lock-in’ and ‘path dependency’ in which 
a combination of socio-technical configurations94 constrains or favours particular 
technological pathways. For the UK electricity system, as an example, such socio-
technical design is widely understood by interviewees as a set of specific features 
like centralised fossil fuel generation, dominated by large-scale technologies, 
designed to be supply oriented and structured around big and vertically integrated 
utilities95. But, in return, STT has received long-standing criticism in failing to 
capture well the political complexities of the transition process.  Its approach has 
been widely contested for a so-called ‘de-politicised’ and ‘technocratic’ account 
of technological transformation (Shove & Walker 2007; Smith & Stirling 2007; 






Together, the policy change framework and STT could open up an analytical 
possibility of characterising policy changes, more rigorously, in ‘large-technical’ 
and ‘techno-centric’ subsystems such as the electricity system. The main 
argument here, encapsulated in proposition 1, is that, without considering shifts in 
the characteristics of socio-technical systems, the full characterisation of policy 
changes is yet analytically incomplete. Accordingly, table 4 provides a visualised 
summary of an improved framework that the analytical chapter proposes for both 
characterisation and measurement of change in techno-centric subsystems.  
 
Proposition 1: In ‘techno-centric’ policy subsystems, the characteristics of socio-
technical systems constitute a significant component of policymaking. They should 
be taken as an independent policy component in characterising and measuring 
policy changes, called here technology preference. 
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4.1.3. The outline of the chapter 
 
To examine this proposition, this chapter applies the new framework of policy 





the case of EMR in a ‘full policy cycle’, section two examines the chapter 
proposition through a historical analysis of policy evolution during the first 
decade of the 21
st
 century.  As a result, that section characterises UK electricity 
governance in the late 2000s as the policy context in which EMR has been shaped 
and against which its profundity ought to be measured. Analysing policy 
documents and reviewing secondary material cross-checked with complementary 
interviews are the main empirical data sources section two rests on. 
 
A further section focuses exclusively on the EMR policy process. Across its sub-
sections it tries to sequentially describe the EMR formal process, briefly explore 
its policy components and mechanisms, and analytically identify its either 
changing or continuous aspects. The third section is largely built on the content 
analysis of almost 250 responses submitted to the DECC consultation call in 
December 2010, working papers and comments published by stakeholders or 
academic intellectuals, and 52 interviews conducted by this research. The process 
tracing method has been partially used to structure the argument overall. At the 
heart of section three’s analytical target
96
 is measuring the degree as well as 
characterising the type of actual changes in the UK electricity policy by 2012. A 
subsequent section discusses the applicability of the chapter's proposition in the 
UK context. Finally, a summary and conclusions for the whole chapter will come 
under section five. 
 
4.2. Background Study: The UK electricity policy change 
(2000-2010) 
 
Policy change is not a single event, but a process over time. Given that policymaking 
is a ‘long-frame’ and ‘strategic’ process, it needs to be analysed in a ‘full policy 
cycle’. This means a wider context of long-term policy evolution and change that 
allows ‘operationalisation of falsifiable hypotheses’ and ‘smoothing out short-
term fluctuations’ (Szarka 2010: 837). The ACF offers a minimum period of ‘a 






Therefore, to contextualise EMR in a time frame when its policy seeds started to 
get planted, and albeit ought to be measured against as well, this section focuses 
on an analysis of almost the last decade of the UK electricity policy97. In order to 
examine Proposition 1, the chapter applies the developed framework shown in 
table 1 and 4 on different stages of the UK electricity policy since the early 2000s. 
It is worth noting that although EMR is an electricity-specific policy package, it is 
analytically difficult to differentiate between electricity policy and wider energy 
policy in the context of the UK. In fact, EMR is a result of a recent shift in policy 
attention towards the power industry as the main driver of broader energy targets. 
Therefore, the unit of analysis for this section is inevitably the overall energy 
policy changes. Perhaps, wherever it is distinctive, the focus of analysis has been 
made on electricity-specific policies.  
4.2.1. De-regulation, privatisation and marketisation (1980s-1990s) 
 
Following the election of the Conservative government in May 1979, as part of a 
wider paradigmatic shift, a new model of energy governance replaced the former 
nationalised-politicised UK energy policy98. Central to this new model of energy 
governance was the idea of a ‘de-emphasised socio-economic role’ for energy
99
 
from a ‘national or strategic’ asset at the heart of modern society to ‘just another 
commodity’. Consequently, in a direct link between energy characterisation and 
governance, the ‘commoditised’ energy was perceived in a way that should be 
governed through a depoliticised-privatised competitive market rather than state 
intervention
100
. In other words, the preference was to rely on market much more 
than on political process. Collectively, the concepts of ‘normalised energy’ and 
‘marketised de-politicisation101’ functioned as a policy paradigm for the pro-
market energy governance model.   
 
Neo-liberal ideas like competition and cost efficiency were deeply embedded in 
UK energy governance insofar as they transcended the ideational level and were 
reflected in policy objectives as well. Consequently, even security and other social 





of marketisation (Mitchell 2002). Respectively, for the UK energy system, a 
competitive market became the main policy objective and then, by far, others.  
 
The process of ‘marketised de-politicisation’ was also reinforced by the 
emergence of an overarching privatisation strategy. After gas privatisation and the 
partially unsuccessful attempt at privatising the nuclear and coal industries during 
the 1980s, the 'non-nuclear' electricity industry became another subject of the 
privatisation process in 1990102. Furthermore, as a result of a ‘technocratic de-
politicisation103’, energy was seen a ‘technical’ subject that needs to be ruled by 
the ‘experts’ instead of ‘politicians’. Therefore, the responsibility of the state in 
energy planning and policy was increasingly conceived as limited to market 
regulation and monitoring104. The pattern of energy ‘deliberative’ de-politicisation 
even constrained public scrutiny and political accountability of the energy system. 
Consequently, in 1992, the Department of Energy was officially abolished. Since 
then for almost 16 years, energy was the responsibility of the DTI, similar to other 
'economic commodities' and ‘traded goods’. In addition, to ensure effective 
competition, Ofgem was ultimately established as an independent regulatory 
body. Altogether, both structural changes, i.e. privatisation and ‘technocratic de-
politicisation’ in Kuzemko’s wording (2011), shifted institutional authority and 
responsibility of the UK energy sector from government to the market and the 
independent regulator.  
 
From an instrumental point of view, boosting the competitive market was the 
common answer of pro-market governance to a diverse set of policy questions 
from security to cost-efficiency.  Accordingly, the first electricity market 
mechanism, called the Wholesale Market ‘Pool’, came into place. Under that 
mechanism, all power should be virtually sold into and bought from the pool. 
However, there were also some marginal economic instruments like ‘blind’ 
energy VAT (DTI 1993) to meet very preliminary sustainability targets.  
 
In terms of socio-technical configuration of the UK electricity system, pro-market 





favoured technology neutrality and ‘blindness’ to any preference for the type of 
fuel source
105
. By the application of the pool market, nuclear stations were 
perceived economically unattractive106 (DTI 1995). Likewise, this process 
coincided with a dramatic decline in the coal industry's competitiveness because 
of a complex set of economic, political and legal reasons107 (Pearson & Watson 
2012: 15). More importantly, the initial fall in the imported gas price and its 
comparably lower investment risk
108
 led to a widespread 'dash for gas' and the 
installation of Combined Cycle Gas Turbines (CCGT). Overall, pro-market 
energy governance shifted the technological balance of the generation mix (See 
figure 18 in Appendix B). Nonetheless, it was kept locked into fossil fuel options 
and other socio-technical characteristics like centralisation, scale and structure109 
remained intact.  
 
In short, as part of a wider macroeconomic ‘revolution’, it is claimed that a fully 
fledged paradigmatic shift in energy governance took place in that period. What 
happened was a set of fundamental shifts at all policymaking levels and 
components, from the ideational level to policy objectives, which then ascended 
respectively to the structure of governance, market-based policy instruments, and 
finally affected the technology mix and socio-technical configuration.  Altogether, 
they made new pro-market ideas deeply institutionalised within the UK energy 
governance. 
4.2.2. The policy re-birth and modest policy implications (the early 2000s) 
 
In 1997, when the Labour party won the election, some changes in the UK 
electricity policy started to emerge. The publication of a series of high profile 
reports, particularly the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution (RCEP 
2000), showed that environmental issues had got more political significance. This 
pattern led to an Energy Review in 2002 (PIU 2002). It upgraded the concern of 
climate change in energy policy with a set of ‘ambitious’ policy 
recommendations. As a conservative response, the DTI published the 2003 Energy 
White Paper, which highly compromised on radical aspects of the PIU report and 





dominant liberalised policy paradigm remained intact. This was similar for 
governance structure as well. The PIU’s recommendations for a new department 
were rejected by the 2003 White Paper. Therefore, no major institutional change 
occurred, except establishing some low carbon technology institutes such as the 
Carbon Trust and the UK Energy Research Centre. 
 
The main important change in that period took place at the policy objective level. 
For the first time, emission reduction and affordability targets were added to the 
mixture of competition and security. However, the practical impact of those new 
targets on other levels of policymaking was constrained due to their imprecise and 
vague wording: ‘… to put ourselves on a path to cut the UK’s carbon dioxide 
emission…’ (DTI 2003: 11). Actually, there remained some ‘wriggle room’ for 
further negotiations and interpretations.   
 
In terms of policy instruments, while the main direction was consistent with 
market-based mechanisms, some new instruments were introduced. Firstly, as a 
result of political criticism of the pool market110, it was replaced by a 'voluntary 
bilateral contracting' design in 2001: the New Electricity Trading Arrangement 
(NETA), which then was extended into the whole UK in 2005 and entitled British 
Electricity Transmission and Trading Arrangement
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 (BETTA). Secondly, in 
continuation of remarkable efforts to bridge economic incentives and climate 
targets, a set of complementary policy instruments emerged. The replacement of 
Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation (NFFO) with the Renewable Obligation (RO) was a 
clear example. Similarly the introduction of the European Emission Trading 
Scheme (EUETS) in 2005 intensified the UK momentum of climate policy. 
Apparently, both RO and EUETS were supposed fully compatible with market 
principles.  
 
With regards to the fifth policy component, despite continuous dominance of 
technology-neutral policymaking, some spaces began to open up. The 2003 White 
Paper drew a prospect of future technology mix. It highlighted the role of 





and emphasised gas as a transition option. Furthermore, by the introduction of RO 
and the ‘re-emergence of the UK energy innovation system’ (Winskel et al 2012: 
7), a form of modest innovation policy started to emerge112. Nonetheless, in 
practice, these changes were still marginal to mainstream fossil fuel generation. In 
terms of other socio-technical dimensions, the UK electricity policy was still 
characterised as centralised, large-scale and structured around big companies. The 
introduction of NETA, in particular, resulted in a 'coupled consolidation' of 'an 
oligopoly' and 'vertical integration' undermining real competition (Henney 2011a: 
338; Henney 2011b: 53).  
 
As such, given the level of institutionalisation, the pro-market energy governance 
showed a high degree of policy resilience and path-dependency. Consequently, 
even in the case of the re-birth of energy policymaking and a potentially 
significant change in policy objectives, they were accompanied neither by new 
instruments nor by change in the machinery of state. Unsurprisingly, the 
technology preference was also affected marginally.   
4.2.3. Re-prioritisation of objectives and the process of contestation (the 
mid 2000s) 
 
Contrary to the complacent presumptions of the 2003 EWP, in the mid 2000s a 
combination of dramatic changes in the domestic and international context of the 
UK energy system raised serious concerns about the 'security of supply'. As will 
be elaborately explained in the next chapter, the pattern of energy ‘securitisation’ 
raised a high level of public expectation for a state role in ensuring access to 
energy as, once more, a national strategic asset. This concern then resulted in a 
plethora of policy documents including the 2006 Energy Review (DTI 2006), the 
report published by Joint Energy Security of Supply (JESS 2006) and eventually a 
new Energy White Paper in 2007 (DTI 2007).  Nonetheless, despite opening up 
some space for questioning the over-reliance on the pro-market policy 
paradigm113, energy security was still understood to be the natural function of a 






For the first time since privatisation, the hierarchy of policy objectives shifted 
fundamentally whereby energy security jumped to the top, even above the 
competitive market. But subsequent changes in policy components remained 
limited mainly because of not blaming pro-market governance. There was a very 
minor institutional-structural shift. Despite the re-politicisation pattern and 
increasing demand for state interference, in practice only some marginal 
capacities were added to the relevant departments and policy debates began to 
broaden out into other voices not previously involved in energy policymaking
114
. 
Similarly, policy instruments remained committed to the market-based 
mechanisms115. Alongside NETA/BETTA, a new version of RO was also 
introduced. 
 
The condition for technological preference was slightly different. As a natural 
response to a geopolitically informed security concern, a clear shift occurred 
towards a more ‘home-grown’ and domestically produced energy portfolio. 
Although this strategy included renewable energy and coal as well, it was a more 
significant change in terms of nuclear energy, compared to the 2003 White 
Paper’s rejection.  The 2007 Energy White Paper's supportive approach was 
complemented by the Nuclear White Paper116 (BERR 2008). Similarly, the UK 
approach to the emerging CCS technology was also encouraged. Such ‘centrally 
planned’ innovation policy is called ‘breakthrough style’ by Winskel et al (2012: 
2). Having characterised both nuclear and CCS technologies as centralised large-
scale supply options, it would be apparent that there was no major change in 
socio-technical preferences towards either decentralisation or disruptive small-
scale technologies. Furthermore, despite growing technology-specific policy 
rhetoric, no supportive policy was officially introduced, nor was the predominant 
market principle of technology neutrality seriously challenged:  'it would be for 
the private sector to fund, develop, and build new nuclear power stations' (DTI 
2007).  
 
Overall, while the energy policy paradigm were deeply ‘re-politicised’ and policy 





boundaries of market-led energy governance. The main changes in that period 
were limited to the process of securitisation and consequent re-politicisation. 
Nonetheless, it is undeniable that such provocative set of anomalies and 
contradictions triggered a process of public contestation of existing framework of 
energy policy and governance. 
4.2.4. Target-setting and institutional reconfiguration (the late 2000s) 
 
With the continuation of the processes of ‘re-politicisation’ and contestation, the 
next chapter will explain how the strategic convergence of re-emerging climate 
movement with security concern formed a growing demand to re-evaluate the 
effectiveness of existing policy design. As a direct result, the dominant liberalised 
policy paradigm was gradually displaced in favour of a more interventionist 
approach117. Eventually, an unprecedented plethora of obligatory policies and 
legislations was brought about including the Climate Change Act (DECC 2008) 
and the ‘European-led’ Renewable Directive (EC 2007). A clear distance from 
liberalisation narrative then became visible in several published policy 
documents118. As an example, the UK Low Carbon Transition Plan (DECC 2009) 
clearly reflected the 'culmination' of an 'interventionist industrial strategy119' 
(Scrase et al 2010: 6; Skea et al 2011: 49). Instead of an entire rejection of the 
market’s workability, the new mixed approach120 questioned the adequacy of 
market paradigm in meeting challenges on such a scale of de-carbonisation 
(Scrase et al 2010: 2). Though, there was also an interpretive shift in the socio-
economic role of energy with the emergence of a mixture of ‘energy-climate 
nexus’ (Kuzemko 2011). Indeed, what had shifted from a normalised commodity 
to a national asset, in the mid 2000s, now was expanded to include climate issues 
as an indispensable part of the energy system. 
 
Arguably, the crystallisation of policy objectives was one out of the two most 
significant changes in that period. Firstly, the 2008 Climate Change Act set a 
legally binding, ambitious emission reduction target. Simultaneously, the 
European Renewable Directive committed the UK energy system to an ‘over-





the energy portfolio121. Collectively, both compulsory measures formed the 
emergence of a ‘climate-renewable’ target, alongside security and affordability, 
albeit less concerning at that time. Indeed, the translation of policy objectives into 
legal obligations gave them a high level of institutionalisation and political 
saliency they never had before122.  
 
Apparently, the second most notable shift happened at the structural level. To 
represent new system boundaries covering two ‘inextricably inter-linked’ areas of 
climate and energy policy at the Cabinet level, the Department of Energy and 
Climate Change (DECC) was established in 2008123.  Similarly, as directed by the 
Climate Change Act, the Committee on Climate Change (CCC) was formed as an 
independent, de-politicised monitoring body that crystallises the long-term de-
carbonisation targets124. Several reviews of Ofgem’s duty also expanded its 
already narrow regulatory responsibilities. In addition, the UK energy innovation 
system was ‘remade’ through the creation of ‘several arms-length agencies’ like 
the Energy Technology Institute and the Technology Strategy Board (Winskel et 
al 2012: 9). Altogether, these institutional changes not only reflected high-level 
political saliency and long-term commitment to energy policy objectives, but also 
they marked a culmination in the process of structural re-politicisation. 
 
Having signed the Renewable Directive and published a new series of policies, 
like the UK Low Carbon Transition Plan (DECC 2009a) and the UK Renewable 
Energy Strategy (DECC 2009b), arguably a major shift in policy discourse started 
to emerge towards a form of technology-specific policymaking. Consequently, 
Winskel (2012: 5-6) points to the construction of ‘a serious interest in 
technological innovation’ and the process of ‘re-energising’ the UK energy 
innovation system as two major changes that occurred. In terms of generation mix, 
for the first time a particular generation option, ‘home grown’ renewable, was 
understood as a dual answer for both climate and security concerns (DECC 2009b: 
10). Nonetheless, this period witnessed a range of minimal instrumental changes, 
from ‘banding’ in RO to introducing small-scale Feed-in-Tariff. In practice, none 





locking into the fossil fuel system. Likewise, despite political temptation towards 
decentralised community-based energy policy due to the process of devolution 
and the discourse of ‘localism’, such ideas did not get enough institutional 
momentum in the context of financial recession and ambitious change 
imperatives. 
 
Overall, from five levels of policymaking constructed in the framework applied 
here, by the late 2000s new policy objectives had been institutionalised and 
governance structure had shifted substantially. There were also some forms of 
change at the policy paradigm and policy instrument level, albeit less significant 
than a ‘clear break from the past’. While the former implied the displacement of 
an ex-paradigm, a greater role for government and a mixed ‘energy-climate 
nexus’, there was no cohesive alternative interpretative framework instead. The 
latter, similarly, altered existing design of RO and added new mechanisms like 
FiT, but just in small-scale technologies, and the dominance of market-based and 
fuel-blind instruments was never practically challenged. More importantly, there 
was very minimal shift in socio-technical preference. In spite of some new 
technology-oriented policy narratives and marginal mechanisms, neither 
generation mix nor system configuration witnessed any significant alteration. It 
means, the then electricity system was still largely technology neutral, heavily 
locked-in unabated fossil fuel centralised supply, and dominated by an 'oligopoly' 
of the Big Six with 'cross-ownership' and a 'vertically integrated' structure. In 
short, that status fell far behind a comprehensive paradigmatic shift that needs to 
be represented in significant alteration an all policy components. Regarding the 
centrality of targets and new structures at the heart of the governance system, I 








4.3. The period of regulatory reform and technology 
delivery (2010 onwards) 
 
Given the significant shift in obligatory policy objectives and governance 
institutions, a new set of practical questions began to arise: So, what’s next? Who 
is responsible for delivery, and how? The level of puzzlement is reflected in the 
following quotation from a member of ECC in Parliament, when he explained the 
rationales behind EMR. 
 
We have arguably the toughest decarbonisation targets in the world, enshrined in law. Is 
that enough? Dieter Helm tells us it is, others tell us it isn’t. I’m sure it’s still a point for 
policy controversy. … But a more important question I think really is: to whom do you 
think it should be given to deliver it? Is it a government obligation? Is it a generator 
obligation? Is it somebody else’s obligation? The bit of the puzzle I've never worked out 
is, it’s great dreaming up the target, but who do you, actually, and how do you would 
make it happen? (Interview 53, June 2013) 
 
In the late 2000s, as will be elaborately discussed in chapter five, the accumulative 
desire for policy change was a signal for an end to a long period of ‘complacency’ 
and ‘over-optimism’ about meeting targets and new challenges through ‘business 
as usual’ with only parsimonious instrument modifications. In fact, a combination 
of escalating challenges, legally binding targets and disappointing results 
collectively shifted UK electricity policymaking beyond high-level policy debates 
of setting targets and restructuring governance departments. Instead, in the early 
2010s, the focus moved towards issues around practicalities and technicalities of 
an on-the-ground delivery. There was a transition from policy rhetoric and ‘energy 
targetism125’ (Newey 2012) to practical reforms and getting hands dirty. 
 
The first practical shift was a turning focus on power generation as the central 
solution to meet overall energy objectives
126
 (CCC 2008; DECC 2009). In 
addition to a near carbon-free with 30% renewable electricity system, growing 
security and affordability concerns also emerged. Consequently, a series of 
warning policy documents and reports during 2009-2010 addressed such 
electricity-related concerns127. Ofgem's Project Discovery128 (2009), the Treasury's 





report were the main instances. More importantly, this pattern eventually led to 
the Coalition Agreement (HMG 2010) which politically endorsed the aim of 
'energy market reform to deliver security of supply and investment in low carbon 
energy'. Though, its detailed suggestions framed almost all policies that came 
afterwards131.  
 
Collectively, albeit from different points of view, such important policy 
documents deeply disputed the adequacy of 'current market arrangements' for 
meeting electricity targets. That market was understood to be incapable either of 
attracting enough investment or of directing investment towards low carbon 
technologies. Thereby, a growing demand emerged for some form of reform in the 
power market. It was the first time since privatisation that the central concerns of 
electricity policy were about how to deliver investment and via which 
technological pathways this should be done.  
 
Electricity Market Reform primarily seeks to meet the above concerns. Therefore, 
the rest of this section aims at providing an analysis of the changing 
characteristics of EMR. The main question here is to what extent and in which 
aspects EMR could be regarded as a major policy change? Has EMR fulfilled the 
requirements of a paradigmatic shift? It is worth noting that the results of this 
section are largely based on the content analysis of stakeholder comments 
submitted in response to the EMR consultation call (DECC 2010) and are cross-
checked with 53 interviews conducted with policymakers, business 
representatives, consultants, civil activists and energy experts who were involved  
in the policy process of EMR. 
4.3.1. The Electricity Market Reform White Paper (2011) and the Energy 
Bill (2012) 
 
In response to the growing recognition that current electricity market design was 
unlikely to meet the government's electricity-specific targets, the DECC launched 
a consultation on Electricity Market Reform (EMR) in December 2010, which 





announcing EMR proposal to the House of Commons on 16
th
 of December 2010, 
the then DECC Secretary of State, Chris Huhne, published an article in The Daily 
Telegraph: “The biggest energy market shake-up in 25 years”. 
 
...Left alone, the current market will not deliver these objectives at the lowest cost...Yet 
private incentives do not capture public objectives...So today the Coalition begins a 
consultation on a reform that would reshape this market more fundamentally than at any time 
since the eighties, when the Lawson reforms were the pioneer of Europe’s deregulation...By 
forging a comprehensive response, our mix of four inter-locking policy instruments should 
provide greater assurance of decarbonisation at the same time as lower bills in the long run... 
Taken together, these reforms can unlock private investment on an unprecedented scale... It is 
time to get off the fossil fuel hook and onto clean, green electricity (Huhne 2010). 
 
Since privatisation in the 1990s, EMR was the third132 and arguably ‘the most 
fundamental’ shift in the design of the UK electricity market. It was basically 
proposed to reassure investors about the profitability of low carbon electricity 
supply investments with maximum de-risking characteristics. The White Paper 
was followed in order by the Technical Update (December 2011), the draft Energy 
Bill (May 2012), the pre-legislative Parliament scrutiny (July 2012), and finally 
the Energy Bill (November 2012) (review all updates in DECC (2012b)).  Since 
EMR is yet, at the time of writing in mid 2013, an ongoing process until 
implementation in 2014, it is still difficult to assess the extent of further likely 
changes. By the end of 2013, technical details will be more elaborated and Royal 
Assent on the Energy Bill is expected
133
. Indeed, it is still ‘too early to judge’ its 
practical consequences. Therefore, what this research means by EMR relies 
mainly on the published documents: the EMR White Paper (DECC 2011) and the 
Energy Bill (DECC 2012a). 
 
While EMR acknowledges the 'diagnosis' of previous documents about the 
inadequacy of existing institutional design, its recommended solution consists of 
an over-complex policy package with a mixed characteristic of radical and 
incremental changes. To characterise policy change under EMR, this section starts 
with an analysis of four new policy instruments, as the most tangible changes 





• The introduction of a new package of policy instruments 
The EMR policy package rests on four pillars of policy instruments introduced to 
either replace or complement major existing mechanisms. Firstly, the Feed-in 
Tariff with Contract for Difference134 (FiT-CfD) was designed to replace RO with 
not only a more interventionist mechanism, but also one more inclusive to nuclear 
and CCS alongside renewable energy. The CfD is arguably 'the main mechanism 
of EMR', whereby a fixed ‘strike price’ is determined for the different low-carbon 
technologies. Then, through a long-term contract, its difference with average 
market price is paid to or charged from the generator. Another central proposal of 
EMR is the Capacity Mechanism (CM). This is a security-specific mechanism 
ensuring an adequate flexible peaking supply135.  The third policy instrument is an 
Emissions Performance Standard (EPS). It functions as a ‘bolstering regulatory 
back-stop instrument proscribing fossil fuel generation, particularly unabated 
coal136’ (Nigel Cornwall 2012; Newbery 2011: 6; Green Peace 2011: 5). Finally, 
the Carbon Price Floor (CPF) has been proposed to complement EUETS which 
has become gradually ‘useless137’ due to the volatility of the price of carbon and 
the ‘lack of European political commitment’ (Newbery 2011: 12). Although the 
2012 Energy Bill has kept the main features intact, it has also proposed a contracts 
counterparty body and a Cap of the Levy Control Framework (LCF). 
• Towards more intervention; a ‘market-government hybrid’ paradigm 
An analysis of consultation responses clearly shows that EMR mechanisms have 
been widely understood as a clear move away from pure market ideas towards a 
more interventionist policymaking. As just one example, the European Federation 
of Energy Traders wrote in its comments (EFET 2011:1) that ‘the package, as a 
whole, marks a decisive and irreversible shift from market outcomes towards 
government sponsored solutions’. Nonetheless, it is yet to represent a complete 
shift in policy paradigm. Indeed, there is neither a wholesale rejection of market 
ideology nor a complete replacement of a cohesive alternative policy paradigm. 
Consequently, a new form of ‘hybrid138’ paradigm between the central governance 






On the one hand, a large proportion of future supply is expected to be driven by 
the CfD and CM which are technically non-market mechanisms139. As a result 
‘these mechanisms lead to a level of state involvement not seen since privatisation 
in 1990' (Exeter EPG 2011: 2), as the CEO of SSE described: 
 
The powers in the Bill effectively give government an unprecedented power to dictate 
almost every aspect, ranging from which generation technologies are built, at what scale, 
where, when, by whom and how much they are paid. This is a remarkable amount of 
intervention, basically amounting to public sector procurement. (Marchant 2013) 
 
Unsurprisingly, most free market economists criticise CfD and CM because they 
fundamentally shift 'competition for customer' to a political 'competition for 
government subsidies' (Platchkov et al 2011: 57). Such level of complain was 
clear when I interviewed several high profile, so-called, Hayekian and marketer 
economists of energy sector. One said ‘it is no longer a competition in the market. 
It is, indeed, a politicised competition for the market’. Another described EMR a 
‘disastrous package’ and a ‘miss-sold’ financial product that ‘obviously does not 
work’ and it is going to ‘fall off the rails at some point. As an instinctive free 
marketeer, I’m certainly uncomfortable with that’ (Interview 13 and 19, 
December 2011). Such critical approaches have been encapsulated in the 
quotation below from the Regulatory Policy Institute (RPI), an important market-
based think-tank.  
 
At home, current policies and proposals have been excoriated by leading economists… 
Abroad, followers of UK policies must be surprised by an approach that seeks to abandon 
policies in which the UK has led the world, in favour of illiberal-central planning of 
investment, which represents 'a big government small society' sort of effect…which will 
marginalise us in Europe and of course and won't be taken up by everybody else… In 
general, I concur with the recent critics of EMR rightly identifying the current trend as 
involving 're-monopolisation of power' and 'wishful thinking' (Regulatory Policy Institute 
2011: 1). 
 
Critics believe that by transferring responsibilities from industry to government, 
EMR rules out market signals substantially (Platchkov et al 2011: 59). Indeed, 
after the application of various measures proposed, it is difficult to envisage ‘how 
much of a market in electricity will be left to be contested in a normal, 
competitive way’. The following quotation from a former civil servant and fellow 






[Under EMR] The cost structure of the industry is going to substantially change. The aim, 
as I understand, is to de-risk upstream generation, low carbon generation but de-risking is 
just another way of saying, taking away pricing signals, taking away market signals. Once 
you’ve done that, the market will be small, it will be easily gamed, it will give very odd 
price signals, you're going to get a structure that really won't work very well. There will 
be a small proportion of the market which is making the price. Since then, what is going 
to be underpinning the whole system is not markets but a set of regulations... it's a sort of 
a house of cards. (Interview 48, July 2012) 
 
On the other hand, no coherent policy paradigm has yet emerged. Indeed, despite 
a clear distance from market orthodoxy, EMR suffers from an ‘absence of a 
distinct ideological direction’. Instead, its current features are more conditioned by 
existing contexts and practicalities and it is still heavily influenced by the legacy 
of the market. Not only does the title of EMR explicitly resonate with Market 
terminology, but the prospect of policy is also shaped by the aspiration of another 
competitive market. As one of the EMR’s architects said during an interview, 
despite significant intervention still required to see new technologies come into 
the market, ‘our long-term aim is to transition to an electricity market where low 
carbon technologies compete on cost and the cheapest win the biggest market 
share. Under EMR the competitive market will remain at the centre of energy 
policy BUT... (Interview 29, EMR senior member at DECC, July 2012). In a 
similar statement, the former member of DECC Ministerial team said:  
 
In essence I would like to say that DECC remains and Government remains very, very 
committed to a market-led approach to energy reform, … You can argue that it is a 
market intervention, yes obviously it is, but it is designed to offset the externalities in 
terms of pollution, alternatively we could ban the use of fossil fuels entirely, but this is a 
rude alternative … I think in general we are not in favour of allowing people to bay other 
people to kill each other, but that would be I suppose an intervention in the market. All 
markets are social contracts in other words... Interview 46, December 2012).  
 
 
Such a new form of ‘interdependency between public and private actors140’ 
provides a new arrangement in which the market should do whatever government 
wants'. As a critic of EMR said, it means the state has ‘fixed the market to get the 
technologies it wants' (Interview 13, Economist at a leading Electricity Policy 
Research Group, November 2011). Thereby he predicted such a mixed framework 
requires 'continuous fixing' through 'fundamentally unstable' subsidies to send 





satisfied with such a hybrid arrangement, almost all thought that ‘it is more about 
persuading market to operate in a certain way in the light of market failure than an 
ideological commitment to regulation’ (Interview 15, Former politician and head 
of an energy institute, December 2011). Accordingly, a former SPAD of PM and 
energy policy commentator called the ‘current complex mixture’ of state-market 
framework a ‘very uncomfortable hybrid’. 
 
Hybridity is, actually, to some extent unavoidable, but we need a clearer intellectual 
framework for electricity system to work properly… What is happening here is that 
private investment is constrained in every detail by a vague mix of regulation, subsidies 
and national political and security concerns… therefore, I would say that current 
electricity policy suffers from a form of drift and indecision (Interview 50, April 2013).  
 
In sum, the hybrid nature of the current policy paradigm not only has eventuated 
in an ideologically inconsistent status, it also has casted a lot of doubts on further 
possible scenarios. Those scenarios range from a temporary hybridisation and 
wholesale ‘reversion’ of market logic, as the UK government wishes for a set of 
market-friendly solutions like auction, to ‘a permanent deviation from the 
liberalised trajectory’ (Keay 2012). Despite the continuing market rhetoric in 
place, a senior policy research fellow at Policy Exchange predicted different 
practical consequences of the ‘new market-government hybrid governance 
model’.  
 
It is not completely stopping the market. It is diminishing the role of market and bringing 
market to the end. It undermines the logic of the market in providing more benefit for 
customers. It is not a neutral shift from one market to another; it is a lessening in the 
functionality of the market, because many of the main decisions are made by government and 
it will lead to a 'frustrating, given-up and less proper' market. If EMR is sustained, it will lead 
to the end of the market. (Interview 17, December 2011) 
 
• Beyond targetism and the ‘trilemma’ of electricity-specific policy objectives 
Despite a politically controversial debate in the process of the 2012 Energy Bill 
(DECC 2012a) and the subsequent amendment proposal for setting a de-
carbonisation target for 2030142, EMR eventually does not indicate any electricity-
specific policy objective143, a fact that reflects an intentional distance from what is 






Setting targets is only a part of policy process. It’s perhaps a good way of challenging and 
inspiring people, I would say, but they can’t work effectively, and, in another word, won’t be 
relevant to policy outcomes unless you know how to meet them... if you set ambitious targets 
without knowing how they can be met and via which policy pathway, that won’t be a 
responsible decision for a Minister to make. It’s, indeed, my difficulty with being trapped into 
a target-setting stage without following further policy steps. (Interview 47, Former member of 
DECC Ministerial team, Conservative MP, February 2013) 
 
In a similar statement, an analyst of energy politics criticised an over-reliance on 
target-setting as the end of the story, particularly in the case of UK de-
carbonisation target. 
 
What we need to understand is that setting a legal target is just the beginning in a process of 
political struggle. In the UK, I think our current problem is not a lack of ambitious targets, but 
we’re facing a post-target policy challenge in which our existing targets, I think, have not yet 
been able to drive a kind of self-perpetuating policy dynamic. Look at the Climate Change Act 
as a clear example. It aimed to guarantee the UK’s low carbon pathway by relying on legal 
means and a very bold piece of law. But it has so far failed, arguably, to energise a political 
process with sufficient momentum to reach a no-return point. (Interview 51, Former 
environmental campaigner and political analyst of energy governance, May 2013) 
 
Nonetheless, EMR is, by no means, a target-free policy package. The overall 
design of EMR seeks to materialise sector-specific translations of legally binding 
energy targets. Firstly, the prospects of near-complete de-carbonisation of the 
electricity supply as well as 30% renewable power have predominantly inspired 
the expectations that EMR is to address.  It is almost the same for new security 
concerns derived from the risk of power blackout and under-investment. As the 
second objective, this implies that EMR is expected to attract almost £110 billion 
in new investments by the next decade. Finally, the growing concern of 
affordability and energy cost in a period of austerity is increasingly gaining 
political momentum as another mainstream policy objective144. Together, these 
three distinctive objectives shape a complex mix of competing objectives that is 
commonly referred to the energy policy ‘trilemma’ (Bolton & Foxon 2013: 2; 
Winskel 2012; Winskel et al 2012; Helm 2012b; Foxon 2013; Boston 2013). The 
interaction and tradeoffs between these multiple policy priorities form a ‘multi-
dimensional energy policy riddle’, in McIlveen and Helm’s (2010) wording, that 
EMR is supposed to address. Consequently, the fact that EMR attempts to 
‘reconcile diverging policy objectives’ has resulted in a ‘convoluted, complex, 





2013). The senior member of EMR at the DECC envisaged in an interview that ‘it 
is our view that Ministers need to make the ultimate trade-offs, because some of 
these trade-offs are quite big between the environment, cost and security of 
supply…’ (Interview 29, July 2012). 
 
Technically, this trilemma is clearly reflected in the level of complexity EMR 
contains. To some extent, three out of four EMR mechanisms are primarily related 
to the de-carbonisation objective: CPF, EPS146 and CfD. The CfD is also the core 
instrument for incentivising low carbon generation. In turn, the Capacity 
Mechanism (CM) is directed towards ensuring supply security. In contrast, EMR 
is still critically scrutinised for the lack of full attention to the affordability 
concern. The introduction of the Levy Control Framework in the Energy Bill 
(DECC, 2012) is seen an attempt to ‘limit the direct financial impact of EMR on 
bills’ (Steward 2013). Also, in 2013, the Government is going to define the scope 
of an exemption for energy intensive industries from the costs of Contracts for 
Difference (BIS-DECC 2013). Overall, the majority of people I interviewed 
thought that the original design of EMR in the 2011 White Paper had prioritised 
‘climate and security objectives over competition and affordability concerns’ 
(Interviews 11, 13, 15, 17, 19, and 24). Though, this balance has changed since 
then, during the long policy process that still continues.  
• Towards a more state-led governance structure  
From an institutional point of view, while EMR does not explicitly impose any 
specific structural change, it clearly underpins the design of the late 2000s. 
Arguably, it would further shift the balance of power from market and 
independent regulator, Ofgem, towards government and the DECC in particular. 
As a senior director in Ofgem described during a lecture in July 2012, ‘EMR was 
likely to fundamentally change the Government’s role in energy generation and 
delivery and the arrangements would place the Government in a quasi-
procurement role’. He felt that the Government’s role in EMR had landed towards 
the more radical end of what had been put forward a few years before in Project 
Discovery and that EMR now is a ‘government-controlled policy’ 
147
. In a similar 






I think the independent role of the regulator is now very much subordinate to DECC, it's there 
to primarily deliver what Government prioritises, and it's required to report every year on how 
it does that. There will be strategy and policy statements issued by the Secretary of State in 
which Ofgem will be required to regulate to try and achieve. (Interview 31, Lawyer at Norton 
Rose, July 2012)  
 
By the introduction of an Institutional Framework (DECC 2012c), EMR declares 
the exact responsibilities of departments involved in which all are expected to be 
accountable to the DECC. More importantly, in the Energy Bill (DECC 2012a), 
EMR introduced a governmental body that is functioning as the contracts’ 
counterparty. Regardless of further technical details, this new structure would 
cause a more direct involvement of state ‘delving into the heart of energy policy’.  
Even within the DECC, setting up ‘dedicated offices’ for the main low carbon 
electricity technologies facilitated explicit government technology strategies and 
policies. What is more, the DECC now has a more active involvement in co-
ordinating centrally diverse technology institutes and energy innovation 
policies148.  
 
Such strategic power of the state is not limited to the DECC’s institutional 
boundaries. There is an increasing pattern of Treasury’s involvement in energy 
policy as well. In addition to Treasury’s control over subsidies and contracts, it 
also represents the political voice of Conservatives in the Coalition energy 
policies: ‘Energy policy decisions are not made in the DECC [exclusively] – they 
are made in the Treasury [as well]’ (Interview149 50, senior energy analyst at 
Financial Times, April 2013). The setting of financial limitations for the Levy Cap 
in the Energy Bill (DECC 2012a) and the introduction of the Gas Generation 
Strategy (HMT 2012) are just two examples of how influential is the role of 
Treasury. As another example, when I participated in an event organised by the 
Westminster Forum about EMR, the absence of a Treasury representative was 
strongly protested by attendees. They believed that every debate about EMR is 
inconclusive unless Treasury is playing an active role. As the former Chair of the 
Energy and Climate Change Committee warned, regarding the growing policy 
tension between the DECC and Treasury, ‘the Treasury could make energy policy 





• Technology-centric policymaking and a resilient socio-technical configuration   
The return of technology-related debates at the heart of UK electricity 
policymaking is seen as a unique feature of EMR. Indeed, EMR represents a 
substantial shift in the nature of UK energy policymaking. It primarily aims at 
articulating technically how to achieve the targets already adopted. This is 
reflected in what a former member of DECC ministerial team said to me: 
 
Well EMR is obviously a big policy change, yes, the main mechanisms is first of all it 
provides for the first time a serious way of encouraging all three of the low carbon electricity 
generating families, so gives us the means to deliver decarbonisation of the power sector. I 
think the fundamentals is exactly as I described to you, there are three low carbon families 
electricity generation, they each has substantial uncertainties, all options have their own 
economic issues and all you doing with CfD for low carbon is you’re providing, first of all an 
offset for the externalities, the adverse externalities which are created by fossil fuel 
production… It is a technical solution to a policy objective, which at the last election we 
shared by all three major political parties, namely the decarbonisation of power sector at the 
least cost, So EMR is substantially about practicality and delivery, as a vehicle for policies it 
shows change in means and direction of policy delivery…(Interview 46, December 2012) 
 
In fact, it is a clear shift ‘beyond target-setting’ and ‘institutional reform’ towards 
‘technology-specific’ and ‘delivery-related’ policymaking. The central role of 
technology in contemporary electricity policymaking is also reflected explicitly in 
a quotation from an interview with the former DECC Energy Minister: 
 
I am rather suspicious about the effectiveness of target-setting tradition in UK energy policy 
without having a clear roadmap for delivering them. Ultimately, meeting targets on the 
ground depends primarily on clarity for each delivery technology, not on making political 
statements with a lofty and wishful ambition which no one knows how and by whom it can be 
delivered… therefore, I think the main distinctive factor in EMR is, I would say, the structure 
of technology. (Interview 47, the former Conservative member of DECC Ministerial team, 
February 2013) 
 
The vital importance of technology preference in EMR was also reflected in most 
of the consultation responses in 2011. Indeed, supporting a particular technology, 
albeit differently depending on the stakeholder’s position, was the central part of 
debates about EMR. It was also central characteristics for the DECC 
empowerment strategy: ‘In essence I accept the point that we need more technical 
skills, since we are really in EMR, absolutely in the transition from policy design 
to implementation and technical delivery’ (Interview 29, EMR senior member at 






This fact is in clear contrast with a long period of ‘technology-neutral’ 
policymaking in the UK liberalised electricity system that resulted in a fossil fuel 
based electricity system. As such, EMR is ‘fundamentally a package to support’ a 
particular low carbon technology mix, i.e. nuclear, renewable and CCS 
(Interviews 8, 43). In contrast, EMR has not been primarily designed in favour of 
fossil fuels. Particularly, it is clearly a ‘death’ to unabated coal, whereas its 
consequences for gas are still controversial. Depending on further settings, there 
are different gas scenarios, from an entire abandonment as 'a base load option151' 
(Oil & Gas UK 2011: 6; BP 2011: 5) to another ‘dash for gas’ due to a so-called 
'hole in legislation' and the design of EPS152 (Confederation of UK Coal Producers 
2011: 3; FoE 2011; Greenpeace 2011; Interviews 17, 25). This concern was hotly 
debated during the Energy Bill process (DECC 2012a). On the one hand, the 
rejection of the 2030 de-carbonisation target made the ‘dash for gas’ scenario 
more likely. It means, in EMR, there is a direct interrelationship between debates 
on de-carbonisation target and which technological pathway to follow. On the 
other hand, the coincident introduction of the Gas Generation Strategy (HMT 
2012) also increased the risk that the UK electricity system is becoming ‘locked 
into’ a new generation of gas infrastructure153. An insider member of DECC 
Technical Expert team made it clear that preventing from another dash for gas was 
part of initial incentives behind EMR: 
 
Separate two different things, the EMR is a mechanism for delivering targets. Yes it is a 
solution to how do you better support technologies which are not commercially viable without 
supporting them. All sorts of things are interconnected. You need investment, if you don’t say 
what kind of investment you want, then it would be gas. Do you want gas, oh, you want some, 
but you don’t want all investment to be gas. So, what you are doing to make sure that it is not 
all gas? If you do not say anything, it would be a dash for gas, we won’t meet our the targets 
(Interview 12, December 2011) 
 
Even amongst low carbon technologies, it is ‘technically unlikely’ to support 
equally ‘every possible option available’. As a member of the Energy and Climate 
Change Select Committee stated in an interview, ‘the Government’s policy is 
based on …the lie that Government is neutral between technologies, as it’s not’ 






[Even] among those who support the government’s decarbonisation targets, opinions differ 
about the mix of technologies, fuels and other measures that should be prioritised. The 
differences of opinion are partly due to technical and economic uncertainties, and partly due to 
social and political preferences of different advocacy groups. (Watson 2013) 
 
Having analysed changes in the setting of CfD as well as some significant 
contextual-political shifts since the beginning of the policy process in 2011, the 
sixth chapter of this research will elaborate how the nuclear-renewable 
technological balance
154
 in EMR has moved from a nuclear victory in the 2011 
White Paper to a rather short-term gain for renewable energy in the 2012 Energy 
Bill. Nonetheless, further changes are yet to come, depending on any revision in 
the current design of the ‘devilishly detailed’ (Steward 2013) CfD proposal. 
 
Apart from a substantial shift in generation mix towards a low carbon technology 
portfolio, EMR is changing less in other socio-technical features of the UK 
electricity system. Firstly, the overall direction in EMR is still in favour of a 
predominant centralised large-scale design155: ‘[We do] not believe that 
decentralised and community energy systems can lead to significant replacement 
of larger-scale infrastructure’ (DECC 2011: 24). This approach is also reflected in 
what Winskel (2012: 6) calls a ‘regime-led innovation policy’ that focuses on 
‘shorter-term deployability, cost reduction, and swifter delivery’ of incumbent-
centralised large-scale technologies rather than on radical/decentralised small-
scale technologies156. Consequently, the current low carbon ‘socio-technical 
regime’ centred on ‘big technologies’ is more likely to get increasingly reinforced. 
EMR’s centralised design has been mentioned in a remarkable number of 
stakeholder comments and interview discussions, mainly from energy experts with 
a technology and STS approach (Interviews 2, 4, 6, 7, 10). As an example, the 
head of external affairs at Good Energy, an energy supplier, said:  
 
We need to change the very DNA of our market through a more decentralised approach. The 
role of distributed energy must be recognised and promoted in the reform package. (Gill 2012) 
 
Furthermore, this move to ‘capital intensive low carbon power generation’ 
continually benefits ‘larger, vertically integrated incumbent energy companies’, 





‘oligopoly’ on more than 95 percent of the market. This concern was reflected in a 
part of stakeholders’ comments in 2011. They had warned about the role of EMR, 
respectively, in an ‘excessive centralisation’ of the system design and the 
marginalisation of ‘smaller players, newcomers, local and community-based 
actors, devolved areas and civil society’ (Exeter EPG 2011: 1; SEG 2011: 1; 
Scottish Government 2011:5; Endesa Ireland 2011: 1; EIUG 2011: 3; FoE 2011: 
1; UKERC 2011: 1; NFLA 2011: 6; Ofgem 2011: 2; Flint 2012; Interviews 18, 
24). This fact relates to the current hybrid nature of EMR that relies on ‘regime 
agency for delivery’. It creates, in Butler’s term (2013b), a ‘revenue certainty’ for 
decades to incumbent investors in low carbon businesses. Unsurprisingly, an 
important actor in such investment-oriented policy is a group of banks and 
financial institutions. As several interviewees from the civil service indicated, the 
position of funding agencies is now more ‘persuasive for’ and ‘influential on’ 
policymakers than at any other time (Interviews 43, 37, 38, DECC and Ofgem 
staffs, July 2012).  
 
Finally, EMR proposals are still geared towards a ‘traditional supply-focused’ 
approach to energy policy and the importance of reducing energy demand has not 
been sufficiently addressed under EMR. Several comments from policy actors 
have criticised EMR for missing this opportunity for demand reduction (WWF 
2011: 1; Exeter EPG 2011: 2-3; Scottish Government 2011: 17; FoE 2011: 1; 
CHPA  2011: 1; Eyre in UKERC 2012). 
 
To sum up, while EMR aims to bring about a fundamental shift in generation 
technologies towards a low carbon mix, regardless of gas controversy, other 
features of socio-technical configuration would remain intact. At the end of the 
day, the UK electricity system is yet characterised as a centralised model, 
dominated by large-scale power plants, focused on the supply side and structured 
by big and vertically integrated utilities. Even regarding the possibility of another 
dash for gas, EMR might still continue with a fossil fuel based generation mix. As 







EMR, you know, does not complement paradigmatic shift in terms of shift in technology and 
let’s say system structure. EMR as I see, in that sense, strengthening the previous centralised 
system… Well, in terms of change in energy centralised system structure and use of 
technologies and also business practices, the current proposal of EMR presents, I would say, 
still a very little signs of policy change… I do not consider EMR a fundamental kind of 
reform. If EMR was to represent an actual reform, it would have been structured primarily 
around the goals of reducing energy demand and, similarly, stimulating technological 
innovation. (Interview 6, January 2013) 
 
Regarding huge investments expected to come in place as a result of EMR, the 
unchangeable nature of the socio-technical system under proposal could 
technically lock the UK electricity system into a large-scale centralised design for 
further decades
157
. This is another reason why the technical design and 
configuration of the power sector in EMR has attracted the attention of several 
spectators. The following quotation is a part of an interview with a long-
experienced energy commentator and the former SPAD of PM: 
 
The policy is damaged by lack of attention to the very rapid process of technical change 
which is reshaping the energy business.  The policy sets a solution which is "static"… My 
difficulty with the EMR plan is that it freezes the system in aspic and, to some extent, 
disables it to be timely adapted with dramatic changes, we’re witnessing, in market and 
new technology. So, in the case of any rapid technical change to what I imagine a smaller, 
nimbler and, possibly, more integrated energy system, the flexibility and adaptability of 
such a system would be highly limited due to being trapped into huge resources invested 
and payments committed… Trapping the UK economy in a centralised gas-dominated 
power system, seems to me very out-fashioned and anachronistic. As somebody else, Mr 
Yeo I think, has said before it likes using “a fax machine in the age of the iPad”. 
(Interview 50, April 2013) 
 
 
4.4. Analysis and discussion  
 
Having reviewed the main features of the UK electricity policy since the early 
2000s in two previous sections, this section seeks to shed light on theoretical 
contributions it make and to draw some lessons from the studied case. Firstly, it 
tries to bridge between these empirical analyses and the adopted analytical lens. 
This part aims at a deductive examination of the chapter proposition and proposed 
framework. In addition, this section will offer some lines of theoretical 
contribution and analytical proposition for further research. This type of 





beyond literature-driven concepts that were hypothesised and encapsulated into 
the chapter proposition.  
4.4.1. Paradigm ambivalence158 and socio-technical lock-in    
 
Having applied the proposed five-layered framework in more than a decade of the 
UK electricity policy evolution, it shows that despite several significant policy 
changes that have taken place, it is still too early to claim a paradigmatic shift in 
the UK electricity system. Over the last 12 years, the orthodoxy of the pro-market 
paradigm has been widely displaced, the socio-economic role of the power sector 
has been dramatically upgraded and expanded, a series of very ambitious targets 
have been crystallised, the governance structure has been substantially re-
configured, a new mix of generation technology is expected to arise and a package 
of policy instruments are proposed to come in place159. Nevertheless, the practical 
way that the electricity system operates and is structured as well as the 
technological outcomes that it is supposed to bring about have not significantly 
shifted yet. There are also a lot of doubts about how significantly they would shift 
by the implementation of EMR.   
 
This research argues that there are at least two main policy components that have 
never shifted enough. Whilst the current design has moved far away from the 
dominance of market ideas, it still suffers from a form of confusing paradigm 
ambivalence. It reflects the status that has been termed differently throughout the 
empirical study as ‘hybrid design’ (Bolton & Foxon 2013), ‘the absence of 
ideology consistency’ (Butler 2013) or ‘inter-paradigm borrowing’ (Hay 2010: 
22). The lack of an integrative-cohesive interpretive framework has led to a 
‘policy mess’ which has widely affected other policy components of the UK 
energy system and governance. In addition, the main criticisms of the EMR 
proposal, such as ‘over-complexity’, ‘uncertainty’ and ‘inconsistency’ of the 
policy package, are arguably direct consequences of such paradigm ambivalence. 






It is a period of fundamental uncertainty. I would say it is similar to the ‘Kotov plan’ in chess, 
if you have heard about it. It is a situation that a chess player does not find a good plan after 
thinking long and hard on a position, and you know, inevitably and under time pressure, the 
player suddenly decides to make a fast move, perhaps often a terrible one which its 
consequences often was not analysed properly. (Interview 52, Former civil servant and energy 
consultant, April 2012) 
 
Therefore, it seems unlikely that the UK electricity system could meet its adopted 
targets, unless a coherent and consistent policy paradigm not only frames, but also 
directs the entire governance system160. Until then, a wholesale paradigmatic shift 
cannot be identified. 
 
The second incompletely changed component is the socio-technical configuration 
of the UK electricity system. EMR aims substantially to shift the technological 
base of the power sector. Having assumed that it could reach the targeted low 
carbon technology mix despite the possibility of another dash for gas, it would not 
be seen as a fundamental shift in the UK electricity socio-technical system. On the 
basis of the current design of EMR, it clearly reflects a centralised perspective 
rather than a decentralised community-based system; large-scale generation 
technologies that are least disruptive; institutions that favour few big regime 
incumbents and limit real competition; and a focus on supply almost regardless of 
the level of demand. In spite of remarkable criticism (see responses to EMR 
Consultation by Exeter EPG; SEG ; Scottish Government; Endesa Ireland; EIUG; 
FoE; UKERC and NFLA), the UK electricity system has been locked into this set 
of characteristics for several decades. This research argues that without moving 
away from such system configuration, a complete paradigmatic shift is far from 
coming about.    
 
This conclusion is in a direct contrast with similar studies that have tried to 
characterise current UK energy policy. Regardless of some differences in the time 
frame and the scope of research, most of them argue that the UK energy paradigm 
has shifted at all levels (Helm 2005; Kern et al 2013). This contrasting finding is 
potentially derived from either the different framework this research has applied 
or a longer-term analysis this research has undertaken – or even both. Figure 3 has 





decade. It is worth noting that while the changing colours present an overall 
alteration in those policy components, they do not, and cannot, reflect the detail 
levels and features of detected changes at all. This is a technique that aims at 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.4.2. Socio-technical configuration as a policy component 
 
As one of the early findings, this study highlights an increasing significance of 
technology in the post-privatisation UK electricity policy. Particularly in the case 
of EMR, technology preference fell at the heart of policymaking process. This is 
approved notwithstanding a long history of technology neutral electricity policy. 
The analysis shows that since the re-birth of energy policy in the early 2000s, 
technology preference has always been an inextricable component of the 
electricity policy mix. Although, due to the legacy of pro-market thinking, it was 
highly dismissed until the late 2000s, it then became clear that there is no actual 
electricity policy without a serious consideration of the matter of technology. This 
is the case, perhaps, with respect to the nature of the electricity system as a ‘large-
technical’ or ‘techno-centric’ subsystem.  
 
Therefore, this research provides enough empirical evidence for the claim that the 
inclusion of a technology-related policy component, as the fifth component, in 
assessing policy change is not only applicable, but also crucial. Otherwise, any 
framework aiming at the characterisation and measurement of the electricity 
system change would miss an important, and arguably central, part of the analysis. 
Let us compare EMR, as an example, with the electricity policy of the late 2000s. 
Without taking changes in EMR’s technology preference into consideration, EMR 
would represent almost what came before, with the addition merely of a set of 
new policy instruments. However, this analysis shows that technology-specific 
policymaking and a commitment to a new low carbon generation mix are the 
substances of EMR.  
 
The incorporation of insights from Socio-Technical Transition theory also proved 
useful in providing a more systematic account of technological change in 
electricity policy. In other words, it seems analytically naïve to explain the 
dominance of a certain type of technology compared to others, unless taking 
socio-technical characteristics of the system into account161. For instance, without 





UK electricity system, it would be difficult to understand why EMR is primarily 
in favour of nuclear energy and big renewable options like wind farms, rather than 
other small-scale, decentralised technologies. Similarly, analysing socio-technical 
configuration gives us a comparative idea about why the UK electricity policy is 
so different from other countries with similar policy objectives, such as 
Germany
162
. The exceptional dominance of the Big Six, as vertically integrated 
continental companies, in the structure of the UK electricity system, is another 
example. It explains why any new proposal gets tweaked in a direction that enables 
regime actors exclusively to benefit most from their centralised, large-scale resources 
and capacities. To summarise, it seems that the choice of technology in the 
electricity system is associated with policy dimensions about how the power 
sector is organised, designed, structured, operated and controlled. In other words, 
the dominant design of the electricity socio-technical system depends heavily on 
inherited preferences and policy directions in terms of a set of institutional 
arrangements like the level of centrality, scale, structure and generation mix.   
4.4.3. The problems of measurement, hierarchy and implementation 
 
Although this chapter supports the applicability of the five-layered framework in 
characterising the UK electricity policy change, it also reveals some analytical 
shortcomings and limitations the framework suffers from. The first problem 
relates to the ambiguous concept of measurement. Despite the contribution of the 
proposed framework in capturing different characteristics and aspects of change, it 
has very limited insights about how one could measure those characteristics. The 
original idea is that each policy component is seen as ‘changed’ once there is a 
clear ‘break’ or ‘departure’ from the past. Given the qualitative and relative nature 
of the measurement, such stretchy and elastic definition suffers from a high degree 
of interpretive ambiguity. As an instance, whilst this research argues that policy 
objectives have changed significantly, there are a set of contrasting assessments 
that even current legal targets are still insufficient changes to affect other parts of 
the policy. This approach is manifested partially in the proposals for the 2030 de-
carbonisation target and in another renewable target for post-2020. Proponents of 





target is too soon’ (Interview 25, Senior policy fellow at Friends of the Earth, 
January 2012). From this viewpoint, to assure investors about the direction of 
policy, the first one needs a more sensible, shorter-term translation, whereas the 
latter requires a longer-term follow up. Similarly, another group of critics argue 
that current institutional changes are also inadequate. Particularly, they point to 
the creation of the DECC and the CCC. Based on their scrutiny, none of those 
departments has sufficient authority to govern energy policy: the first one is 
politically constrained by an open hand from the Treasury over the UK energy 
policy and the latter’s advisory position has limited its practical influence over 
climate policies (Lockwood 2013). The problem of measurement is also evident in 
identifying policy changes less significant than the extreme level of paradigmatic 
shift. While there is no doubt that the UK electricity policy has increasingly 
shifted from a liberalised model since the early 2000s, it is still analytically 
imprecise to identify which level of change each stage represents.  
 
Another limitation that was unfolded throughout this study refers to the hierarchy 
of policy components. Since Hall’s original ideas in 1993, such hierarchy has 
always been assumed. This is reflected preliminarily in Hall’s change orders 
where change in policy objectives (the third order change) necessarily implies 
change in policy instruments (the second order change). Similarly, change in 
policy paradigm is assumed that involves change in all other policy components. 
But empirical evidences do not support such hierarchical interaction between 
policy components. While official objectives changed in the early 2000s, they had 
very minimum impact on policy institutions and instruments. This was the case 
even for the legally binding targets in 2008. Instead of an immediate change, it 
took several years until new policy instruments, e.g. in EMR, were introduced. It 
is worth noting that this is by no means dismissive of the role of targets in re-
thinking process or further scrutiny. The main argument here is that their 
interaction is more complex and non-linear than what was supposed in advance. 
Such complex interrelation needs to be analysed in a longer time frame, when the 






The period of analysis is also challenging when it comes to the notion of policy 
implementation. Obviously, there is no necessary compatibility between what 
policies are expected to achieve and the actual outcomes they provide once 
implemented. It certainly does not mean going back to the traditional stage-based 
frameworks163 of policy process, but it warns against dismissing the distinctive 
role of implementation there. In modern policy studies, the importance of the 
implementation phase of policy has been recognised as of equal importance and 
interrelated to agenda-setting and formulation. In order to trace the actual 
outcomes of a policy change, it needs to be assessed in a ‘full policy cycle’. This is 
the problem that this research is faced with when it comes to analysing EMR, 
given that EMR is still an ongoing process and far from implementation, whereas 
other former changes in the UK electricity policy have been analysed with full 
consideration of their outcomes and consequent policy failures.   
4.4.4. From ‘technology preference’ to ‘policy preference’ 
 
The inclusion of a new policy component that represents socio-technical 
configuration is also consistent with what broader, i.e. non-technology exclusive, 
policy process frameworks suggest. Particularly, the recent version of the 
Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) (Sabatier & Wieble 2007: 195) has 
introduced the concept of ‘policy preference’. This concept primarily means an 
‘overall solution’ and actual ‘policy proposal’ required to meet adopted policy 
objectives. Indeed, the ACF assumes that policies should not only clarify their 
main objectives, but also need to determine how and via which solutions on the 
ground those targets are practically expected to be met. Perhaps policy 
instruments would then be designed to facilitate those overall strategies
164
. In a 
similar argument, Lockwood (2013) points to the ‘preferred system configuration’ 
as a dimension for political sustainability of policy change. Inspired by the work 
of Patashnik (2008), he expands the definition of policy change beyond 
conventional policy components. He argues that policies are not ‘politically 
sustained’ unless a fundamental transformation in ‘actor preferences’ takes place. 
They need to ‘create new constituencies, new vested interests and rewrite what is 





return’. Obviously, in ‘techno-centric’ subsystems, the main feature of ‘policy 
preference’ refers to the characteristics of preferred ‘technological configuration’ 
and socio-technical systems. Therefore, shift in technological system and physical 
infrastructure enhances the chance to ‘lock-in’ new policies into vested interests 
and preferences.  
 
Although this chapter has applied a technology-specific translation of this 
concept, it seems potentially generalisable and analytically meaningful even 
beyond techno-centric subsystems. This means, in a non-technologic policy 
subsystem, that an extreme change in governance, a so-called paradigmatic shift, 
not only includes change in paradigm, objectives, institutions and instruments, but 
also should represent a change in the preference of how that system would operate 
on the ground. Depending on the nature of those policy fields, the policy 
preference could involve features like the main solutions, strategies, system 
configuration and regime structure. For further case studies of non-technologic 
policy changes, this research suggests developing relevant propositions to be 
tested in terms of the applicability of the concept of policy preference. 
 
4.5. Summary and conclusions 
 
With regards to the analysis presented in previous sections, this chapter has aimed 
to provide a set of contributions to the literature of policy change. Since providing 
an explanation of change dynamics is out of this chapter’s analytical scope, it has 
mainly sought to contribute to theoretical debate about how one could characterise 
and measure policy changes. By applying a developed framework in the UK 
electricity policy since the early 2000s, this chapter has argued that even the most 
recent regulatory reforms manifested in EMR do not fulfil all characteristics of a 
wholesale paradigmatic shift in the power industry. This empirical finding 
contributes to and almost contrasts with recent debates about whether or not a 
paradigmatic shift has occurred in the UK energy and electricity policy (see Helm 





Kern et al 2013). Such a conclusion, in itself, has wider international implications, 
given the leading role of the UK in developing a ‘British model’ of liberalised-
marketised energy governance. It shows that despite a lot of alterations, the 
market legacy is still alive and its consequent socio-technical arrangements are yet 
almost resilient.  
 
From a theoretical perspective, this chapter contributes, in part, to conceptual 
debates trying to bridge the gap between science and technology studies and 
public policy. With respect to the nature of the electricity system as a ‘large 
technical system’ or a ‘techno-centric subsystem’, this study illustrates that the 
current policy change literature is analytically incompetent to capture all 
characteristics of policy change in the electricity system. In particular, it points to 
the lack of a specific policy component to characterise changes in socio-
materiality and technological features of the electricity system. By incorporating 
insights from Socio-Technical Transition literature, this chapter conceptualises a 
fifth policy component165, so-called technology preference, which aims at 
analysing changes in socio-technical characteristics of the electricity system. For 
the current UK electricity system, such characteristics include centralised design, 
large-scale technologies, supply-focused approach and an uncompetitive oligopoly 
structure.  
 
Nonetheless, in spite of important contributions from this study, it also reveals a 
series of analytical shortcomings and limitations in the applicability of the adopted 
framework. Firstly, the elasticity of the concept of measurement led to very 
imprecise and, occasionally, controversial conclusions. Secondly, the findings of 
this research display a much more complex interrelation between different policy 
components than the simple hierarchical one that was supposed in the framework. 
Finally, due to the contemporary nature of EMR, this study is unable to analyse it 





5. Chapter Five: Policy Failure and Major Shifts 
in the UK Electricity Policy Mix   
 
5.1. Introduction  
 
Building upon the findings of previous chapter in characterising the UK electricity 
policy change from the early 2000s to 2012, this chapter aims to explain why and 
how such significant changes occurred.  In particular, it focuses on the evolving 
role of the market policy paradigm from when it was seen as a complete 
orthodoxy to a process of gradual displacement that eventually led to paradigm 
ambivalence in the period of EMR. It shows that throughout more than a decade 
of very complex policy process, there has been always a relation between the level 
and the nature of perceived policy failures and the actual policy changes on the 
ground. As such, it points to a widespread recognition of electricity market failure 
in low-carbon technology delivery as the main driver of EMR
166
. Theoretically it 
moves beyond the conventional typology of change drivers in policy literature 
based on distinctive origin and nature of impetuses. It claims that policy failure is 
a relative concept to previous policy legacies which is imposed by policy salient 
drivers and is socially and politically constructed and strategised by competing 
advocacy coalitions.    
5.1.1. The chapter propositions: Policy failure and coalitional balance 
 
This chapter aims primarily to answer the main explanatory research question 
about how one could explain the UK electricity policy evolution since the early 
2000s. In particular, why that process led to the formation of the EMR in the UK 
2011? Which policy dynamics influenced on its characteristics and how? As 
discussed in the Analytical Framework chapter, there is a complex set of 
theoretical factors in the literature for explaining significant changes in public 





four different paths to policy change: external subsystem events; policy-oriented 
learning; internal subsystem shocks; and, negotiated agreement (Sabatier & 
Weible 2007). Given the impact of learning and negotiated agreement are limited 
to minor policy changes, the main contribution of the ACF for ‘non-incremental 
changes’ is the introduction of ‘external-internal dichotomy’
167
. While this 
conceptual distinction has proved useful in large numbers of policy studies 
(Weible et al 2009) in providing an understanding of different nature and origins 
of change drivers, it does not say anything about varying likely outcomes, either 
in terms of the level or the type of resultant changes. From this viewpoint, actual 
changes in policy result from a ‘political process’ and ‘societal reaction’ triggered 
by certain events rather than events themselves
168
 (Birkland 2006; Cortell & 
Peterson 1999; Kingdon 1995). Such situations are called ‘periods of disorder’ 
and 'momentums of breakdown'  in literature implying that they question and 
discredit established policies, practices, and institutions and increase the 
receptivity to new ideas (Alink et al. 2001; Boin et al. 2005; Cortell and Peterson 
1999; McConnell 2008: 557). Therefore, a piece of the literature calls for more 
precise theories regarding the specific parameters conditioning the impact of 
change impetus on public policymaking (Hall & Taylor 1996; Legro 2000; Boin 
and ’t Hart 2003; Nice and Gross 2001). 
 
Building upon the concept of ‘policy proximity
169
’ developed by Nohrstedt and 
Weible (2010: 20), this research claims there is a relationship between the level 
and type of challenges and anomalies that change drivers impose on existing 
policy arrangements and the features of final policies
170
. In other words, actual 
changes are framed by the extent and aspects that existing policies are ‘de-
institutionalised’ from and are expected to ‘reform’ against. As such, the 
perception of policy failure is a relative concept as a ‘meaningful reaction’ to 
previous ‘policy legacies’ to adjust into new context. Proposition 2 seeks to bridge 






Proposition 2: The characteristics of ultimate changes relate to the degree and 
the nature of ‘deficiencies’ and ‘failures’ that change drivers present to any of 
existing policy components.  
 
But policy changes do not occur in a ‘political-administrative vacuum’. The policy 
impact of change drivers is mediated not only by the nature of the change driver, 
so called policy saliency here, but also through ‘strategic social construction’ and 
‘contest framing’ by advocacy coalitions. Given the complexity of policy making, 
recent developments in the literature argue that change drivers are neither ‘self-
apparent’ nor ‘knowable’ (Kern & Mitchell 2011; Kuzemko 2011) nor even 
‘certain’ and ‘unambiguous’. Therefore, they are always subject to ‘interpretation’ 
(Jones & Baumgartner 2012) by competing coalitions. They strategically exploit 
them and employ ‘persuasive tactics’ to impose meaning on them in terms of 
causes, implications and policy alternatives. It means in the absence of a pro-
change advocacy coalition, as Nohrstedt and Weible (2010: 13) predicted, it 
seems unlikely that new problem definition and credible solutions could gain 
prominence, even notwithstanding an intrinsically policy salient change impetus. 
Drawn from these insights, this research develops following proposition. 
 
Proposition 3: The level of policy impact of a change impetus is conditioned not 
only by its policy saliency, but also by coalitional balance, in favour or against 
policy change, and their strategies.  
5.1.2. Outline of the chapter 
 
Similar to the structure of previous chapter, the next section reviews almost the 
first half of the last decade when despite the emergence of some challenges, the 
dominance of the market paradigm in the UK electricity policy remained almost 
intact. Further section explains how the situation started to change from the 
emergence of some degree of contestation towards the status of fundamental 
displacement. Nonetheless, it tries to illustrate why such strong process of market 
discrediting did not lead to a wholesale paradigmatic shift, at least by late 2012. 





the chapter findings and their theoretical implications. Finally, section five 
summarises the main points of the chapter and ultimate conclusions. 
 
The findings of this chapter are again based on a combination of reviewing 
secondary materials, analysing the content of almost 250 responses submitted to 
the DECC consultation call in December 2010, working papers and comments 
published by stakeholders or academic intellectuals, and 53 interviews conducted. 
Nevertheless, as analysis proceeds towards the period of EMR, the greater 
analytical weight is attached to the original evidences like interview materials. 
Whereas, the analysis of policy changes in the early 2000s, by contrast, is largely 
based on policy documents and some secondary studies.  Likewise, it is the case 
for analytical distinction between electricity and energy policy. Whilst their 
changes are hardly discernable in early stages, there is clear shift towards an 
electricity-specific policymaking since the late 2000s. Overall, throughout the 
sections, both the unit of analysis and the source of data have been inevitably 
evolved.  
 
5.2. The period of market orthodoxy and its resilience 
 
5.2.1. The dominance of liberalised-marketised policy paradigm (By 
2000s) 
 
For several decades under Keynesianism, the UK electricity system was 
characterised as a nationalised-politicised energy policy171. The monopoly of the 
Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) with an understanding of socio-
economic role of energy as a vital ‘public good’ with ‘national importance’ 
showed how suspicious the Welfare State was of the adequacy of market in power 
sector. The role of State in energy policy was even reinforced by the 1970s oil 
shocks172. Nevertheless, criticisms on the ground of ‘managerial inefficiency’ and 
‘cost ineffectiveness’, particularly in nuclear and coal industries173, disputed the 





policy failures, particularly the subsequent economic recession, was discursively 
constructed as the ‘failure of Keynesianism’ (Lawson in Kuzemko 2011: 98).  
  
In return, as a part of a wider paradigmatic shift, a new model of energy 
governance came to dominate UK energy policy174: ‘the new world model had 
come to replace the old model’ (Hayes & Victor 2006: 322). Theoretically it was 
largely grounded on ‘neo-liberal economics’ and ‘rational choice’ governance 
approaches. Although such ‘economistic
175
’ ideas had existed in the energy 
literature pre-1980s176, they got practically ‘vocalised’ then following the election 
of Conservative government in May 1979. As a ‘top-down’ process of change, an 
influential advocacy coalition, led by the Prime Minister Thatcher and Lord 
Lawson177, the then Secretary of State for Energy, transferred the liberalised 
paradigm into the UK energy policymaking. Central to that advocacy coalition 
was an epistemic community of ‘new right’ economists178, inspired by the work of 
Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman, who ‘crossed over’ into political positions 
in the Ofgem and DTI179. The Prime Minister is quoted as saying that energy 
departments should be always directed by ‘one of us’180, indicating leading market 
economists. In addition to research institutes like the Institute of Economic Affairs 
and the British Institute of Energy Economics, other departments like the Treasury 
and the Bank of England were also important members of that policy coalition181.  
 
By this, the Conservatives aimed at changing the state’s functions in energy 
policy182. They sought to 'roll back the frontiers of the state' (Thatcher 1998 in 
Pearson & Watson 2012) as a response to 'governmental and bureaucratic 
failures'. As Nigel Lawson clarified in his Parliamentary debate on Oil and Gas 
Bill in 1982, he believed that 'the proper business of Government is not the 
government of business. No industrial corporation should be owned and 
controlled by the State…' (Lawson 1982). Consequently, as described in previous 
chapter, a liberalised policy paradigm emerged in which energy was seen as a 
‘normalised commodity’ that needed to be governed merely by a depoliticised 
competitive market. Regarding the coincidence with an extremely benign 
contextual condition
183







, as an absolute success that had achieved what its 
architectures wanted: 'so much in so little time'
185
. Consequently, it became deeply 
institutionalised in all aspects
186
 of the UK energy policy and shaped what seen as 
‘political orthodoxy
187
’. By then, the status of ‘hands-off state' made it ‘reluctant’ 
to any form of energy policy making. Thereby, it left the government with a 




5.2.2. Early climate policies and compromise  
 
Whilst for few years after the election in 1997, New Labours continued with a 
strong commitment to the pro-market paradigm, they were soon faced with a 
series of energy challenges. The depletion of UKCS resources, an increase in oil 
price and a series of industrial disputes in the fuel sector collectively signaled an 
end to the ‘golden period of benign context’. Similarly, there seemed little 
opportunity to replicate previous ‘easy gains’ in emission reduction
189
, particularly 
in the period that climate issues were seen more politically salient. Although, 
environmental concerns had already entered the UK energy policy since 1990s
190
, 
they got vocalised following the pre-election pledges of Labour to put 
environmental concern 'at the heart of policymaking', not as 'an add-on extra'
191
. 
As a result, the environmental advocacy coalition was empowered not only due to 
a loader voice in British politics, as was evident in the report of Royal 
Commission on Environmental Pollution (RCEP 2000)
192
, but also as an outcome 
of European and international agreements
193
. Consequently, with respect to the 
nature of climate change as a market failure194, environmental movements called 
for a more active role of government in meeting climate targets.  
 
Nonetheless, the climate politics was unable to shake the foundations of British 
faith to the market. The dominant pro-market paradigm proponents were well able 
to ‘see off challenges’ through downgrading them from paradigm discrediting to 
the level of ‘problem solving195’. Given de-politicised governance departments, the 
existence of an influential market advocacy coalition
196
 as well as a form of 





coalition constituted only a ‘moderate’ change imperative which was eventually 
compromised by the Labour government
197
.  As a result of such compromising 
strategy, liberalisation and environmental concerns were seen as intrinsically 
consistent. The practical meaning behind that idea was that the competitive market 
is adequately able to meet all policy objectives including climate targets. The 
quotation below from my interview with a senior member in UKERC and RCUK 
displays how market-based mindsets resisted against any likely significant shift.  
 
The neo-liberal version became dominant in 1990s and climate change policy certainly does 
not find it easy. Not because climate change policy is inconsistent with it because neo-liberal 
concept recognises the market failure and recognises that climate change is a serious market 
failure that government needs to do something about it. But if you are committed to the neo-
liberal you always are looking for some reasons to show that firstly the climate change is not a 
serious issue and secondly that you could deal with it through very light touch regulations led 
by the market which at the moment have not been effective. It is very similar to throwing old 
policies at new problems, I would say, without refining the whole system and structures 
(Interview 5, November 2011). 
 
As shown in previous chapter, by publishing a series of policy documents like the 
2002 Energy Review and the 2003 Energy White Paper, some modest and vague 
shifts in different policy components, mainly in objective levels, came about. 
Whilst this development marked the return of the State into energy policy, its role 
was seen still secondary to and in an absolute consistence with the continuous 
centrality of the market.  Nevertheless, such minor changes opened up some 
windows of vulnerability against more credible critique and scrutiny of dominant 
paradigm in the future. Unsurprisingly, setting even imprecise targets not only 
made climate change politically salient, but also pushed the governance system 
under the burdens of accountability. More importantly, the formation of a low-
carbon advocacy coalition in itself was a crucial base for further developments. 
Since then, it was expanded by the creation of a cluster of low-carbon industry 
and research institutions like the Carbon Trust and the UKERC
198
. It was also 
financially reinforced by getting accumulatively subsidised with supportive 
initiatives like the RO and EUETS. A senior board member of UKERC and a 
former Green politician marked this period as the ‘birth period’ of a then stronger 
climate policy that appeared later in 2008 onwards. Though, in contrast to 





change as the main change driver, this research has challenged such strong 
deliberation, at least in early stages. 
 
The low carbon commitment, which this country now has, dates back to the process of 
forming climate [coalition] and low-carbon policy which really got on the way with the new 
Labour government in 1997 when there was no climate change program before that date. It led 
by the government by creating new institutions and taking the agenda forwards… Supposedly 
the single most important issue was the commitment of Tony Blair to the climate change 
agenda, and it insured that we had a high profile policy agenda and we had a number of legal 
and institutional innovations. The creation of CT, EST, CCA, various industry-related 
initiatives like ETI, and emphasis on innovation through the TSB, and then creation of CCC 
and DECC and review in Ofgem. So the government was very active and brought forward lots 
of institutional change (Interview 15, Former politician and head of an energy institute, 
December 2011). 
 
5.2.3. Crisis securitisation and energy re-politicisation   
 
Since the early 2000s, the UK energy system was facing with a series of 
contextual shifts that potentially put the security of supply on risk. That concern 
culminated when the status of energy ‘self-sufficiency’ was replaced by an import 
dependency of energy sources. It was even worse for electricity sector due to the 
lack of investment and a ‘tight demand-supply balance’. Nonetheless, such 
challenges were still understood as consequences of continuous role of ‘statist’ 
agents
199
 in international energy market and thereby the common answer was 
always a more expansion of competitive market. Ironically, such simplified 
perspective was contested in the mid 2000s, in the wake of several geopolitical 
events like the re-nationalisation of Russian energy sector and the Russo-
Ukrainian conflict in gas transit. Indeed, they were understood as significant 
challenges to the universality of the pro-market ‘British model’.  
 
Concern about security of energy supply, though largely driven by global 
geopolitical developments
200
, revived debates about the UK national energy 
strategy. They propelled energy supply from being a matter in the commercial 
realm to being the focus of political debates around state responsibility. The 
construction of such concern as a national security threat, akin to the 1970s oil 
crisis or even the period of Cold War, broadened out energy debates beyond the 





politician, it raised a high-level of public deliberation
201
 and political call for an 
urgent state intervention to ‘do something’. Therefore, a process of ‘re-
politicisation’ of energy issues started to publicly emerge. A board member of 
Energy UK described his personal experience of the role of media and politicians 
in energy re-politicisation: 
 
In 2003 Things began to happen. The Russians had a dispute with the Ukraine over paying the 
gas bill and threatened to cut them off. The lights went out on the eastern seaboard of the 
United States and that included New York, the lights went out in Italy because a tree fell down 
in Switzerland and knocked out the line that was absolutely critical to Italy’s power supplies. 
The lights went out in Denmark and then most importantly, the lights went out in this area, 
part of central London for about 45 minutes one evening and all hell broke loose....that 
incident caused the largest number of phone calls I've ever had to my office and the calls from 
the journalists went on for three weeks. The BBC broadcasted a dramatised documentary ‘IF 
the lights go out’. That was far more than any controversy over the electricity pool, over 
privatisation itself, or indeed anything else that I can think of. And it tells you that security of 
supply actually is a big issue for journalists and politicians. But this is the starting point for all 
of the industry’s problems and opportunities; this is about the ‘trilemma’ as it's called now. 
(Interview 27, July 2012) 
 
As such, concern about energy security was thought as a short-term, urgent and 
tangible challenge. It was highly controversial for both public and politicians, 
much more than the public concern that climate change raised in the early 2000s.  
Nevertheless, as shown in previous chapter, it never transcended the level of 
policy objectives and rhetoric towards imposing a substantial overhaul on the UK 
energy governance. Therefore in that period, no clear shifts in policy solutions and 
measures were observed. In the absence of a distinctive advocacy coalition 
associated to energy security and proposing credible policy solutions
202
, the pro-
market advocacy coalition was well able to dampen increasing political pressure 
and criticism. By constructing insecurity concern as a result of ‘unpredictable and 
exogenous’ events
203
, the market advocates addressed emerging challenges out of 
market responsibility and argued that the UK needed to firmly continue with the 
process of energy marketisation. Nonetheless, in addition to necessitating the 
entrance of the state in energy policy, such big anomalies revealed the lack of 
capacity of de-politicised technocrats in dealing with similar complex challenges. 
Following two quotes from the head of energy policy in the Green Alliance and 









The concern of security, as the basic philosophy of the state, publicly legitimised state 
intervention. We certainly did not have any form of energy policy without a very big scare of 
security (Interview 14, Policy research fellow at Green-alliance, December 2011).  
 
Energy policy objectives were neglected and the politician relied on the market. Just when the 
problem was cleared about the gas supply in the North Sea and problem in import ports, UK 
government realised that market may not work properly in some cases and stronger 
mechanisms including interventions are required. This was a significant policy change 
resulting from security of supply concern (Interview 1, Scottish energy directorate and 
member of UKERC advisory board, November 2011). 
 
5.3. The process of market demission205 and paradigm 
ambivalence 
 
5.3.1. A strategic climate-security convergence and the market 
contestation  
 
In the second half of the first decade of 21
st
 century, there was a growing 
suspicion about whether or not current policies are adequately able to meet carbon 
reduction targets. In the wake of insecurity concern, the low-carbon advocacy 
coalition brought back climate targets as another example of policy failure
206
. In 
several documents, climate and renewable policies were framed in terms of their 
significance for security of supply (FoE 2008 and 2011; Conservative Party 2009). 
As an Emeritus director of an energy and environment research institute 
summarised, 'greens see low carbon as leading to security, not undermining it' 
(Interview 10, December 2011). Such discursive exploitation of security for 
climate issues is still evident also in the case of EMR.   
  
Friends of the Earth believe that energy security is essential not only in its own right, but 
also as a necessary condition for public acceptance of the changes needed to achieve a 
low-carbon energy system (FoE 2011: 3). 
 
Thereby, a complementary mixture of evocative security concern coupled with 
failed climate targets provided a high degree of policy saliency that they 
separately never had before
207
. Together, these ‘two immense challenges’ (Blair in 





convergence in re-framing crisis narrative. Kuzemko (2011: 195) points in such 
process of ‘narrative appropriation’ as a change strategy undertaken widely by 
environmentalists. Several high profile reports warned about harmful 
consequences of an over-reliance on market208 and marginal state’s role in energy 
and climate policy (IEA 2007: 176; Foxon et al 2005: 23; Stern 2006).  By 
providing a new perception of the challenge’s tone and scale as ‘the greatest 
market failure the world has seen’ (Stern in Benjamin 2007), they substantially 
questioned the credibility of market paradigm for tackling climate change. It was 
arguably understood as an end to the ‘market orthodoxy’
209
. The concern was 
being officially acknowledged by a series of reports such as the UK Parliamentary 
Committee report in 2006. It claimed that both national and international contexts 
show that meeting climate targets needs more urgent policy interventions (HCSTC 
2006). As a revenge to the dismissal of the 2003 climate targets by DTI and 
Ofgem210 (Kuzemko 2011; Lockwood 2013), an increasing number of calls for a 
‘tighter long-term target’
211
 and an institutional reconfiguration gradually 
emerged.  
 
This pattern was firstly reinforced by the Big Ask campaign led by Friends of the 
Earth for a binding legal target, the Climate Change Bill. Regarding a dramatic 
increase in public salience of climate change in that period of time
212
, the 
campaign was quite successful in mobilising a large number of civil society 
groups and publicly influential people
213
. What’s more, several interviews with 
representatives of the main green NGOs revealed that by that time, compared to 
the early 2000s, a series of reproductive dynamics had given a ‘loader political 
voice’ and wider policy impact to the low-carbon advocacy coalition
214
 (Interview 
14, Green Alliance; Interview 11, RSPB; Interview 25, FoE).  
 
Secondly, as the result of an empowered campaign, a large number of politicians 
also gradually got involved
215
. Climate change was then mentioned in the Queen’s 
Speech in November 2006 and was announced by the PM Blaire as a priority.  
More importantly, the conversion of Tory leader, David Cameron, towards 





climate policies. As part of a wider political strategy of 'modernisation' and 
‘detoxification’, the New Conservatives decided to remake the party’s public face 
and identity. Despite traditional Tories’ skepticism towards climate science, they 
deliberately added values like 'liberalisation and greenery' and launched a new 
electoral slogan: ‘Vote Blue, Go Green’. Given the emergence of a kind of ‘party 
competition’ on climate change with the Lib-Dems, who had been already in 
favour, it pushed the Government for more radical decisions
216
. Consequently, as 
most interviewees agreed, that pattern led to a form of cross party ‘political 
consensus’ in support of climate target
217
, as a former green politician and head of 
an energy institute highlighted during an interview: 
 
Very interestingly and unlike the other countries it never became a party political issue. So the 
climate change passed by the force of the entire major parties. [Devolved areas like] Scotland 
played a very important role and Scottish government has been even more in favor than the 
UK government is and has it adopted more ambitious targets etc…So we have a remarkable 
degree of political consensus led by government by creating new institutions and take the 
agenda forwards. Very interestingly I hardly ever go to meetings now that these issues are 
discussed where anybody at the meeting is prepared to publicly raise doubt about climate 
change. All of those meant that the reduction of carbon emission became one of the principal 
drivers of energy policy in the UK (Interview 15, December 2011).  
 
Another important driver was changing the perception of ‘climate economics
218
’. 
The Stern Review (2006), in particular, was widely persuasive in providing a cost-
effective presentation of climate policies. It was not only understandable for 
market economists in Treasury, but businesses also realised that it could benefit 
from low-carbon technologies (Interview 14, Policy research fellow at Green-
alliance, December 2011). As it is evident in following quote, the issue of climate 
change gets gradually appropriated as a commercial matter. 
 
Also Stern report was very important in belief change because of its way of explanation of 
costs of climate change by economic justification. As a result, while the neo-liberal ideology 
is strong in the UK, it does not led to the rejection of climate science and the UK has 
[arguably] stronger climate change regulation than any other country in the Europe (Interview 
1, Former Scottish energy directorate and member of UKERC advisory board, November 
2011). 
 
The introduction of policies like the European Emission Trading Scheme EUETS 
was also important in shifting the mindset of business sector about climate 





change group, they highlighted the collective role of both economic justification 
and regulatory policies as ‘reference points’. They changed the ‘game rules’ and 
created a ‘positive loop’ for businesses to find some ‘windows of commercial 
opportunity’ within the new climate policy space (Interviews 35 and 41, CBI 
energy and climate change group members, August 2012). In response business 
groups like the CBI and the TUC chose to ‘embrace’ climate policy rather than 
‘resisting against it’ (Interview 41). By the introduction of several initiatives like 
Ethical Investors
219
, the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP)
220
, Corporate Leaders 
Group on Climate Change, and signing Climate Change Taskforce
221
, the British 
business sector also played a remarkable role in campaigning for the Climate 
Change Act in 2008 (Interview 38)
222
. This overall support should be seen, albeit, 
in addition to some businesses who had directly benefited from low-carbon 
technologies such as renewable and nuclear
223
. Though, the business sector’s shift 
towards interventionist climate policies also inevitably reinforced the process of 
re-politicisation. It was arguably the beginning of a ‘corporate-government 
nexus’
224 
which then culminated in the case of EMR, as discussed in chapter 
before. 
 
When, going along with that, it has been a more important incentive for businesses, to get 
involved in energy efficiency and renewables that is created an industrial coalition around 
renewable and low-carbon transition. The Big Six generators were being involved in that. 
They have changed their portfolio substantially. Obviously the renewable companies spun up 
and nuclear lobby became active, and they created a kind of big political backlash ... and you 
could see a beginning of an advocacy coalition around that business sector and it is actually 
very remarkable that a body like CBI has never challenged the climate change objective. 
(Interview 35, Head of energy in a leading lobby group for UK businesses, August 2012) 
 
Altogether, these dynamics expanded the coverage and inclusion of the low-
carbon advocacy coalition from just environmental NGOs to a wider set of 
members including scientists, politicians and businesses. Ultimately a ‘widespread 
political will’ for tackling climate change was shaped
225
. As discussed in previous 
chapter, by the introduction of the Climate Change Act and the creation of DECC 
in 2008, policy change at that period of time was manifested in a set of legally 
binding targets and institutional reforms. While the UK already had emission 
reduction targets, the introduction of such ‘bold piece of legislation’, in Lockwood 





market-based, climate and energy policies. In fact, the CCA had significant 




5.3.2. The policy feedbacks of new targets and institutional 
reconfigurations   
 
At the time of enactment, the CCA was understood as a way of locking the UK 
energy policy in emission reduction targets through legal means and new 
institutional landscape
227
. Since adoption, it also shifted the direction of public 
and policy debates towards solidifying the low-carbon metaphor228. Although such 
strong legislation provided, to some extent, a safeguard around the targets
229
, soon 
after, it became clear that ‘legal lock-in is never complete’ (Lockwood 2013: 47). 
As Szarka (2010: 849) highlighted, there was an ‘unresolved tension between 
ambitious targets and modest means’. In similar statements, such imbalance 
policymaking in the post-target era was widely criticised by different studies as 
‘hot air and cold feet’, in reference to the mismatch between ‘high political 
rhetoric’ of climate change and ‘cautious policy implementation’ (Lorenzoni et al 
2008: 113-119; Lockwood 2013: 15). In the one hand, the centrality of targets, 
which was then enshrined in ‘law’, to current climate governance made it very 
difficult to be changed or neglected. Not only because it required ‘repeal’, which 
was time-consuming, but also entailed huge political costs and unintended policy 
implications. An interview with a senior civil servant at DECC, who was then 
directly responsible for the EMR, made it clear to me that, regardless of legal 
consequences, it is still politically expensive for the government to impose a  
substantial move from binding targets. 
 
The carbon budgets and the climate change goals equally are statutory goals set out in the 
Climate Change Act previously. I would argue if you get close to missing those targets 
you are likely to be judicially reviewed and I’m sure some members of today’s 
audience230 will be in the lead in making sure we were held to account for that, but 
equally the political cost I think is incredibly high of missing your climate change [and 
renewable] goals, so just to give you a sense, I don’t think there is a sense that we can 
simply wait and revise these targets later on and equally, I would argue, that’s not just 
because we have statutory targets, that’s because we have an incredibly pressing goal 
which is to try to help globally to tackle climate change which is just something that the 






On the other hand, since there was no explicit ‘enforcement penalty’ for missing 
binding targets, environmentalists have always been concerned about policy risks 
in the way of the targets. The then head of climate change in WWF warned that 
the Climate Change Act would be ‘withered by neglect’, if it was left on its own 
(Allott 2012). From this viewpoint, the adoption of a target is only the beginning 
of a process of change, as shown in chapter before231. Otherwise, the targets and 
the political deliberations behind them would not be necessarily translated to 
practical strategies and actual outcomes. 
 
The main engines of further changes were at the heart of the CCA itself: the 
introduction of carbon budgets and the establishment of CCC. While the budgets 
were set to strategise the way of meeting 2050 target, the CCC was expected to 
provide advices and recommendations for government. By the time of writing, 
four carbon budgets have been passed and the CCC’s reports have had a 
remarkable role in scrutinising government policies and pushing it under 
accountability. Although some members of environmental movement still 
criticised the lack of enough authority and real political power in the CCC 
(Interviews 25 and 51, the members of FoE and former environmental 
campaigner), its remarkable role in ‘crystallising’ the long-term direction of 
energy policy was acknowledged by a wide range of interviewees and some 
academic literature (Lockwood 2013; Hill 2009).  
 
Meanwhile, another important part of institutional reconfiguration was the re-birth 
of a state level energy department, the DECC. Although this was largely derived 
from the PM Brown Cabinet reshuffling and the climate commitment of Ed 
Miliband prior to the CCA, its creation was also accelerated by political 
consequences of the CCA. By representing the whole government responsibilities 
in the CCA and linking energy and climate policies ‘under the same roof’, the 
DECC not only has ‘balanced up different policy objectives’, but also has 
represented ‘broader change in policy thinking’ (Interview 1, Former Scottish 
energy directorate and member of UKERC advisory board, November 2011). In 





climate policy trade-offs arise and officially announced the strategic role that 
government is expected to play. Nevertheless, there were still some sceptical 
views amongst interviewees from some environmentalists who thought that the 
DECC is still more dominated by ‘neo-classical economists transferred from the 
DTI’ than ‘others from the DEFRA’ (Interview 11, Senior planning policy officer 
at RSPB, December 2011; Interview 5, Senior member in UKERC and RCUK, 
November 2011). Likewise, some critics pointed in the lack of full and exclusive 
power of the DECC over energy policy. For them, the open-handed Treasury has 
yet constrained the UK energy policy within the borders of the market (Interview 
51, Former environmental campaigner and political analyst of energy governance, 
May 2013). Despite such reservations, most of whom I interviewed, from different 
perspectives, highlighted the remarkable impact of ‘political re-structuring’ of the 
energy institutions on further policy changes
232
. As an instance, a market 
economist of the Conservative think tank Policy Exchange, evaluated, albeit 
criticised, the whole structural shifts for re-politicising and far distancing from the 
logic of market.  
 
The appearance of CCC, the Climate Change Act in general but particularly creation of CCC 
has really driven a long-term planning approach to the UK energy policy. They produce 
reports, they set targets, and there is where we should be in the future. I am talking about a 
whole approach of knowing what energy system should look like in the next decades ahead. 
That is given emphasis by CCC. That needs a backdrop, needs a set of arrangement by the 
market which has been always criticised by some that cannot deliver a certain amount of 
renewable, certain amount of nuclear and a long-term plan that CCC has set out, because the 
market cannot deliver this level of certainty… Similarly, the creation of DECC has changed 
the whole balance of policy making in energy. When I was working in the Treasury, I headed 
energy policy in the Treasury, and at that time DTI did energy policy and DEFRA did climate 
change policy. The dynamic balance of policy making was more towards understanding the 
market, the benefits of the market, and I had been surprised if EMR would be emerged from 
that machinery.… Because DECC has bring them together, it has removed the energy policy 
veto over climate policy and I believe there is a dominance of climate over other energy 
objectives. Also I would categorise it as being a large step towards more centrally planned 
energy system (Interview 17, Senior policy research fellow at Policy Exchange, December 
2011). 
 
In parallel with British targets, the UK energy policy was ‘'hysterically shocked’, 
in Henney’s wording (2011a), by the imposition of the European Renewable 
Directive
233
. As civil servants within the Energy Department claimed, ‘nobody in 
energy sector was expecting the mandatory level of the obligation. We suggested 





Energy team senior member, August 2012). According to the speculation of a 
former member of the DECC energy team, the Directive was conceived as ‘an 
immediate surprising decision because, at the time of signature I guess, Tony Blair 
was not realising the consequences of what he had personally signed without 
consulting anybody else
234
’ (Interview 42, Former civil servant at DECC, August 
2012). As a result, that signature not only brought the government under the 
burden of an international statutory obligation
235
, but also entailed huge political 
and economic implications as well. As a current member of the EMR Technical 
Expert Panel highlighted, it arguably changed substantially ‘the way of thinking 
about low-carbon support’. Because of what he called the ‘deterministic 
philosophy’
236
 behind the Renewable Directive, other market-based instruments, 
particularly the RO
237
, were practically ‘taken over’.  (Interview 12, Government 
advisor and the EMR Technical Expert Panel, December 2011). On the other 
hand, its shorter time-frame compared to 2050, provided it with a 'catalytic 
impact
238
' in accelerating progress towards low-carbon target. Since then, the 
government was responsible for meeting a mixed ‘low-carbon/renewable’ target. 
Consequently, the EU Renewable Directive undermined the central role of the 
market and, in return, necessitated some forms of state interference. The next 
chapter will discuss how the CfD then re-framed the role of State as a ‘price 
fixer’. 
 
To sum up, by the late 2000s, as climate policies proceeded, more interventions 
were required. The process of increasing intervention showed that if security 
concern legitimised state intervention, climate policies gradually represent, in 
Henney’s term (2011b: 51), 'the death knell' of competition
239
. Such shift in the 
perception of the climate change nature, from a function of market to a policy 
failure and then towards the demise of competition, was reflected in several 
responses to the EMR consultation call. As two contrasting instances, the 
Cambridge Electricity Research Group and Prospect240, the largest union of the 
UK professional engineers, noted a huge shift in the level of intervention 






One effect of the developments during the 2000s is an apparent emerging (deep) conflict 
between the agendas of liberalisation and the environmental agenda… There seems to be an 
increasing risk of environmental agenda unrolling the liberalisation agenda and pushing us 
back towards centrally planned power system… (Cambridge EPRG 2011: 7). 
 
We believe that the original concept that light-touch regulation was only a stopgap before full 
competition could be introduced was a delightful intellectual fantasy. The benefits of 
competition to [climate change] can only be achieved by clear and robust intervention to set a 
market with clear understanding of the desirable outcomes for the consumer… The original 
concept has lost what relevance it had to consumer aspirations (Prospect 2011: 3). 
 
This substantial move away from market paradigm was derived mainly from the 
practicalities and the risk of policy failures rather than from ideological stances. A 
decade of disappointing experiences in meeting policy objectives not only 
disputed strongly the previous faith in the market, but also enhanced the 
receptivity to new ideas and concepts. As a long-experienced civil servant, who 
was a senior member of the DECC energy team during 2008-2009 observed:   
 
I do not agree that new Labour had ideological approach to intervention. Over-
emphasising of ideological stance is not acceptable, while Ed [Miliband] was rather 
ideologically neutral and reacted to practicalities… Intervention was not an objective in 
its own. It was an unintentional side-effect of environmental mainstream and financial 
collapse increasing political risk of missing the targets…Energy policies did change, 
when there was absolutely no alternative'. (Interview 39, August 2012) 
 
5.3.3. Financial crisis and a widespread mistrust to market agencies 
 
In 2008, the largest international financial crisis since the 1920s began to appear. 
As one of the policy narratives that emerged, the crisis was interpreted, to some 
extent, as an overall fault of the market system and ‘capitalism’. Unsurprisingly, 
the UK energy sector was also influenced by that overall pattern. The crisis was 
represented, or at least coincided, in energy with a sharp increase in energy 
prices
241
 and consequent growing concern for fuel poverty
242
. In such a critical 
context, the first DECC Secretary of State, Ed Miliband (2008: 4) was of the first 
official positions that acknowledged a ‘markets-only’ view of energy policy on its 
own is no longer ‘enough for a successful energy policy’. In return, he called for 
‘a more strategic role for government’ alongside what he called ‘dynamic 
markets’. As part of a widespread mistrust to the market agencies at the time, he 
also implicitly convicted electricity companies and independent regulator, Ofgem, 





discussion with John Mog and Alastair Buchanan who were worried that the 
government kept, they, Ed Miliband had a way of describing all energy companies 
as greedy and the regulator as incompetent’. It was said by the former DECC 
Energy team senior member:  
 
Ed arrived in the context of public anger over energy price increase, financial problem, 
and, I mean the shift in policy had started under Ed Miliband. So, so there was a sense in 
which Ed Miliband had kicked off the process by making this speech and by asking for 
options on what was the strategic role of government. And there wasn’t much, sort of, 
detail behind this to say what he actually meant.  And so he was pressing us internally 
within the department to come up with options as to, you know, what should be the 
strategic role of government?  And, so, we presented him with a series of options, the 
most extreme of which was what we call the single buying agency... And so in, this 
must’ve been early, first quarter of 2009 we had a, sort of, serious debate with him about 
the single buying agency model in the electricity market.  He, sort of backed off at that 
point and didn’t, sort of, say I must run with this, he just said well, I want to think about 
this, as it were. I think, he knew that he was only going to be in power for about another 
year. And I think he was concerned about launching a fundamental reform of, of the 
electricity market with only a year to go... (Interview 39, August 2012)   
 
Another former DECC civil servant, who was working at the time of interview in 
Ofgem, characterised that status as rather a form of ‘revenge of liberalisation’.  
 
I would argue he [Miliband] had rather sympathy with the legacy of Labour left in 
concerning about an oligopoly privatised sector. To differentiate himself from the former 
energy minister, John Hutton, as a market-oriented and nuclear fan, Ed started a process 
of substantial re-thinking which in the context of financial crisis and policy failures, it 
was understood, I would say, as rather getting ‘revenge of liberalisation’ in energy that, 
unlike many other sectors, had still remained intact since the Labour power in 1997 
(Interview 42, August 2012). 
 
The critical approach of the Labour government to the Ofgem raised several 
tensions between them. This conflict escalated in the Project Discovery report 
(2009) when, as some former civil servants thought, the Ofgem intended to 
respond to Miliband’s blame and to ‘get ahead of the government’ not only to 
‘position themselves in that way’, but also to politically push responsibilities 
towards the Labour government (Interviews 38; 39; 41; 43). In response ‘the 
Government stepped in’, in a number of instances and drove recurrent reviews in 
the role of Ofgem. Though, Labour’s concern appears to continue to today. As 
their Shadow energy secretary, Caroline Flint (2012), declared ‘the time has come 
to say goodbye to Ofgem’ and to replace it with a more ‘trustworthy regulator’. 





with the challenge so-called the ‘Big Six profiteering’ (Macalister 2011). A long 
advisor of the Government described hidden intentions behind such a conflict: 
 
Project Discovery irritated the government because Ofgem clearly thought the 
government was not taken this problem seriously, Ofgem said look you had three white 
papers in 2000s but nothing is happening, get serious, these are the problems and the 
Government, the DECC, said hang on a minute, Ofgem is going to influence us, so 
tension bet regulators saying something has to be changed, and the government is saying 
yes, but we decide what is, we want to decide what should change (Interview 12, DECC 
Expert Panel Team, December 2011) 
 
Arguably, the legacy of such high level of mistrust in big businesses is still alive. I 
realised the fact when I interviewed some high profile figures in private sector. 
For a board member of Energy UK, the biggest trade union of energy providers, 
‘continuous mistrust to big companies is yet an important challenge’ (Interview 
27, July 2012). The head of energy policy at one of the Big Six criticised current 
government that, due to the lack of public trust, ‘even Tories sometimes try to 
publicly pretend that are opposing big companies’ proposals’ (Interview 44, 
September 2012). In one of the most recent evidences, a joint study by the 
Glasgow University Media Group (GUMG) and Chatham House showed that 
most people still think the energy companies are in the ‘corruption’
243
 (Froggatt et 
al 2012). Similarly, according to the YouGov poll as of 2013, the energy industry 
was nearly ‘as hated as the banks’ (Hawkes 2013). It argued almost 76 percent of 
the nation wanted the Government to do more to ‘crack down on the sector’. In 
return, the current Energy UK chief executive, argued that ‘energy sector must 
make public trust the number one priority’ (Knight in Weber 2013). Inspired by 
such critical context, the continuous ‘oligopoly’ of Big Six in the UK electricity 
market has been widely criticised as another example of improper market 
functioning and the lack of ‘real competition’
244
.   
 
The financial crisis also undermined the effectiveness of market based instruments 
in attracting investments. Under the context of austerity, some tax-based 
mechanisms like the EUETS and CPF almost technically ‘collapsed’ and the risk 
of investment increased. Likewise, the economics of the RO was no longer seen 





prevent huge political cost of missing the targets, the state was inevitably expected 
to ‘step in’ to assure investors for long-term investments (Interview 43, SPAD of 
former DECC Secretary of State, August 2012). As a former civil servant said, 
‘ministers decided to gain much more power to fulfil their responsibilities. It was, 
in my view, a practical decision more than an ideological one’ (Interview 42, the 
former member of DECC energy team, August 2012). Altogether, these factors 
illustrate the multiple impacts of financial crisis in discrediting the already shaken 
belief in the self-fulfilment adequacy of the market. Even though some critics 
argue that the potential of such widespread collapse of the economy in a 
wholesale paradigmatic shift has been ‘wasted’ (Pemberton 2013), the public 
perception of market failure imposed a significant impetus for energy policy 
change. However, the financial crisis has also had some undermining 
consequences for climate and renewable policies, we will discuss later. 
5.3.4. The recognition of electricity market failure in technology delivery 
 
With regards to the emergence of accelerated change imperatives in the late 
2000s, the focus of all suggested strategies moved towards technology delivery in 
power generation as the central solution to meet energy objectives (CCC 2008; 
DECC 2009). Having assumed that electricity is going to form a large part of our 
future energy mix
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 and potentially play a much wider role across the economy, 
electricity policy was then conceived as at the 'heart of two faceted energy policy 
objectives' (Interview 18, Senior director at CCC, December 2011): reducing 
carbon emission and renewable provision. In the one hand, while there was no 
electricity-specific binding target, the CCC’s main scenario presented in the 
Fourth Carbon Budget (CCC 2010) implied a substantial de-carbonisation of the 
electricity sector (see figure 7 in Appendix B). From this point of view, the de-
carbonisation of large-scale electricity supply was the main feasible way of 
reaching low carbon targets (Interview 29, EMR senior member at DECC, July 
2012). But the volatile design of EUETS, as the main mechanism, was seen as, by 








On the other hand, the signing of the EU Renewable Directive imposes an ‘over-
ambitious’ 15% target to the whole UK energy sector. Again, the ‘lead scenario’ 
here expects a minimum of 30% renewable electricity by 2020s, which is unlikely 
to be achieved under the current incentivising mechanism, the RO247.  
 
Furthermore, despite a decline in geo-political insecurity concerns in the late 
2000s
248
, a set of new electricity-specific security issues has started to grow. 
Whilst by then, it was largely taken for granted that lights will stay on, a set of 
supply scarcity concerns emerged. A combination of decommissioning a large 
proportion249 of current nuclear and coal power stations, the growing role of 
intermittent renewable resources, which perhaps requires a level of excess supply 
investment, as well as an increasingly reliance on electric power necessitated an 
urgent huge re-investment in electricity infrastructure. Otherwise, a clear risk of 
‘capacity crunch’ and inevitable ‘blackout’ is expected in the next few years, 
though it is still unclear ‘how at risk we are’250 (Ofgem in Gosden 2013; Marchant 
2013b). Like meeting targets, tackling new security concerns was also understood 
as the challenge of technology delivery. To achieve this task in a period of 
financial crisis and austerity, as described by a member of Energy and Climate 
Change Select Committee of the Parliament, it is ‘the biggest infrastructure 
challenge this nation has ever seen’: 
 
The biggest challenge that we’ve seen, I think in infrastructure development, I think 
probably that this nation has ever seen, we’ve never had what we are looking for now in 
such a short space of time, 110 billion into the electricity market, 200 billion coming on 
stream in the next decade. That is an incredible ask at a time when there is such financial 
uncertainty in Europe, when there are increasingly attractive markets for developing 
infrastructure and capacity elsewhere in the world (Interview 30, July 2012). 
 
Such a Herculean task251 of re-investment is getting even tougher given the need to 
replace conventional market-friendly options, e.g. CCGT, with more expensive 
and risky low-carbon generation technologies (for generation mix scenario by 
2050, see figure 10 in Appendix B): ‘Things are going to be extremely, extremely 
tight. And then, of course, it’s not just about old capacity, it’s about low carbon 
capacity’ (Interview 53, Conservative MP in ECC Select Committee, June 2013). 





proportion’ of the cost of low-carbon targets (see figure 11 in Appendix B). 
Insofar as even some members of pro-market coalition argue that current 
mechanisms are unlikely to fully address such huge investments. Though, 
regardless of low-carbon ambitions, it has been controversial whether or not 
electricity market could deliver capacity re-investment252. However, the level of 
investment concern is clear in the statement made by a board member of Energy 
UK during an interview, whilst he still believed that market would deliver 
conventional capacity re-investment is : 
 
You don’t necessarily need Electricity Market Reform to replace your closing power 
stations. We’ve been doing that for a long time. There’s nothing terribly magical about 
that, but what we are trying to do is to bring new types of generation into the market place 
and it’s generation which is usually more expensive than the participants would choose to 
build if they had a completely free hand and it’s riskier and that has an effect on 
investors. It is roughly about £200 billion, not just for power stations but for all the other 
things that go with them. This is about double the rate of investment that we’ve been 
accustomed to, and of course it’s coming at a time when raising money is a bit more 
challenging that it used to be and investors are very cautious about where they put their 
cash. Somebody said a year or so ago; it’s like building two new Channel Tunnels every 
year. This is a pretty big call and extraordinary steps have to be made to make sure that 
that money comes into the UK to deliver the objectives that the Government has 
(Interview 27, July 2012). 
 
To sum up, the UK electricity system was seen to be heavily locked-in to 
unabated fossil fuel generation, suffering from the lack of real competition and 
dominated by Big Six 'oligopoly', threatened by a serious risk of under-capacity 
and thereby blackout, and designed technically improper to incentivise sufficient 
low-carbon investment. Furthermore, the main regulatory low-carbon instruments, 
i.e. EUETS and RO, have not been as effective as hoped to incentivise adequate 
investment in low-carbon technologies253. Consequently, none of the trinity of 
low-carbon generation technologies, i.e. nuclear, renewable and CCS, could 
readily deliver as required. This status would ultimately lead to a severe security 
challenge and the miss of both inter-related sector-specific targets: full carbon 
reduction and %30 renewable obligations. Mcllveen and Helm (2010) described 
such complexity surrounding electricity policy as 'a tangled web' and a 






A series of warning policy documents and reports during 2009-2010 addressed 
these concerns including the Ofgem's Project Discovery
254
 (2010), the Treasury's 
Energy Market Assessment
255
 (2010), the CCC’s Step Change
256
 (2009) and the 
CBI’s Decision Time
257
 (2010). Collectively, albeit from different points of view, 
they diagnosed that the 'existing market arrangement is unlikely to deliver' the UK 
electricity targets. Thereby, a growing demand for some forms of inevitable 
market reform emerged. Even though in pre-election context, Labour deliberately 
‘had stepped back from fundamental change’258; they concluded that ‘whichever 
Government would have been elected in 2010 would have had to embark on 
EMR’. (Interview 30, Member of Energy & Climate Select Committee, Labour 
MP, July 2012). By contrast, the Coalition Government aimed strategically at 
tackling that challenge from very early stages in the Coalition Agreement259 
(HMG, 2010). As one of the main renowned Tories in energy policy said to me, 
their proposed reform in the EMR dated back to the Conservative electoral 
campaign (Interview 47, Former member of DECC ministerial team, Conservative 
MP, February 2013). A senior civil servant in the DECC EMR team, who was in 
the Cabinet Office when I interviewed him, explained how significant a sense of 
failure amongst the Coalition Government was when they decided to put forward 
the EMR proposal. Though, his focus in quotation below is merely on the failure 
of climate policies and is rather against Labour’s claim of policy continuity. 
 
[Although] before 2009, we had actual climate policies, but there were practically insufficient 
and less effective than what government hoped and it was proving that meeting the targets are 
more difficult than what government thought before. And therefore government got 
disappointed and I think it was a very important driver for the EMR. Because the previous 
government did not seem to realise the way in which the electricity market was set up was 
going to militate against reaching these targets and I think the present government has realised 
quite quickly that we need a fundamental reform of the electricity market, while there is some 
people who think that reform is not going far enough… So all of the previous policies had 
been shown as being unsatisfactory, they reformed the market in 2001 but it made a miss of it, 
so they set up EUTES which produced an unsatisfactory carbon price, they had RO which 
turned up to be very poorly designed.. so almost every policy that they had tried wasn’t going 
to work or won’t going to do it in a reasonable cost, so they had to change that, so this caused 
a lot of pressure to change it, if they may not change it, it would be politically difficult to 
persuade that previous government made mistakes (Interview 21, DECC EMR team member, 
January 2012). 
 
In short, a widespread recognition of failure in electricity system from different 





electricity policy. A combination of change impetuses including a new form of 
insecurity fear of ‘capacity crunch’, the risk of missing legal targets and 
international obligations, and the emerging concern of increasing fuel poverty and 
market mistrust led to an overall agreement that current arrangements, by no 
means, are ‘fit for purpose’.  It became clear that, in Henney’s wording (2011a: 
339), 'power and politics are inextricably entwined ' and electricity industry is a 
'classic case of contrived competition'. Thus one of the technical architects of the 
EMR who recently left the DECC pointed to a ‘universal feeling’ of the failure at 
that time.  
 
I really want to take you back to that point in sort of 2010 where the Department was 
asking itself the question, you know, do we believe that the market arrangements we have 
are fit for purpose? And, I think generally there was a kind of universal feeling that what 
we have at the moment was not going to deliver the sorts of things that we hoped for in 
terms of decarbonisation, security of supply and indeed cost…Well, first of all we have 
looked very hard at the incentives inside the market, and I think it’s a generally shared 
view amongst us, ourselves, politicians, the industry, the regulator and Civil Society, that 
all of us believe some kind of intervention is needed. (Interview 29, the then senior 
member at DECC EMR team, July 2012) 
5.3.5. The accumulative complexity and policy paralysis   
 
In response to such ‘universal feeling’ of the failure of existing market 
arrangements, the original design of the EMR reflected a large tendency towards a 
‘politically determined’ style of policy making. A market economist, albeit a critic 
of the EMR, described it as ‘an admission of defeat for economic rationalism and 
sensible low cost economic policymaking’ (Interview 13, Economist at a leading 
Electricity Policy Research Group, December 2011). Such a government-led 
policy package has been largely contested by business leaders:  
 
I wonder sometimes whether the Government actually really does think that it’s still got a 
CEGB out there and that all it really needs to do is to decide where that £110bn is going 
to be spent, who’s going to do it, where and when. (Interview 44, Head of energy policy 
at one of the Big Six, September 2012) 
 
Nevertheless, given technology delivery was central to the EMR proposal as 
shown in previous chapter, soon after it became clear that the DECC does not 
have enough capacity to design such complex and technical policy package. In 





capacity of the DECC was critically scrutinised by a wide range of long-
experienced civil servants and energy experts. From whom I interviewed, they 
thought that the DECC is still suffering from the legacy of ‘de-skilled and de-
politicised’ energy departments that were dominated by ‘young economists’ who 
has no enough knowledge about ‘the history’ and ‘the complexity’ of electricity 
policy (Interview 22, Former Board member of London Electricity, January 2012; 
Interview 16, Former civil servant and researcher in an energy consultancy, 
December 2011). As a personal experience, the current head of energy policy in 
E.ON, one of the Big Six generators, told me his feeling of ‘institutional danger’ 
after working within DECC for sometimes. 
  
I spent some time in DECC on secondment last year so I am concerned about some 
institutional danger I believe which DECC has in delivering EMR, where electricity 
market reform is of mostly economics and technical side and both sides have to be right. 
And, DECC is populated by civil servants who don’t have technical knowledge and this is 
all about electricity so there is a considerable institutional risk due to DECC not having 
enough technical in-house expertise… So I think there’s perhaps a bit of disconnect. The 
Secretary of State recognises he’s got lots of power under EMR but I don’t see within 
DECC, at the moment, the equivalent of the CEGB planning team who’s actually figuring 
out how to maintain and deliver. (Interview 33, Director of energy policy in one of the 
Big Six, August 2012) 
 
To cover such lack of ‘in-house expertise’ and ‘qualified staff’, the DECC opened 
up the policy process beyond official calls for consultations and policy learning
260
. 
By establishing several platforms like Expert Panels, Working Groups, 
Stakeholder Events and other communicating forums (see DECC 2013b), a wide 
range of stakeholders within electricity sector have become ‘informed of and 
involved in EMR progress’. Though that it is albeit controversial how balance 
those voices have been heard
261
.  Nonetheless, regarding the central role of 
businesses in technology delivery and investment, the EMR was heavily 
influenced by the industry. Current studies also illustrate how influential is 
industrial lobby compared to others, such as environmental interest groups (Butler 
2013). Below is another quotation from one of the EMR main technical architects 
that reveals the rationale behind the introduction of the Collaborative 
Development Process aiming at having the industry and financial bodies on board 






We want to move decision making though out of Government, out of the civil service in 
effect, and into the industry where they have more expertise around …of different kinds 
of technology. We need to work intensively with the industry to try and design the right 
systems and processes, not only to get the right policy answer but to make that policy 
answer work on the ground… And, I think in essence I accept the point that we need 
more technical skills. I think frankly we also need more commercial [and funding] skills 
inside. (Interview 29, EMR senior member at DECC, July 2012) 
 
Such level of state-business interdependency, in previous chapter, was described 
an ‘uncomfortable hybrid’ of government and market drivers. As discussed, it 
reflected a lack of intellectual coherency, what was so-called paradigm 
ambivalence. By studying the policy process that led to the formation of the EMR, 
this chapter explains how and why such ambivalence emerged. It shows that shift 
in predominant policy paradigm was primarily driven by the practicalities of 
policy failure than the emergence of a coherent alternative paradigm. The fact was 
reflected in contrasting understanding of the nature of EMR. Whilst the 
Government called it ideally ‘a long term transitionary strategy’ from huge 
inevitable intervention to the aspiration of a ‘low-carbon competitive market’ 
(Interview 47, Former member of DECC ministerial team, Conservative MP, 
February 2013), others saw it as a ‘Dictators Bill reversing the entire process of 
liberalisation’ without any ‘exit strategy’ (Interview 53, Conservative MP in ECC 
Select Committee, June 2013). Consequently, such confusing mixture of policy 
frameworks raised a huge level of complexity and undermined the ability of quick 
decision making. The fact was mentioned by the representative of businesses. 
Similar to what I heard from the CEO of REA, the head of energy policy at one of 
the Big Six pointed out: 
 
You can either set the market, let the market run, or you can actually say exactly what you 
want, but to sort of somehow tread the path in between, it’s almost like having a CEGB 
but operating it by remote control with a great big instruction book, it’s not very 
straightforward… the Government does not want to exercise total control but it does want 
to achieve all the outcomes set out above.  The result is a mess. As such, I feel we’re in a 
state of paralysis (Interview 44, September 2012). 
 
As a result, the EMR policy process turned into a long and evolving process that, 
by the end of 2012, still continued. It started officially more than three years ago, 
following the signing of the Coalition Agreement. But the introduction of the 





late 2012 when the Energy Bill was announced, several shifts in the original 
context of the EMR had occurred and the focus of policy had evolved over time. 
 
The main change relates to the shift in the balance of ‘trilemma’ in policy 
objectives. There have been always massive trade-offs between climate/renewable 
policy, security of supply and cost for consumers which has made it very difficult 
to get a good landing between those three seemingly ‘irreconcilable objectives’. 
Firstly, since 2010-2011, a new generation of insecurity risk has got more 
prominence. Whilst the UK had a ‘lucky escape’ from capacity crunch in the late 
2010, due to the economic downturn and corresponding drop in energy demand, it 
seemed then very ‘fast approaching’. The warnings of the regulator and some 
industrial analysis (Marchant 2013) shifted the political debate on to the question 
of security. It was even reinforced by a ‘Conservative pragmatism
262
’ when the 
then DECC Energy Minister in 2012 addressed ‘security of supply as top priority’ 
that needs ‘immediate action’ (Hayes in Newton 2012).  
 
Likewise, an escalation in the number of citizens deemed to be in fuel poverty 
gave the affordability objective an increasing political relevance. As an interview 
with the head of energy policy in Consumer Focus revealed, a growing advocacy 
coalition of new members including ‘energy intensive industries, consumer 
representatives and tax payer alliance’ is gradually emerging (Interview 40, 
August 2012). A long experienced energy expert also confirmed change in the 
nature and policy saliency of affordability concern.  
There are a lot of new members, while the concern of energy bills has been used already 
by competition-oriented coalition. Affordability is rather a new concept. What was 
important in the beginning of privatisation was not affordability. It was more about 
liberalisation and efficiency.  So far affordability hasn’t been tremendously important but 
it will become important … so it passive, I say, in essence (Interview 27, A board 
member of Energy UK, July 2012) 
Its political importance was also reinforced by publishing some studies 
highlighting the impact of low-carbon policies, particularly the EMR, on 
consumer bills and industrial competitiveness in the era of austerity (Platchkov et 
al 2011; Consumer Focus 2011; EIUG 2011; CBI 2011). Therefore, it seems that 





initially introduced’ (Interview 44, Head of energy policy at one of the Big Six, 
September 2012).   
 
More importantly, soon after the 2010 election a political tension over 
climate/renewable policies became gradually clear. It was firstly revealed within 
the Coalition Government over the Fourth Carbon Budget in 2011 and then was 
reflected in the cabinet reshuffling in 2012
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. By late 2012, the tension 
culminated in the case of the 2030 de-carbonisation target in the Energy Bill and 
renewable-gas dispute
264
. As a Conservative MP described, it seems that ‘the UK 
is reluctantly dragging its feet over climate change issues’ (Interview 34, Aug 
2012). Nevertheless, policy debate over climate and renewable is increasingly 
‘divisive’ now than the election era in 2010, not only within Government partners, 
but also within Tory party itself
265
. There was also a decline in public climate 
support compared to other priorities (see figure 22 in Appendix B). Building upon 
the consequences of financial crisis on climate costs and the emergence of 
unconventional resources, a growing divergence between climate/renewable 
targets and security and affordability appeared
266
.   
 
Collectively, such shifts in the relative importance of different policy goals were 
contested between the Coalition government partners and across different 
departments. Consequently, the original political consensus over the EMR 
proposal was relatively disputed. To balance between multiple change drivers, 
further layers of complexity also were added to the already convoluted EMR 
package
267
. Therefore, taking long-term decisions about detail mechanisms of the 
EMR became even more difficult. Several interviewees characterised that period 
of electricity policy as ‘drift’ and ‘indecision’ (Interview 50, Former SPAD of PM 
and energy commentator, April 2013; Interview 37, Ofgem Wholesale Market, 
August 2012). A Tory member of the Parliament ECC Select Committee 





You can construct beautiful policies, I can do beautiful policies, if they can't be delivered 





on almost everything we do, and sometimes that the compromise you end up with can 
look extremely messy. I mean I'm the first to admit, even though I'm a Government MP, 
that EMR is fiendishly complicated. it’s plasters upon plasters upon plaster to fix the 
unintended consequences of previous plasters…And I think what we’ve got here is 
DECC, BIS, the Treasury, 105 backbenchers and Number 10, playing around with this in 
relation to a bit of a mix up and nobody really controlling it, nobody really being able to 
deliver something that has that long term message and assurance. (Interview 53, 
Conservative MP, ECC Select Committee, June 2013) 
 
Overall, since work on these policies began, the world had changed. The resultant 
policy package was an increasingly complex ‘meshed up set of measures’ that 
were very difficult to fit together. What I found from the debates in a very recent 
Westminster Forum I had participated was that policy community was very 
suspicious about whether the current EMR is still fit-for-purpose. What another 
MP from the ECC Select Committee said illustrates how fundamental is the 
debates around EMR. 
 
I think we started off hoping that we could differentiate ourselves by having a policy 
package which would take policy risk away from the investor, I think we are discovering 
how hard it is to achieve that….And in fact one of the things we did in the energy Select 
Committee, when we’re doing pre-legislative scrutiny on EMR, the first question we 
considered was do we recommend tearing this whole thing up and starting again, or are 
we too far down the line and do we make recommendations to try to make it work… Yes, 
a major re-evaluation of policy now would be an embarrassment, but we need to get out 
from the mess that has paralysed the policy into inaction. While energy policy requires a 
constant balance of different interests and risks over time, but what is clear for me is that 
such a complex situation is not unlocked by halt and indecision. (Interview 30, April 
2013). 
 
5.4. Analysis and discussion  
 
Having reviewed the overall pattern of policy change in the UK electricity policy 
since the early 2000s in two previous sections, this section seeks to shed lights on 
theoretical contributions and to draw some lessons from the studied case. Firstly, 
it tries to bridge between these empirical analyses and the adopted analytical lens. 
This part aims at a deductive examination of the chapter propositions. In addition, 
this section will offer some lines of theoretical contribution and analytical 
proposition for further research. This type of contribution is derived from an 
inductive approach to the case study and fall beyond literature-driven concepts 





5.4.1. Policy failure and the level of reconcilability     
 
On the basis of the analysis of recurrent changes throughout more than a decade of 
the UK electricity policy, it could be argued that the legacy of energy 
liberalisation and marketisation has always constrained the policy impact of 
different change drivers. As a result, the level and type of policy changes have 
been limited to the degree that existing arrangements were seen in an absolute 
irreconcilability with new requirements. As mentioned before, change was driven 
mainly by practicalities than ideology or alternative paradigm. In the early 2000s, 
while the emergence of early energy challenges and the rise of climate concerns 
marked an end to the previously ‘benign context’ and thereby revived energy 
policy, the level of actual transition in policy was highly compromised. The main 
reason was that such level of anomaly was not understood fundamentally 
irreconcilable with market based governance. Eventually very modest and 
imprecise shifts in objectives and new instruments were seen sufficient to 
compensate market failure. It was almost the same in the case of huge insecurity 
concern in the mid 2000s. Whilst it brought back energy issues at the heart of 
public and political debate, the perception of seeing challenges exogenous and 
temporary prevented from imposing the allegation and responsibility of failure to 
existing policies and governance system.  
 
But the situation started to change when, in the context of securitisation and re-
politicisation, the minimal climate policies were gradually proved unable to meet 
the UK targets. The accumulation of failure evidences shifted the balance in 
favour of more radical alterations. Since they were understood as consequences of 
low political commitment to targets and technocratic de-skilling, they led to the 
emergence of ambitious targets and institutional reforms. Soon after, in the 
context of financial crisis and renewable targets, another version of failure became 
apparent. If the UK was expected to meet its climate/renewable targets, the then 
market arrangements could not deliver technologies required. It was highly 
reinforced by the intensification of under-investment concern and the increasing 





and affordability expanded the sense of market deficiency across the sector insofar 
as it became almost an inescapable conclusion for all advocacy coalitions 
involved. Such multi-faceted perception of failure in electricity market imposed a 
huge change imperative that ultimately led to the status of paradigm ambivalence 
in the EMR.  
 
To sum up, this study shows that in the context of market paradigm dominance 
with no remarkable alternative, the interpretation of deficiency and failure, derived 
from practicalities on the ground, is the ultimate driver of change. They de-
institutionalise established policies and practices and thereby open windows of 
receptivity to new ideas. Without questioning and discrediting the adequacy of 
existing policy components in meeting new requirements, the legacy of dominant 
paradigm would be able to dampen new challenges by minor adjustments and 
compromises.  In other words, the more irreconcilable failure, the greater 
likelihood of policy change. Without denying the different typologies of change 
driver in the literature, this research moves beyond those theories and highlights 
the role of failure perception as the main factor conditioning the level and the type 
of actual policy changes, as hypothesised in Proposition 2.   
5.4.2. The nature of change drivers and their policy saliency 
 
As discussed in the Analytical Framework chapter, the policy impact of a change 
impetus depends on a combination of its nature and political process it triggers. 
Although the existence of the latter is essential, this mixed effect, by no means, is 
dismissal of the crucial role of driver’s policy saliency drawn from its intrinsic 
characteristics. Throughout this study, it was revealed that different nature of 
change drivers show distinctive potentials for the subsequent process of framing 
contests and societal reactions. As Boin et al (2009: 98) argues some change 
impetuses ‘hit at the heart of existing policy domains, espousing deficiencies and 
failures’. It is evident in a comparison between the policy saliency of climate 
change and security concern. Whilst climate change was being increasingly seen 
important not only for public and environmental NGOs, but also consensual for all 





limited and easily compromised. It was largely because of its natural 
characteristics as ‘intangible’, ‘global’, ‘non-immediate’ and ‘long-term’ 
challenge. In a similar conclusion, Lockwood (2013) calls it politically ‘valence’ 
not ‘salient’. Though, the situation became different, in terms of the level of 
urgency and political commitment, when the targets enshrined to the law. By 
contrast, security concern was intrinsically understood ‘urgent’, ‘nationally 
evident’, ‘historically meaningful’, politically ‘provocative’ and highly ‘visible’ 
for the public and policymakers. Unsurprisingly, the emerging concern of 
affordability and energy price was then proved as the most ‘popularly 
understandable’, highly ‘tangible’ and politically salient change driver which was 
universally important beyond the boundaries of energy sector. As such, the recent 
constructed divergence and conflict between climate cost and energy price 
undermined the political support for climate and renewable policies.  
 
While this research found the different policy saliency of change drivers, it has not 
developed an explicit theoretical proposition about the characteristics that cause 
such varying policy impacts. It seems still something missing in the literature as 
well. Despite the introduction of ‘geographical and policy proximity’ concept by 
Nohrstedt and Weible (2010), it has remained yet under-theorised which features 
enhance the policy saliency of change drivers. The literature of focusing events 
(Birkland 1997; Kingdon 1995; Zahariadis 2007; Hermann 1972) presents a set of 
‘politically symbolic’ features that are important in attracting attention to an event. 
They include surprise, suddenness, threat, uncertainty, urgency, visibility, scale, 
the level of anomaly and exclusiveness. The policy saliency of a change driver 
could potentially be studied in further research. 
5.4.3. Policy context, contestation and alternative design    
 
In order to impose the perception of failure on a policy and thereby accelerate a 
significant change, the intrinsic policy saliency of change impetus is only a part of 
the story. It would never lead to a significant change in public policy, unless it is 
politically mediated and strategically framed by active advocacy coalitions.  The 





framing; it also depends on policy alternatives designed and offered by pro-
change coalitions
269
. In the early 2000s, when a set of ambitious policy 
recommendations were suggested by the PIU report, they were seen as ‘steps too 
far’ by policymakers. It was partly because of the lack of coalitional balance in 
favour of climate policies. The still dominant market paradigm that was being 
supported by a powerful advocacy coalition of politicians, businesses and civil 
servants was able to frame emerging climate challenges as something compatible 
with market ideas. By presenting it as a market failure, they claimed that it could 
be met simply by ‘light-touched regulations’. Therefore, early climate movement, 
by no means, was able to challenge the predominance of market paradigm. By 
contrast, geopolitical security challenges were constructed by the media and 
politicians as national security threats. Thereby, they substantially re-politicised 
energy policy. Nevertheless, the continuous dominance of liberalised thinking and 
market instruments in energy sector resisted against a fundamental overhaul in 
energy policy. As shown before, in the absence of a pro-change advocacy 
coalition with credible policy alternatives, the ‘likeminded’ energy departments 
framed security challenges in the way that affected established policies only very 
minimally.  
 
The coalitional balance shifted when the growing climate advocacy coalitions 
started to frame both challenges collectively as accumulative evidences for policy 
failure. It was the starting point of a process of market contestation by a wide 
range of energy policy stakeholders
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. The establishment of new departments also 
embodied such new constructed nexus implying that ‘energy and climate are 
inextricably intertwined’. The strategic exploitation of financial crisis and the 
challenge of fuel poverty by that coalition, as other evidences for market 
discrediting, facilitated a significant move away from market-based policymaking 
in the EMR. Nonetheless, whilst their contestation was able to fundamentally 
displace market paradigm, the absence of an alternative paradigm led to a status of 






Overall, empirical evidences in this study highlight the complementary role of 
pre-existing policy context
271
, including coalitional balance and their strategies, in 
the exploitation of policy salient change drivers, as proposition 3 formulated. 
Furthermore, this research also contributes into the emerging literature aiming at 
bridging between two already mismatch realms: policy narratives and the 
literature of policy process
272
. In recent developments, different studies claimed 
that ‘the inclusion of policy narratives as a causal variable in the policy change 
process is not only helpful but also critical’ to enhance its ‘explanatory power’ 
(Shanahan et al 2011: 536; Nowlin 2011; Nohrstedt 2011). Since their focus was 
particularly in the ACF, they describe policy narrative as a coalition strategy to 
policy change
273
. As such, a strategically constructed policy narrative
274
 is 
expected to frame the contestation of ‘interpretative hegemony’, to provide 
‘evidence of failure’ and to add ‘credibility’ and ‘legitimacy’ to policy alternatives 
(Kern 2012; Fischer 2003; Hall 1993; Nohrstedt 2011). Having analysed the role 
of different framing in policy changes, this research observed how a resonant 
combination of policy narratives could impose the perception of multiple failures 
on a policy paradigm
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.  Nonetheless, this study shows that even if a set of 
contestation strategies lead to discrediting established paradigm, they are not 
necessarily capable to fully replace old governance model. The emergence of 
paradigm ambivalence was a clear example. It reflected a state of ‘fundamental 
uncertainty’ in dominant paradigm that thus led to a form of ‘paralysed’ 
policymaking
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. This finding triggers another conceptual debate about which 
characteristics are required for a policy narrative or a mix of narratives, as evident 
in this case, to result in a wholesale paradigmatic shift. Perhaps, it could be 
studied in more detail later.  
5.4.4. The heterogeneity of advocacy coalitions and different policy 
weight   
 
As an important finding, this study sheds light on the black box of advocacy 
coalitions involved. Contrary to the initial ACF’s presumption about the 
‘homogeneity’ of coalition members, it reveals that, in this case, different 





influence on electricity policies. By this, this case study not only confirms the 
concept of heterogeneity of coalition membership (Weible 2009: 130), it also 
draws an analytical linkage between different types of policy change and the most 
influential members in changing policies in each level. Empirical evidence reflects 
that there was a wide range of diverse policy actors who had participated in the 
process of UK electricity policymaking. Indeed, advocacy coalitions here included 
representatives of political parties, ministers, governmental departments and civil 
servants, businesses and trade unions, academia and energy experts, consultancies 
and think-tanks, NGOs and civil society as well as media and journalists. Perhaps, 
each of those heterogeneous members were distinctively characterised based on 
the political resources they equipped with and the level of policy influence they 
enjoyed from. 
 
A very interesting observation showed that throughout various stages of the 
process of UK electricity change, different coalition members played different 
roles and presented different levels of policy weight. For example, in the case of 
EMR as a delivery-focused and technology-specific policy proposal, there was 
evident a high level of influence by businesses, technical analysts and civil 
servants in designing its ‘devilishly complex’ mechanisms.  It became clear 
particularly from interviews with some representatives of environmental NGOs 
and senior academics. Both were complaining from being marginalised by 
business lobbyists in the process of EMR (Interviews 6 and 7, two lead academic 
energy experts; Interviews 14 and 25, two representatives of Green Alliance and 
FoE). Throughout this research, I have heard similar statements to the quotation 
below: 
EMR is not representing too much ideological change …In fact, here I would say, technicality 
prevails novelty and ideology. So, in the EMR policy process, technical consultancies and 
business lobbies have been seen more influential than academia and NGOs. Though the latter 
are also involved in the process, they’re always invited to policy meetings, they’re constantly 
publishing their comments, but in reality their voices, I think, are not seriously heard here 
(Interview 6, Government advisor and head of a research centre on energy governance, 
January 2013). 
 
It was substantially different in the case of the Climate Change Act in 2008. It was 





While during that period of time political actors at ministerial and parliamentary 
levels officially supported and voted for such significant shift in policy objectives 
and institutional levels, the role of civil society and academia was crucial in 
initiating those ideas, framing solutions, convincing policymakers and shifting 
public opinion. This contextual explanation suggested that depending on which 
component of UK electricity policy was about to change, there was a particular 
group of actors who were then more influential than others. This conclusion 
opposed such simplistic claims that explain changes in electricity policy only 
based on the central role of big businesses or constantly driven by politicians. 
Instead, it provided an understanding of the links between the level of change and 
the policy weight of coalition members. As an evidence, a former member of 
DECC ministerial team divided the EMR process into two political and technical 
stages with different actors: ‘So firstly the policy objectives were clearly 
politically agreed and then technicalities were agreed in iteration between civil 
servants, academics, politicians and international experiences’ (Interview 46, 
Former member of DECC ministerial team, December 2012). Table 5 suggests a 
conceptual linkage between different levels of policy change and the most 
influential policy actors in this case study. It is, perhaps, a good starting point for 







Table 5: linking the most influential policy actors and different policy change levels 
Policy 
components  
Important factors and political 
resource 







-Ability to shape public opinion  
-Policy narrative construction and 
appropriation 
-Legitimacy and academic credibility  
-Impartiality and public acceptance 
-Idealist NGOs and civil society  
-Academics and Epistemic Communities 
-Media and press 






 -Public engagement capacities e.g. 
campaigning, media power, lobbying 
and establishing a ‘national 
conversation’ 
 








-Ministerial and parliamentary level  
-Access to political authorities and 
policy making venues 
-Political lobbying  
-Negotiation capacities and building 




-Senior civil servants 













- Bureaucracy   
 
-Delivery businesses and lobbyists 
-Middle range civil servants 
-Policy specialists and consultancies 
-Think tanks and advisory bodies 
-Instrument constituencies 





5.4.5. The accumulative process of change and paradigm incoherency  
 
By reviewing the process of change for more than a decade, it seems that policies 
change gradually and evolutionary over a long period of time. They are often a 
reaction to unintended consequences of previous policies rather than complete 
disconnected shifts. As such, policy change is not a ‘single event’. It is an 
interrelated ‘process’ characterised by both ‘path dependency’ (Pierson 2000) and 
also ‘policy feedbacks’ (Patashnik 2008). While some changes are incremental 
and minor, at the same time they are bases for further changes
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. Collectively 
they make an accumulative change process. For instance, while the vague targets 
and marginal low-carbon mechanisms seemed disappointing at the early 2000s, 
they triggered a further stage of policy change either by introducing targets as a 





coalition through financial subsidies and cluster building. Similarly, although 
security challenges did not eventuate in a set of remarkable shifts in policy 
components, the resultant re-politicisation legitimised greater role of government 
and re-awakened public attention to energy issues. That context then facilitated 
change in the state machinery and political support for legally binding targets in 
2008. The chain of actions was accelerated by the policy feedbacks of such strong 
legislations and institutional reforms. They marked an intensive process of 
‘political struggle’ that paved the way of a further significant move beyond target 
setting into technology delivery. Despite the fact that all recounted changes by 
2012 still did not represent a paradigmatic shift, it is undeniable that their 
accumulative effect highly discredited market paradigm. It is compatible with 
what Hall (1993) predicted that ‘the accumulation of anomalies’ and ‘multiple 
adjustments stretch the intellectual coherence of the paradigm’ and gradually 
undermine its ‘credibility’.  
  
Whilst previous chapter aimed at characterising the UK electricity policy changes 
based on their type and level, the findings of this chapter could contribute in the 
literature of change process  In contrast to sharp distinction between continuity 
and change in conventional ‘punctuation theories’ (Baumgartner & Jones 1993; 
Hall 1993; Pierson 2000), a new generation of frameworks argue that ‘change and 
stability are in fact inextricably linked’ (Streeck & Thelen 2005; Kern & Howlett 
2009; Mahoney & Thelen 2010). As such, significant changes often take place 
through a ‘gradual process of breakdown and replacement’ which is ‘cumulatively 
transformative’
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. Apparently, the case of UK electricity policy change by 2012, 
to some extent, provides supportive evidences for the latter. This represents an 
accumulative change process in which unintended consequences of each step call 
for more changes in the next step.  It shows how changes in some components 
undermine policy ‘consistency and coherency’ and thereby they open up the door 
for a reproductive loop of adjustments. Theoretically, the conceptualisation of that 
process and the analysis of the role of every step of change in stimulating such 





contributions to the literature of change ‘modes and strategies’
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. Though, such 
contribution falls out of the original scope of this research. 
 
5.5. Conclusion and summary   
 
On the basis of an analysis of the process of shift in the UK electricity policy over 
a period of almost 12 years, this chapter aimed to explain why and how such levels 
of change in policy components, characterised and measured before, occurred. 
The next chapter will focus particularly on explaining change in low-carbon 
technology mix. Consistent with the wording adopted in previous chapter, this 
chapter illustrated which dynamics shifted the UK electricity policy mix from a 
market-based, liberalised, privatised and technology neutral governance to a 
policy model in the late 2012 in which market was substantially discredited; a set 
of diverging objectives were legally binding; energy departments were highly 
politicised; a particular set of technologies were targeted; and a very complex 
package of policy instruments were in place.  
 
By applying the insights from the literature of policy process and change, 
particularly the ACF, this chapter draws a dynamic picture of interrelation 
between change drivers and pre-existing policy context. Whilst it introduces the 
concept of policy saliency for change drivers, it claims that actual changes are also 
affected by policy context’s reaction to those change impetuses. In fact, their 
policy impact could be either amplified or undermined, depending on the 
coalitional balance and strategies in favour or against policy change. Together, a 
combination of policy salient change driver and supportive coalitional strategies 
could contest established policies and offer solutions. The main argument here is 
that the level and the type of final changes in policy components are the function 
of how significant and irreconcilable the imposed perception of policy failure is. 
Such relative and constructed understanding of anomaly and deficiency could 
explain why the UK electricity policy has experienced distinctive forms of change 





market paradigm observed, whereas in early stages, a set of market-compatible 
adjustments were seen adequate. 
 
Despite remarkable findings, this research was unable to contribute in the 
literature of paradigmatic shift. The main reason was that notwithstanding an 
accumulative alteration in almost all policy components, the UK electricity policy 
did not yet represent a wholesale paradigmatic shift. Likewise, although this study 
found distinctive policy saliency of change drivers, it did not provide a clear 
understanding of characteristics required. It was the same for the role of policy 
narrative as a coalition strategy. Whilst the incorporation of narrative in the realm 
of policy process studies was a contribution in itself, compared to previous studies 
of the UK energy policy changes
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, it remained for further research to show how 
policy narratives could not only displace predominant paradigm, but also replace 
it with a new policy alternative. And finally, this research opened the doors to a 
debate in future about the ‘modes’ and ‘pathways’ of change process. As a 
preliminary finding, by presenting an accumulative and gradual process of 
transformation, it showed how change in different policy components, e.g. policy 
objectives in 2008, could trigger further changes in other components, e.g. 











6. Chapter Six: Understanding Gradual 
Transformations in Electricity Low Carbon 
Technology Policy 
 
6.1. Introduction  
 
This chapter aims to answer the third research question by investigating how and 
why the low carbon technological balance of UK electricity policy had gradually 
shifted throughout the period of study, 2000-2012. It reflects this fact that in the 
early 2010s the choice of technology turned into the heart of UK electricity policy 
debate. Particularly, EMR was seen as the first electricity policy over almost three 
decades that was substantially designed to support ‘the low carbon technology 
family’, largely nuclear and renewable
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. To provide a deep contextual 
explanation of such incremental alteration in electricity policy, this chapter moves 
beyond the traditional metaphor of policy literature in focusing primarily on 
significant policy changes driven by external drivers. As such, it shows how two 
already divergent nuclear and renewable advocacy coalitions compromised on an 
agreement as the result of an inevitable process of policy negotiation. It then 
explains why the UK electricity policy was fraught with policy tensions in the 
post-White Paper context. This chapter refers it to EMR’s characteristics like 
policy ambiguity and over-complexity. Subsequently, it observes a reduction in 
political significance of nuclear technology due to either the post-Fukushima 
context with the emergence of shale gas or a fall in political support of 
Conservative party. Finally, it points to an interrelation between nuclear-
renewable reconciliation and a form of internal defection within both advocacy 
coalitions. Theoretically, this chapter expands the explanatory power of the ACF 
concept of negotiated agreement by claiming that compromised policies are often 





retrenchment or even reversibility following any alteration in original contextual 
arrangements or coalitional balance. 
6.1.1. The choice of technology at the heart of contemporary electricity 
policy 
 
As explained in previous chapters, since the late 2000s and the early 2010s, the 
choice of technology turned into the heart of UK electricity policy debate. In fact, 
for the first time in the post-privatisation context, there was no longer any 
electricity policy without a serious consideration to the notion of low carbon 
technology. It means the main policy question that every electricity policy was 
expected to answer was an outline of through which technological trajectories the 
UK electricity-specific targets are to be met. As of 2011, this discussion 
culminated in the period of EMR. As such one of the main characteristics of EMR 
was the fundamental shift it represented in the technological direction of the UK 
electricity policy. As discussed earlier, after a long period of technology neutrality 
followed by a period of ‘re-politicisation’ and ‘target-setting’, EMR was 
conceived as a major policy proposal aiming at the delivery of low carbon 
technologies and moving ‘beyond target-setting’. Although the policy rhetoric of 
technology-blindness amongst low carbon options, i.e. nuclear, renewable and 
CCS, was still in place, it soon became clear that the design of EMR would have 
potentially different consequences for various technologies. Given that CCS was 
then a ‘yet to commercialise’ technology, the nuclear-renewable
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 competition 
was central to the EMR policy process.  
 
Therefore, this chapter seeks to analyse the UK electricity policy change through a 
technological lens by investigating the differing balance between nuclear and 
renewable policy since the early 2000s. It is expected that throughout that 
analysis, this thesis could shed light on the evolving role of nuclear and renewable 
as the main UK low carbon electricity technologies. Furthermore, it also sets out 
to explain why and how the nuclear-renewable balance had gradually shifted 





this analysis is largely based on almost 53 interviews conducted and 
complementary document analysis as well as secondary material.  
6.1.2. Analytical framework and theoretical proposition 
 
In order to provide an in-depth understanding of such gradual shift represented in 
the shifting low carbon technological elements of UK electricity policy over the 
period of 2000-2012, the fourth section of analytical chapter moved beyond the 
traditional metaphor of policy change literature in focusing primarily on major 
and significant policy changes. Indeed, the main policy change frameworks draw 
a ‘rather sharp conceptual line between [continuity] and discontinuous changes’ 
(Thelen 2009: 474). Therefore, they hardly address a ‘gradual transformation’ 
such as what was represented in the shifting low carbon technological balance of 
the British electricity policy particularly under EMR. Likewise, inspired by 
‘varieties of neo-institutionalism’ literature
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, they explain policy changes largely 
on the basis of the emergence of an external change driver.  
 
To cover those theoretical gaps in answering the third research question, chapter 
two formulated proposition 4. Amongst various factors that have contributed to 
this change, this proposition was mainly based on the concept of ‘negotiated 
agreement and policy compromise’ introduced by the recent developments of the 
ACF (Sabatier & Weible 2007). Having reviewed theoretical and empirical 
literature of gradual policy change through policy compromises, it focused on 
theorising the role of negotiated agreements in changing technological elements of 
electricity policy as a basis for empirical examination and testing. Having showed 
the substantial ‘importance’ of negotiated agreement as a pathway to ‘gradual-
evolutionary’ changes via ‘often mixed policy solutions’ in previous studies 
(Nohrstedt 2008; Ingold 2011), this thesis theorises what happens next once a 
policy has changed through a mutual compromise. For this purpose, chapter two 
then tried to expand the explanatory power of ‘negotiated agreement’ by 
incorporating insights from the Institutional Change theory (Thelen 2009). As 






Proposition 4: Compromised policies often suffer from ‘contested’ arrangement 
and ‘ambiguous’ design which keeps open a space for ‘continuous tension’ and 
‘re-interpretation’. Therefore, they are always ‘vulnerable to shift’ following 
‘contextual change’ or new ‘coalitional balance’.   
 
  
6.1.3. Outline of the chapter 
 
The conceptual development manifested in proposition 4 is used here to inform a 
contextualised explanation of the case. Accordingly, the rest of this chapter 
examines this proposition by applying it in the case of UK electricity policy 
between 2000 and 2012. Respectively, the following two sections historically 
review different stages of the nuclear-renewable relations. Although both sections 
are based on a mixture of empirical evidence, the latter relies largely on original 
semi-structured interviews. It is, perhaps, due to the lack of already analysed 
literature about very contemporary changes in EMR. The analysis in section two, 
in contrast, is structured mainly upon investigating policy documents and 
secondary material. Within that context, the main focus is on long-term 
divergence and conflict between nuclear and renewable policy which gradually 
conformed to a form of nuclear-renewable reconciliation. This strategic 
convergence was initially manifested in the Coalition Agreement and then 
formulated overall under the Electricity Market Reform (EMR) policy package 
and the introduction of Contract-for-Differences (CfD) in particular. Having 
studied the empirically rich story of the case, section four discusses findings of 
empirical evidence and applies the chapter’s proposition to them. In addition, that 
section suggests a further hypothesis as a theoretical base for further applications. 
Finally, a summary of the contributions and conclusions of this thesis comes 






6.2. Nuclear-renewable relations by the late 2000s: the 
history of divergence 
 
For several decades, nuclear and renewable technologies had been seen as two 
extremely divergent and technically incompatible energy sources. While support 
of renewable energy has been rooted ideologically in environmental ideas 
advocated originally by green civil societies and NGOs, nuclear technology, by 
contrast, represents the controversial inheritance of militarisation and large-scale 
industrialisation. This mismatching history became even more problematic after 
the subsequent emergence of renewable industry, due to an additional sense of 
commercial competition in attracting public support and market share. This sub-
section reviews briefly the historical backgrounds of several decades of nuclear-
renewable conflict. 
6.2.1. A background of fluctuating nuclear policy  
 
The UK government support of nuclear dates back to almost the 1950s after the 
Second World War. As other countries with a legacy of military interest in nuclear 
technology, the UK tended to develop civil nuclear power as well. Since then, ‘the 
UK continued to play a leading role in developing [civil] innovative nuclear 
technologies
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’ (Worthington, the then Shadow Minister for Energy and Climate 
Change, 2013). This high political status, derived from the ‘dual functionality’ 
characteristic of nuclear technology, was intensified by the 1970s’ oil shock with 
a ‘wave of new investments’ in nuclear power stations as an ‘indigenously 
produced’ and geopolitically secure power technology  (Lockwood et al 2013: 16). 
   
In the late 1980s and 1990s following the process of privatisation in the UK 
electricity sector and the application of a pool market, nuclear stations were 
perceived as economically unattractive by the investors, due to their inherent 
inflexibility, scale and risk (Pearson & Watson 2012: 10). New policies were 
derived from the pro-market approach of technological neutrality and ‘blindness 





This happened despite a long period of strong governmental commitment to 
support nuclear by either 'nuclear tax' in the 1989 Electricity Act or Non Fossil 
Fuel Obligation (NFFO). Consequently, in the 1995 Nuclear Review (The 
Prospect for Nuclear Power in the UK), the UK government declared its 
disappointing prospect for commercial attractiveness and interventional 
justification of nuclear power (DTI 1995; Pearson & Watson 2012: 15). This fact 
was officially proclaimed in the 2003 Energy White Paper (Our Energy Future) 
where it says “its current economics make it [nuclear power] an unattractive 
option for new, carbon-free generating capacity and there are also important issue 
of nuclear waste to be resolved” (DTI 2003: 12). Although the document stated 
formally that “the option will remain open” (DTI 2003: 48); building any new 
nuclear power station, nonetheless, became subject to “the fullest public 
consultation”. This conclusion, perhaps, was highly contested by the nuclear 
lobby and led to its pro-active stance to alter state policy (Pearson & Watson 
2012: 24).  
 
Given the dominance of crisis narrative derived from a geopolitically-informed 
security concern in the mid 2000s, a direct policy response was a shift – ‘albeit 
somewhat covertly’- towards a more ‘home grown’ and domestically produced 
energy portfolio. As a result, in contrast to nuclear disappointment and 
'indifference' in the 2003 EWP, the nuclear lobby smartly started an intensive 
effort to convince government through an opportunistically association with the 
energy security agenda and supply diversity. After almost a ‘decade of anti-
nuclearism’ (Interview 32, Former minister in Department of Energy, 
Conservative MP, August 2012), they persuaded the Labour government that a 
trinity prospect of the 2003 EWP including energy efficiency, renewable and 
CCS, might not keep lights on and guarantee security of supply. A long-
exprienced civil servant at that time shared his interpretation of the hidden reasons 
for the evolution of Labour nuclear policy as below: 
 
Well, I think Mr Blair was, probably, had always taken a view that, you know, nuclear 
should be able to compete if it could stand on its own two feet, but, you know, they had 
accepted that the old Labour wing of the party were not going to let him do this and that, 





you know, that is was unrealistic to think that you could have the policy that was based 
just on renewables and energy efficiency.  I mean you can caricature the 2003 white 
paper...and we reserve our position, or, you know, we’re not going to change our position 
on nuclear, for the moment, and if we do we will, you know, publish another white paper 
and consult about it... I think, the, there are various trends here that work in the 
background...Growing concern about climate change, and in, in this context, quite 
importantly, the appointment of David Kind as the Chief Scientific Advisor, who 
would’ve been saying to the Prime Minister that, you know, a policy that’s only based on, 
well, renewables and energy efficiency but didn’t actually do very much to promote them 
was not going to work... you know gradually getting to the point where, the Prime 
Minister felt that nuclear must be allowed back into the policy mix.  (Interview 39, DECC 
energy team senior member, August 2012) 
 
As a result, although the Blair ‘nuclear renaissance’ rhetoric, manifested in the 
2006 Energy Review (The Energy Challenge), was primarily challenged 
successfully by Greenpeace due to the lack of full consultation process, it 
eventually led to a governmental positive shift towards the nuclear option in the 
2007 Energy White Paper (Meeting The Energy Challenge): 'the economics of 
nuclear power now look more positive than 2003' and 'new nuclear power stations 
reduce the costs and risks associated' (BERR 2008: 21). However, the inevitable 
'careful language' of the White Paper did not declare any propensity to nuclear 
public support (Pearson & Watson 2012: 26): 'it would be for private sector to 
fund, develop, and build new nuclear power station'. Nevertheless, some forms of 
state support were then consolidated by the following Nuclear White Paper, at 
least for supporting 'decommissioning costs' (BERR 2008: 36). More importantly, 
that document not only confirmed that ‘the Government believes new nuclear 
power stations should have a role to play in this country’s future energy mix’, it 
also emphasisd that ‘the Government should take active steps to facilitate this’ 
(ibid: 7). 
6.2.2. The growing but marginal renewable policy 
 
As a general pattern, the 1970s’ oil crisis was a starting point to the issue of 
alternative energy sources including renewable, whereas initial motives got 
watered down in the UK after oil price decline and the discovery of North Sea 
resources. During the Conservative era, renewable demand was expected 
predominantly as a natural result of a freely trading market (IEA 1998: 67; DETR 





was stated in the New Labour electoral manifesto in 1997, although they said very 
little about how they wanted to meet that target.  
 
At that time, the Climate Change Levy, the creation of the Carbon Trust, and the 
replacement of NFFO with the Renewable Obligation (RO) were the main policies 
in place. Nevertheless for the renewable advocacy coalition, the introduction of 
RO (DTI 2000), as the first renewable-specific policy opposed by the nuclear 
lobby, was ‘an achievement in itself’ (Kuzemko 2011: 129; Mitchell 2000). 
Indeed, NFFO had never specifically supported renewable technologies
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, 
compared to its large support of nuclear (Mitchell 2000: 293-4; Kuzemko 2011: 
129). As an over-optimistic analysis, the 2002 Energy Review even doubled the 
renewable target to 20% by 2010 and another 20% by a further decade (PIU 2002: 
6). But like most of other ambitious features of the PIU report, the renewable 
target was also conceived by policymakers as ‘a step too far’ (Kuzemko 2011: 
142) and eventually was heavily compromised in the 2003 Energy White Paper. 
This case shows a clear example of ‘hard battle’ between the politically influential 
nuclear lobby and a coalition of environmentalists and relevant departments like 
DEFRA. Based on the report of an insider interviewee, Kuzemko (2011: 144) has 
pointed in a lose-lose trade-off.  The 20% renewable target by 2010 was ignored. 
In return, any likely new nuclear build was subjected to a full White Paper review. 
Although that report deliberately rejected the state’s responsibility to decide about 
the fuel mix and to set technology targets, it only informally ‘predicted’ a 10% 
share of renewable technologies by 2010 and the same for another further decade 
(DTI 2003: 12): ‘In reducing carbon dioxide emissions, our priority is to 
strengthen the contribution of energy efficiency and renewable energy sources’ 
(DTI 2003: 12).  
 
The status of renewable policy remained almost intact in the 2007 Energy White 
Paper. Given the ‘reappearance’ of nuclear power at the centre of policy attention, 
triggered by security concerns, renewable policy suffered from a sense of 
complacency about ‘significant progress’ that had been made under RO. As the 





a form of Feed-in-Tariff or ‘long-term contracts’ (Henney 2011a: 290). 
Nevertheless, the fact that the increased 'multiplicity of options' might reduce 
security risks was utilised partially by the renewable coalition to justify the 
necessity of moving away from an over-reliance on fossil fuel resources 
(Interview 25, Senior policy fellow at Friends of the Earth, January 2012).  
6.2.3. Continuous nuclear-renewable conflict 
 
Since the inception of civil nuclear technology as a matter of public attention 
following an era of ‘private-secretive’ development, it has always remained 
socially, politically and environmentally an ‘ironically controversial technology’ 
(Wynne 2010: 1). This fact was reflected in the 1970s by the Nuclear Power and 
the Environment Report (Flowers 1976): “nuclear development raises long-term 
issues of unusual range and difficulty which are political and ethical, as well as 
technical, in character”. Attracting public engagement and debate around nuclear 
led to ‘several high profile and long-lasting public inquiries’ that took place and 
were extended later under the Labour government.  
 
Although the anti-nuclear movement in the UK has never been as politically 
powerful as in other European countries without nuclear military legacy such as 
Germany and Denmark, green NGOs have always actively challenged the 
environmental consequences of nuclear development. Their position has been 
further reinforced by the emergence of an accumulatively subsidised renewable 
industry as a potentially business rival for the nuclear industry. From their point of 
view ‘nuclear… stands like bouncer at the door blocking the way for renewables’ 
(GreenPeace 2008: 11). Added to the economic competition in gaining public 
support, there is a technical rationale that the two ‘technology families’ are not 
particularly compatible. Once one is established, ‘technology-specific 
complementarities’, e.g. network infrastructure, are ‘likely to crowd out the other 
family’ (Katz & Shapiro 1985: 424-25).   
 
Together, the environmental coalition played an influential role in the 2002 PIU 





Paper about nuclear. Nevertheless, it became clearer and more challenging in the 
mid 2000s, when government policy re-shifted towards supporting new nuclear 
build, which had been practically ‘on-hold’ since Sizewell B in 1985. The 2006 
Energy Review was firstly sued legally by Greenpeace to the Royal Courts of 
Justice (RCoJ) as a “seriously flawed” and “wholly inadequate” consultation 
process (RCoJ 2007: 45). Once the process got repeated, it was again abandoned 
by other NGOs like the Green Alliance and WWF, due to what they labelled as a 
‘sham’ and ‘rubber stamping exercise to legitimise a decision already taken’ (see 
Macalister 2009; Johnston 2012). Generally, the anti-nuclear movement criticised 
the transformation of an originally political process as an increasingly 
‘technocratic rationality and post-political’ deliberation which exclude significant 
social and environmental concerns. It seems that widespread public engagement 
and the role of civil society in the nuclear policy process is no longer appreciated. 
Instead, it was perceived, in Johnston’s (2012) term, as a ‘planning risk’ 
constraining up-scaling new nuclear stations. This problem was significantly 
deepened following the 2008 Planning Act (HMG 2008b) that will be elaborated 
later.  
 
6.3. Nuclear-renewable reconciliation: the era of 
vulnerable compromise 
 
6.3.1. The 2008 Climate Change Act, the ‘minimised concept’ and the 
second nuclear 'renaissance’   
 
If security concerns revived the option of nuclear, then the statutory de-
carbonisation target necessitated nuclear as the most economically feasible and 
environmentally friendly option for meeting that target. As a result of the legally 
binding target of %80 reduction in carbon emissions by 2050 in the 2008 Climate 
Change Act, the huge practical gap between this ambitious target and the actual 





huge political and legal cost. The exploitive capability of the pro-nuclear lobby 
attempted seriously to persuade policy makers that nuclear is the most accessible, 
mature and affordable low carbon option.  As a RSPB campaigner pointed out, by 
fracturing and downgrading the concept of multiple 'environmental pollution' to 
'just carbon', they smartly exploited this 'minimised definition' to attach 
themselves to the pro-climate coalition (Interview 11, Senior planning policy 
officer at RSPB, December 2011). They proposed two fully divergent scenarios 
which need to be chosen from either ‘abandoning climate change target publicly’ 
or ‘investing on nuclear’ (Interview 42, the former member of DECC energy 
team, August 2012). 
 
‘In fact, the climate change substantially shifted the debates around nuclear from de-
commissioning and economics to low carbon generation. It was supported by no-subsidy 
narrative as well’ (Interview 41, CBI Energy Group member, August 2012).  
 
This pattern was also evident in different scenarios of published reports by the 
Committee of Climate Change (CCC), as the advisory body for meeting the 2050 
target. They presented nuclear-based scenarios as the most economically feasible 
and practically deliverable options to replace CCGT, as the base load 
technology
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(Interview 33, Director of energy policy in one of the Big Six, 
August 2012; Interview 44, Head of energy policy at one of the Big Six, 
September 2012). As a result in late 2009, Ed Miliband as the DECC’s Secretary 
of State at the time, announced ‘the most ambitious’ nuclear plan in Europe for 8 
new nuclear power plants. It reflected a substantial shift in the level of debates 
around nuclear as a climate change mitigating technology. Since then, this status 
was widely described as a ‘nuclear renaissance’ (Cooper 2009; Sovocal 2011; 
Henney 2011a; Johnstone 2012: 2; MacKerron 2012) indicating the ‘resurgence’ 
of nuclear as a joint strategy for both challenges: mitigating climate change and 
ensuring energy security. 
 
To summarise, it could be argued that the most important advantage of the pro-
nuclear coalition was the ability to present nuclear as the only way of reconciling 
a ‘certain degree of different objectives’. Though, this argument has been albeit 








There is a long history of discussion over the question of whether or not the UK needs 
new nuclear. As of 2008, the nuclear industry, led by EDF, had been able to assure the 
already sceptical public about nuclear’s safety and cleanness and it strategically pushed 
the focus away from controversial issues like radiation and nuclear waste towards carbon 
emissions and global warming (Interview 11, Senior planning policy officer at RSPB, 
December 2011) 
 
6.3.2. The imbalance in political power: the defection of the anti-nuclear 
coalition and the 2008 Planning Act 
 
Following the 2008 Climate Change Act, the originally integrative anti-nuclear 
environmental coalition was broken down due to a series of dynamics. Firstly, 
some members of the environmental coalition gradually became more relaxed 
towards nuclear. They were mostly high profile individuals, called ‘heretics’ by 
others, who inevitably perceived nuclear as a ‘necessary evil
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’ to address climate 
change
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 (Interview 11, Senior planning policy officer at RSPB, December 2011; 
Interview 14, Policy research fellow at Green-alliance, December 2011). As an 
example, Mark Lynas in "What the Green Movement Got Wrong" (2010) 
suggested that opposition by environmentalists, such as himself, to the 
development of nuclear energy ‘had speeded up climate change’.  
 
Had the Green movement of the Seventies and Eighties supported nuclear power — 
instead of violently opposing plans for greater use of atomic energy — we would not be 
facing the climate crisis we are today (Lynas 2011). 
 
Similarly the British environmental-journalist George Monbiot moved to the 
nuclear camp when he ‘harshly’ condemned the anti-nuclear movement because it 
‘has misled the world about the impacts of radiation on human health’ (2011). 
This movement was started initially by environmentalists like James Lovelock 
who in 2004 argued that "only nuclear power can now halt global warming" 
(McCarthy 2004), as the only realistic alternative to fossil fuels. As another 
instance, Stephen Tindale who was the Executive Director of Greenpeace until 
2005, alongside some other members rejected its conventional position against 
nuclear and started lobbying for it. As an environmental politician summarised to 





side'. He pointed to a form of 'implicit agreement between [those parts of] 
environmental and nuclear lobbies' who 'synergistically' supported each other to 
persuade the public for de-carbonisation via nuclear (Interview 43, former DECC 
Secretary of State SPAD, August 2012). 
 
The environmental coalition has at least two parts. There is a part that regards nuclear 
power as an environmental solution and there is a part that regards nuclear power as a 
continuous environmental problem. So, environmental coalition itself is a bit divided on 
that (Interview 15, Former politician and head of an Energy Institute, December 2011). 
 
Besides individual figures, it became also the case for some ‘moderate NGOs’ 
who practically got rather convinced that meeting electricity carbon reduction 
targets through renewable generation alone is quite difficult and challenging. It is 
evident in the following quotations from two interviews conducted with senior 
analysts in Green Alliance and WWF: 
 
Comparatively, the significant drawbacks of nuclear are outweighed by the more 
significant drawbacks of not doing anything possible to deliver low carbon power 
mitigating climate change (Interview 14, Policy research fellow at Green-alliance, 
December 2011).  
 
Because all analysis shows that meeting electricity carbon reduction targets through 
renewable alone is not at present affordable nor feasible in the timescales Government 
wants.  This has, over time, carried weight with Government, mainstream parties and 
those greens more focused on carbon rather than emotional antipathy to nuclear 
(Interview 17, Senior policy research fellow at Policy Exchange, December 2011). 
 
Nonetheless, the main green NGOs environmental activists continued with their 
opposition to nuclear and support of renewable technologies. In fact, nuclear still 
had kept elements of an ‘ironically controversial technology’ and is an issue of 
social and political concern for most of environmentalists. Insofar as the DECC’s 
Officer of Nuclear Development complained recently that still ‘each of the key 
decisions that Government has taken so far on nuclear power, has been the subject 
of challenge on judicial review. I expect that to continue’ (Higson 2013). As an 
instance, a Green Party MP has recently argued: 
 
It would be a folly to think that there is no hope of tackling climate change without 
nuclear power. But analysis using the government's figures shows that we don't need 
nuclear power to meet climate goals and keep the lights on. The path we take is a matter 






However, the internal schism certainly contributed to the weakening of ‘public 
opposition’ against nuclear power in the UK
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. It could be explained better by 
thinking about the marginal role of ‘ideological green NGOs’ in shaping overall 
British politics and public opinion compared to the European
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 level and other 
anti-nuclear countries like Germany (Interview 11, Senior planning policy officer 
at RSPB, December 2011; 41). This pattern ultimately led to a 'quieter' and less-
influential anti-nuclear coalition in the UK. This fact was evident by some studies 
showing a growth in the number of supporters for building nuclear stations up to 
double compared to whom were firmly against them
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 (Haslam 2013).  
 
The status of the nuclear side reflected clearly contrasting signs. Having access to 
the financial support of big companies, mainly 'state-backed' EDF, an open-hand 
in exploitation of the persuasive and ‘highly credible’ technical and engineering 
advice
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 (Interview 24, An economist and head of a low carbon research institute, 
January 2012; Interview 40, Consumer Focus Head of energy policy, August 
2012), and a close relation with some internal parts of government helped them to 
change the ‘mindset of policymakers’ in favour of the nuclear option. There was 
some unproved evidence like claims of a Friends of the Earth senior analyst that 'a 
proportion of the DECC budget was coming from nuclear industry' or the position 
of Gordon Brown's brother in EDF which ‘articulates how strong the connection 
is’ (Interview 25, Senior policy fellow at Friends of the Earth, January 2012). 
Similar comment made by a Lib-Dem politician based on this fact that 'two former 
Labour energy ministers, John Hutton and Alistair Darling, then became nuclear 
lobbyists' (Interview 43, SPAD of former DECC Secretary of State, August 2012).  
But the main person in changing policy rhetoric about nuclear, was seen as John 
Hutton who was ‘instrumental in securing the takeover of British energy by EDF’ 
(Interview 39, former DECC energy senior member, August 2012). More 
importantly, critics like Johnstone (2012) compared subsequent government 
policies, such as Planning Act, IPC and EMR, with what Keith Parker, the head of 
Nuclear Industry Association suggested in 2005. They argue that new policies are 
fully compatible with what he prescribed as key changes required for developing 





nuclear back to the legacy of military-civil links that it is still covertly in place in 
the UK. Therefore, she argued that the UK ‘energy policy is muddled with 
powerful regional and defence policies and lobbies’. 
 
Such strong lobbying had not been limited only to politicians. It also was 
expanded to civil servants as well. On the one side, institutional re-structuring 
including the creation of DECC and the marginalisation of independent Ofgem 
shifted overall institutional design towards a more ‘minister-led’ policymaking. 
As the former DECC Energy senior member described during an interview, this 
fact left the DECC more affected by both politician and business lobbies desire 
than Ofgem which was primarily responsible to public consumers (Interview 39, 
August 2012). Based on an analysis of the ‘register of meetings’ released by the 
DECC, a Guardian environmental journalist argues that the nuclear lobby is by far 
superior to other energy lobby groups: ‘the nuclear lobbyists are in a different 
league’ (Hickman 2013). On the other hand, given DECC is a newly established 
department
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, it opened up more spaces for ‘external stakeholders particularly the 
large number of inward secondees from energy industry’ (Interview 40, Consumer 
Focus head of energy policy, August 2012; Butler 2013). Another important 
lobbying factor, highlighted by a former member of the CBI energy group was the 
overall political stance of the CBI, as then a ‘credible’ climate policy supporter, in 
favour of nuclear. It was evident when the Labour’s first re-conversion towards 
nuclear was publicly announced by Tony Blair in the CBI conference in 
November 2005 (BBC 2005; Interview 38, CBI energy group member, August 
2012).  
 
The political position of nuclear was reinforced also by the introduction of the 
Planning Act (HMG 2008). In order to develop large scale infrastructures, 
particularly nuclear power stations, more rapidly, the planning system was 
expected to get ‘streamlined’ and ‘sped up’. Therefore, a clear distinction was 
made in between the consultative frameworks of National Planning Statements 
(NPSs) and those of local issues. Consequently, since then, there was no longer an 





the possibility to comment on their detailed designs or local issues. Nevertheless, 
several critics argued that regarding the still controversial nature of nuclear power 
and treating public consultations as ‘planning risks’ (HMG 2008), the 2008 
Planning Act eventually facilitates a less-democratic and more centralised 
decision making process on nuclear technology. They complained that by framing 
nuclear under an ‘incontestable rationality’, the planning system was inclined 
towards sidelining diverse perspectives by a ‘false consensus’ and preventing the 




It could be argued that [through Planning Act] it is easier to oppose the construction of 
wind farms than it is to substantially deliberate the issue of nuclear power (Johnstone 
2012: 5- 9). 
 
In sum, this set of factors shifted the overall political balance in favour of the 
nuclear side. It could partially explain why even in the post-Fukushima context, 
the level of political support for nuclear technology in Britain remained rather 
intact. As a Lib-Dem politician concluded, it seems that the nuclear lobby 
successfully exploited all three levels of lobbying space: public opinion and 
media; political parties and ministers; and, policy level and civil servants 
(Interview 43, SPAD of former DECC Secretary of State, August 2012). This fact 
should be analysed in conjunction with the emergence of another defection of 
political parts of the anti-nuclear coalition, which will be elaborated in further 
sections. 
6.3.3. The EU Renewable Directive (2008); renewable as ‘dual answer’ and 
the political-economy of RO   
 
Starting from the rhetoric of 20-20-20 in 2007, the European Union published a 
'climate and energy package' (EC 2007) revealing a significant tendency to 
enhance the role of renewable option in the energy portfolio to 20% at the 
European level, which subsequently was translated nationally into 15% from the 
entire UK energy production, under the Renewable Directive. It was a statutory 
obligation for the UK power industry which was expected to reach the minimum 





mandated level' was highly contested in terms of the huge economic costs it 
'hysterically' imposes on the UK, compared to other European countries, as well 
as its weakening effects on current de-carbonisation policies (Henney 2011a: 
261). A senior economic advisor of the DECC explained that the rationale behind 
such ‘shockingly over-ambitious demand-pull’ target was ‘to encourage 
investment in renewable innovation as a public good legitimising public support’ 
(Interview 12, Government advisor and the EMR Technical Expert Panel, 





Inspired by the still-in-place legacy of security concern, the renewable target re-
framed the debate around renewable as a ‘dual answer’ for both climate change 
and energy security: ‘…turning to renewable will help the UK recover some of its 
energy self-sufficiency’ (DECC 2009b: 10). This new mixed role for renewable 
technologies was manifested in a series of policy documents. As arguably 'the 
most comprehensive strategy' (Skea et al 2011: 51), the UK Renewable Energy 
Strategy (DECC 2009b) broke down the way of meeting 15% renewable 
obligation from all UK energy. It specified the share of each sector in reaching 
that target. More importantly, this pattern also led to a range of instrumental 
change from ‘banding’ RO technology-specifically to introducing a small-scale 
Feed-in-Tariff (FiT).  
 
Nevertheless, the Renewable Directive imposed a set of fundamental concerns for 
the effectiveness of RO under the new regime. Firstly, given the very low-level of 
renewable deployment at the time, there was a practical concern that under the 
current incentivising mechanism driven by RO, it would be ‘rather unlikely to 
meet this target’ (Interview 12, Government advisor and the EMR Technical 
Expert Panel, December 2011). More importantly, the Directive substantially 
changed the perception of support from ‘subsidising’ to ‘price fixing’. As a former 
senior member of the DECC energy team envisaged, meeting renewable target 
through RO would make the government a ‘machine of subsidy’. Thus, it could 





political constituency’ (Interview 39, August 2012). This group of critics argued 
that RO would work for ‘baby technologies’ with marginal proportion but it was 
absolutely ‘less-effective in delivering central technologies’ in-scale, as what is 
expected from renewable technologies to do under the EU Directive (Interview 
43, SPAD of former DECC Secretary of State, August 2012; 39). This concern 
would be more understandable in the context of the financial crisis which 
constrained dramatically the overall level of public expenditure. Whereas it 
elevated, instead, the affordability concern in which renewable technologies might 
be perceived by the public as ‘expensive and luxury’ options
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. In addition, there 
was another non-renewable concern as well. Given the high-level of political 
support for nuclear at the time, ‘over-subsidising’ renewable under RO could also 
‘undermine the economics of nuclear technology and would threaten its 
competitiveness’ (Interview 39, the former DECC Energy senior member, August 
2012).  
 
In sum, following the over-ambitious renewable target, the inability of RO, in 
terms of either economic cost or the level of delivery for renewable technologies, 
became widely apparent. It was also understood by pro-nuclear politicians as a 
threat for the political-economy of the nuclear technology (Interview 43, SPAD of 
former DECC Secretary of State, August 2012). Altogether, these dynamics 
stimulated a shift from RO to a ‘more inclusive’ and ‘price fixing’ mechanism, 
which will be discussed later. 
 
6.3.4. Coalition Government; ‘no public subsidy’ narrative and nuclear-
renewable compromise  
 
Following the general election in May 2010, none of the main political parties had 
sufficient majority to form a single-party government. Consequently, for the first 
time since the Second World War, an intense process of negotiation started 
amongst the three main political parties. Given several years of ‘great alliance of 
the Liberal-Labour centre-left’ (Laws 2010: 7), the actual result came as a surprise 





Liberal Democrat Coalition Government. In terms of the nuclear-renewable 
balance, the negotiation prospect was challenging. With respect to the traditional 
propensity
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 of Conservatives to nuclear as well as political antipathy to 
renewable technologies and in particular, on-shore wind; there was expected a 
huge conflict with Lib-Dems who had been typically anti-nuclear and pro-
renewable simultaneously. In his book, David Laws, one of the then Lib-Dems’ 
negotiators, has reported a few quotations about nuclear-renewable debate from 
that politically historical discussion.  
 
But on nuclear power we came to an era of obvious disagreement. Oliver Letwin 
[Conservative negotiator] said: ‘Look, there is a genuine disagreement here. But this need 
not be an era of confidence. We can agree that the Lib-Dems do not need to support 
nuclear power’… Chris Huhne [Lib-Dems negotiator and subsequent DECC Secratery of 
State] responded that the issue was one of public subsidy, ‘Can we agree that there should 
be no public subsidy for nuclear power? It is incredibly expensive’…Oliver replied: ‘Yes, 
there will be no direct public subsidy. But as we put the carbon price up, that will 
obviously favour non-carbon generating technologies’. We agreed on a form of words on 
this…Chris Huhne suggested that there needed to be much greater ambition on carbon 
reduction and renewable technologies that ‘until recently, Labour just hasn’t done enough 
on this’… [during Labour-Lib Dem talks] Ed Miliband [Labours negotiator and former 
DECC Secretary of State] said that it was impossible to stop climate change without 
relying on nuclear power: ‘We must have more nuclear power to meet our climate change 
targets’ (Laws 2010: 118, 151, 171). 
 
To resolve that challenge, both parties eventually agreed on a form of bilateral 
agreement which kept all options open and left some windows for further 
challenges. The Coalition Agreement (HMG 2010) came to an ambiguous 
wording on that contract. They agreed ‘to increase the target for energy from 
renewable sources
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’, while they still pretended there is 'no public subsidy 
specifically for nuclear power' unless 'general measures' that would be in place as 
part of wider policies (Henney 2011a: 101). In other words, they pledged to resist 
neither nuclear nor renewable. It was, indeed, as a part of the deal that the position 
of the DECC Secretary was given to the Lib-Dems.  
 
Liberal Democrats have long opposed any new nuclear construction. Conservatives, by 
contrast are committed … [but nuclear stations] receive no public subsidy. We have 
agreed a process that will allow Liberal Democrats to maintain their opposition to nuclear 







But in reality, the political balance of final agreement shifted slightly in favour of 
the nuclear option. Indeed, the formation of the Coalition Government and its 
compromise generally weakened the party-political power of the anti-nuclear 
advocacy coalition. This fact ultimately exacerbated the pattern of coalition 
defection amongst environmental activists. As a former Lib-Dem Special Advisor 
of the DECC Secretary said during an interview, the position of being a central 
part of ‘governmental game’ as the DECC Secretary of State has firmly 
constrained the Lib-Dems’ flexibility ‘to politically lead an anti-nuclear coalition’. 
On the other hand the accumulative ‘Labour-Tory consensus’ on nuclear support 
was ‘fairly strong’. The nuclear option was an attractive case for both 'left-wing 
industrial policy' and 'right-wing big-project desire' (Interview 43, SPAD of 
former DECC Secretary of State, August 2012). Overall, the political significance 
of shift in the nuclear position of Lib-Dems has been compared by some energy 
analysts to the ‘re-conversion’ of Labour in the mid 2000s. 
 
Also important is conversion or re-conversion of Labour government to nuclear power in 
2006 Energy Review which had been rejected in 2003; and also conversion of the Lib-
Dems rather than the whole coalition agreement which enabled nuclear to continue to be 
on the agenda. The combination of those is important. The Tories were always in favour, 
the Liberals were against, but in the coalition agreement they agreed wording on nuclear 
power which enables nuclear power to go ahead without any subsidy… Now the green 
NGOs are anti-nuclear but not too much others. They are out of the mainstream even the 
Lib-Dems and Green Party. I think none of the media, no company, no one in the 
government are anti-nuclear (Interview 17, Senior policy research fellow at Policy 
Exchange, December 2011).  
 
6.3.5. The 2011 Electricity Market Reform White Paper: the way to delivery 
 
In response to the growing recognition of the fact that current electricity market 
design is unlikely to meet the Government's both electricity-specific targets 
(complete de-carbonisation and 30% renewable share) as well as to secure the 
future generation capacity and thereby energy security, the DECC launched its 
consultation on Electricity Market Reform (EMR) in December 2010, which 
resulted in the White Paper in July 2011 (Planning our electric future). This 
document was seen as a continuation of ‘a plethora of warning documents’ 
including Project Discovery (Ofgem 2009), Energy Market Assessment (HMT 





to some electoral promises manifested in the Coalition Agreement for 'energy 
market reform to deliver security of supply and investment in low carbon energy' 
(HMG 2010). Amongst complex objectives of EMR, one of the most important 
aspects had targeted the delivery of low carbon technologies, i.e. nuclear and 
renewable. Overall it was proposed to assure investors about the profitability of 
low carbon electricity supply investment with ‘maximum de-risking’ 
characteristics (Interview 46, Former member of DECC ministerial team, 
December 2012). As the then DECC Secretary of State, Chris Huhne, wrote to 
The Daily Telegraph on December 16
th
 2010, at the day he launched the proposal 
in the House of Commons, attracting technology-specific private investment for 
both nuclear and renewable was of primary objectives behind EMR: 
 
...Some £110bn of investment, or more than double the normal amount in the next decade – 
must be in low-carbon and secure sources like renewables, nuclear, clean coal and gas if we 
are to meet our climate change targets...But nuclear and most renewables are [of] the mix that 
investors most dislike when faced with uncertainty...By forging a comprehensive response, we 
can unlock investment on an unprecedented scale...By providing greater certainty, we can 
encourage new market entrants and investors...However, there is no justification for paying 
extra support to nuclear, which is a mature technology... It is time to get off the fossil fuel hook 
and onto clean, green electricity (Huhne 2010). 
 
As shown in previous chapters, the White Paper technically introduced four 
mechanisms: Carbon Price Floor (CPF); Feed-in Tariff with Contract for 
Difference (FiT-CfD); Emission Performance Standard (EPS); and, Capacity 
Mechanism (CM). Although all mechanisms would have implications for low 
carbon technologies, the Contract for Difference (CfD) had been designed more 
inclusively to cover both nuclear and renewable options
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. Technically it was 
proposed to replace RO, which was supporting renewable technologies 
exclusively. The CfD has been regarded as 'the main mechanism of EMR' 
somewhere, which could potentially cover other aspects of EMR (Interview 18, 
Senior director at CCC, December 2011; UKERC 2011: 1). Most of the 
policymakers and civil servants I have interviewed, including the former DECC 
Secretary of State and Energy Minister, have claimed the neutrality of EMR’s 
original design amongst low carbon technologies, particularly renewable and 
nuclear (Interview 46, Former member of DECC ministerial team, December 





February 2013; Interview 30, Member of Energy & Climate Select Committee, 
Labour MP, July 2012).  
 
I do not regard signing a CfD for nuclear as a subsidy. I mean, I suppose you could 
construct it that it would be a subsidy, but the key point here is not that it is a subsidy, the 
key point is that it offsets the externality, the adverse externalities which are created by 
fossil fuel production, well, so obviously if you go beyond that and you pay more than 
that level, then that become specific subsidy to the industry. I am genuinely technology 
neutral on that sense and centre boat policy at this stage is that to make sure that we do 
not bet everything in one of the families of technology. So, I disagree with you that EMR 
was ever only for nuclear or renewable (Interview 46, Former member of DECC 
ministerial team, December 2012).  
 
They argued that through EMR, the UK would be the first country to introduce an 
inclusive mechanism for both nuclear and renewable technologies: ‘we will lead 
new energy era as we led energy liberalisation’ (Interview 47, Former member of 
DECC ministerial team, Conservative MP, February 2013). The Public Policy 
Advisor to Nuclear Industry Association (NIA) declared similar aspiration in his 
lecture a nuclear policy forum in central London that ‘what we were doing in 
terms of EMR, that’s seen as a real model for the future on how to finance nuclear 
power stations’ (Haslam 2013). This is conceived somewhere as a ‘maximum de-
risking approach’ (Interview 9,  professor of energy policy at Lancaster 
University, November 2011) ‘socialis[ing] nuclear investment risk' (Henney 
2011a: 104) to assure investors in the context of the Fukushima crisis and the 
German nuclear challenge. The rationale behind nuclear support has always been 
defended strongly by influential nuclear lobbyists: ‘I would argue strategically 
potentially that is a good condition for nuclear subsidies… we are buying 
ourselves an option’ (Blyth 2013). 
 
Nevertheless, despite EMR’s initial claim about inclusiveness and technology 
neutrality amongst low carbon options, its legislation process has been an 
attractive ground for different technological lobbies to compete for more long-
term gain and contracts. As a member of the Energy and Climate Change Select 
Committee of Parliament has, rather harshly, described, this is one of the three 






Look the Government’s policy is based on three lies, it’s based on that energy isn’t going 
to cost more, it’s also based on the lie that Government is neutral as between 
technologies, it’s not… And the third lie, I think, is that you can do nuclear without 
public subsidy. You can’t, and actually it’s about time that we said that openly (Interview 
30, Labour MP in DECC Select Committee, July 2012) 
 
In a very interesting comparison with post-2007 context, a former energy senior 
member at DECC expressed how far he was surprised by new nuclear policy 
under EMR: 
  
Yeah, the Friends of the Earth and, oh, I, was it Greenpeace, it was one of, probably both 
of them, took us to judicial review for not consulting properly.  The policy we actually 
consulted on was that we would allow nuclear to compete in the market, not that we were 
going to offer a subsidy.  And, and so, yes, there’s clearly been a change in government 
policy.  The government likes to say that, actually, it’s not a change in policy because 
we’re not offering nuclear as subsidy, but, but that seems, to me, to be clearly different 
from the policy on which we consulted. I don’t think we ever contemplated that we would 
be offering EDF a fixed price for nuclear under the original policy...I think, I think, now, 
question is was, was the, was it a shift in policy on nuclear that drove, that drove the 
EMR or was it, or was it EMR that drove the shift in nuclear policy?  Whether the 
Government felt there was an opportunity to, to support the nuclear transition?  Or, was it 
the other way round? (Interview 39, August 2012) 
 
After publishing the White Paper, there was a huge disagreement about the likely 
practical consequences of EMR on different technologies. Having analysed 
consultation responses of almost 233 stakeholders and several interviews 
conducted alongside reviewing further secondary material, my overall perception 
was that, despite some opposing perspectives and politicians’ public rejection, the 
existing 'one size fits all' settings of CPF and CfD were widely understood as a 
way to support nuclear power plants, whereas the extent of their support for 
renewable technologies was still unclear and dependent on further settings. 
Although I heard few moderate arguments like ‘I do not think that this is the 
winning of nuclear, this is just catching up of nuclear rather than renewable not 
complete winning (Interview 17, Senior policy research fellow at Policy 
Exchange, December 2011), the perception of imbalance support was reflected 
frequently by interviewees in phrases such as ‘nuclear is an obvious winner of 
EMR’ (Interview 1, Former Scottish energy directorate and member of UKERC 
advisory board, November 2011; Interview 6, Government advisor and head of a 
research centre on energy governance, January 2013; Interview 10, Emeritus 





Interview 9, professor of energy policy at Lancaster University, November 2011). 
Particularly, it became the main concern for green NGOs and the renewable 
industry who comparably preferred the RO’s 'stability and retention' (REA 2011: 
1; Scottish Government 2011: 2). 
 
This is fundamentally a package designed to support the needs of nuclear ... Renewable 
technologies come off a very poor second best….EMR will promote investment in new 
nuclear … at the expense of renewable energy – and even deliver windfall gains for 
existing nuclear power companies (FoE 2011: 1).  
 
The overarching aim of EMR from the Government’s perspective is to enable the building 
of new nuclear power, rather than the various other laudable objectives set out in the 
consultation… we would argue [it is] the result of a political need rather than the outcome 
of evidence-based policy analysis. (Exeter EPG 2011: 1-2). 
 
In short, there is no doubt that EMR was to fundamentally change the power 
technology mix towards a low carbon portfolio through attracting a ‘Herculean 
amount of investment’. On the basis of its original design, it was widely thought 
that nuclear would be fuelled much more than other low carbon options by EMR 
mechanisms, mainly CFP and CfD. Insofar as some critics argued that EMR 
seems as a 'complex cover justifying hidden state support' for nuclear and an 
‘escaping way’ from legal limitations of ‘no-subsidy’ narrative within the 
Coalition Agreement and the European State Aid legislation (Interview 43, 
Former SPAD of DECC Secretary of State, August 2012; Interview 6, 
Government advisor and head of a research centre on energy governance, January 
2013; Interview 41, CBI energy group member, August 2012; Interview 44, Head 
of energy policy at one of the Big Six, September 2012). Although, ‘[even talking 
about subsidies] became a real sort of dirty word and nobody wants to admit to 
having subsidies’, in practice it was clear then that ‘nuclear is subsidised now’ 
(Blyth 2013). This fact is also resonated in an interview quotation from a Friend 
of the Earth campaigner and senior analyst as follow: 
 
[EMR] is also built around the needs of nuclear, but in so doing it’s also tangled itself up 
in the need to avoid state aid complications, the Treasury’s obsession with having none of 
these commitments on the public books, and indeed trying to negotiate the mess that is 
the Coalition Agreement promise to have no new public subsidy for nuclear, in so doing it 
has some major problematic effects for other things. It means that we’ve ended up with a 
support mechanism that is highly complicated. (Interview 25, Senior policy fellow at 






On the other hand, EMR’s initial design imposed several ambiguities and 
uncertainties on the way of renewable technologies. In that context, the prospect 
for the 2020 renewable target
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forthcoming policy settings. The level of concern is clear in this statement by the 
representative of Renewable Energy Association in a policy conference in April 
2012. 
 
When I want to say something about EMR, I don’t really have anything, all I have is a 
load of questions, a load of questions and a load of kind of concerns about how it would 
work and for those of you that are Renewable Energy Association members…renewable 
industry is cautious about the process of Electricity Market. EMR is primarily for nuclear. 
Renewable technologies are being swept along in the flow, with little control over the 
outcome.  
6.3.6. The on-going policy process and the expansion of tension  
 
As the process of EMR legislation was going ahead between the White Paper in 
July 2011 and the Energy Bill in December 2012, a set of further tensions 
gradually became clear. Having reviewed written comments from different 
stakeholders and the pre-legislative scrutiny evidence sessions in Parliament, in 
addition to participating in several events including Westminster Energy Forums 
and conducting further interviews, the elements of an increasingly conflicting 
policy process were being empirically observed. On the one hand, regarding the 
‘level playing field between renewable and nuclear’ under the inclusive 
mechanism of CfD, it raised a serious concern amongst a part of the renewable 
industry and green NGOs. They believed that under current design, ‘renewable 
technologies will fare less well as it is proposed to have a shorter contract length, 
and it seems likely that nuclear will need a higher strike price than most 
renewables’ (REA’s written evidence to the Energy and Climate Change 
Committee, June 2012). They predicted that practically the renewable support will 
be getting ‘distorted’ by nuclear subsidy (Interview 43, SPAD of former DECC 
Secretary of State, August 2012).  
 
On the other hand, policy tensions exceeded the borders of industry and civil 





as well. Following the financial recession and growing concerns about renewable 
costs, the historical antipathy of right-wing Tory backbenchers against renewable 
technologies in general, and wind power in particular gradually started to reveal 
publicly. 
  
Tory scepticism about the RE is not something new or surprising for the UK. But what 
has shaken the Government’s political commitment to wind-power started by a letter 
signed by more than 100 Conservative MPs urged the prime minister to further cut 
subsidies to onshore wind-farms in 2011…what was even more politically significant, I 
believe, was the emergence of rumours around that the chancellor was sympathetic to the 
MPs as well. (Interview 52, Former civil servant and energy consultant, August 2012) 
 
In contrast, although government was keen to lay on the political rhetoric of ‘no 
public subsidy for nuclear’, the practical implication of EMR was widely 
perceived that ‘the government has broken its pledge not to subsidise nuclear 
reactors’ (Geels 2013). This contradiction has evidently affected intra-government 
conflict. 
 
Government’s policy is also based on the lie that Government is neutral as between 
technologies, it’s not, and the fudging that has gone on to square the tensions within the 
Coalition over nuclear (Interview 30, Labour MP in DECC Select Committee, July 2012). 
 
Coalition tension over nuclear-renewable support then was partially embodied in 
Treasury-DECC conflict, while there were visible other elements of either 
between or within-party
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 tensions as well. Such complicated political conflict 
was even expected to intensify, at the time of writing, since the compromise was 
thought still unsatisfactorily ‘paradoxical
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’ in a political context that upcoming 
election was also approaching (Interview 30, Labour MP in DECC Select 
Committee, July 2012). Furthermore, the 2012 reshuffle in the DECC showed ‘a 
serious move’ towards marginalisation of renewable technologies regarding the 
‘demotion’ of Charles Hendry, as a pro-renewable Conservative energy minister, 
who was replaced by Mr Hayes who already had declared his war against 
renewable technologies: ‘Renewable energy needs to pass the twin tests of 
environmental and economic sustainability, and wind power fails on both counts’ 
(Hayes in Harrabin 2012). In an opposing comment he said ‘we are working hard 







6.3.7. The 2012 Energy Bill and Gas Strategy; contextual shift and the risk 
of nuclear ‘relapse’ 
 
Despite great efforts made by successive UK governments to make nuclear 
investment as secure as possible, unsurprisingly nuclear was encountering several 
difficulties in the global context. On the one hand, the international challenges, 
like the Fukushima crisis and political protest against German nuclear power 
plants raised ‘divergent policy responses’ across the Europe and overall disputed 
‘nuclear’s renewed legitimacy’
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policy had still remained officially firm, the actual position of the nuclear option 
had being politically undermined, as was then reflected in further policies. On the 
other hand, what was so-called as ‘economic self limiting future of nuclear power’ 
(Kuzemko 2013; Johnstone 2012) had made it still economically uncompetitive 
and a financially unviable policy option. These conditions were derived from a set 
of factors including high capital cost, technical bottlenecks, long construction 
times, uranium importation, waste problems, decommissioning and security 
challenges. This fact was proved recently by evidence of several business 
challenges in the way of the first contract for a new nuclear plant since 1985. The 
withdrawal of E.ON and RWE as well as the semi-endless challenging negotiation 
with EDF, at least by the time of writing in summer 2013, had raised concerns that 
‘the nuclear dream has [practically] failed’ (Economist 2012).  
 
Indeed, these significant shifts in contextual features of nuclear led to reminding 
such pessimistic predictions that ‘the nuclear renaissance has so far been more 
rhetorical than actual’ (Sovocal 2011) and it ‘may actually turn out to be more of a 
nuclear relapse’ (Cooper 2009). Despite official policies being still in place, there 
were seen practical elements of policy reversibility and ‘nuclear give up’. 
 
They are very well aware, not just the Treasury, this is the politicians too, of the huge 
costs of the UK nuclear programme which took place in the 1970’s and 1980’s and which 
burdened the UK economy for many years and was a major public sector economic and 
technological disaster in Britain' history, bigger I think than any other thing. They won't 





got an almost impossible negotiation taking place and I don’t really see any good 
outcome out of that and I think the likely result, I’m afraid, is further delay and then … a 
bit of a rethink after the Election. It’s one aspect of EMR which I think has been set up to 
fail as it were (Interview 48, Former civil servant and fellow at an energy consultancy, 
July 2012) 
 
The challenging prospect of the UK nuclear policy was then politically used by 
two groups of policy stakeholders to strategically challenge the current nuclear 
aspiration and offer their own alternatives. Apparently the first group consisted of 
environmental activists and the renewable industry who had long wished to shift 
the pro-nuclear political balance and capture low carbon public resources. This 
tendency was clear from the comments of some interviewees I have talked with, 
as quoted here from a representative of the Friends of the Earth. 
   
I think there’s some really big questions at the moment about whether the level of new 
nuclear that the Government talks about will actually ever emerge, we’ve seen numerous 
Big Six companies pulling out of nuclear plans, we’ve seen estimates of the level of strike 
price that will be required to get new nuclear away from both the University of 
Birmingham and from City Groups suggesting nuclear will cost more, or demand more, 
than offshore wind to get those projects underway. (Interview 25, Senior policy fellow at 
Friends of the Earth, January 2012) 
 
As a result, despite keeping the main features of EMR’s original design intact, the 
2012 Energy Bill (DECC 2012a) revealed some further details of EMR’s 
implementation. By introduction of a ‘levy cap’, clean energy would be funded 
until 2020, almost at the amount that CCC had advised to meet emissions targets 
(CCC, response to Energy Bill draft, 2012). Given no new nuclear plant was 
expected by 2020, due to the long construction timescale, the large proportion of 
this money would go to meet the 2020 EU renewable target. Having reviewed 
several policy comments, there was a growing perception that renewable options 
would eventually gain a more balanced support under the 2012 Energy Bill than 
what was conceived under the 2011 EMR White Paper: ‘the Government has 
picked [both] nuclear and offshore wind “too early”’ (Shrestha 2012). 
Nevertheless, there still remained a high level of ‘anxiety’ remaining in the 







[By the Energy Bill] the government is now explicitly committed to meeting its 
obligations under the renewable directive. And it has provided the money to do so 
through increased cap in the levy control framework.… it has locked in the delivery of a 
third of our electricity from renewable by 2020 and pre-empted a lot of the money needed 
to subsidise new nuclear. (Burke 2012) 
 
The post-Bill positive prospective of renewable is reflected in what a senior 
representative of Renewable Energy Association said during a talk in one of the 
policy forums in central London I had participated in July 2013. It though clearly 
contrasts what the same person had said in 2012, quoted before, reflecting a big 
concern within renewable industry about the future of renewable support under 
EMR.  
   
So I think first point is sufficiency of the LCF, well is it sufficient for what?  So I’m not 
sure that that it is really sufficient, partly because we don’t know exactly what the Levy 
Control Framework is going to be paying for. The renewable energy industry, they’re on 
the whole quite happy with the strike prices. They’ve been set according to the levels that 
exist at the moment in the renewables obligation. There are enabling powers in the 
Energy Bill for a solution which guarantees renewable generators can sell their power at a 
reference price. So if they were happy with what they had under the Renewable’s 
Obligation, they will be happy with the current draft strike prices…   
 
The second group of policy actors was a combination of the gas lobby and right-
wing conventional Tories. They opportunistically were seeking to fill the capacity 
gap of any likely nuclear failure by a new generation of gas power plants. 
Following the discovery and forthcoming exploitation of unconventional 
resources, particularly shale gas, there was some prediction about a radical 
reduction in the gas price as the main market reference. Therefore, it did cast 
doubts on the feasibility of a speedy support for nuclear and renewable 
technologies in nearby future: 'the lower the gas price, the less favourable the 
economics of nuclear and renewable (Henney 2011a: 104). This technological 
innovation was also strategically exploited as a political opportunity for climate 
sceptics and Conservative backbenchers to challenge any form of low carbon 
support including nuclear policy. Below is a quotation from a right wing analyst 
about the approach of new Environment Secretary.  
Britain's energy policy now faces a huge opportunity [in shale gas]. Mr Paterson will support 
ending energy subsidies and promoting shale gas. (Benny Peiser, the Global Warming Policy 





The most direct response to the emergence of the ‘game changing’ shale gas 
option came from the Chancellor by introducing a new Gas Generation Strategy 
(HMT 2012) that included a plan for 30 new power plants. Unsurprisingly, it 
caused a huge disagreement amongst energy analysts and commentators. In 
contrast to a group of strong supporters who deeply believed in shale gas as an 
engine for the ‘UK industrial renaissance’ and ‘energy revolution’ (Corin Taylor, 
Institute of Directors, in IoD 2012; Helm
 
2012b), its practical consequences were 
critically scrutinised by different members of the low carbon coalition
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criticisms ranged from conservative comments of the DECC Secretary of State 
(Davey in Murray 2012) to a more direct challenge from the then CCC’s Director 
(Kennedy in Telegraph 2012) describing it as a ‘wishful thinking’ which will 
prevent UK ‘to meet its climate targets’.  
 
Arguably, the parallel emergence of the gas strategy and the nuclear policy 
dispute were not merely due to an accidentally coincidence. As an explanation of 
their mutual interrelation, it has been argued that in the case of problematic revival 
of nuclear, there would be an empty space in the electricity portfolio which needs 
to be filled by another option. ‘If [nuclear investments] don’t happen, then we’ve 
got a major hole in our energy mix’ (Interview 25, Senior policy fellow at Friends 
of the Earth, January 2012). It triggered a growing call for a ‘Plan B’ by MPs 
instead of relying what they called as the ‘ambitious and at worst unrealistic’ UK 
nuclear goal. Such alternative scenario was thought crucial ‘to ensure it will be 
able to meet its climate change targets if nuclear projects fail to materialise’ 
(Shankleman 2013). The Chancellor was also sending signals that he ‘believes 
there are alternatives to nuclear’ (Lefty 2013) and in particular that gas should be 
central to any ‘Plan B’. As CCC suggested in the Fourth Carbon Plan, shown in 
figure 4, there is a bulk of almost 40% for nuclear in 2030 compared to an 8% gas 
share, which might be ultimately reversed.  It was something that was publicly 
mentioned by the anti-nuclear movement. 
At the same time the Government’s attempts to revive the nuclear industry are beginning to 
look like a train wreck and EDF Energy is demanding subsidies which are double or even 
triple the current cost of electricity. This must be raising questions about how much of the 





stations will ever get built…The Government's plans for gas are unclear, perhaps because it is 
waiting to see how far the nuclear program progresses. (NFLA 2012) 
 
Figure 4: A scenario for power sector decarbonisation to 2030  
(DUKES 2010, CCC Calculations, cited in Thomson 2012) 
 
6.4. Analysis and discussion  
 
Having reviewed an empirically informed analysis of the nuclear-renewable 
relationship in the UK electricity policy since the early 2000s in two previous 
sections, this section sheds light on theoretical contributions and draws some 
lessons from the studied case. Firstly, through the empirical examination of the 
chapter’s proposition, it tries to bridge between these analyses and analytical 
discussion about policy change and negotiated agreements. In addition, this 
section offers some lines of theoretical contribution and analytical proposition for 
further research. This type of contribution is derived from an inductive approach 
to the case study and goes beyond literature-driven concepts that were 
hypothesised and encapsulated into the chapter’s proposition.     
6.4.1. Negotiated agreement; ‘mixed’ and ‘middle-way’ policy solutions 
 
Let’s start with re-examination of basic hypotheses about the ‘importance’ of 
negotiated agreement as an alternative path to ‘gradual-evolutionary’ policy 





policy compromise have already been supported by some previous studies. Firstly, 
the centrality of nuclear-renewable reconciliation at the heart of EMR supports the 
ACF’s hypothesis that negotiated agreement could facilitate policy change, when 
there is a deadlock with no feasible alternative. The mixture of adopting legally 
binding climate targets alongside the European renewable obligation made the 
‘status quo’ totally unacceptable and urged policymakers to ‘reform’ policies. 
Furthermore given a form of almost balanced coalitional power in 2010-2011 
particularly under the Coalition Government, no advocacy coalition was able to 
fully materialise its own preference. Therefore, the only option was a ‘mixed’ and 
‘middle-way’ policy solution (Nohrstedt 2008; Ingold 2011). What happened in 
the Coalition Agreement and then in the original design of EMR was a partial 
coverage of, at least in theory, some dimensions of both camps’ preferences. As 
an interviewee described, ‘EMR [and perhaps CfD] is a classical combination of 
different ideas. But nobody, I would say, is deeply happy with that. It is actually a 
total mess’ (Interview 13, Economist at a leading Electricity Policy Research 
Group, December 2011).    
6.4.2. Inherited ambiguities; contested implications and continuous 
tension  
 
The wealth of empirical evidence shown in previous sections reflects what has 
been claimed in the first part of chapter proposition: ‘Compromised policies often 
suffer from ‘contested’ arrangements and ‘ambiguous’ design which keep open a 
space for ‘continuous tension’ and ‘re-interpretation’’. With regards to ‘policy 
ambiguity’, it was widely understood not only by stakeholders, but also by policy 
makers and politicians as well. Both had pointed out that, as of 2012, it was very 
difficult and arguably too early to predict the exact consequences of EMR, since 
the most important detailed arrangements were ‘yet to come’. In fact, while the 
2012 Energy Bill had shed light on some detailed arrangements like the contract 
counterpart and the levy cap, there were still several unanswered questions
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different possible responses to them would lead to diverse scenarios for both 
nuclear and renewable. This was the main reason for the reluctance of different 





foreseeable outcomes. In fact, what the two coalitions agreed on was mainly a 
general guideline that was then formulated in a very ‘complex and inconsistent’ 
policy package. Thus, a group of critics has called the overall design of EMR as a 
‘wishful thinking’ representing political ideas more than practical realities 
(Interview 22, Former Board member of London Electricity, January 2012). 
 
The EMR package is, it’s a disastrous package… It reflects a backward committee-based 
design and seems, I would say, a classical addition of diverse interests. What I feel now is 
that it’s unwisely designed by determining the technology fix and planning to meet it. But 
it misrepresents the targets and it’s going to fall off the rails at some point, I am sure 
(Interviews 13, Economist at an electricity policy research institution, December 2011)  
 
This inherited ambiguity and ‘subjectivity307’ in the design of EMR had kept doors 
open for different advocacy coalitions to impose their own interpretations on the 
policy package. Such confusing level of complexity was evident in the advices 
that the main DECC’s civil servant in charge with EMR gave to a group of 
business representatives during an event I attended in July 2013 at the central 
London. He firmly encouraged them to get their lawyers involved to help them in 
understanding the EMR’s complexities. 
 
Well, you’re going to see a huge amount more detail come out on the CfD over the next 
six months…My encouragement, and I’m sure you will, but my encouragement is that 
you get your lawyers involved too because that will set out the fine detail of the drafting 
of the contract….because really the debate does need to move onto those details. 
Because, as we’ve found when we’ve worked through it, those details are incredibly 
important… So, I would ask you to very quickly go through that, and for your lawyers to 
go through that. (Jonathan Brearley, the then DECC Electricity market and network 
Director, July 2013) 
 
The case study showed similar evidence for contested design of compromised 
policies. Having reviewed various stakeholders’ responses to the consultation call 
and my interview questions as well as pre-legislative hearing evidence, they 
suggest a challenging status in which a remarkable degree of interest conflict was 
visibly going on. Therefore, the EMR policy process was witnessing an 
extraordinary intense lobbying battle from businesses and trade unions to secure 
their own long-term commercial interests. Actually, the main reason why the 
EMR process was being so overwhelmed by lobbying rested on the shifting nature 





opportunity. For instance, what was going on for a long time and behind the 
closed doors between EDF and government, as the first CfD, was expected to 
determine the profit margin of the giant EDF for almost 40 years. As the BBC 
reported in summer 2013, despite a long-run negotiation, the conflict gap was still 
seen so big and there was a serious concern that ‘there is a risk that the whole 
thing will collapse’ (Peston 2013). On the other hand, this contract would also 
lock the UK electricity market and consumers to paying the cost of a particular 
generation option for several decades that was so-called by critics as an ‘inflexible 
an expensive’ technology (Interview 50, former PM SPAD and energy 
commentator, January 2013). A similar challenge was in place, to some extent, in 
the way of renewable industry as well. In fact, regarding the ambiguities 
mentioned in the design of EMR, each business side was trying to guarantee its 
own share of forthcoming subsidies and also to prevent itself from unintended 
consequences. Therefore, they started an intensive lobbying process aiming at 
imposing their own policy interpretations and enforcing their preferred ways of 
implementation. 
 
This is consistent with Szarka’s argument that the role of political/material 
interests in negotiated agreement is always crucial: ‘the negotiated agreement path 
arises from new opportunities to reconcile beliefs and/or interest’ (2010: 849). 
Additional to commercial interest conflict, the cases of negotiated agreement, 
embedded in EMR, provided empirical evidence for political interest conflict as 
well. The Coalition Agreement was arguably derived primarily from a 
reconciliation of political interests of ‘office seeking’ rather than a merely belief-
driven compromise. The most important explanation behind such agreement is 
that both parties prioritised their political interests to their policy beliefs and 
thereby agreed on a policy which would guarantee, to some extent, their mutual 
political gain in the new government. Altogether, empirical evidence suggested 
that following the introduction of EMR, a high-level economic and political 
challenge, albeit covertly, began to arise within the UK electricity policy 
subsystem. It happened with regards to a wide range of political-economic 





about. Following quotations reflect the extent that EMR suffered from policy 
ambiguities and thereby became a level battle field for different lobbyists. As 
Butler (2013) describes, it likes ‘a Christmas present for lawyers and lobbyists’. 
 
Lobbying is happening everywhere. But what is differentiating EMR from others is a high 
level of complexity and messiness it entails. There are only very few, I think, who are 
able to fully understand how it is going to work. All the confusion over policy has kept 
open a huge scope for lots of lobbying that are overrunning the department. I guess since 
now, the central skill in power industry will move from econometrics and economic 
modelling to lobbying and policy brokering in Westminster and Whitehall (Interview 5, 
Senior member in UKERC and RCUK, November 2011) 
   
Regarding both characteristics of ‘inherited ambiguities’ and ‘politically contested 
design’, the policy process of EMR was arguably ‘fraught with tensions’. This fact 
was largely evident by empirical observations. Since reaching the initial mutual 
consensus in the Coalition Agreement and the first formulation under the EMR 
White Paper, business-led tensions were gradually revealed. Highly conflicting 
approaches were embodied in documents published and comments made by 
different stakeholders. An even more intense process was going on behind the 
scenes and through the lobbyists. The tension even reached inside the Coalition 
Government itself. It was primarily unfolded by the anti-wind stance of Tory 
backbenchers but then was ‘squared’ within government departments. 
 
The increasing disputes within the Coalition Government itself either between the DECC 
and the Treasury or between Ed Davey and his own ministerial team have led to a 
confusing status what I would call it a policy blight (Interview 30, Labour MP in DECC 
Select Committee, July 2012).      
 
To summarise, this case provided empirical support for the first part of 
proposition 4. A remarkable level of generality and subjectivity in the EMR’s 
initial design and high-profile commercial and political implications it was 
supposed to bring about made it a critical battle field for different advocacy 
coalitions involved in initial agreement. Consequently, there was evident an 
increasing tension amongst policy actors who were keen to exploit existing 
‘policy gaps’. There is where I return back to what a Tory MP said about EMR 







Politics is a messy business and that you can have as many academics, industrialists and 
civil servants sitting round as you like, designing policies that they think look, you know, 
beautiful policies. But at the end of the day, we are in a democracy and democracies don't 
always follow what some people might consider to be the logically pure path. And the art 
of the possible really is the problem that I and other politicians face, which is that we 
have to compromise on almost everything we do, and sometimes that the compromise you 
end up with can look extremely messy. I mean, I'm the first to admit, even though I'm a 
Government MP, that EMR is fiendishly complicated, it’s plasters upon plasters upon 
plaster to fix the unintended consequences of previous plasters… (Interview 53, 
Conservative MP, ECC Select Committee, June 2013) 
 
6.4.3. Policy retrenchment and reversibility  
 
Although negotiated agreements might lead to a consensual policy change and the 
formation of a new coalitional balance, this research claims that they can not 
necessarily guarantee long-term stability of coalitional equilibrium or 
irreversibility of altered policies. As Szarka (2010: 849) pointed out ‘a divergence 
in either beliefs and/or interests is not an insuperable barrier to coalition formation 
[or policy change], but is problematic for coalition maintenance [and policy 
sustainability]’. In other words, under any change in the contextual conditions that 
had initially facilitated negotiated agreement, there is a risk that inherited 
challenges within advocacy coalitions might also began to arise. In such a case, it 
is more likely that the mutual agreement would eventually fail. This is what was 
formulated in the second part of the proposition: ‘[Compromised policies] are 
always ‘vulnerable to shift’ following ‘contextual change’ or new ‘coalitional 
balance’’.  
 
Having reviewed recent changes in practical realities around the notion of nuclear-
renewable relation under the EMR policy process, the balance of support was seen 
moving away from nuclear in the 2012 Energy Bill, compared to the era of 
nuclear renaissance which led to the 2011 EMR White Paper.  The empirical 
evidence provided two justifications for this pattern. The first rationale related 
back to the contextual changes which occurred during 2011-2012. While the 
Fukushima crisis and German nuclear phase-out discredited the nuclear option 
internationally, nuclear ‘self-limiting’ dynamics, particularly the increasing cost 





the prospect of UK nuclear electricity generation. The following written comment 
from one of the interviewees summarises the declining pattern of nuclear, due to 
shifting contextual conditions. 
 
UK has a long history of discussion over the question of whether or not it needs new 
nuclear stations. As of 2007-2008, that question was hardly disputed…But now in five 
years time a lot of things have changed… If I was to make a simple answer it was that in 
terms of physical supplies and energy security, I would say, the UK no longer needs new 
nuclear… Nevertheless there is still a case for new nuclear in terms of diversity in energy 
supply and emissions reduction. However nuclear is not the only way to those objectives 
at any price …For me; nuclear seems a static business that its long time technical 
evolution has come to a deadlock. Without emergence of some sorts of technical 
breakthroughs of a new nuclear generation - which has been long promised but never 
seems to happen – the sector could not compete and its development would be largely 
dependent on areas of state support (Interview 50, Former PM SPAD and energy 
commentator) 
 
Furthermore, given the constant support from Labour for nuclear, which then was 
continued by Tories in the Coalition Government, that political balance shifted 
dramatically during recent years. Besides disappointing substantial limitations of 
nuclear itself, two further interrelated dynamics have moved the position of Tories 
more in favour of the gas: the rise of right-wing ideologies and climate scepticism 
within the Conservative party reinforced by the emergence of shale gas 
technology. Although nuclear still was enjoying some conventional ‘big project’ 
ideas among Conservatives, there was no longer an ‘ideological-political’ support 
from governmental departments, specifically the Treasury: ‘it seems that nuclear 
has been given up and there is no clear hope for future’ (Interview 48, Former 
civil servant and fellow at an energy consultancy, July 2012). As another 
supporter of nuclear technology declared (Leftly 2013), the ‘Treasury believes 
there are alternatives to nuclear. Treasury officials insist that the "power stations 
of tomorrow" do not necessarily mean nuclear sites’. The nuclear coalitional-base 
was more weakened when two giants, i.e. RWE and E.On, decided to exit from 
ongoing negotiations with the Government. On the one hand, leaving EDF as the 
‘only player’ definitely gave it a unique upper-hand in the negotiation process. It 
was clear from policy rhetoric was going in the media at that time. 
 
[From government point of view], the prime minister is a bit concerned about the political 
fallout, if the project were scrapped. Doubts would be exacerbated about the government's 





infrastructure projects. Also the credibility of the government’s long-trumpeted low 
carbon energy policy would be undermined, perhaps fatally, [after years of successive 
governments pledging themselves to a new nuclear age] (Peston 2013). 
 
On the other hand perhaps, there would be no serious hope for a market with only 
one player. There was a lot of doubt on how market mechanisms, e.g. auction, 
would function once there was no real competition (Interview 3, Government 
advisor and Professor of energy economics, December 2011). This fact weakened 
the position of EDF because the government knew that it would be an expensive 
failure for the EDF as well. 
 
The calculation being made in the Treasury and Downing Street is that EDF has more to 
lose from the deal's collapse than the UK does … and its ambition to become the global 
player in nuclear development and operation would be damaged, and perhaps 
terminated…George Osborne seems to me to be less worried about EDF ultimately 
walking away than about being seen to pay too high a price for the Hinkley power station. 
[He wants to achieve] a petty political win and negotiation victory (Peston, 2013).   
 
In short, given a series of contextual change as well as some shifts in coalitional 
balance, the agreed nuclear-renewable convergence under the Coalition 
Agreement and then the EMR White Paper was gradually retrenched. It was 
supposed to some extent that it was going back to a form of re-divergence
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the result, there arose several doubts on the future of renewable. It was getting 
even more obscure in the case of nuclear policy. Insofar as Robert Peston (2013) 
has reported after talking with nuclear negotiation counterparts, ‘my reading of the 
mood of both sides is one of cautious pessimism…[If the negotiation failed] there 
is a risk that the whole thing will collapse’. 
6.4.4. Negotiated agreement and sub-coalition division and defection  
 
Having applied the chapter’s proposition in the case of nuclear-renewable 
relations in the UK electricity policy, three previous sub-sections illustrated how 
empirical evidence supports the main concepts of that proposition. Nevertheless, 
the wealth of empirical materials gathered could shed light on some more lessons 
to be learnt. This section attempts to theorise them inductively and provide a few 






One important fact emerging from the empirical observations was that policy 
compromises were often associated with the defection of the coalitions involved. 
Evidently, the process of renewable-nuclear convergence was accelerated with a 
substantial shift in the approach of some already anti-nuclear environmentalists in 
the late 2000s. The case of defection occurred largely within the most ‘moderate’ 
members of the environmental coalition who ultimately facilitated an agreement, 
whereas the core ideological anti-nuclear environmentalists still strongly held 
their policy beliefs. Similarly the Coalition Agreement itself emerged from a 
process of coalition division. It was a within party division when the new 
environmentalist Conservatives gained power, in spite of the Tory backbenchers 
known as ‘climate sceptics and renewable deniers’. On the other side, given the 
Lib-Dems as political part of the anti-nuclear movement, it was seen a movement 
division when they came to a mutual agreement with Tories to reduce ‘nuclear 
antipathy’. Both cases reflected the marginalisation of extreme ideological 
members as a primary condition for policy compromise. The moderate approach 
of both party representatives in the process of talks has been evident in following 
quotation from a Lib-Dem negotiator. 
 
The shift in the positioning and tone of the Conservative Party also made it much easier to 
secure a policy agreement for the coalition. We were negotiating with a moderate and 
reasonable group of Conservatives, who were willing to make real concessions to reach 
agreement…While the Conservatives have shifted towards the centre ground of British 
politics since 2005, the Lib-Dems had also moved decisively from the left to the centre… 
(Laws 2010) 
 
This could be well conceptualised by taking into account the concept of 
‘heterogeneity of advocacy coalitions’ with ‘a solid core and fuzzy edges’ 
(Nohrstedt 2008: 28). From this point of view, advocacy coalitions comprise sub-
coalitions with a different level of rigidity in their commitment to policy beliefs. 
Therefore, to respond to a stalemate circumstance that has stalled policymaking 
for a long time, there is always a possibility of some forms of coalition defection 
amongst those members who are less ‘principal’ and more flexible in their policy 
beliefs. These defected sub-coalitions involving ‘auxiliary/material’ members are 
more likely to lead a negotiated process and reach a consensus with other likely 





‘actors on the fuzzy periphery might very well switch allegiances over relatively 
short periods of time to increase their political influence’. In return, ‘extreme 
coalition members may defect from both coalitions to prevent the adoption of 
“balanced” [negotiated] policies
309
’ (Weible  et al 2009: 129). To provide a 
theoretical base for further discussion and scrutiny, this fact has been encapsulated 
in the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis: Negotiated agreements often emerge from a process of ‘coalition 
defection’ and the re-alignment of non-principal members on compromised 
policies.   
 
6.5. Summary and conclusion 
Although the introduction of the concept of negotiated agreement and policy 
compromise is relatively new to the theoretical field of policy change (Sabatier & 
Weible 2007), its existence has been frequently evident in some previous UK 
energy policy studies (Bernstein 2001; Kuzemko 2011). Nonetheless, the amount 
of research that has developed and examined compromise-related theories remains 
quite rare. Inspired by insights from ‘institutional change theory’ developed by 
Thelen and her colleagues, this research seeks to contribute to theory development 
around the notion of negotiated agreement. 
 
Based on the developed conceptual proposition in chapter two, the findings of this 
research supported the important role of negotiated agreement in achieving a 
gradual-incremental change. Having reviewed the history of nuclear-renewable 
relations since the early 2000s in the UK electricity policy, this chapter showed 
how the initially conflicting approaches turned to an era of gradual convergence 
that ultimately led to the Coalition Agreement and the EMR White Paper. Then, 
the chapter displayed to what extent the nature of compromised policies might 
suffer from a set of ‘policy gaps’, derived either from ambiguities in original 
design or from politically contested arrangements. It argued that the substance of 





tensions and contradictions. Empirically, it was reflected in high level of 
uncertainty about the implications of EMR for different technological options. As 
the result, an intensive process of controversial lobbying started by both advocacy 
coalitions to prevent probable unintended consequences. The emergence of post-
agreement tensions derived from ambiguous and contested design was a 
supporting evidence for what the first part of proposition 4 suggested. What was 
claimed by the rest of chapter proposition indicated that compromised policies are 
often ‘vulnerable to change’, once they face either changes in their original 
context or a shift in the balance of coalitional power that policies have rested on. It 
was also evident in the status of ‘nuclear relapse’ despite a long period of strong 
political commitment to support nuclear technology. This case empirically showed 
why a compromised policy might fail. It suggested that nuclear policy was 
undermined not only because of international crises and domestic undermining 
dynamics; but also due to the shift in the position of political and commercial pro-
nuclear advocates.  
 
Finally, this chapter suggested a new hypothesis for further empirical testing and 
examination. Deriving inductively from observations made in the case study, it 
was argued that negotiated agreements often emerge from a process of coalition 
defection and re-alignment. Based on the ACF understanding of the internal 
composition of advocacy coalitions, the defection is more likely to take place 
amongst non-principal coalition members who have relatively weaker ties with the 
main coalition’s policy beliefs. This concept was originated primarily by 
analysing evidence of defection in the environmental part of the anti-nuclear 
coalition and the re-alignment of a mixed ‘carbon coalition’ instead. Then, this 
pattern was followed similarly by a form of defection in two political parties 
involved in Coalition Government. To provide a base for empirical examination, 















7. Chapter Seven: Conclusions, Further 
Research and Reflections 
 
7.1. Introduction 
This concluding part of the thesis aims to summarise the main empirical findings 
and theoretical contributions of this research. Having analysed the UK electricity 
policy change over more than a decade ending in 2012, this thesis has provided an 
understanding of what exactly had changed by then and the extent of change 
undergone. It has also presented a rich and contextualised explanation of why and 
how those changes had occurred. This chapter seeks to clarify which challenges 
this case study has brought into the existing understanding of policy change and, 
in return, which theoretical contributions it has proposed to it. The next section is 
structured in such a way as to respectively answer the research questions based on 
findings and concluding observations made already in the three empirical 
chapters. To avoid unnecessary duplication, the section condenses those answers 
here. By examining the developed propositions, it also provides a summary of 
contributions and conceptual implications for policy studies. A further section 
reviews some analytical issues that this research has intentionally not tackled, due 
to the limitations of a PhD thesis, but they potentially open up windows for further 
analysis and research. The last section sheds light on some methodological and 
practical limitations the research has been faced with. It also conveys a few final 
reflections. 
7.2. Answering the research questions, empirical findings 
and theoretical contributions 
Electricity policy has always been a challenging case in studying policy change 
theories. This is not only because of the central role that the power sector plays in 
modern societies; it is also due to the nature of a policy that is characterised by a 





UK, studying recent shifts in electricity policy is even more analytically 
interesting and academically significant. On the one hand, electricity is assumed 
to form a large part of the UK future energy mix as the ‘dominant source’ and the 
‘focal point of competition’ (see in figure 23 in Appendix B). Consequently, it 
potentially plays a much wider role across the whole economy in what so-called 
an ‘electric-centric future’ (Thomson 2012). On the other hand, for several 
decades Britain has led the world of energy and electricity policy towards 
liberalisation and privatisation. Nevertheless, recent developments in its power 
sector have marked a substantial shift from what was traditionally called the 
‘British model’. In particular, Electricity Market Reform, introduced by the DECC 
in 2011-2012, was seen as ‘the biggest transformation to Britain's electricity 
market since privatisation’ and a ‘once-in-a-generation opportunity’ (Davey, the 
then DECC Secretary of State, in Harvey 2012). This was due to a wide range of 
policy implications that EMR was supposed to bring about for the electricity 
system and other related sectors. Firstly, it had challenged the predominant market 
policy paradigm. Secondly, it was supposed to actualise multiple ambitious, and to 
some extent diverging, policy objectives including security, emission reduction 
and affordability. Furthermore, it was substantially designed to shift the 
technology mix in power generation. Finally, it was expected to attract a level of 
investment in the next decade which would outweigh investments in almost all 
other economic sectors (Harvey 2012). 
This thesis has set out to analyse shifts in the UK electricity policy between 2000 
and 2012 in such a way as to answer three specific research questions elaborated 
in the first chapter. While the first question was substantially a descriptive 
research question, the two others were seen as more explanatory. Also, the third 
research question with a particular focus on nuclear and renewable policy was 
assumed a subsidiary of the second one seeking to broadly explain major shifts in 
electricity policy. As a reminder, the main research questions that this section 
aims to answer are as follows: 
1) How could one characterise and measure changes undergone in the UK 





significant policy change? If so, what were the extent and aspects of the 
change? Did it fulfil the characteristics of a wholesale paradigmatic shift? 
2) Why had those changes emerged? In particular, why did that process lead 
to the formation of EMR in 2011-2012? Which policy dynamics influenced 
its characteristics, and how? How could one explain the process of major 
shifts in the UK electricity policy mix?  
3) Given that the choice of technology was central to the UK electricity 
policy debates in the early 2010s, why did the role of low carbon 
generation technologies, i.e. nuclear and renewable, shift over the period 
of the study? Which were the policy dynamics and how did they turn the 
divergent nuclear-renewable balance to a convergence and then a deep 
tension under the EMR policy process? How could one explain the gradual 
transformations in the low carbon electricity technology policy? 
Answering these questions is closely intertwined with conceptual discussions 
about what the policy literature offers to shed light on the answers. Therefore, this 
section also draws a set of theoretical implications informing contextual 
explanations. Those contributions are made based on examining a set of 
propositions developed in the analytical chapter, though in the trade-off between 
generalising simplified universal models and providing a ‘realistic term’ of the 
case study (Hall 2010: 219), this thesis is definitely more committed to the latter 




1) In ‘techno-centric’ policy subsystems, the characteristics of socio-technical 
systems constitute a significant component of policymaking. They should be 
taken as an independent policy component in characterising and measuring 
changes that take place in technological aspects of policymaking. Here it is 
called technology preference. 
2) The characteristics of ultimate changes relate to the degree and the nature of 
‘deficiencies’ and ‘failures’ that salient change drivers present to any of the 





3) The level of policy impact of a change impetus is conditioned not only by its 
policy saliency, but also by coalitional balance, in favour of or against policy 
change, and their strategies. 
4) Compromised policies often suffer from ‘contested’ arrangement and 
‘ambiguous’ design which keeps open a space for ‘continuous tension’ and 
‘re-interpretation’. Therefore, they are always ‘vulnerable to shift’ following 
‘contextual change’ or new ‘coalitional balance’.  
7.2.1. Conceptualising and defining changes in the UK electricity policy 
 
The first research question sought to provide an understanding of changes that 
occurred in the UK electricity policy between the early 2000s and 2012. The 
rationale behind asking such a fundamental question was the fact that there was no 
common and rigorous assessment of what exactly had changed during the first 
decade of the century. Whilst this period of time had constantly witnessed 
different forms of alteration in electricity policymaking, the question of defining 
the extent and aspects of those new policies had always resulted in different and 
even opposing answers. On the one hand, various policies were seen as far-
reaching changes, being called a ‘profound change’ (Blair in DTI 2003: 3), a ‘new 
energy paradigm’ (Helm 2005 and 2007), a ‘ground breaking change’ (FoE 2008), 
‘the biggest transformation’ and ‘once-in-a-generation fundamental reform’ (Ed 
Davey at the DECC 2012). By contrast, others argued not only that ‘still no 
paradigm shift has happened’ (Mitchell 2008; Kern 2009; Kuzemko 2011), but 
also ‘still very little has changed’ and ‘to some extent, we have been here before’ 
(Pearson & Watson 2012: 2). The question had also received a narrow response in 
some cases with respect to various aspects of electricity policy. The moving role 
of state and market (Helm 2005; Rutledge & Wright 2011), the shifting 
composition and hierarchy of policy objectives (Mitchell 2008; Helm 2005), the 
evolving socio-economic role of energy (Pearson & Watson 2012; Kuzemko 
2011) and the changing technology and innovation policy (Kern 2010: Winskel 






Theoretically, this question is rooted in an analytical shortcoming of the literature 
that lacks a comprehensive framework for measuring and characterising policy 
changes. Even recent developments in the field (Kuzemko 2011; Kern et al 2013) 
based on the Policy Paradigm theory (Hall 1993; Oliver & Pemberton 2004) do 
not yet fit for the purpose of this case study. They characterise a policy mix or 
governance regime by a model of four policy components including policy 
paradigm (interpretive framework), objectives, institutions and instruments. What 
is still missing is a framework that could trace changes in technology policy as 
well, which are intrinsically central to the electricity policy mix. For the specific 
case of the UK in recent years, debates over the choice of technology and 
generation mix have predominantly outweighed other policy issues in the sector. 
This fact culminated in EMR (DECC 2011, 2012a) which was substantially a 
‘technology specific’ and ‘delivery focused’ policy proposal. This is, though, a 
part of a wider disciplinary problem of policy studies in overlooking the notion of 
technology and socio-materiality in general.  
 
To both answer the research question and contribute to policy literature, chapter 
two developed a proposition as a platform for empirical examination and testing. 
As such, proposition 1 developed a fifth policy component, a so-called technology 
preference for characterising policy change in ‘large-technical’ and ‘techno-
centric’ subsystems like electricity. Technology preference, in this sense, refers to 
wider socio-technical configurations of a system rather than merely final choices 
of technology. Inspired by the Transition literature (Geels 2002, 2004), 
proposition 1 proposed a systematic account of technological change. As such, it 
seems analytically impossible to explain the dominance of a certain type of 
technology without taking the socio-technical characteristics of that system into 
account. By applying this improved model to the UK electricity policy change 
since the early 2000s to 2012, chapter four divided this period into five distinctive 
timeframes. By this, it illustrated what exactly had changed, and to what extent. 
Furthermore, it showed how evolutionary was the process of change and how 





Eventually, the main focus was on the assessment of EMR in terms of whether or 
not it represented a wholesale paradigmatic shift. 
 
As a background condition, this study characterised electricity policy before 2000 
by a marketised and normalised policy paradigm, a competition-targeted system, a 
privatised and de-politicised governance structure, a de-regulated instrument 
design and a technology-neutral but, at the same time, a centralised, large-scale 
and fossil fuel-based socio-technical system. Observations here pointed to 
parsimonious changes that happened in the early 2000s following a re-birth in 
electricity policymaking. Most importantly, the two objectives of carbon reduction 
and affordability were officially stated, albeit vaguely. The rest were limited to 
some very marginal low carbon instruments and a modest innovation policy. As a 
consequence of a series of serious international insecurity challenges, the middle 
of the decade witnessed a substantial shift in the way energy issues were 
interpreted. From that time, energy was no longer seen as a normal function of the 
market. Instead, it became re-politicised and re-conceptualised as a national and 
strategic asset. It thus led to a pattern of the securitisation of policy objectives as 
the first priority, and the revival of nuclear and other home-grown generation 
technologies. Nonetheless, in practice, neither governance machinery nor policy 
instruments nor even socio-technical arrangements altered remarkably.  
 
As shown in chapter four, the scope of change expanded dramatically in the last 
third of the decade, when legally binding climate-renewable targets emerged and 
new institutional arrangements such as DECC and CCC were officially 
established. Less significantly, there was also more distance from the market 
paradigm alongside a re-interpretation of energy as intrinsically intertwined with 
climate policy. Nonetheless, again, the expansion of change was constrained at 
practical policy levels, i.e. policy instruments and technological features. 
However, it is worth highlighting that a rising importance of technology in 






This thesis observed a significant move, since the early 2010s, in the focus of 
electricity policymaking away from simple policy rhetoric and target-setting 
towards issues around practicalities and technicalities of an on-the-ground 
delivery. Indeed, it was the first time since privatisation that the central concern of 
electricity policymakers was about how to deliver the investment required and via 
which technological pathways this should be delivered. This research has 
addressed Electricity Market Reform (DECC 2011, 2012) as a direct response to 
such concerns. By introducing four new policy instruments, it signed a clear 
distance from market logic. It is worth noting that the high degree of hybridity and 
complexity of EMR resulted primarily from a level of state intervention in 
electricity policymaking that had not been seen in Britain for almost three 
decades. To move intentionally beyond energy ‘targetism’, it simply continued 
with overall objectives set before, albeit with electricity-specific versions. 
However, the objectives reflected a higher level of divergence leading to the so-
called ‘trilemma’ status. This was similar in the case of policy institutions. While 
EMR did not propose any explicit structural change in governance machinery, it 
practically shifted the balance of power and authority in favor of ministerial and 
political departments. Nonetheless, what substantially differentiated EMR from 
the previous three decades of electricity policymaking was definitely its unique 
level of technology specificity. As empirically evident here, it in fact brought the 
choice of technology mix from the margin into the heart of policy debates. 
However, as of 2012, apart from replacing conventional fossil fuel options with 
nuclear and large-scale renewable, other socio-technical features of the UK 
electricity system had remained rather intact. It was still characterised as a 
centralised system, dominated by large-scale power plants, focused on the supply 
side and structured by big and vertically integrated utilities. 
 
Having reviewed the application of the proposed five-layered framework in more 
than a decade of UK electricity policy evolution, this study answered the first 
research question in a way that contrasted with similar studies seeking to 
characterise current UK energy policy (see Helm 2003, 2005; Mitchell 2008; Kern 





distinction comes methodologically from either a more comprehensive framework 
this research has applied or a longer-term analysis this research has undertaken – 
or both. As the main conclusion, this study showed that despite a long process of 
policy change leading to several significant shifts in existing policy components 
by the end of 2012, it was still too early to claim a wholesale paradigmatic shift in 
the UK electricity policy under EMR. Particularly, it addressed two main policy 
components that had never substantially shifted, as of 2012. Firstly, this research 
identified the status of paradigm ambivalence. This means that whilst the current 
design of British electricity governance had moved far away from the 
predominance of market paradigm, it still suffered from the lack of an integrative-
cohesive interpretive paradigm to frame other policy components. This explained 
why existing arrangements had led to a series of challenges evident in this 
research like ‘policy mess’, ‘over-complexity’, ‘uncertainty’ and ‘inconsistency’. 
The second, still resistant policy component was the socio-technical configuration 
of the UK electricity system. Although EMR aimed to substantially shift the 
technology mix of power generation, it reflected a form of continuity in terms of 
characteristics that the UK electricity system had been locked into for several 
decades, as previously recounted. Given the leading role of the UK energy 
liberalisation in developing an international energy market, this concluding 
observation implied that the market legacy had still remained alive and its 
associated socio-technical arrangements had stayed almost resilient. As such, this 
thesis rejected a range of extreme claims characterising EMR either as a 
paradigmatic shift or as continuing as normal.  
 
This analysis has also made several theoretical contributions to the literature of 
policy change. Firstly, by providing empirical evidence for proposition 1, it 
claimed that for understanding the extent and aspects of policy changes, at least in 
‘large-technical’ or ‘techno-centric’ subsystems, it is analytically crucial to 
analyse shifts in technology preference alongside other, already developed policy 
components. This contribution proved useful in analysing more than a decade of 
electricity policy in the UK. By providing a more concrete framework for defining 





perspectives about what change should have been undergone. More importantly, it 
revealed that technology preference has always been an inextricable component of 
electricity policy mix. Particularly following many developments in recent years, 
there has no longer been any debate about electricity policy without a serious 
consideration to the matter of technology. In addition, this finding contributes to 
policy literature through covering its analytical shortcoming in capturing changes 
in socio-materiality and technological features of a governance system. As such, 
this study bridged two different disciplinary realms of public policy and science 
and technology studies. Secondly, by incorporating insights from the Socio-
Technical Transition theory, it displayed how the dominant socio-technical design 
of the electricity system, such as the level of centrality, scale, structure and 
generation mix, could frame the final choices of technology. It uncovered why 
EMR primarily favoured nuclear and big renewable options, like wind farms, 
more than other small-scale and decentralised technologies. Without this 
contribution, it was analytically difficult to explain why those forms of low carbon 
technology were left marginalised, despite shifts in almost all policy components. 
In the absence of such a systematic account of technology, this thesis might have 
simplistically concluded that EMR represented a significant shift in technology 
preference, regarding the aspiration of replacing conventional fossil fuels with 
nuclear and renewable generation options. 
7.2.2. Explaining major shifts in the UK electricity policy mix 
 
Following the conceptualisation of what changes occurred from the early 2000s to 
2012, the second research question aimed at explaining why and how such 
significant changes emerged. In particular, why did that process lead to the 
formation of EMR in 2011-2012? Which specific events and policy dynamics 
influenced its characteristics, and how? To elaborate more, that question sought to 
provide an understanding of the causalities that shifted the UK electricity policy 
mix from a market-based, liberalised, privatised and technology-neutral 
governance to a policy model in late 2012 in which the market was substantially 
discredited; a set of diverging objectives were legally binding; energy departments 





complex package of policy instruments were in place. There was a specific focus 
on the evolving role of the market policy paradigm in UK energy governance, 
from when it was seen as a complete orthodoxy to a process of gradual 
displacement that eventually led to paradigm ambivalence in the period of EMR.  
 
Apparently, this question has theoretical roots in the literature of significant policy 
changes. Having reviewed the main reference frameworks, i.e. PE, MS and ACF, 
there is a complex set of theoretical factors for explaining major changes in public 
policies. Nevertheless, although they provide an understanding of the different 
nature and origins of change drivers, they do not say anything about specific 
parameters and dynamics conditioning varying impacts of those change drivers on 
public policymaking. For instance, existing change theories are unable to explain 
why the rise of climate concerns has had different policy impacts either across 
various timeframes and contexts or in comparison to other events like insecurity 
concerns.  
 
Chapter five sought to answer this explanatory research question. As a theoretical 
framework, it relied on propositions 2 and 3 developed in the analytical chapter. 
With the first proposition, it moved beyond the conventional typology of change 
drivers in policy literature. Building upon the notion of ‘policy proximity’ 
presented by Nohrstedt and Weible (2010: 20), proposition 2 clarified differences 
in the nature and impacts of change drivers by introducing the concept of policy 
saliency. It argued that the level of policy saliency is the function of not only the 
magnitude and policy proximity of a change driver, but also the extent of 
disruption and failure perception that it imposes on existing policy components. 
The main claim there was that the ultimate driver of policy change is derived not 
only from the existence of significant anomalies between objectives and 
outcomes, but also from the perception of deficiency and failure of existing 
policies as the cause of those anomalies. Proposition 3 aimed to highlight the role 
of subsystem context and coalitional balance in imposing such meaning of policy 






To examine those propositions, this thesis provided an analysis of recurrent 
changes throughout more than a decade of UK electricity policy between 2000 
and 2012. By dividing that period into two main timeframes, it pointed to two 
different patterns of electricity policymaking. Observations made here revealed 
that although throughout the first period the market paradigm showed a high level 
of resilience and continuity, the latter triggered the gradual demise of the market 
logic. During the first period, as elaborated in chapter five, even when the ‘benign 
context’ was over in the early 2000s and a set of early energy challenges and 
climate concerns led to the revival of energy policy, the actual level of policy shift 
was highly compromised and limited to vague targets and ‘light-touched 
regulations’. The main reason, presented by empirical evidence, was that such 
level of anomaly and policy failure was not understood to be fundamentally 
irreconcilable with all components of market-based governance. Such modest 
perception of failure resulted from both the lack of disruptive policy saliency of 
the challenges as well as still significant coalitional balance in favour of market 
paradigm, despite the rise of a climate advocacy coalition. It was almost the same 
in the case of the huge insecurity concern in the middle of the decade. The 
construction placed on such policy salient international events as national security 
threats by media and politicians brought back energy issues into the heart of 
public and political debate. However, the absence of a pro-change advocacy 
coalition with credible policy alternatives, as well as seeing challenges as 
exogenous and temporary, removed the ultimate responsibility of policy failure 
from the existing policies and governance system. Eventually, that period of time 
also did not witness a fundamental overhaul in energy policy, as characterised in 
the previous section. 
 
As chapter five elaborated, a different pattern started to appear from the beginning 
of the second period in the last third of the decade. Using the context of 
securitisation and re-politicisation, a growing climate advocacy coalition showed 
that minimal climate policies were no longer capable to meet UK targets. 
Following that shift in coalitional balance, both challenges were framed as the 





political commitment to the policy objectives resulted in a series of legal targets 
and institutional reforms. Furthermore, the reconfiguration of energy and climate 
policy under the new departments was the starting point for a further process of 
market contestation by the low carbon advocacy coalition. Observations 
confirmed that this pattern was intensified, soon after, in the context of renewable 
targets and then financial crisis. As such, another version of policy failure was 
apparently constructed: if the UK was expected to meet its climate/renewable 
targets, the then market arrangements could not deliver technologies required. 
Subsequently, this research pointed to the rise of an extremely policy salient 
challenge: the increasing concern of under-investment and the risk of power 
capacity crunch. Likewise, the growing popularity of policy debate around energy 
price and affordability expanded the sense of market deficiency across the sector. 
Such multi-faceted perception of failure in the electricity market imposed a huge 
change imperative for a substantial move away from market-based policymaking. 
Nonetheless, whilst such an intensive process of contestation fundamentally 
displaced the market paradigm, the inability of the low carbon coalition to provide 
a cohesive alternative paradigm led to the so-called status of paradigm 
ambivalence in EMR.  
 
On the basis of such detailed analysis of the process of shift in the UK electricity 
policy over a period of almost 12 years, this study responded to the second 
research question with the following conclusions. Firstly, it showed that 
differences in the level of policy saliency of various change drivers, like climate 
change and security concern, have always been important factors, albeit by no 
means the only factors, that framed the perception of failure and thereby final 
policies. It was evident that climate change was being seen as increasingly 
important not only for public and environmental NGOs, but also as a consensual 
issue for all political parties and business unions. Nevertheless, with respect to its 
characteristics as ‘intangible’, ‘global’, ‘non-immediate’ and ‘long-term’ 
challenge, its exclusive policy impact was highly constrained and easily 
compromised. Later on, it brought about a higher level of urgency and political 





security concern reflected a different level of policy saliency. It was intrinsically 
understood as an ‘urgent’, ‘nationally evident’, ‘historically meaningful’, 
politically ‘provocative’ and highly ‘visible’ challenge for the public and 
policymakers. Nonetheless, its policy impact was also limited until the early 
2010s when its nature shifted from an exogenous and temporary geopolitical 
concern to an endogenous lack of investment and close fear of capacity crunch. 
Arguably, it was the only time when insecurity challenge was widely understood 
as a fault of existing policies. Unsurprisingly, both climate and security concerns 
came to a higher level of policy saliency when they showed a form of political 
convergence and accumulative resonance. Finally, the emerging concern of 
affordability in energy prices was then proved as the most ‘popularly 
understandable’, highly ‘tangible’ and politically salient change driver which was 
universally important beyond the boundaries of the energy sector. As such, the 
recently constructed divergence and conflict between climate cost and energy 
price undermined public and political support for climate and renewable policies. 
This detailed observation showed that different change drivers reflected various 
levels of policy saliency depending on how remarkable was the perception of 
failure they imposed on existing policy components.  
 
As the second concluding observation, this research drew a dynamic picture of 
interrelation between change drivers and pre-existing policy context. It explained 
how the rise of climate concern was insufficient to significantly shift market-
based electricity policy in the early 2000s. It pointed to the context that the pro-
market advocacy coalition was able to frame the emerging contestation as 
something compatible with existing policies. Thereby it simply compromised 
more radical solutions proposed by the then weak climate coalition. Likewise, it 
addressed the emergence of security concern in the middle of the decade which 
again did not lead to an overhaul of the existing policy components. Despite the 
revival of political aspects of electricity governance, empirical evidence did not 
reflect the existence of a security advocacy coalition ready to seize the moment 
and to challenge existing policies. By contrast, this study points to the important 





framing the contestations and providing accumulative evidence of failure or by 
developing proposals for new acts and institutions. Nevertheless, the policy 
influence of that coalition has been undermined following the emergence of 
financial crisis and the construction of climate cost counter-narrative as well as the 
lack of an alternative policy paradigm.  
 
Furthermore, this study displayed how resistant the legacy of energy liberalisation 
and marketisation was. As evident in chapter five, no change in market-based 
policy components came into place unless there was conceived an absolute 
irreconcilability between existing policies and emerging contexts. The 
introduction of vague targets and renewable instruments in the 2003 EWP was a 
conservative response to the challenges imposed by climate movement into the 
then electricity governance system. A similar pattern observed later on at the time 
that insecurity challenges led to limited policy changes like re-politicisation and 
discursive alterations. More significant changes in objective and at institutional 
levels occurred only when a widespread perception of deficiency and failure of 
political commitment to the targets started to emerge in 2008. Such disruptive 
impact then culminated and expanded into interpretive, technological and 
instrumental levels in the case of EMR. As highlighted in this research, as of 
2011-2012 the existing design of electricity governance came to a complete 
deadlock in almost all aspects of policymaking. Therefore, this observation argued 
that EMR was more a direct response to this widespread perception that the 
‘current electricity market will no longer deliver’ than an ideology-driven policy 
proposal.  
 
Fourthly, this case study provided an image of how gradual, path-dependent and 
evolutionary electricity policies changed over a long period of time. Those shifts 
happened often in reaction to unintended consequences of previous policies rather 
than completely disconnected shifts. In the early 2000s, policy changes remained 
limited to vague targets and marginal low carbon mechanisms. However, what 
this study observed was that they then triggered a further stage of policy change 





empowering the low carbon advocacy coalition through financial subsidies and 
cluster building. Likewise, the level of re-politicisation and legitimisation of state 
intervention in meeting insecurity challenges in the mid 2000s facilitated 
subsequent changes in the state machinery and legally binding targets in 2008. 
The chain of actions continued later with policy feedbacks of strong legislations 
and institutional reforms. They thus paved the way for a further move beyond 
target setting into technology delivery. As of 2012, the accumulative effect of that 
evolutionary process highly discredited market paradigm, despite the fact that it 
still did not represent a paradigmatic shift. This rich contextual explanation, in 
short, not only pointed to the evolutionary and accumulative nature of UK 
electricity policy change, but also highlighted the role of the previous policy’s 
feedbacks in stimulating further changes. 
 
Last but not least, studying a long history of UK electricity policy change 
facilitated unfolding the black box of advocacy coalitions involved. It became 
evident that there was wide participation by heterogeneous policy actors including 
political parties, ministers, governmental departments and civil servants, 
businesses and trade unions, academia and energy experts, consultancies and 
think-tanks, NGOs and civil society as well as media and journalists. A very 
interesting observation showed that throughout various stages of change process, 
different coalition members played different roles and presented different policy 
weight. Given EMR as a delivery-focused and technology-specific policy, this 
study showed a high level of influence by businesses, technical analysts and civil 
servants in designing its ‘devilishly complex’ mechanisms, whereas in 2008 there 
were primarily political actors at ministerial and parliamentary levels that affected 
the significant shift in policy objectives and institutional levels. Perhaps the role 
of civil society and academia was important in initiating those ideas, framing 
solutions, convincing policymakers and shifting public opinion. This contextual 
explanation suggested that depending on which component of UK electricity 
policy was about to change, there was a particular group of actors who were then 
more influential than others. This conclusion opposed such simplistic claims that 





businesses or constantly driven by politicians. Instead, it provided an 
understanding of the links between the level of change and the policy weight of 
coalition members.  
 
In addition to answering the second research question, this research contributed to 
the literature of policy change in at least three different ways. First, it suggested 
that in the absence of an alternative paradigm, the interpretation of deficiency and 
failure, derived from practicalities on the ground, is the ultimate imperative for 
policy change. Therefore, proposition 2 characterised final policy changes as the 
function of how significant and irreconcilable the imposed perception of policy 
failure is. This proposition proved useful in explaining why changes in the UK 
electricity policy reflected a remarkable level of path-dependency and remained 
limited to the policy components that were widely thought to be no longer 
working. It meant the legacy of dominant paradigm would be able to dampen new 
challenges only by minor adjustments and compromises, unless existing policy 
components were deeply questioned and discredited. In short, the more 
irreconcilable failure, the greater likelihood of policy change. 
 
So, where does the perception of policy failure come from and what are the main 
sources of deficiency? This is the point that directs us to two further interrelated 
conceptual implications: policy saliency and coalitional balance. If this section 
was to offer a simple answer to the question above it would be to suggest that such 
widespread de-institutionalisation of existing policies comes perhaps as a mixed 
consequence of an emerging policy salient change driver and a pro-change 
coalitional strategy. By introducing policy saliency, this thesis argued that for 
stimulating a significant change, the emergence of a remarkable anomaly is only a 
part of the story. Such an anomalous driver also needs to put existing policies 
under the responsibility of perceived failure. As Boin et al (2009: 98) describes, 
there are only some events that ‘hit at the heart of existing policy domains, 
espousing deficiencies and failures’. This thesis empirically supported the 
contribution that differences in characteristics of change drivers could cause 






Another relevant contribution of this case study reached further than merely 
clarifying the nature of change drivers. It claimed that in order to impose the 
perception of failure on existing policy components, the intrinsic policy saliency 
of the change driver is by no means sufficient. By applying proposition 3, it 
illustrated that actual changes are also affected by the policy context’s reaction to 
those change drivers. In fact, their policy impact could be either amplified or 
undermined, depending on the coalitional balance and strategies in favour or 
against policy change. By this, current research offered an important addition to 
social constructivist approaches of “framing contests” (Boin et al. 2009; Widmaier 
et al. 2007). Inspired by the ACF, it emphasised the role of actor constellations 
and pro-change advocacy coalitions not only in constructing the widespread 
perception of deficiency and failure, but also by developing credible policy 
alternatives. 
7.2.3. Understanding gradual transformations in electricity low carbon 
technology policy 
 
Given the choice of technology turned into the heart of UK electricity policy 
debate in the early 2010s, the third research question aimed to investigate how and 
why the technological balance of electricity policy in the UK had shifted 
throughout the period of study, 2000-2012. The focus was on the main low carbon 
options, nuclear and renewable
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. The reason for this classification was the fact 
that the policy debate about nuclear-renewable balance culminated in the period of 
EMR. It was, in fact, the first electricity policy over almost three decades that was 
substantially designed to support ‘the low carbon technology family’. As such, the 
third question was a subsidiary of the second research question seeking to explain 
the process of policy changes. What differentiated it was the particular focus it 
had on alterations in the nuclear-renewable balance representing minor and 
incremental policy changes.  
 
In order to answer this question, this research moved beyond the traditional 





significant policy changes. Indeed, the main policy change frameworks draw a 
‘rather sharp conceptual line between [continuity] and discontinuous changes’ 
(Thelen 2009: 474). Therefore, they hardly address a ‘gradual transformation’ 
such as what was represented in the shifting low carbon technological balance of 
electricity policy particularly under EMR. Likewise, inspired by ‘varieties of neo-
institutionalism’ literature
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, they explain policy changes largely on the basis of 
the emergence of an external change driver.  
 
To cover those theoretical gaps in answering the third research question, chapter 
six formulated proposition 4. This proposition was mainly based on the concept of 
‘negotiated agreement and policy compromise’ introduced by the recent 
developments of the ACF (Sabatier & Weible 2007). The chapter then tried to 
expand the explanatory power of ‘negotiated agreement’ by incorporating insights 
from the Institutional Change theory (Thelen 2009). As such, proposition 4 
assumed that compromised policies are often ‘vulnerable to shift’ following 
‘contextual changes’ or new ‘coalitional balances’. This development was then 
used to inform a contextualised explanation of the case. 
 
Empirically, this proposition was investigated by applying more than a decade of 
evolution in the role of nuclear and renewable technologies in the UK electricity 
policy. Through reviewing two distinctive periods of nuclear and renewable 
policies, chapter six explained how fluctuating and varying that long history was. 
The first period, started by the emergence of those technologies as civil 
technologies for power generation in the UK (1950s for nuclear and 1970s for 
renewable), reflected a history of continuous conflict and divergence between two 
technologies. They showed a high level of incompatibility either politically in 
terms of supportive advocacy coalitions or commercially in terms of competition 
for public support, or even technically in terms of different infrastructure required. 
By contrast, the post-CCA context facilitated a gradual convergence between two 
groups of technologies. It was primarily triggered by ambitious climate and 
renewable targets in 2008 that necessitated the revival of nuclear and a 





culminated when traditional anti-nuclear coalitions started to defect and the new 
coalition government came to a cross-party agreement on supporting both 
technology families, though that those compromised policies by no means implied 
that there was no remarkable level of disagreement still left in a part of advocacy 
coalitions. However, the first proposal of EMR was the manifestation of such 
mutual support in which CfD was the first inclusive mechanism covering both 
options, since the introduction of NFFO in the 1989 Electricity Act. Nevertheless, 
an increasing level of tension between politicians, departments and business 
lobbies started to emerge when policy debates moved into the detail arrangements 
and settings of EMR. By late 2012 and in the post-Fukushima and shale gas 
context, the discussions around the Energy Bill showed some signs of policy 
reversibility for nuclear electricity, so-called ‘nuclear relapse’. 
 
Studying this detailed story showed why after several decades of divergent 
policies for nuclear and renewable, different advocacy coalitions eventually 
compromised on a policy that meets some dimensions of both camps’ preferences. 
This was the first empirical finding of this case study in response to the third 
research question. It evidenced that in the context of a policy deadlock with no 
feasible alternative for meeting emerging targets, reaching an agreement on an 
inclusive technology preference represented a gradual change in electricity policy 
mix. Observations here revealed that this happened following a negotiated 
agreement between different members of two advocacy coalitions. On the one 
hand, shifting the stance of a group of anti-nuclear environmentalists facilitated 
that reconciliation. It was then signed by the politicians in the Coalition 
Agreement. Finally, that agreement was formulated by policymakers under the 
EMR mechanisms, particularly the CfD. Without this coalitional explanation, it 
was difficult to understand why the huge ideological distance between two 
technologies’ constituencies began to disappear and how they thus shaped a 
unified camp of the low carbon technologies in the late 2000s.  
 
The second finding related to the turning of that pattern to a high level of policy 





context. This controversy over the role of nuclear and renewable technologies 
transcended the boundaries of business lobbies and interest groups into the 
government and within/between relevant departments. The explanation that this 
research provided for that status, based on empirical evidence gathered, was based 
on the level of policy ambiguity EMR suffered from and the over-complexity it 
was characterised with. In fact, during the policy process in 2011 and 2012, the 
actual outcome of EMR was highly unclear and dependent on further details that 
were yet to be set. Furthermore, since its inception, EMR was expected to bring 
about a wide range of very significant economic and political implications for 
nuclear and renewable technologies. Therefore, both advocacy coalitions began an 
intensive process of lobbying to influence policy details in a way that would 
maximise their own political and commercial interests. As such, this case study 
provided an analysis of the factors that left EMR fraught with policy tensions. 
 
The third observation in response to the third research question addressed several 
challenges that gradually emerged in the way of agreed nuclear and renewable 
policies. In particular, it pointed to the hope of a nuclear role in the future of low 
carbon electricity generation that was substantially watered down during 2012. 
Such reduction in the political significance of nuclear technology was explained 
with reference to two important dynamics. On the one hand, technical and 
economic limitations of nuclear power in the post-Fukushima context undermined 
its feasibility compared to other emerging options like shale gas. On the other 
hand, it lost a large proportion of party political support following shifts 
undergone within the Conservative Party towards the revival of far-right ideas of 
climate scepticism and in favour of gas. 
 
Finally, empirical studies highlighted an interrelation between reaching an 
agreement on nuclear and renewable policy and the emergence of internal rifts 
within two already divergent advocacy coalitions. This was observed in a few 
cases. The defection within the anti-nuclear movement following the 2008 CCA 
and Renewable Directive as well as the marginalisation of anti-renewable and 





coalition government were two main examples. Therefore, this finding suggested 
that without subordinating either ideological nuclear antipathy or traditional 
climate and renewable scepticism, the consensual agreement over nuclear and 
renewable technologies would never happen. 
 
In terms of theoretical contributions to the literature of gradual/incremental policy 
change, this research highlighted three different conceptual implications. Firstly, it 
provided further empirical evidence in support of the ACF’s claim that in the 
context of policy deadlock, negotiated agreements over a ‘middle-way solution’ 
could facilitate achieving gradual-incremental policy changes. Secondly, this case 
study supported empirically the assumption formulated in proposition 4 that the 
substance of compromised policies is inextricably intertwined with inherited 
tensions and contradictions. This was shown by referring to ‘policy gaps’ they are 
suffering from including policy ambiguities and politically contested 
arrangements. Finally, it provided empirical evidence for what proposition 4 
predicted, albeit inspired by the Institutional Change theory, that compromised 
policies are at constant risk of failing or retrenchment following any alteration in 
the contextual characteristics or coalitional balance that those consensual policies 
have rested on and originated in. 
 
7.3. Some avenues for further research 
 
Though we here presented an analysis of policy evolution and change in the UK 
electricity policy between 2000 and 2012 and explored the limitations for existing 
policy studies concepts, this study by no means claims that it has provided a 
comprehensive account of such a complex process of policy change. It thus 
revealed several analytical shortcomings of current policy change literature in 
addressing the complexities of this case study. This section aims to propose some 
avenues for further research and to open up new windows for future theoretical 





7.3.1. From ‘technology preference’ to ‘policy preference’ 
 
Chapter four of this thesis proposed the inclusion of the fifth policy component 
called ‘technology preference’ to characterise changes in socio-technical aspects 
of electricity policy. Although this suggestion was primarily based on the 
centrality of technological shifts in policymaking for specifically large technical 
systems, it seems analytically consistent with what broader policy process 
frameworks suggest as well. Particularly, it is in line with the concept of ‘policy 
preference’ introduced by the ACF (Sabatier & Wieble 2007: 195). This means 
the ACF assumes that policies should not only clarify their main objectives, but 
also need to determine how and via which proposal of solutions on the ground 
those targets are practically expected to be met. Perhaps policy instruments would 
then be designed to facilitate those overall strategies. This approach is also 
consistent with what Lockwood (2013) points to as the ‘preferred system 
configuration’. Similarly, this concept expands the definition of policy change 
beyond conventional policy components. This implies shifts in policies are not yet 
‘politically sustained’ and analytically complete, unless a fundamental 
transformation takes place in the preferred system that is expected to operate on 
the ground. 
 
Perhaps in ‘techno-centric’ subsystems like the case of electricity policy, the main 
feature of ‘policy preference’ clearly refers to ‘technological configuration’ of the 
system. However, it seems potentially generalisable and analytically meaningful 
even beyond techno-centric subsystems. Depending on the nature of those policy 
fields, the policy preference could involve features like the main solutions, 
strategies, system configuration and regime structure. This research proposes 
developing relevant propositions to be examined in terms of the applicability of 
the concept of policy preference in non-technologic policy changes. 
7.3.2. The characteristics of policy saliency 
 
To explain major policy changes, this study introduced the concept of policy 





bring about reflect, to some extent, their magnitude and policy proximity as well 
as the level of failure they impose on existing policy components. While this 
research provided empirical support for that overall claim, it did not theorise the 
main characteristics that shape policy saliency. The literature of focusing events 
(Birkland 1997; Kingdon 1995; Zahariadis 2007; Hermann 1972) presents a set of 
‘politically symbolic’ features that are important in attracting attention to an event. 
They include surprise, suddenness, threat, uncertainty, urgency, visibility, scale, 
the level of anomaly and exclusiveness. While they seem still under-theorised 
here, the empirical investigation of their policy impact could be seen as another 
suggestion for further research. The main question here is which set of 
characteristics of a change driver could increase its level of policy saliency.  
7.3.3. Policy narratives as change strategies  
 
Having addressed several policy narratives constructed by pro-change advocacy 
coalitions, this research highlighted the role of policy narratives as change 
strategies. As evident in chapters five and six, they could either frame the 
contestation of existing policies or shape alternative solutions. In fact, since this 
thesis drew a link between policy failure as perceived and the likelihood of 
change, it highlighted the role of policy narratives as mediators of those 
perceptions. As two examples, it pointed to ‘securitisation’ narrative in the mid 
2000s and ‘no public subsidy’ for nuclear in the early 2010s. Similarly, the most 
recent counteracting instances are ‘climate cost’ and ‘green development’. This 
observation is in line with the point of Shanahan et al (2011: 536) that ‘the 
inclusion of policy narratives as a causal variable in policy change process is not 
only helpful but also critical’. This argument bridges two frameworks of policy 
narratives and the literature of policy process
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 (Shanahan et al 2011: 536; 
Nowlin 2011; Nohrstedt 2011). This is perhaps another avenue for further 
examination. Developing theoretical propositions about which characteristics are 
required for a policy narrative, or a mix of narratives as evident in this case study, 
to enhance their policy impact is the beginning of another conceptual debate that 





7.3.4. Conceptualising change processes and pathways  
 
As one of the main findings, chapter five characterised the process of UK 
electricity policy as a lengthy, gradual, evolutionary and accumulative process of 
change. This means that whilst some changes were incremental and minor in 
themselves, at the same time their policy feedbacks provided bases for further 
changes. Thus, over a period of time, they collectively led to significant shifts in 
electricity policymaking. This finding is consistent with the concept of ‘gradual 
transformation’ introduced by Streeck & Thelen (2005), Kern & Howlett (2009) 
and Mahoney & Thelen (2010). Contrary to most of the change frameworks, it 
describes policy change as a ‘gradual process of breakdown and replacement’ 
which is ‘cumulatively transformative’. Consequently, a group of theories aim to 
address different modes and processes of change. For instance, Streeck and 
Thelen (2005) followed by Kern and Howlett (2009) developed a typology of four 
change mechanisms and strategies for ‘gradual transformation’ in a policy mix. 
Each pathway, in this sense, displays a particular level and order of alteration in 
policy components. Apparently, similar studies could also contribute to this 
literature of change ‘modes and strategies’. Therefore, having characterised the 
type and level of policy change in UK electricity policymaking between 2000 and 
2012, the conceptualisation of change processes and pathways is another 
analytical debate that is worth being studied in further research.  
7.3.5. Coalition defection and policy compromise  
 
The case of nuclear and renewable policy in chapter six revealed something new 
to the literature of policy change through negotiated agreement. It showed that 
compromised policies between two different advocacy coalitions came from a 
process of coalition defection and internal rift. It has been claimed here that the 
marginalisation of extreme, and usually ideological, members of two advocacy 
coalitions is a primary condition for reaching a policy compromise. This status 
reflected the basic concepts of the ACF about the heterogeneous composition of 
advocacy coalitions. They include ‘a solid core and fuzzy edges’ of members with 





study displayed that when two already competing advocacy coalitions are close to 
a mutual agreement over a policy, they are mainly ‘actors on the fuzzy periphery’ 
that might very well switch or compromise their coalition ‘allegiances’. On the 
other hand, ‘extreme coalition members may also defect to prevent the adoption of 
“balanced” [negotiated] policies’ (Weible et al 2009: 129). This finding is 
encapsulated in the hypothesis below and this research suggests its future 
empirical examination. 
 
Hypothesis: Negotiated agreements often emerge from a process of ‘coalition 
defection’ and the re-alignment of non-principal members on compromised 
policies.  
 
7.4. Reflections and limitations of this study 
 
Given the complexity and messiness of policy process, there is no single universal 
and parsimonious solution for dealing conceptually with the world of 
policymaking. Any research thus investigates inevitably only some particular 
aspects of the policy process. Therefore, it is analytically important for a policy 
research to be aware of and transparent about the limitations it faces; the 
theoretical weaknesses it suffers from; the analytical blind spots it is constrained 
by; and the practical challenges it tackles. The previous section identified some 
issues that this thesis has not investigated, which are potential avenues for further 
work. Likewise, this section aims to take account of some methodological and 
practical challenges and limitations this study has confronted.  
 
 
7.4.1. Challenges of a contemporary and complex case study 
 
The first limitation refers to the nature of this case study. Given the time scale of 
this research on electricity policy between 2000 and 2012, the matter under 





Reform, at the time of writing, is still an ongoing and changing process. This 
characteristic, though, has brought in some research advantages like the 
availability of data and accessibility to experts and policy actors. For example, I 
personally have participated in several seminars and conferences about EMR with 
wide participation from the main players' representatives. It provided me a unique 
opportunity to observe, to some extent, the very complex and challenging process 
of policymaking. Therefore, this research has shed light on some aspects of the 
contemporary subject that would never be identified otherwise in any form of 
historical studies. On the other hand, it has constrained the possibility of a 
comprehensive retrospective analysis of the case over a full policy cycle including 
implementation and policy outcomes. In fact, it is hard yet to analyse EMR’s 
policy implications and practical consequences. It might have been easier to come 
to firm conclusions about a policy change through a ‘historical perspective’ given 
a ‘few years of hindsight’. Though that analytical advantages of retrospective and 
historical analyses come always at the expense of losing some detailed aspects of 
the reality. There is, in fact, a trade-off between contemporary access to the case 
and the benefits of hindsight perspective.   
7.4.2. The lack of evidence for studying paradigmatic shifts  
 
Despite remarkable findings about policy change in general, this research was 
unable to contribute to the specific literature of paradigmatic shift. As shown in 
chapter four, notwithstanding an accumulative alteration in almost all policy 
components by 2012, the UK electricity policy did not yet represent a wholesale 
paradigmatic shift. Therefore, while this thesis has provided an understanding of 
the meaning of a complete paradigmatic shift, it has never been able to explain 
why and how it could happen in some point. For example, it studied a set of 
change drivers that highly discredited and displaced existing policies leading to 
the emergence of paradigm ambivalence. But in return, it did not say anything 
about the circumstances in which an alternative policy paradigm could gain 
sufficient credibility and momentum to fully replace the old one. Another example 
was the interrelation between the emergence of a paradigmatic shift in the energy 





historical evidence support this coincidence in the 1980s, it was analytically 
impossible for this research to either approve or reject such interconnection as a 
necessary driver for paradigmatic shift. Reaching such a conclusion became even 
more complicated when the recent financial crisis failed to replace the pro-market 
economic paradigm. This is what has been recently addressed by some leading 
scholars in the field of policy paradigm. Pemberton (2013), as an instance, 
discusses why recent financial crisis was ‘wasted’ in the way of making a 
paradigmatic shift in economic policy.  
7.4.3. Recent developments and possible scenarios for UK electricity 
policy 
 
Since this research stopped the clock for further analysis in the late 2012 and 
throughout the process of writing up in 2013, UK electricity policy has constantly 
witnessed a rapid process of alteration and change. As of December 2013, several 
technical details of EMR are now published, the long-run negotiation between 
Government and EDF has now reached to an initial agreement, the political 
debates around energy price cap have overwhelmed electricity policy and the 
Energy Act has most recently received the Royal Assent. It draws an extremely 
complicated and increasingly conflicting picture of power industry that obscures 
any predictable scenario for the future. Consequently, depending on shifting 
socio-economic and political conditions, there is a wide range of diverse 
possibilities in the way of future British electricity policy. In the one hand, an 
extreme group of the low carbon advocacy coalition thinks about a full 
implementation of EMR with the exclusion of gas and based preferably on 
renewable technologies more than nuclear. By contrast, on the other hand, there is 
a coalition of right-wing ideologists and climate sceptics who dispute current 
commitments to energy targets and push towards a post-election revision in 
national and international climate obligations. Between these two far ends of the 
spectrum, there is perhaps a portfolio of middle range scenarios supported by 
different combinations of political, ideological, technological and commercial 





continuation of what I called paradigm ambivalence that potentially could 
eventuate in any unforeseeable scenario.  
7.4.4. Research reflexivity: an analytical journey between theory and the 
case 
 
Just before the last part, I would like to reflect upon my four year of analytical 
journey. I started by thinking about the adoption of socio-technical transition 
framework, as a Dutch-originated literature, in the UK energy policy. For that 
purpose, I relied on an analytical framework based on insights from different 
literatures of policy learning, policy transfer and diffusion, research utilisation, 
epistemic communities and instrument constituencies. Nevertheless, this initial 
design of the research was empirically challenged once I dealt with the on-the-
ground realities of British electricity policymaking particularly in the case of 
EMR. Soon after, I gradually found that it was analytically difficult to bridge 
between empirical data in this case and primary theoretical frameworks. Only a 
few numbers of interviewees had even heard about the transition theory and it was 
also undermined by the legacy of British superiority and leadership in energy and 
electricity policy. Many studies also pointed out that there are some fundamental 
mismatches between policy and political institutions in the UK energy sector and 
other European countries including the Netherlands (Shove & Walker 2007; Kern 
2010; Kern 2012). In fact, what was seen then central to the UK electricity policy 
process had more to do with political and policy frameworks than theories within 
the realm of Science and Technology Studies. Consequently, these practical 
factors pushed me away from undertaking a pure STS research into the heart of 
policy studies.  Here was where I returned back to the theory and began to develop 
a new set of analytical propositions, largely based on the literature of policy 
change, that enable informing contextual observations. Such analytical journey 
backing and forth between theory and empirical data was constantly repeated 






7.4.1. Positioning theoretical contributions: Bridging between Science 
and Technology Studies and Policy Studies 
 
The last but not least, this sub-section aims to clarify the disciplinary position of 
the thesis. Having been in a Science, Technology and Innovation Studies 
department (STIS), as the hub of a wider university wide network, ISSTI, I have 
been familiar with the growing field of inter-disciplinary and multi-disciplinary 
research. In particular, Science Studies Unit (SSU) within the Edinburgh 
University has been historically rooted on different disciplinary backgrounds, such 
as sociology, philosophy and history. Recent developments towards technology 
and innovation studies have also added to such a rich tradition by incorporating 
other disciplines like economics, business studies and technological subjects.  
 
My research is albeit no exception. Although this thesis has primarily relied on 
policy frameworks, due to a set of practical reasons I explained before, I position 
my work as trying to bridge between two already separated disciplinary realms: 
STS and policy studies. On the one hand, being disconnected from the world of 
policy is still seen as one of the shortcomings of existing STS frameworks (for 
Transition theory in specific see: Shove & Walker 2007; Smith & Stirling 2007; 
Kern & Smith 2008; Meadowcroft 2009, Kern & Howlett 2009; Kern 2012). On 
the other hand, there is also a gap in policy science in theorising the role of socio-
materiality and technology innovation in explaining public policymaking and 
change (Joerges 1996: 3-4; Winskel et al 2012: 1).  
 
This inter-disciplinary approach is very clear in chapter four, where it examines 
recent developments in policy studies, particularly Policy Paradigm (Hall 1993) 
and Advocacy Coalition Framework (Sabatier 1999), for conceptualising the 
extent and the type of policy change in British electricity policy. Having 
characterised electricity system as a ‘techno-centric’ and ‘large technical’ system 
(Hughes 1983), it identifies a theoretical gap in capturing technological shifts as 
an important dimension of policy change in power sector. As such, chapter four 
opens up a space for incorporating STS-originated theories like Socio-Technical 





technical characteristics of a system, as an independent level of policy change 
provides a conceptual framework for defining some specific features of policy 
change in the case of Electricity Market Reform. This theoretical contribution 
arguably lies somewhere between STS and policy studies.  
 
From such a disciplinary point of view, I would categorise other theoretical 
contributions in chapters five and six, largely within the boundaries of policy 
studies. While highlighting the role of irreconcilable policy failures in driving 
ultimate shifts is a move beyond conventional typology of change drivers in 
policy literature, presenting compromised policies as often subject to reversibility 
and retrenchment is thought an ACF-specific theoretical contribution.  
 
However, notwithstanding this discussion about to which academic camp this 
thesis belongs to and to what extent, it is worth to bear in mind, once again, that 
this research is mainly an empirically-driven study providing a contextual 
explanation of UK electricity policy change rather than a primarily theoretical 









                                               
 
1 For example, a historical study conducted by Wieble et al. (2009: 125) shows that environment and 
energy policy, in general, has been the subject of a large proportion of policy researches done based on 
the application of ACF. Szarka (2010: 836) refers to the politically controversial characteristics of 
energy policy required to ‘reconcile values, interests and norms' 
2 Regarding the characteristics of electricity infrastructure like the longevity, the scale and the cost, any 
alteration in electricity technology policy could lock the system, for a long period of time, into a 
particular form of technological trajectory and socio-technical system. 
3 Though that it also points to the absence of an alternative advocacy coalition representing a cohesive 
policy paradigm, as the main reason behind incomplete paradigmatic shift in EMR.  
4 Public policy could be defined diversely referring to an intention; a specific policy proposal; a 
decision; a program; a process; a policy sector; or, an outcome.  
5 A good policy theory, as Dye (1992) indicates, should simplify and respond to reality with 
meaningful information about the policy process and with good explanations of public policy.  
6  The comprehensive rationality assumes that a comprehensive, coherent and rank-ordered analysis of 
policymaking is substantially possible and policy makers are to potentially maximise policy utilisation 
and adopt ‘optimal solutions’. In contrast, modern theories point to ‘bounded rationality’ of policy 
actors whose decision is filtered by belief system and cognitive biases and follow the logic of 
‘satisfaction’ and ‘appropriateness' rather than simply ‘utility maximisation’ (Weible et al 2009; 
Sabatier 1998; Cairney 2011: 212). 
7  The policy cycle approach, called ‘the stages heuristic’ (Lasswell 1956; Brewer & deLeon 1983; 
1999), suggests functionally breaking the complex policy process down simply into a series of 
sequential stages such as agenda setting, policy formulation, implementation and evaluation. This 
approach arguably represents the ‘public face of public policy’ (McConnell 2010: 222) once most 
governments yet recognise stages, at least the formulation-implementation distinction, in delegating 
authorities to different institutions. It could also prevent the misleading dominance of agenda setting 
and the dismissal of policy implementation in policy process theories. 
8 The reason that ‘comprehensive rationality’ and ‘policy cycles’ are no longer inspiring modern policy 
theories, is that they suffer from a set of  constraining characteristics like central top-down policy 
implication and lack of causality linkage, as well as over-simplification. Nevertheless, they still 
function as ‘descriptive’ analytical ‘starting points’ and ways of ‘organising policy studies and 
strategies’ (Cairney 2012a: 6, 41). 
9 Cairney (2012: 154) points to a ‘blurred boundary’ between formal and informal ‘sources of 
authority’ that disperse power vertically amongst different ‘supranational’ and ‘sub-national’ levels and 
horisontally to quasi and non-governmental actors. 
10 It means, while governments have ‘authority’ to make policies, they do not have sufficient ‘capacity’ 
to act alone. It is due to either the lack of specialised expertise or the problem of ‘overloading’ (Nowlin 
2011: 50).  
11 Such technocratic perception of policymaking was rooted in the definition of politics based on 
‘conflict, interests and power struggle’. It led to this conclusion that ‘ideas do not matter, as power and 
material interests ultimately drive politics’ (Price 2006: 252). But under the complex situation that 
interests are not clearly ‘knowable’ and ‘certain’, they are no longer seen as independent from 
interpretative bias of ideas and beliefs (Kern 2010: 33) to address policy ambiguities. 
12 Ideas are broadly defined as paradigms; norms; policy ideologies and beliefs; and, policy proposals. 
They function either as constraining factors framing the policies and limiting action alternatives, like 
paradigms and norms which are taken for granted, or as dynamic ‘irresistible forces’ stimulating and 
fuelling profound change, such as new policy proposals. Indeed, depending on different forms of ideas, 
they could potentially cause stability or change. 
13 Hay (2002: 194) argues that ‘power and ideas are inextricably linked’ and therefore ‘ideas often hold 
the key to unlock political dynamics’. In a similar argument, Fischer (2003) points to an accumulative 





                                                                                                                                      
 
14 Cairney (2012: 2) identifies five conceptual pillars and analytical lenses to study policy process. 
They range from ‘individual policy makers’ choices and interests to ideas and policy beliefs. They also 
extend to institution and then policy networks and interest groups followed by taking ‘socio-economic 
context’ and ‘policy condition’ into consideration. In addition, there are some elements of ‘serendipity’ 
and ‘chance’ in dealing with the concept of unpredictable opportunity windows and external events.    
15 In a similar argument, Nohrstedt and Weible (2010: 12) characterise any likely change in terms of its 
'nature (normal or paradigmatic)' and 'tempo (gradual or rapid)'. 
16 This section does not deal with the concept of explaining the processes of change, which will be 
discussed in further sections.  
17Policy change could refer diversely to shift in a policy intention, a specific proposal, a decision, a 
program, a process, a policy sector, or an outcome. 
18 Hall calls policy components ‘central variables’ of the policymaking process. 
19 Thomas Kuhn (1962: 10) conceptualises a scientific paradigm as an integrated framework and 
‘heuristic device’ of analysis including 'theoretical propositions' and 'models' that provide an 
integrative explanation of a scientific phenomenon. 
20 ‘Policymakers customarily work within a framework of ideas and standards that specifies... Like a 
Gestalt… it is influential precisely because so much of it is taken for granted and unamenable to 
scrutiny as a whole. I am going to call this interpretative framework a policy paradigm (Hall 1993: 
279)’. 
21 It is noteworthy that policy paradigm is often used with reference to a wider socio-economic policy 
(cross-subsystems), rather than a particular area of policymaking (subsystem-wide) (Hall 1993; 
Kuzemko 2011: 66).  Hall also acknowledges the possibility of identifying policy paradigm in some 
fields with ‘highly technical issues’ and ‘a body of specialised knowledge’ like energy policy (Hall 
1993: 291). 
22 There is an ambiguity in Hall’s classification when he takes third order change as both change in 
policy objectives and change in all dimensions simultaneously. To prevent confusion in cases where 
policy objectives change while other dimensions are still stable, I have taken third order change as 
change in policy objectives compared to paradigmatic shift as change in all dimensions and framework. 
23  Recent developments assume policy settings as a sub-component of policy instruments. Therefore it 
has not been mentioned as a distinctive policy component and level of analysis. 
24  While Hall has used the terminology of ‘policy paradigm’ as an ‘interpretive framework’, Kern et al 
have referred it to overall governance system including all four components. To prevent confusion, this 
research uses policy paradigm in its original meaning as an interpretive framework component. Instead, 
it uses policy mix or governance system for all components together.   
25 For example, the initial work of Kuzemko (2011: 67) had divided the ideational component, i.e. 
policy paradigm, into two different sets of ideas: ‘ideas about socio-economic role of energy’ and 
‘ideas about energy governance’. 
26 Though the ACF is not foremost and solely a policy change theory. 
27 The ACF’s policy belief system briefly recognises three layers for coalition beliefs: deep core-
normative belief, policy core belief, and secondary ones. This classification is also consistent with 
Cairney’s distinctive typology of ideas as paradigms; norms; policy ideologies and beliefs; and, policy 
proposals (2012: 15). 
28
 Both function as theoretical and ontological assumptions of the ‘nature and operation of the world’ 
(Kern & Mitchell 2010: 7). They are similarly spanning most policy areas (Campbell 2002: 171) and 
simulated with ‘landscape macro-political trends’ (Shackley & Green 2007: 221; Kern & Mitchell 
2010: 3). Furthermore, they are highly resistant to any change ‘akin to religious conversion’ as they are 
‘taken for granted’ and ‘largely inculturated normative issues’ (Sabatier 1993: 31).  Similarly, such 
normative-paradigmatic ideas function primarily as a source of ‘stability’ and ‘a constraint’ on policy 
change (Cairney 2012: 15-16). 
29 When I asked one of the researches, who had contributed to developing the current policy paradigm 
theory about incorporating technical issues in characterising energy policy change, the replay was that 
‘I did not include this as a separate level of the paradigm  [policy mix] - partly because that might 





                                                                                                                                      
 
30 Winskel (2012: 5) points to some advanced technological scenarios that the cost of change would be 
even ‘halved’. It shows the ‘broad appeal’ and ‘compelling promise’ of technological innovation for 
socio-technical system change’. 
31 Winskel et al (2012: 25) criticises the lack of inter-connection between ‘energy innovation 
policymaking’ and ‘policy analysis research’. Thus, he recommends a ‘strong policy research 
community’. 
32 The multi-level perspective (MLP) is at the heart of STT for explaining system change. It shows that 
socio-technical systems, or ‘regimes’, also interact across and between other levels: the ‘socio-
technical landscape’ (macro) and ‘niche-innovations’ (micro). These levels are understood as heuristic, 
analytical concepts that help to explain how systems both operate and change (Geels & Schot 2007: 
399). 
33 This set of features of the UK electricity system has been widely mentioned in interviews as well as 
in several studies (Bolton & Foxon 2013; Watson 2013; Wolsink 2012). 
34 Expensive electricity infrastructure gives a heavily path-dependent nature to regimes. 
35 Incumbents will respond positively to policies promoting particular technologies or activities if these 
present opportunities that fit within core corporate strategies and vested interests (Lockwood et al 
2013: 18). They have capacity to learn and a willingness to tweak initial proposals.  
36 The electricity socio-technical system or regime in this sense is a complex configuration of technical 
artefacts, institutional arrangements and social practices (Bolton & Foxon 2011; Foxon 2011; Geels 
2004). 
37 The inclusion of practical solution, e.g. technology change, is also supported by wider policy process 
theories like the concept of ‘policy preference’ in the ACF; this will be elaborated later.  
38 As noted in section one, the modern theories are characterised by a set of shifting features of policy 
studies. As such, contrary to the policy cycle perspective, the reference approaches 'aim to uncover the 
underlying generative causal processes that constitute the drivers of policy dynamics (change and 
stability)' (Real-Dato 2009: 118). Likewise, their explanatory accounts rest on the behaviour of 
rationally-bounded actors and the ‘logic of appropriateness’. All three theories are substantially away 
from taking policy makers simplistically as full rational decision makers. Furthermore, in all 
frameworks, policy dynamics and causalities have been conceived as characteristically ideational 
(Real-Dato 2009). It means they acknowledge the analytical salience of ideas in policymaking and their 
symbiotic interaction with power, as the traditional focal point of policy studies. Finally, the concept of 
policy subsystem and new forms of group-government relationship are central to all three frameworks. 
39 There are some more frameworks which have been taken into account in recent policy change 
studies. This is notwithstanding the fact that their initial focus is particularly on policy learning aspects 
of change: the Discourse Coalition Framework (Hajer 1995) and the Epistemic Communities 
Framework (Haas 1992). 
40 This form of monopoly emerges from a strong connection with powerful political ideas and 'policy 
images' reflecting both the ‘emotive’ and ‘empirical’ social construction of an issue (Weible 2008: 
618). 
41 The main rationale behind this circumstance is the ‘disproportionate/ asymmetric information 
processing’ by bureaucrats resulting from the policymakers’ information ‘oversupply’: ‘delegated 
authority and formal routines within the bureaucracy can dampen signals from political principals 
while centralised authority and informal procedures can amplify those signals’ (May et al 2008; Nowlin 
2011: 54). Consequently ‘popular issues tend to benefit from large increases in macro political 
attention but also that unpopular issues tend to benefit from decreasing attention’ (Mortensen 2009: 
450). 
42 The significance of policy change comes from this fact that actors seek to ‘over-compensate’ their 
former neglect of information by ‘radically readjusting’ the new policy image. The wide acceptance of 
the new policy image, resulting from the 'venue shopping' process, is conceived as 'the beginning of 
another lengthy period of policy stability' (Meijerink 2005: 10). 
43 Some elements of serendipity and 'chance occurrences' are also mentioned in PE. 
44 This describes a situation in which policy advocates are potentially enabled to convey their policy 
alternative because of attentions paid to either relevant problems or political patterns. It highlights the 





                                                                                                                                      
 
Cohen et al’s (1972) ‘garbage can model’ and ‘organised anarchy’: ‘The origins of policy may seem a 
bit obscure, hard to predict and hard to understand or to structure’.  
45 There are some modifications in new versions of the MS framework. Firstly the basic assumption of 
streams full independency is no longer verified. They are now assumed to be semi-autonomous but co-
evolutionary interrelated: ‘Stream independence is a conceptual device… The MS framework can 
assume that the streams act “as if” they are independent’ (Nowlin 2011: 57). Furthermore, new 
revisions have added institutional factors which are called ‘policy milieu’, including such institutions 
as state government structures. More importantly, the focus of MS has been expanded beyond merely 
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46 Laudan (1997) defines the concept of theoretical 'progressivity' as 'maximising the scope of empirical 
problems, while at the same time minimising the scope of unsolved anomalous or conceptual 
problems'. On that basis, the ACF could be regarded as a relatively 'progressive theory', despite that it 
still shows some signs of 'degeneration' and conceptual ambiguity (Nohrstedt 2008: 52). The ACF also 
enjoys a high level of systematic ‘standard requirements’ of ‘empiricist’ theory formulation (Szarka, 
2010: 837; Weible et al 2009: 125- 127; Sabatier & Weible 2007: 208). Therefore, Grin and Loeber 
(2006: 210) conclude that the ACF ‘deserves credit as being theoretically comprehensive, rigorous and 
integrative’. 
47 Similarly, the study done by Weible et al (2009: 125) displays that amongst various theories of 
policy process, the (ACF) is one of ‘the most popular’ and ‘pervasively tested’ policy theories in 
diverse 'geographical and substantive breadth and depth' during last two decades. The 
‘internationalisation of the ACF’ has happened notwithstanding a ‘fundamental ontological question’ 
regarding the applicability of it in different political systems outside of the ‘pluralistic’ context of  the 
United States (Weible et al 2011: 350). By introducing the concept of universal ‘policy style’, Cairney 
(2008: 350) points to ‘common standard operating procedures’ of policymaking irrespective to 
differences in macro political system and ‘national level generalisation’.    
48 There are various 'theoretical foci' within the scope of the ACF (Weible et al 2011: 353). Overall, the 
most important contributions of the ACF are: advancing an understanding of the formation and 
behaviour of advocacy coalitions, policy-oriented learning, science-policy relation, policy stability and 
change (Sabatier & Weible 2007: 192). 
49 The ACF is conceptually built on a 'range of theoretical contributions' from policy network theory to 
policy learning and also institutional rational choice theory. 'There are few discussions of policy theory 
today that do not devote attention to the ACF' (Fischer 2003: 2). Schlager (2007: 317) describes it as a 
'meta-theoretical language' functioning as ‘a single roof’ above other policy theories and models. 
50 The ACF has recently been a subject of criticism for 'increased complexities undermining the 
injunction to be clear enough to be proven wrong' (Sabatier 1999: 5; Nohrstedt 2011: 462). Critics 
argue that the ACF should remain committed to its original principles and scientific tradition (see 
Sabatier 1999) to 'balance between simplification and comprehensiveness’ in recognising complexities 
of public policymaking (Nohrstedt 2008: 54; Nohrstedt 2011: 481).   
51 Statistically, policy change is one of the most-frequently tested hypotheses amongst all ACF studies 
ever done (Weible et al 2009: 121) and it enjoys increasing 'academic popularity' compared to other 
policy change theories (Nohrstedt 2008: 4). 
52 The ACF introduces the concept of policy subsystem as its specific unit of analysis. This is an 
analytical construct that simplifies the analysis of participation in the policy process through an 
artificial 'semi-autonomous partitioning' (Albright 2011: 486; Nohrstedt 2011: 462; Weible et al 2009: 
134). The notion of a subsystem is characterised by both functional/substantive and 
territorial/geographical dimensions and 'the vast majority of policy making occurs within policy 
subsystems' (Sabatier & Weible 2007: 193). This includes multi-level governmental and multi-sector 
non-governmental actors who are organised into a manageable number of 'advocacy coalitions'. Using 
the terminology of 'subsystem' highlights the fact that subsystems are 'not immutable' to the wider 
context, though subsystems are typically systems within themselves.   
53 Typically, coalition-based policy theories assume that for any form of policy change ‘a coalition of 
the willing’ is needed, since ‘no agent is sufficiently powerful to design policy individually and any 
major change has multiple causes’ (Szarka 2010: 836). As the ACF defines, 'advocacy coalitions' are 





                                                                                                                                      
 
in a nontrivial degree of coordination' (Weible et al 2009: 132). They ‘strive to translate components of 
their belief systems into actual policy [designs] before their opponents can do the same’ (Sabatier and 
Weible 2007: 196). 
54 The ACF describes a shared three-layered belief system. It is structured into a hierarchy composed of 
deep core beliefs, policy core beliefs, and secondary beliefs. These three structural categories are 
arguably arranged 'in order of decreasing resistance to change' (Fischer 2003: 3) and narrowing their 
scope. Amongst them, policy core belief is perceived as the main driver of advocacy coalitions 
(Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1994; Kim & Roh 2008). Arguably, the ACF 'does not assume that actors 
are driven primarily by economic/political self-interest’ (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999: 131). Inspired 
largely by social psychology literature rather than 'microeconomics', it is based on the concept of 
bounded rationality, instead of rational actor as normal (Nohrstedt & Weible 2010: 9; Weible et al 
2011: 349).  
55 The ACF assumes that any change in policies does not occur in 'a political-administrative vacuum' 
(Nohrstedt & Weible 2010: 26) and in isolation from wider context as well as internal dynamics. 
Policies change 'through the interaction of competing advocacy coalitions' (Fischer 2003: 2) and are 
influenced by the specific 'set-up of policy subsystem' in terms of both quantity of advocacy coalitions 
and their interaction patterns, i.e. the level of internal conflict among coalitions (Nohrstedt & Weible 
2010: 13). 
56 The ACF defines policy subsystem operating within the broader political environment divided into 
relatively stable parameters and changing external trends. While the first condition the possibility of 
change, the latter make ‘shocks’ to subsystem. The relatively stable parameters consist of institutions; 
basic attributes of problem area and distribution of natural resources; legal/constitutional structure; 
fundamental socio-cultural values and social structure (Weible et al 2011: 352; Albright 2011: 487). 
Alternatively, the changing external factors comprises elements like change in public opinion,  
demographic change, socio-economic change, regime shift, spill-over effect of over-subsystem policy 
changes, crises and disasters (Albright 2011: 487; Nohrstedt 2011: 464; Nohrstedt & Weible 2010: 5). 
57 Inspired by ‘ideational policy theories’, like Heclo’s ‘social learning’ (1974), Hall’s ‘policy 
paradigm’ (1993) and Wiess’s ‘enlightenment’ concept (1977), the origin of the ACF had primarily 
tried to ‘integrate the hitherto largely separate literatures on knowledge utilisation and policy change’ 
(Sabatier 1987: 650). The ACF defines policy-oriented learning as 'the relatively enduring alterations 
of thought or behavioural intentions that result from experience and/or new information' (Sabatier & 
Jenkins-Smith 1999: 123).  
58 Although the ACF introduces ‘the internal and external shock dichotomy’ in terms of both policy 
and geographical distance (Nohrstedt & Weible 2010: 3), their definitions and impact pathways have 
been regarded as almost the same (Albright 2011: 506). 
59 This will be discussed in detail in a further section. 
60 ‘The basic argument in the neo-institutional literature is that most policies are firmly rooted in inert 
institutional settings … which cannot be changed from within. Therefore, stimuli, external to the policy 
subsystem, are required for non-incremental policy change’. (Nohrstedt & Weible 2010: 3) 
61 Critics argue that the ACF has overemphasised the role of (external-internal) events as the cause of 
policy change (James & Jorgensen 2009). This is due to the empiricist legacy of the ACF towards 
‘contextless universal generalisation’ (Fischer 2003: 25) that sees such events as easy to measure in 
time series analyses (Fischer 2003: 7). The presumption there is that drivers are of sufficient magnitude 
for change and there is a direct relation between the magnitude of external events and the level of 
change: ‘the bigger the cause, the bigger the impacts’ (Keeler 1993; Cortell & Peterson 1999). In 
contrast, Fischer (2003: 16) emphasises the fact that a deep explanation of how policy change comes 
about is expected to be drawn from a ‘detailed social and historical contextual examination’ of any 
particular case. 
62 Critics point to an analytical risk in explaining policy change based on ‘arbitrarily chosen’ and 
‘vaguely defined’, either external or internal, change drivers (Capano 2009; Nohrstedt & Weible 2010: 
5) Evidently, there is a wide range of definitions and divergent vocabulary emerged to capture 
differences between those drivers. While they were called simply ‘external events’ or ‘external 
perturbations’ by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993), they were then called ‘external shocks’ by Ingram 





                                                                                                                                      
 
Kingdon 1995; Zahariadis 2007) and ‘critical junctures’ (Hogan & Doyle 2009) aim to broadly 
conceptualise change drivers and the consequences they bring about. 
63 Policy literature points to common ‘managerial challenges’ that current policies face to meet new 
contextual requirements involving surprise, threat to core societal values, uncertainty, urgency, scale, 
and necessity of reform (Boin et al. 2009; Widmaier et al. 2007).  
64 This study suggests using the label of disruptive for those events or change drivers that are policy 
salient. 
65 Perhaps, regarding the unavailability of empirical evidence, this research does not provide a 
complete conceptualisation of a fully-fledged paradigmatic shift. In a similar study, Kuzemko (2011: 
93) concludes that for a wholesale paradigmatic shift alongside the perception of policy failure and 
paradigm discrediting, the availability of a cohesive alternative policy paradigm is also necessary.  
66 In the aftermath of an event or crisis, a more likely scenario is that policy debates focus on pre-
existing problems and solutions rather than raising and developing new policy challenges or options 
(Keeler 1993; Kingdon 1995; Quarantelli & Dynes 1977). Particularly in highly controversial cases, 
‘symbolic’ policy changes are the most likely and less challenging outcomes.  
67 From a constructivist point of view, different coalitions interpret change drivers differently, based on 
their belief-driven conceptual lenses. They highlight what is adaptable to their belief system and tone 
down, or even ignore if possible, events that are conceived as conflicting to their policy beliefs. 
68 This fact is in consistence with the concept of ‘skilful exploitation’ introduced by the ACF. It implies 
the degree to which a pro-change coalition can skilfully exploit the crisis (change driver). 
69 Building upon policy paradigm theory (Hall 1993), Kuzemko points out that the process of change 
would be accelerated by the ‘mounting evidence of policy failure’ and increasing ‘anomaly between 
objectives and outcomes’. She similarly argues that this process is driven largely by ‘political 
protagonists’ (Kuzemko 2011: 93) through the process of ‘narrative appropriation’ and contestation 
(Kuzemko 2011: 75). Hall (1993: 280) calls this process ‘discrediting the prevailing paradigm’ that 
eventually leads to its ‘obsolescence’. 
70 This literature includes historical, social and rational-choice institutionalism. Given ‘all definitions of 
institution’ imply ‘persistence’, they focus mainly on ‘stability’ and ‘continuity’. Consequently, ‘the 
inescapable conclusion’ is that any change in ‘self-reinforcing institutions’ requires ‘an exogenous 
origin’ driver and there is no space for an ‘endogenous change driver’ (Mahoney & Thelen 2010: 4, 6, 
7). In other words, given policies firmly consolidated by ‘inert institutional setting’ and ‘policy 
equilibrium’ status, policy change is rather unlikely unless an external ‘stimulus’ emerges. 
71 The ACF views minor policy change as a product of policy-oriented learning, while major policy 
change requires a perturbation in non-cognitive factors that are external to the policy subsystem. 
Learning, however, is not a sufficient condition for major policy change. (Schlager 1999: 250). 
72 Skocpol demonstrates that policies themselves are institutions that shape other institutions, ideas, 
alliances, and other aspects of the policymaking arena. (Skocpol 1995 cited in Silberberg 1997: 372) 
73 This point contradicts directly the concept behind varieties of institutionalism literature that denies 
any gap between design and outcome of policies: ‘the enactment of the rule both reflects and reinforces 
its existence’ (Thelen 2009: 492). 
74
 In the literature, different strategies are distinguishable on the basis of their ontological and 
epistemological assumption; the starting point and procedures; the aims and logics; and, the style of 
outcome.  
75 Yin (2003) points to a classification of experiment, survey, archival analysis, historical research, 
ethnography, grounded theory and case study. Similarly Lijphart (1971) suggest a typology of research 
strategies including experimental, statistical, comparative and case study approaches. 
76 There are a range of pragmatic factors such as personal interests, available time and budget, the level 
of access to required infrastructures and data and the expectation of influential audiences.  
77 Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999: 125) suggest energy studies as 'the most likely' cases for policy 
research respecting to their features like 'technical complexity' as well as 'substantial political conflict'. 
78 This is because policymaking is thought as a ‘long-frame’ and ‘strategic’ process that needs to be 
analysed in a ‘full policy cycle’. This means a wider context of long-term policy evolution and change 
that allows ‘operationalisation of falsifiable hypotheses’ and ‘smoothing out short-term fluctuations’ 





                                                                                                                                      
 
79 As Rhodes (1997: 17) describes, ‘central state functions got lost upwards to the European Union, 
downwards to special purpose bodies [and devolved areas], and outward to agencies’. 
80 Lijphart (1999) characterises UK as a ‘majoritarian’ system based on a set of features like centralised 
power in the hand of majority party, adversarial politics, top-down policy imposition, ‘statist’ public 
policy monopolised by the government without 'too many checks and balances' (Kern 2011:12; 
Schmidt 2006), politically neutral civil service and hierarchical departments. 
81 Based on an empirical study, Cairney (2011) draws a picture of modern British policy style. 
Accordingly, the normal UK policymaking is largely derived from incrementalism; it is subject to 
inertia and path dependency; policy outcomes result from ‘the complex interplay between 
governmental and non-governmental actors’; there are evidences of ideational policy making; the 
extensive consultative norms are commonly acceptable; and, radical paradigmatic changes are less-
likely to occur. There are perhaps some exceptions of symbolic ‘headline decisions’ taken at the centre 
of political system. 
82 This sample is not sufficiently inclusive. For example, my observations found an important role of 
some media and journalists as well as the central role of political parties in that process which are not 
directly represented in this sample.  
83 The current electricity industry includes four distinctive types of functional 'entities' working 
complicatedly together to provide the flow of power in the UK: generators; transmission operators 
(TNOs); distribution network (DNOs); and, electricity suppliers (Skea et al 2011: 42). In the UK, most 
generators and suppliers are almost administered and owned by the ‘Big Six' companies: EDF; E.ON, 
RWE, Scottish Power, Centrica and Scottish and Southern Energy. The National Grid (NG), as overall 
System Operator, in collaboration with other TNOs and DNOs is responsible for transmission and 
distribution functions and balancing power flow (Skea et al 2011: 43). Furthermore, several 
independent companies are also working rather marginally in different stages of electricity power 
process. In addition, there are a wide range of businesses that are affected by the direction of electricity 
policy. Appendix D displays an overview of all private companies that submitted to EMR’s call for 
consultation.  
84 From a structural point of view, energy policy is not limited only within the functions of Department 
of Energy and Climate Change (DECC). There are several other departments like Treasury, Business, 
Innovation and Skills (BIS), Transport, DEFRA and the Foreign Office (FCO) which are engaged with 
the notion of energy policy in some aspects (Pearson & Watson 2012: 34). In addition, there are at least 
two independent statutory regulatory and advisory bodies dedicated to energy and climate change 
policy: Ofgem and CCC. A list of such departments commented on EMR could be found in Appendix 
D. 
85 A list of academic institutes, think tanks and consultancies participating in EMR has been presented 
in Appendix D. 
86 Perhaps NGOs have diverse affiliations. In electricity policy, environmental, consumer support and 
local societies are the most active ones. A list of NGOs that commented on EMR could be found in 
Appendix D. 
87 Despite those advantages, there are a set of analytical challenges in the way of applying a mixed-
method strategy. The improper implementation of each method separately and thereby an ineffective 
use of them, the risk of inconsistent theoretical and epistemological assumptions and the lack of 
distinctive analysis and presentation are some possibilities required careful considerations (Moran-Ellis 
et al 2006; cited in Milne 2010).  
88 In contrast with random sampling generalising interview findings to a wider population, snowballing 
method seeks personal first-hand accounts of strategic policy players.  
89 It is arguably a common challenge in the way of most policy studies in general. How could one 
differentiate between what policy makers say and what they actually believe? Does what they say is 
directly related to what they actually do? What is the interaction between what they believe, say and do 
from one side, and the real impacts and consequences of their policy stance from the other side? Does 
what they do not say and do not do resonate their policy beliefs as well? Even it is problematic to treat 
official policy documents and parliamentary hearing as ‘unbiased expression of their true belief’ 
(Jenkins-Smith et al 1991: 858). Since they are presumably to persuade policymakers, there is a risk of 





                                                                                                                                      
 
organisation; the consideration to the self-interests, and the concern of ‘credibility and persuasiveness’. 
Therefore, any research needs to cautiously contextualise data embedded either in policy documents or 
interview transcripts. 
90 Otherwise, without a set of robust theoretical propositions, it would be analytically difficult to 
eliminate other likely causal explanations through a process tracing analysis (George & Bennett 2005: 
223). 
91 It is perhaps for studies aiming at ‘partial explanation’ of a social phenomenon. Otherwise, there are 
always endless probable causal linkages that could be envisaged between a particular policy change 
and different actual conditions in society (Nohrstedt 2007: 24).  Kern (2010: 58) argues that this is still 
a wider methodological concern encountering all social sciences. Anyway, the degree of openness and 
reflexivity in the way of interpreting data and choosing a particular causal explanation rather than 
others is the only possible way to increase research internal validity. 
92 This is an addition to the four already developed policy components in the literature: policy 
paradigm, objectives, institutions and instruments.  
93Whilst a full characterisation seems, to some extent, unlikely due to ‘diachronic’ and ‘relative’ nature 
of policy change Hay (1999: 30), this research seeks to contribute in the way to overcome such 
conceptual limitations. Section four will discuss such limitations in detail. 
94 The electricity socio-technical system or regime in this sense is a complex configuration of technical 
artefacts, institutional arrangements and social practices (Bolton & Foxon 2011; Foxon 2011; Geels 
2004). 
95 These features of the UK electricity system have been mentioned in several studies (Bolton & Foxon 
2013; Watson 2013; Wolsink 2012; Mitchell 2013; Hoggett 2013). 
96 Given EMR as a very contemporary case study, there is no way to analyse its practical consequences. 
Therefore, this research relies largely on the analysis of EMR’s policy content rather than actual 
outcomes. 
97 While this time frame could explain the policy roots of EMR, it cannot cover its implementation. 
98 This governance model is labelled differently by Mitchell (2008) as Regulatory State Paradigm 
(RSP) and by Kuzemko (2011) as Pro-market Energy Policy Paradigm (PEPP). 
99 Energy could be conceptualised differently: an input for economic growth; a public good for quality 
of life; a source of revenue for exporters; an employer and community supporter; a national-strategic 
asset; a security factor; an emission polluter; or a tradable commodity (Kuzemko 2013). 
100 As such, energy policy was assumed as a 'rational, consensus based, objective process' that could be 
self-sufficiently provided and invisibly planned by the competitive market, in the most effective way 
(Pearson & Watson 2012: 30). 
101  The term ‘marketised de-politicisation’ was introduced by Colin Hay as ‘off-loading of areas of 
formal political responsibility to the market’ (Hay 2007: 82). 
102 Electricity privatisation was delayed due to characteristics like complexity; scale; vertical 
integration; technological mix; non-storability; required excess supply; and successful nationalised 
experiences (Pearson & Watson 2012: 9; Skea et al 2011: 42). 
103  Hay describes it as ‘displacement of responsibility from government to public or quasi-public 
authorities’ (see Kuzemko 2011: 63). 
104 This idea was arguing that in the wake of 'full disciplines of the market', even a regulatory role 
would be naturally downplayed (Pearson & Watson 2012: 7). 
105 As a result of this disinterest in innovation policy, energy RD&D funding after privatisation 
witnessed almost a ‘collapse’. See figure 6 in Appendix B. 
106  This happened due to their inherent inflexibility, scale and risk (Pearson & Watson 2012: 10) and 
despite strong governmental commitment to support nuclear energy by either a 'nuclear tax' in the 1989 
Electricity Act or Non Fossil Fuel Obligation (NFFO). 
107 Nevertheless, the legacy of subsidising coal was kept under the new paradigm, respecting its 
historical socio-economic role as the heart of ‘British industrialisation’ (Kuzemko 2011: 110). 
108 The lower investment risk for gas was due to its low capital cost/higher running cost characteristics. 
109 The structure changed from a nationalised monopoly to a privatised duopoly and then oligopoly.  
110 New Labour evaluated the Pool market as discriminatory in favour of gas and against coal, as their 





                                                                                                                                      
 
111 This mechanism then received strong criticism as a 'game changing policy failure' in terms of either 
missing its objectives or undermining competition (Henney 2011a: 79). It was characterised as 
comparably less transparent, less liquid and more difficult to enter than the pool market, mainly 
because of the absence of 'benchmarking' function (Helm 2010: 2; Henney 2011b: 53).  
112 Kern (2012: 10; 2011: 15) points to the emergence of a complementary policy rhetoric to the 
competitive market around the notion of 'developing low carbon technology’.  
113 Even the underinvestment feature of the security concern that had already been understood as a 
consequence of continuous ‘statism’ was then conceived, conversely, as the result of 'naive marketism’ 
(Henney 2011). 
114 Energy was then discussed widely in Parliament and within committees and a range of new actors, 
and institutions. 
115 The introduction of some sorts of geopolitically-informed ‘protectionist’ policies, like the 
International Energy Strategy with the involvement of FCO, faced a high degree of ‘scepticism within 
DTI and Ofgem’ and therefore they were generally discredited (Kuzemko 2011: 243). 
116Those policies argued that 'the economics of nuclear power now look more positive than 2003' and 
'new nuclear power stations lower the costs and risks associated' (DTI 2007). 
117 Nonetheless, the new pattern by no means implied a conceptual return to nationalised single-central 
planning experienced pre-privatisation. Indeed, that trend seems neither desirable nor even possible, 
due to the inter-dependency of government, industry and the international context (Skea et al 2011: 3). 
118 They implied a more 'regulative', 'quantitative, plan-based, centrally directed', 'command and 
control' approach (Skea et al 2011:3; Pearson & Watson 2012: 31-32).  
119 It is also the case for the Low Carbon Industrial Policy (BIS and DECC 2009) trying to bridge 
economic potentials of quick transition to a low carbon economy to broader industrial opportunities 
(Pearson & Watson 2012: 27). 
120 That condition was ‘neither market nor state’ (Helm 2010) and was called ‘inter-paradigm 
borrowing’ by Kuzemko (2011). Given the resultant intellectual incoherency of such a mixed 
paradigm, Hall (1993: 280) predicts a pattern of gradual decline in the dominant-original paradigm. 
121It was completed by the UK Renewable Energy Strategy (DECC 2009) breaking down the means of 
meeting the 15% renewable obligation from the whole of UK energy and specifying the share of 
different sectors of it (Skea et al 2011: 51). 
122 ‘Objective setting is one method, therefore, of giving [ideas] political saliency and agency in that 
they move policy in certain directions. Indeed, policy objectives can be understood as a statement of 
what a nation or a group of nations holds important. Targets are a method of holding political 
institutions accountable’ (Kuzemko 2013b). 
123 DECC came about from merging energy-related policy functions of the Department of Business, 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR) and the Department of Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs (DEFRA). 
124The formation of CCC intensified policy activities by providing louder recommendations for and 
‘criticism’ of government policies (Pearson & Watson 2012: 26). 
125 Guy Newey , the head of the Environment & Energy in Policy exchange, describes it as ‘the dangers 
of energy targetism' (Newey 2013). It refers to setting targets without knowing how to meet them.  
126 As Exxon Mobil Energy Outlook to 2040 shows, electricity will be the dominant source of final 
energy consumption making the power sector the focal point of competition between all the primary 
fuels (Exxon Mobil 2013). 
127
 Arguably this process was started by Ed Miliband in 2008 when he called for ‘a strategic role for 
government’. However, he has been criticised for ‘late diagnosing’ and ‘slow responding’ to the 
challenges of the electricity market (Interview 41). 
128 More importantly, it proposed a 'far reaching energy market reform' (Newbery 2011: 5) through five 
'policy packages’. For an overview of those scenarios, look at figure 13 in Appendix B. 
129 This document disputed market ability to deliver ‘excess supply’ and ‘a particular technology 
profile’.  Thereby it urged government to 're-assess’ the current approach towards a 'mixed balance 





                                                                                                                                      
 
130 Particularly, it criticised a sense of 'complacency' for easy gain of the low carbon target due to 
recession and over-reliance on the adequacy of EUETS (Skea et al 2011: 48; Pearson & Watson 2012: 
27; Henney 2011a: 278).   
131 It consisted of a complex package of measures like smart grid; feed-in tariff; emission performance 
standard; a floor price for carbon; a review of Ofgem's role; and de-centralised community-based 
power generation. 
132 The wholesale pool market is the first followed by the NETA/BETTA models.  
133 At the time of final editing, the Energy Act received Royal Assent on 18 December 2013 (DECC 
2013a). 
134 This complex label reflects the rejection of other possible forms of FiT as well as some signs of 
Coalition Agreement terminology (Henney 2011a: 313). See figure 15 in Appendix B. 
135 It would be used on an irregular basis in the case of an increasing share of intermittent generation 
like wind in the final portfolio. It may lead to another set of contractual design to reserve sufficient 
capacity (See figure 16 in Appendix B). 
136 Although it received several criticisms as a 'redundant', 'dispensable' (UKERC 2011: 14) and 
ineffective mechanism (FoE 2011: 10), the EPS resulted from an electoral-political promise of 
Conservatives to environmental NGOs to symbolically distinguish them from Labour. 
137 For a comparison between CPF and EUETS, see figure 14 in Appendix B. Nonetheless, the 
adequacy of CPF for incentivising investment has been questioned due to the lack of de-risking 
function and 'bankablity' (Newbery 2011: 7; Henney 2011a: 312).  
138 The term hybrid model has been used frequently in recent studies (Bolton & Foxon 2013: 15; Butler 
2013: Kern et al 2013). 
139 Newbery (2011: 12) points to the lack of ‘de-centralised investment decision’ and competition as 
well as a ‘maximum de-risking' for investors as EMR’s characteristics that are in clear contrast with a 
typical market model. Apart from EPS, a constraining regulatory standard, the only market-compatible 
mechanism of EMR is CPF. 
140 ‘Government, while intervening in a more direct way to pursue its goals of long term 
decarbonisation and energy security, is still reliant on private actors and market processes to deliver its 
energy policy priorities (Bolton & Foxon, 2013: 16)’. 
141 These signals are a substitute for central government control of the whole power generation sector 
which used to exist through the CEGB.   
142 This amendment was proposed by a group of cross-party MPs. Eventually, in June 2013, it was 
rejected by a low margin of votes - 290 MPs to 267 voted against. 
143 This fact was highly contested as a ‘Westminster tragedy’ by a wide range of stakeholders for the 
‘lack of vision’ and ‘choosing the tools without knowing what the outcome is' (WWF 2011; Green 
Peace 2011; Exeter EPG 2011). They argue that the absence of a clear target could cause a high risk of 
“investment vacuum” after 2020. 
144 Affordability in the case of EMR includes both fuel poverty of end users and the lack of 
competitiveness for energy intensive businesses (Platchkov et al 2011: 5; Consumer Focus 2011; EIUG 
2011: 2; CBI 2011: 5). A growing advocacy coalition of new members including energy intensive 
industries, consumer representatives and tax payer alliance is gradually emerging (Interview 17). For 
an estimation of EMR’s impact on affordability see figure 17 in Appendix B. 
145As the result of ‘inherited tension’ between policy objectives, EMR has been characterised as 
‘internally inconsistent’ and ‘incoherent in wider policy landscape’, suffering from ‘redundancy’,  
'dispensability', 'duplication’ and ‘policy overlap' (Platchkov et al 2011: 5; UKERC 2011: 1; Exeter 
EPG 2011: 2; Oil & Gas UK 2011: 2; FoE 2011: 2).   
146 The EPS is the most compatible mechanism with the 'deep environmentalism' idea. ‘What CPF and 
EPS are designed to do is give a carrot and a stick to the market place’ (Interview 13). 
147 It is perhaps in consistence with a wider pattern of strengthening the ministers’ roles in ‘civil service 
reform’. The concern is now about undermining civil service political impartiality and threatening 
Whitehall’s independence (Butler 2012). Another example happened when the prime minister 
personally blocked the appointment of permanent secretary of the DECC which showed that ‘the 





                                                                                                                                      
 
148 Winskel et al (2012: 14) points to the ‘re-launch’ of the Low Carbon Innovation Group comprising 
almost all energy innovation institutes. It shows more ‘centralised’ innovation governance. 
149 Nick Butler has made similar statements in the following article as well: http://blogs.ft.com/nick-
butler/2013/01/16/the-uk-energy-departments-corridors-of-power/ 
150 Such tension is going to result in a substantial risk for EMR insofar as recently two main architects 
of the reform have resigned from their position at DECC. 
151 In all scenarios under CM, expectedly, gas could play the role of flexible backup for peaking plants.  
152 The current level of EPS at 450g CO2/kWh as well as its ‘grandfathering’ nature ‘give a free ride to 
unabated gas-fired plants’  to continue 'as long as it is economically viable under CPF' (Interview 17). 
153 Unsurprisingly this fact was strongly criticised by the CCC (2012) and environmental groups as a 
‘completely incompatible [scenario] with the UK's carbon targets’ that might ‘cremate the 
Conservative's green credibility for eternity’ (Carrington 2012). 
154 While EMR claims neutral approach towards all three low carbon technologies, CCS has always 
been marginalised due to the long distance it still has from actual marketisation. 
155 Centralisation of large-scale technologies in the UK power industry has historical roots in the policy 
mindset and infrastructure design. It is more related to the ‘logic of situation more than a strong 
ideology’ (Interview 16). 
156 After a collapse in UK energy innovation, the key to recently arisen energy technology is not ‘blue 
skies innovation but coaxing existing inventions through the so-called Valley of Death to commercial 
scale’ (Harrabin 2012). For an overview of the UK energy innovation spend, see figure 19 in Appendix 
B. 
157 Mark Winskel (2013) points to an increasing risk of ‘forced up-scaling’ and ‘early lock-in’. 
158 I would like to thank my colleague Mike Kattirtzi for suggesting ‘ambivalence’ instead of my initial 
terminology of paradigm confusion. 
159  This does not mean that all mentioned dimensions have changed fundamentally. There are several 
claims that some features still have not changed adequately. For instance, Lockwood (2013) points out 
that the creation of CCC and DECC do not reflect a complete structural shift. 
160 Otherwise there is a remarkable risk of policy failure and interruption. EMR has been characterised 
by an interviewee as ‘the beginning of a bigger change [theoretically] that may not happen at all 
[practically]’ (Interview 24, Economist and director of a low carbon Research Institute, January 2012).  
161 Indeed, technology is not a separate part of a system. Socio-technical transition framework tries to 
incorporate the interaction of material and non-material components of a system into analysis.  
162‘Beyond legal targets there is little similarity between the two countries' energy policies on the 
ground. [Contrary to the UK] Germany is transforming energy system practices from a centralised top 
down to interlinked system, regional and local networks; as well as dispersing energy providers 
geographically, by scale and by users’. (Mitchell 2013) 
163 The stages heuristic approach (Lasswell 1956; Brewer & deLeon 1983; 1999) suggested simply 
breaking the complex policy process down functionally into a series of sequential stages such as 
agenda setting, policy formulation, implementation and evaluation. That generation was then replaced 
due to their analytical shortcomings and over-simplification.  
164
 For example, in the case of the UK electricity policy in the early 2000s, increasing the share of 
renewable and energy efficiency were seen as ‘overall solutions’ to meet new low carbon policy 
objectives. Consequently, RO was introduced as a policy instrument to facilitate those targets. 
165  It is an addition to the four already developed policy components: policy paradigm, objectives, 
institutions and instruments.  
166 Though, it also points in the absence of an alternative advocacy coalition with a cohesive policy 
paradigm as the main reason behind incomplete paradigmatic shift in the EMR.  
167 Though, inspired by neo-institutionalism, 'for several decades and with few exceptions, major 
events have been conceptualised as occurring “external” to policy subsystem boundaries’ (Nohrstedt & 
Weible 2010: 19). 
168 Nohrstedt and Weible (2010: 19) point in ‘phenomenological’ differences between them. 





                                                                                                                                      
 
170 Policy literature points in common ‘managerial challenges’ that current policies face to meet new 
contextual requirements involving surprise, threat to core societal values, uncertainty, urgency, scale, 
and necessity of reform (Boin et al. 2009; Widmaier et al. 2007).  
171 Winskel (2012) characterises that governance model as ‘corporatism and technocracy’. Similarly, 
Henney (2011a: 335) describes it a centrally administered; publicly owned; and 'politically 
manipulated' system. 
172 There were two oil shocks in 1970s. The first one in 1973/4, in particular, led to the creation of 
Department of Energy in the UK and International Energy Agency in the OECD level.  
173The cases of Sizewell B nuclear station and coal fixed price contracts and 1984 strikes are two 
examples.  
174 This governance model is labelled differently by Mitchell (2008) as Regulatory State Paradigm 
(RSP) and by Kuzemko (2011) as Pro-market Energy Policy Paradigm (PEPP). 
175 I have got this term from Hadfield (2007: 2). 
176 Helm (2003) argues that such ‘pragmatic, market based Conservatism had been developed from the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.’ 
177 He was the ‘key architect’ of the wider privatisation strategy.  
178 Economists like Keith Joseph, Eileen Marshall and Stephen Littlechild played a crucial role in 
linking academics with politicians. 
179 By hiring a large number of ‘likeminded’ energy analysts with ‘economics’ and ‘statistics’ 
background, the pro-market paradigm was deliberately institutionalised in both DTI and Ofgem. In 
particular, Kuzemko (2011: 232) describes Ofgem’s approach as ‘off the end of economistic scale’. 
Such market legacy is still visible in Ofgem approach: 
 
We consider that the appropriate use of competitive mechanisms is likely to lead to the best 
outcome for consumers over the long-term, that would be competition 'in the market' or 
competition 'for the market'… Of course, the success of these measures will depend heavily 
on the role of the market on the final EMR package (Ofgem 2011: 3). 
 
180 Helm (2003: 65) emphasises on that deliberate decision: ‘Lawson, like Thatcher, put particular 
emphasis on choosing the right individuals to carry out his policies.  He wanted to find managers who 
were ‘one of us’ … executives were to be chosen with a mind to the political objectives as much as 
their managerial competence’. 
181 The pro-market advocacy coalition is still active in the UK electricity policy subsystem. In the case 
of EMR, the main important market-oriented bodies are right wing think tanks commissioned by old 
Tories, like Policy Exchange or Regulatory Policy Institute, as well as neo-classical economic institutes 
like Cambridge Electricity Policy Research Group and Oxford Energy Institutes. There are several 
other consultancies with explicit market affiliation. Amongst governmental and public bodies also this 
approach has been institutionalized mainly in the Treasury, BERR and Ofgem as statutory body for 
protecting competition. Perhaps other state departments to some extent are influenced by the legacy of 
this paradigm as well. Businesses that used to be a part of that coalition are now more opportunistic and 
looking for rent seeking. 
182 Change in the approach to the role of state was not limited to energy sector exclusively. It was a part 
of ‘broader macroeconomic governance ideas’ emerged at that time. 
183 Helm (2005: 4) points to a set of background-contextual conditions that facilitated these easy gains. 
They include the disconnection between economic growth and energy consumption and thus, a 
temporary fall in energy ratio; the availability of indigenous resources in North Sea; the heavy state-
funded investment in energy infrastructure; a limited improvement in energy efficiency; the reduction 
of oil price; and, a gradual reduction in CO2 due to a shift from coal to gas: 'dash for gas'. 
184 This paradigm was also disseminated internationally via ‘multilateral institutions’ and ‘good 
governance standards’ (Youngs 2009: 8).  As such it is argued that neo-liberal ideas dominated ‘both 
energy and wider macroeconomic policymaking in the UK and beyond’ (Kuzemko 2011: 61). 
185 Such sense of success related to achieving some features like over-supply; effective competition; 





                                                                                                                                      
 
about ‘overstating’ the benefits of marketisation and overlooking its consequences. (Pearson & Watson 
2012: 15, 19).  
186 Previous chapter showed how significant all policy components changed at that time. Kuzemko 
(2011) points in de-politicisation, either in technocratic or in public level, as the main strategy for 
institutionalising pro-market policy paradigm.  
187The term of orthodoxy has been used in different studies with reference to an ‘ideological lock-in’ 
taking competition as ‘fait accompli as opposed to social construct’ (Kern & Mitchell 2011: 8; Helm 
2005, 2003; Mitchell 2008).  
188  This status is called ‘de-skilling’ by several studies (Helm 2005; Skea et al 2011; Kuzemko 2011). 
189 Particularly, the decline of emission driven by dash for gas was almost reversed in early 2000s. In 
addition, it became clear that the Climate Change Programme (DETR 2000) could not meet emission 
targets (Lockwood 2013: 7). 
190 Climate change was officially recognised by PM Thatcher in her speech to Royal Society in 1988. 
Environmental target was firstly acknowledged by the 1993 Coal White Paper (DTI 1993). 
191 Whereas 'Old Labour' was traditionally associated more with affordability and equity values, the 
New Labour government tried to be seen as market friendly. Nevertheless, some in Labour were still 
concerned that a pro-market ‘economic paradigm’ considers growth without adequate consideration to 
environmental and social consequences. 
192 The report of Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution (RCEP, 2000) was widely cited and 
very influential for Prime Minister Blair to get involved in energy policy nationally and then 
internationally (Henney 2011a: 257). 
193 In 1988, UK signed the Large Composition Plan Directive. Then, the 1992 UNFCCC and the Kyoto 
agreement in 1997 were the main drivers of UK climate policy. It was then productively coupled with 
the leadership aspiration of UK foreign policy by the entrance of the FCO. 
194 Climate policies overall require more direct state involvement. They are ‘often associated with the 
left’ and ‘less-devolved or independent’ policy implications (Kaletsky 2010). It has conceptual roots in 
theories that are more aware of environmental and political aspects of energy then neo-liberal 
approaches, like the modern versions of 'leftist economic and political views' (Interview 10, Emiratus 
head of an energy and environmental policy institute, November 2011). Nonetheless, Rowson (2013) 
argues it has no necessary contradiction between the values of the centre-right and the challenge of 
responding to climate change, whilst the left has a relatively coherent position on that (it’s by no means 
clear cut) and that many of the potentially effective forms of action (subsidies, regulation, taxation) fall 
out of their worldview. 
195Problem solving here is assumed the functional coherence of existing phenomena within the given 
framework. It by no means seeks to shift the dominant interpretive paradigm. 
196 In addition to the institutionalisation of market ideas in both Ofgem and DTI, they were supported 
by an influential combination of powerful and wealthy private bodies including big energy generators 
and investors in the City, who had been benefited a lot from the market (Interview 11, Senior planning 
policy officer at RSPB, December 2011). 
197 Bernstein called it the emergence of a ‘liberal-environmentalism’ compromise (2001: 187). In a 
similar statement Kuzemko (2011: 154) describes such ‘weak compromise’ as a political strategy for 
the Labours to ‘disarm political opposition’ and to ‘buy time’.  
198 Kern (2010) also points in the emergence of a supportive policy discourses like the ‘low-carbon 
technology development’.  
199 The responsibility of statist exporters for ‘negative effects’ on energy markets has been mentioned 
in several studies (Mitchell et al 2001; Henney 2011).  
200 Geopolitical approach has been defined by linking the possession of energy resources with issues 
like the influence of foreign policy, ‘state sovereignty’ and ‘national-level politics’ (Correlje & Linde 
2006). 
201  There is assumed an ‘inter-subjective relationship’ between public awareness and political action. It 
links between the interpretation of context and the way of conduct (Widmaier et al 2007: 755). 
202 Given the nature of insecurity challenge as a shared concern, it has been used strategically by 
various advocacy coalitions. In further sections, this chapter shows how security was then exploited as 





                                                                                                                                      
 
different generation technologies. From this viewpoint, I agree with what a high profile energy analyst 
from RSPB argued: 
 
Security is mainly an indigenous and politician-led concern. It shapes the basic philosophy of state. 
Therefore it has never been absent in any policy. Generally security here, I think, is more like a 
shared discourse than a base for shaping a distinctive coalition (Interview 11, Senior planning 
policy officer at RSPB, December 2011). 
 
203 This perception of security crisis in the mid 2000s is evident by interviews quoted in Kuzemko 
(2011: 238). 
204 Henney (2011a: 339) argue that electricity industry is fundamentally different from other sectors. 
The ‘politicisation is inevitable’ and ‘power and politics go together in all countries'. 
205 I got the idea of ‘market demission’ from Alex Henney’s term: 'demise of competition' (2011b: 50). 
206By the mid 2006, it became clear that UK will miss its domestic 2010 carbon reduction and 
renewable targets by 'a large margin’ (Skea et al 2011: 61; Lockwood 2013: 8). 
207It refers to different natures of climate and security. While security was an urgent, visible, evocative 
and politically salient narrative (Lockwood 2009), it was not understood as the failure of system and 
was not translated to policy solutions and recommendations. On the other hand, although climate was a 
commonly acceptable and permanently important issue, it was not seen as tangible and immediate 
crisis compared to others and across the time (Giddens 2009: 2). Therefore, Lockwood says that 
climate is more a ‘valence’ issue than a ‘salient’ one (2013: 16). For a comparative idea, see figure 22 
in Appendix B.   
208 Henney points in 'naïve marketism', which ideologically prescribes the unified market formulation 
too far into all areas regardless of 'complexity; transaction cost; relevance; and, practicality' (2011a: 
343). It also suffers from an extreme pessimism of any form of state intervention (Pearson & Watson 
2012: 30). Whereas, the reality of energy policy is ‘much messier’ than what market supposes. 
209 Several economists I interviewed (Interviews 17, 19, 24 and 26) described that period of time as 
when ‘the voice of neo-liberal economics was balanced’ with a more 'regulatory quantitative-oriented' 
perspective.  The dominance of 'finance techniques' in shaping a 'predictable future' and meeting the 
'certain targets' was also another characteristic mentioned. This approach was then manifested in the 
CCC reports:  
‘a quantity rather than price-based instrument would provide most confidence over 
delivery…It will be necessary for government to determine the appropriate pace of de-
carbonisation and to translate it into contracting strategy’ (CCC 2011: 1). 
 
210 It happened because of both targets’ characteristics as imprecise, vague and with ‘get-out-clause’ 
and technocratic de-politicisation of those departments. 
211 Such emphasise on targets was due to this assumption that there is no enough political will to tackle 
climate change. It also reflected both also new changes in climate science and modelling (Lockwood et 
al 2007). 
212
There was always a fluctuation in climate public interest. After a decline in public interest in climate 
change in early 2000s for 2 years, its salience rose steadily from around 2% in early 2004 to around 
12% in mid-2007. For the result of the Ipsos-MORI tracker poll see figure 21 in appendix 1. 
213 Lockwood (2013: 9) points in the formation of a very broad coalition of civil society groups, 
including the National Federation of Women’s Institutes, Christian Aid, the National Trust, Oxfam, 
UNISON and the RSPB. In addition, some interviewees from green NGOs marked the engagement of 
well-known figures like music stars in Liberty Concert (Interview 14, 25 and 28).  
214 They pointed in dynamics like receiving ‘accumulative subsidies’, using ‘communication 
instruments and campaigning potentials’, attracting ‘skilful members’, gaining more 'analytical ability’, 
and moving from a merely ‘ideological enthusiast’ to an ‘analytically credible’ position. 
215 Over 400 MPs signed a parliamentary motion for the Climate Change Bill (Lockwood 2013: 9). 
216It is quoted from the then Environment Secretary David Miliband that “the Labour could not get into 





                                                                                                                                      
 
217 I heard similar description in most interviews conducted, e.g. Interviews 17; 15; 34; 41; 43. Though 
while in the 2010 election, all major party campaigns presented an ‘environmentally decorated’ 
politics, climate change was never amongst the top-ranked electoral strategies (Lockwood 2013: 20).   
218 I got this term from a economist specialised in the micro-economy of energy market. He 
differentiated between 'energy economics’ and ‘climate economics' in the way that while the first 
neutrally seeks the most economically efficient design, the latter is biased in favour of climate targets 
and is to strategise the way of reaching climate targets (Interview 19, December 2011). 
219 An organisation advising on ethical, socially responsible and environmental investment 
220 An organisation working with shareholders and corporations claiming to disclose the greenhouse 
gas emissions of major corporations 
221 An independent, non-governmental committee aiming at shaping ‘a synergy of climate experts, 
world leaders, Nobel peace laureates, and shapers of opinion  to help creating the political will to 
address climate change. It produced a report Climate Change – Everyone’s Business in 2006. 
222 Despite some challenges with current policies, research undertaken by The World Energy Council 
(WEC, 2012) among 40 energy industry executives shows that major energy firms are still amongst 
who calls for clear ‘political action and leadership’ for carbon emissions targets. 
223 Big energy industry companies are the most influential. Their objective is to make money… They 
are happy with new objectives, once the cost of new policies is paid by others, particularly the 
government and consumers…Actually they see new investment as a gigantic opportunity at relatively 
low risk similar to the introduction of rail industry in US (Interview 1, Formerly in Scottish energy 
policy and member of UKERC advisory board, November 2011). 
224 Such form of inter-dependency between government and incumbent businesses was also mentioned 
in interviews with business representatives (Interview 33, 38, 41and 44). A regulatory economist 
explained how opportunistically businesses have shifted their approach towards state intervention: 
  
‘The energy companies have been moving around, they have tried to adapt with the situation. 
Possibly they originally have been pro-market, but they always are willing to support an 
intervention which they think is good for their strategy. If any form of government regulation 
could secure their market and profit, they do not like real competition. Therefore, they prefer 
shifting their 'commercial decision making' towards 'a political rent seeking' model’. (Interview 17, 
Senior policy research fellow at Policy Exchange, December 2011). 
 
225 The breadth of that consensus was reflected in almost 17,500 responses to the bill consultation call 
and high-level cross party supports in Parliament. 
226This term is quoted from an interview with the then PM energy advisor in Lockwood (2013: 28).  
227 Lockwood (2013: 14, 26) uses the metaphor of ‘binding the hands of future government’, regarding 
the problems of ‘time-inconsistency’ and ‘credible commitments’.  
228 The cultural implications of the CCA have been mentioned in several interviews I have done. 
Whether admiring or criticising, they acknowledged that since the CCA, the UK energy policy is 
locked in low-carbon paradigm (Interviews 4, 11, 13, 15). Nonetheless, it by no means has ended 
political debate over climate, as seen over the gas-renewable conflict in the 2012 Energy Bill. 
229As an example, when Chancellor resisted against the Fourth Carbon Budget in 2011, it ultimately 
was passed just by increasing the risk of legal claim and the pressure of the CCC.   
230He referred to one of the Westminster Forums which I interviewed him just after that. 
231 In previous chapter, this research claimed that policy changes are not complete just by shifts in 
objective and institutional levels. It suggested that for a paradigmatic shift, all five policy components 
need to alter significantly. 
232 As discussed in previous chapter, in continuation of the CCA, this period led to a series of 
accelerated changes in all levels. Banding the RO, introducing FiT, revising the Ofgem duties and 
remaking UK energy innovation system were some examples.  
233 For the UK it means that %15 of whole energy should come from renewable sources by 2020. 
234 One of the few speculations I have heard for that ‘odd’ decision was based on international 
aspiration of the UK government and Prime Minister ‘to lead Europe-wide debate’ (Interview 41) 





                                                                                                                                      
 
policy decision (Interviews 39, 22). Another interviewee highlighted the indirect influence of the 
European environmental groups in Brussels on the UK policies (Interview 41). 
235 Following quotation from the DECC EMR team senior member shows how serious is that 
obligation. 
 
I think, as I’ve described in terms of the renewables goals, that is the statutory EU targets, 
that’s not something that we can go back to Europe and change. The renewable goals are 
agreed, group EU statutory goals; therefore we will face infraction proceedings if we do not 
hit our renewable targets. Now the implications of those proceedings are not clear right now, 
they could, and are likely to involve, some sort of fine and some sort of penalty, but a lot will 
depend on progress elsewhere and what’s happening across the EU, but Government is 100% 
committed to delivering against its renewables goals.… (Interview 29, July 2012). 
 
236 It is deterministic because it is not about what market wants but it aims at bringing something that is 
not ‘already marketised’ (Interview 31). 
237 This dynamic was partly mentioned by many other interviewees. A then member of DECC EMR 
team argued that by bringing RO from ‘margin’ to the ‘centre’, the Directive made it as a ‘machine of 
subsidy’ (Interview 34, August 2012). Therefore, particularly regarding the era of austerity, such 
dramatic growth in the cost of RO was neither economically affordable nor politically acceptable. In 
the next chapter, its specific implications for nuclear and renewable technologies have been discussed. 
238 I got this term from an interview with a policy research fellow at Green-alliance (Interview 14, 
December 2011). 
239 It reflected also a shift in understanding of the ‘uniquely difficult nature of climate change as a 
public policy problem’. From this point of view, climate change and renewable targets were 
accelerating rationales for more influential and powerful government ideology (Interview 12, 
Government advisor and the EMR Technical Expert Panel, December 2011). Henney (2011a: 336) 
concludes that ‘now the world looks different’. It seems that liberalised competitive market and 
'political objectives of de-carbonisation’ and almost social targets are fundamentally 'divergent'. 
Similarly, a former politician and head of an Energy Institute said:  
 
Obviously there are also ideological issues here. The fact that carbon is, in the word of Lord 
Stern, an enormous market failure means that to reduce carbon emission you need a strong 
government action, and for some people ideologically strong government action is 
unacceptable. The way that I try to characterise that is for these people, strong governmental 
action as an answer under a big question, because that is not an acceptable answer to anything. 
Obviously part of that comes from neo-liberal assumption that markets basically provide 
progress and solution to societal problems and clearly climate change strays very strongly at 
that (Interview 15, December 2011). 
 
240The Prospect is the union for professionals, representing engineers, scientists, managers and other 
specialists in areas as diverse as agriculture, defence, energy, environment, heritage, shipbuilding, 
telecoms and transport. We are the largest union in the UK representing professional engineers. 
241 Oil and gas prices more than trebled between 2002 and 2007, with oil prices peaking at over $140 
per barrel in 2008 (Youngs 2009: 1). 
242Despite the target set in 2003 that fuel poverty should be eradicated by 2016-18 (DTI 2003: 107), by 
2008 this had risen to 3.3 million households, compared to 1.2 million fuel poor homes in 2003. It then 
increased to 5.5million by 2009 (DECC 2011b). 
243 Events like the 2013 lobbying scandal around MP Yeo, the then chair of ECC Select Committee, is 
likely to further damage the already troubled relationship between the wider public, government, and 
energy companies.  
244 A recent report by IPPR suggests that with more competition in the market, bills could be as much 
as £70 less per year. Similarly, a wide range of interviewees and academic literature (Henney 2011; 





                                                                                                                                      
 
regime incumbents’ in electricity market as a signal for the market failure even in meeting its original 
claims.  
245 The Exxon Mobil Energy Outlook to 2040 shows that electricity will be the ‘dominant source’ of 
final energy consumption making the power sector the ‘focal point of competition’ between all the 
primary fuels. For an estimation of increase in electricity share in end use energy see figure 23 in 
Appendix B. 
246 The weakness of EUETS has been mentioned in several studies (Skea et al 2011, Newbery 2011) 
and interviews. A former politician and head of an Energy Institute said to me: 
 
Another thing I would add is that the original hope had been in a rather reasonably stable and 
adequately high carbon price would emerge from EUETS, and of course that did not happen for 
various reasons and that is a very significant lack of incentive for investors to put in low-carbon 
generation (Interview 15, December 2011).  
 
247 The inadequacy of the RO has been criticised by a wide range of stakeholders. Below is an example 
of responses to DECC consultation call for the EMR. 
 
The ROC regime has produced a great deal of uncertainty for developers, leading to high 
finance rates. It has been said of ROCs that never, in the field of renewable, has so much been 
spent by so many to deliver so little’ (London Analytics, 2011: 1). 
 
 Based on a scenario building model, only a half of the minimum target, 15.4%, is likely to be met by 
2016. (See figure 8 in Appendix B presented by Gaynor Hartnell, the CEO of Renewable Energy 
Association, May 2012). 
248 It happened mainly due to a set of international developments in gas industry like Russian 
agreement and the discovery of shale gas. They suggest that gas is more plentiful and less 
geographically concentrated than what people feared. 
249 Almost a quarter of peak demand needs to be closed by 2016, due to either the LCPD obligations or 
the normal retirement. It would increase to three-quarters of the UK’s existing generation plant stock 
by 2025 (Skea et al 2011: 23; Newbery 2011: 1). 
250 The risk of blackout culminates when the ‘capacity margins could hit 5% with more intermittent 
supply’. Based on Ofgem’s assessment, the risk of power cuts would increase from near-zero in 2012 
to one-in-12 by 2015 and one-in-two if demand was very high. However, DECC forecasts are far less 
gloomy. For more information look at figure 9 in Appendix B. 
251Whilst in historic models we have actually been investing £10bn to £12bn per annum, some people 
put the investment challenge by 2030 at well over £300 billion (Byles MP 2013). For an estimation of 
investment required in electricity sector by 2020 see figure 12 in Appendix B. 
252 There are also remarkable arguments that regardless of low-carbon generation and excess supply 
required, current energy mechanism is unable even to finance merely the replacement of forthcoming 
closures (Interview 16; Helm 2010; Henney 2011). By contrast, a group of market economists refer 
such capacity investment challenge back to the failure of policymaking rather than the failure of market 
thinking. In interviews with some academic proponents of market economics from Oxford and 
Cambridge, they pointed in examples of wrong policies like improper design of NETA, political 
support of nuclear and technical problems of RO, as the main reasons of current challenge. As such, 
they claimed that still pure electricity market can work for economic objectives, unless it is 
counterproductively affected with political interferences (Interviews 16, 19 and 22).     
253 In a further evaluation, Henney (2011b: 55) warned that ironically, as the result of multiple 
subsidies, even conventional functions of electricity market have also been undermined. In fact, market 
incentives have been  replaced by political lobbying for getting subsidies and  the planned CCGT 
investments have been affected  negatively due to increasing capital cost and political risk (Henney 
2011b: 55). 
254 More importantly, it proposed a 'far reaching energy market reform' (Newbery 2011: 5) through five 





                                                                                                                                      
 
255 This document disputed market ability to deliver ‘excess supply’ and ‘a particular technology 
profile’.  Thereby it urged government to 're-assess’ the current approach towards a 'mixed balance 
between market and government' (Skea et al 2011: 51, 60-61; Helm 2010: 5).   
256 Particularly, it criticised a sense of 'complacency' for easy gain of low-carbon target due recession 
and over-reliance on the adequacy of EUETS (Skea et al 2011: 48; Pearson & Watson 2012: 27; 
Henney 2011a: 278).   
257 The then member of energy policy team in CBI described it as ‘one of the main mechanisms for 
lobbying and convincing policy makers’. By this, business conveyed this message to them that ‘under 
current electricity market, we cannot deliver low carbon generation. We need a new electricity market’. 
(Interview 35, August 2012). 
258While Labours claim a lot of continuity and consensus between the two Governments in 2010, their 
decision to defer market reform has received several criticisms, mainly from businesses, for ‘late 
diagnosing’ and ‘slow responding’ to the challenges of electricity market (Interview 41, CBI Energy 
Group member, August 2012). 
259 It consisted of a complex package of measures like smart grid; feed-in tariff; emission performance 
standard; a floor price for carbon; a review in the Ofgem's role; and, de-centralised community-based 
power generation. 
260 Several interviewees within civil service also pointed to the role of international policy learning in 
EMR. A member of EMR team in the DECC told me that they had arranged a team for comparative 
studies and also kept their connection with other countries in different levels. As such, one important 
institutional platform facilitating cross-European learning was the European commission which 
informally connects different countries policy makers under its European forums and initiatives 
(Interview 34, DECC EMR team, August 2012). Experiences of other countries were reflected, 
particularly, in design of CM and CfD (Interview 35 and 36, Ofgem Wholesale Market team members, 
August 2012) 
261 A part of interviewees, mainly from academia and NGOs, complained that ‘policymakers listen to 
somebody who says what they want’ and critics are always marginalised (Interview 6, professor of 
energy policy and head of a research institute on energy governance, April 2013). Such imbalance 
influence also has been evident in the next chapter about renewable and nuclear lobbies. 
262 I got this term from an interview with a senior member of energy policy team in Consumer Focus 
(Interview 40, August 2012). 
263 The appointment of Owen Paterson as new Environment Secretary and the replacement of 
renewable-fan Energy Minister Charles Hendry were described by the environmentalists as "declaring 
war" from Mr. Cameron on the environment: "There is a shift away from greener ministers in posts 
towards less green ministers and I think that's serious" (Whitehead, a member of the Commons Energy 
Committee, in Harrabin 2012). 
264 Such tension was mentioned in the media as ‘an unholy war’ (Carrington 2012b) and ‘battle royal 
being waged at the heart of government’ over the future role of gas (Ekins 2012). The Lib-Dem Leader 
made it clear when he said: 
 
We made no secret of the fact we wanted to set a target in this Parliament, but as it was not in 
the coalition agreement or any of the parties’ manifestos, the Conservatives flatly refused 
(Nick Clegg, Deputy Prime Minister, 2012). 
 
265 While in Coalition Agreement, New Conservatives compromised within party tensions over climate, 
but soon after such conflicts started to arise: ‘[intra-government] tensions are there – but it’s less Lib 
Dem-Tory, more Tory on Tory’ (Ellis 2012). A backbencher Conservative MP told me: 
 
A growing number of Tory MPs privately do not believe climate change, because it is 
ineffective. We are not in empire era, we can’t change the world. Support for climate change 
came not from a deep intrinsic belief. But resulted from modernisation of the party: retreating 
glassier. If after next election we went alone without Lib-Dem, then by speculate we reduce 
our coalition-driven commitment to climate change. (Interview 32, Formerly minister in 









There are potential ‘setbacks’ for climate ideas. Geels (2013) points to changing public concerns, 
weakening supportive policies and additional system costs as the main reasons. The following 
quotation shows such a divergence:  
 
‘I think security concern could be met through different policies other than merely 
environmental ones. Potentially the emergence of unconventional resources and particularly 
shale gas could distinct climate and security objectives. Similarly any likely decrease in gas 
price too’. (Interview 15)  
 
267As an example, previous chapter indicated the introduction of the LCF and Carbon Intensive 
Business Exemption as two additions derived from the rise of affordability.  
268 Though, nobody is fully satisfied by the whole package, although each coalition has some partial 
gains. It is a ‘heterogeneous mixture’ of different mechanisms that are not only inconsistent, but also 
sometimes redundant. As the former senior member of DECC energy team described, EMR resulted 
from different work streams regardless of overall coherent idea (Interview 39, August 2012). 
269 Though in the literature, there is at least some level of overlap between problem definitions and 
policy design components (Nohrstedt & Weible 2010: 22). 
270 As shown before, whilst there was no explicitly anti-market advocacy coalition, a wide range of 
policy actors became gradually less committed to pure market policies. They included growing market 
sceptic environmentalists like NGOs and even public bodies like CCC. The situation was partially the 
same for the DECC which was echoed in EMR draft as well. More importantly devolved areas like 
Scottish Government were more ambitious in supporting their renewable industrial policy. Also 
consultancy institutions, with leftish ideas and socio-political perspective about energy like the Institute 
for Public Policy Research (IPPR) and academic departments associated with evolutionary economists 
and STSers, were less committed to the market thinking. Sussex Energy Group and Exeter University 
are two examples. More importantly, in line with their business opportunity, low-carbon electricity 
supply chain industries in general and renewable and nuclear in particular were emphasising on the 
more direct governmental interference. 
271 Though that in the literature, some other contextual features also have been mentioned as important 
in policy impact. The issue of ‘timing’ (Boin et al 2009) and a form of serendipity and coincidence of 
multiple streams (Kingdon 1984, 1995) are two examples.   
272 For long time, they had been seen incompatible, due to ontological and epistemological differences 
between two literatures. This pattern started by the introduction of the Narrative Policy Framework 
(NPF) by Jones and McBeth (2010).  
273Similarly, policy narrative has also been mentioned as an important ‘coalition’s power resource’ or 
‘political agency’. 
274 Based on the literature, a good policy narrative is characterised as ‘normatively appealing’, 
‘cognitively convincing’, ‘interpretively flexible’ and ‘symbolically and simply rationalised’ policy 
discourses (Kuzemko 2011; Shanahan et al 2011). It has been mentioned as an important ‘coalition’s 
power resource’ or ‘political agency’.  
275  The next chapter also shows how nuclear and renewable coalitions constructed policy narratives, 
such as ‘nuclear as dual solution’ or ‘no public subsidy’, to exploit contextual shifts and present their 
technologies as common solutions.  
276 What was in place in 2011-2012 was described as a discursive battle between different advocacy 
coalitions to frame climate and renewable policies either as ‘green engine of growth’ or by contrast, ‘a 
barrier to UK competitiveness’ and extra burden of ‘climate costs’.  
277In a similar statement, Jones & Baumgartner (2012) describe policymaking as a ‘continual struggle 
between the forces of balance and equilibrium and the forces of destabilisation and contagion’. 
278 Following figure developed by Streeck and Thelen (2005) introduces a typology of Policy Change 
Processes. 











Incremental Reproduction by adaptation Gradual transformation 
Abrupt Survival and return Breakdown and replacement 
 
279Streeck and Thelen (2005) followed by Kern  and Howlett (2009) argue that ‘gradual transformation’ 
in a policy mix emerges through one or more of four change mechanisms or pathways, ‘drift’, 
‘conversion’, ‘layering’ and ‘replacement’, depending on the level and order of changed policy 
components.   
280 While the notion of policy narrative has been already used in different institutional and social 
constructivist studies of the UK policy change (Kern 2010; Kern & Mitchell 2011; Kuzemko 2011), it 
has never been studied complementary to the ACF or other actor-based policy process theories. 
281 In that category, Gas and CCS have been deliberately overlooked. The inclusion of the first in low 
carbon options is still controversial, and the latter is yet far to commercialise. Though that both nuclear 
and renewable represent a wide range of technologies. For example, renewable technology in the UK is 
largely based on wind technology, both off-shore and on-shore. 
282 In that category, gas has been deliberately overlooked, due to controversies around it as a low 
carbon technology.  However, both nuclear and renewable represent a wide range of technologies. For 
example, renewable technology in the UK is largely based on wind technology, both off-shore and on-
shore. 
283 This literature includes historical, social and rational-choice institutionalism. Given ‘all definitions 
of institution’ imply ‘persistence’, they focus mainly on ‘stability’ and ‘continuity’. Consequently, ‘the 
inescapable conclusion’ is that any change in ‘self-reinforcing institutions’ requires ‘an exogenous 
origin’ driver and there is no space for an ‘endogenous change driver’ (Mahoney & Thelen 2010: 4, 6 
and 7). In other words, given policies firmly consolidated by ‘inert institutional setting’ and ‘policy 
equilibrium’ status, policy change is rather unlikely unless an external ‘stimulus’ emerges. 
284
 The UK commissioned the world’s first nuclear power station way back in 1956 at Calderhall . 
285
  In 2000, electricity produced from renewable sources was still 5% - exactly the same as it had been 
in 1990 despite a decade of claimed support for renewable, as a part of low-carbon energy, via the 
NFFO (DTI 2000: 32). 
286  Their official optimistic estimation of the cost of nuclear power and the prospect of new generation 
of less-risky nuclear technology framed the decision of independent politicians (Interview 44). Though 
based on the Gordon MacKerron (April 2012) report, this estimation has been constantly increased 
from £1,250/KW in 2007 (DTI) to £3,743/KWh in 2010 (Mott McDonald). 
287  Nuclear critics argue that it is not justifiable by either of policy objectives separately. Nuclear is 
neither competitively economic, regarding its full life cycle and need for subsidy, nor environmentally 
acceptable, because of its waste pollution and risk. It also could not provide a high level of security 
regarding its inherited 'operational inflexibility' (Interview 10). 
288 ‘It's a choice of two evils, but one is much worse than the other’ (Monbiot 2013) 
289 They supported nuclear with a wide range of rationales from the safety improvement in new nuclear 
technology to prioritising carbon over other types of emissions and an inevitable trade-off. 
290 My argument here was supported by the Frank Geels’ presentation in the IGov workshop in April 
2013, where I attended too.  
291  This European more ‘receptive political environment’ to green ideas is partially evident in cases 
that the UK has been influenced ‘indirectly’ by ‘unprecedented’ European policies, as presumably 
occurred in the case of the Renewable Directive (Interviews 11; 18; 39; 41). 
292 'At the end of 2011, the poll then showed that support for new build had reached 50% compared to 
just 20 against, and the latest polls continue to show those in favour of nuclear power outnumbering 
those against by around 2:1’ (Haslam 2013). 
293 As explained before, publishing reports indicating optimistic estimation of nuclear costs, which are 
now approved as ‘wrong estimations’, and emphasising the deliverability of nuclear played a 
substantially important role in shifting the balance of negotiation power of the nuclear lobby 
(Interviews 43; 44). 
294  One important characteristic of current energy civil servants in the UK is their organisational lack 





                                                                                                                                      
 
ago withered away substantially the former policy privilege of the State. This pattern has been 
intensified by quick job rotating procedures and large scale retirement of experienced staff. 
295 This consensus happened through blaming sceptics as ‘left wing dogmatist’ and ‘violent opposition’ 
(Johnstone 2012: 6). 
296  Nevertheless, a group of renewable advocates has criticised renewable targets for the ‘investment 
uncertainties’ they cause. They emphasise the fact that investors need longer term assurance, beyond 
2020, to cover the risks of investment for the people and infrastructure. Given the lack of a ‘renewable 
specific’ implication of 2050 climate target, a campaigner from Friends of the Earth pointed out that for 
incentivising investment on renewable '2050 target is too far and intangible whereas 2020 target is too 
close and short-term' (Interview 25, the then FoE senior policy analyst, January 2012): ‘It is essential 
that a high level of ambition for renewable technologies is expressed beyond 2020’ (REA 2011: 4). 
297 A combination of likely affordability consequences of renewable technologies and their risk of 
'unpredictability' and 'intermittency' has been frequently used by the nuclear lobby to undermine public 
support for renewable technologies (Interview 44; 43).  
298  Note that backbench Tories are mainly climate sceptic and pro-market, but they inevitably prefer 
nuclear to their low-carbon options: ‘we basically do not like nuclear because it is not justified by 
market. But we are hoping for engineering solution making nuclear cheaper and competitive’. 
(Interview 33) 
299 One important factor here was the EU Renewable Directive. It incentivised the Coalition 
Government in a 'mixed and balanced enthusiasm' (Interview 25, the then FoE policy director, January 
2012). Similar to the partial persuasion of Lib-Dems in the case of nuclear, the Conservatives also 
accepted a supportive approach towards renewable technologies because of the banding obligation of 
the Renewable Directive. 
300  Note that EMR is officially about a trinity of nuclear, renewable and CCS. This chapter has focused 
on nuclear and renewable technologies because of both their centrality to analytical focus and the 
practical distance of CCS from market. 
301 EMR has been widely criticised that its current intellectual design does not reflect explicitly the 
urgency and the necessity of the renewable target. It relies on further institutional settings of how and 
by whom CfDs would be finalised (Interviews 25, 30, 33). 
302 Particularly there is a challenge between environmental Tories and conventional Tories over 
renewable subsidy. 
303 ‘I describe paradoxical compromise when partners do not like the result contrary to contradictory 
when both sides are satisfied’ (Interview 30)  
304 I got this term from Johnstone’s presentation at RGS workshop (2012: 2). 
305 Actually the shale gas has shifted intra-government tension from nuclear-renewable in EMR to a 
gas-low carbon controversy. Accordingly it has been described as a ‘battleground between Chancellor 
George Osborne, who favours gas-powered generation, and the Liberal Democrats, who want clean 
energy’ (BBC 2012).  
306 Questions like what is strike price and whether there is an auction or not.  
307 This term has been used by Kuzemko (2013) for nuclear technology. She argues that different 
nuclear consequences and risks, i.e. economic and environmental, are often presented subjectively. 
308 To re-converge nuclear with renewable, there are some new technical ideas emerging. Very 
recently, the policy director of the Nuclear Industry Association (NIA) suggested: ‘and the other 
technical solution we need to find a way that nuclear and renewable technologies can work together, so 
finding ways to deal with intermittency of renewable’ (Blyth 2013). 
309 Presumably, this could be seen as a rationale for the typical shortness of the duration in which 
negotiated agreements are in place before turning to tension. Given that defected sub-coalitions are 
more driven by tactical/political interests than stable policy beliefs, changes in political situation could 
simply lead to their interest divergence. Consequently, such agreements are more likely to encounter 
fundamental challenges and gradually fail. 
310 Note that both propositions 2 and 3 relate to the second research question. 
311 In that category, gas and CCS have been deliberately overlooked. The inclusion of the first in low 





                                                                                                                                      
 
nuclear and renewable represent a wide range of technologies. For example, renewable technology in 
the UK is largely based on wind technology, both off-shore and on-shore. 
312 This literature includes historical, social and rational-choice institutionalism. Given ‘all definitions 
of institution’ imply ‘persistence’, they focus mainly on ‘stability’ and ‘continuity’. Consequently, ‘the 
inescapable conclusion’ is that any change in ‘self-reinforcing institutions’ requires ‘an exogenous 
origin’ driver and there is no space for an ‘endogenous change driver’ (Mahoney & Thelen 2010: 4, 6, 
7). In other words, given policies firmly consolidated by ‘inert institutional setting’ and ‘policy 
equilibrium’ status, policy change is rather unlikely unless an external ‘stimulus’ emerges. 
313 For a long time, they had been seen as incompatible, due to ontological and epistemological 
differences between the two literatures. This pattern started with the introduction of the Narrative 
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Appendix A: The list of interviewees and interview instrument  
Table 6: The list of interviewees 




Scottish energy directorate and member of UKERC advisory board   Nov. 2011 1 
Professor of energy policy and advisor of DECC, UKERC and Defra Nov. 2011 2 
Government advisor and Professor of energy economics  Nov. 2011 3 
Senior researcher in the politics of energy policy Nov. 2011 4 
Senior member in UKERC and RCUK  Nov. 2011 5 
Government advisor and head of a research centre on energy governance  Nov. 2011 6 
Policy advisor of DECC and DEFRA Nov. 2011 7 
Board member in the Low Carbon Research Institute Nov. 2011 8 
Professor of environmental sociology  Nov. 2011 9 
Emeritus director of an energy and environment research institute   Nov. 2011 10 
Senior planning policy officer at RSPB Dec. 2011 11 
Government advisor and the EMR Technical Expert Panel Dec. 2011 12 
Economist at a leading Electricity Policy Research Group Dec. 2011 13 
Policy research fellow at Green-alliance Dec. 2011 14 
Former politician and head of an energy institute Dec. 2011 15 
Former civil servant and researcher in an energy consultancy Dec. 2011 16 
Senior policy research fellow at Policy Exchange Dec. 2011 17 
Senior director at CCC Dec. 2011 18 
Professor of energy micro-economics Dec. 2011 19 
OXERA and UKERC advisory board  Dec. 2011 20 
DECC EMR team member Jan. 2012 21 
Former Board member of London Electricity Jan. 2012 22 
Political Analyst of an Electricity Policy Research Group Jan. 2012 23 
An economist and head of a low carbon research institute  Jan. 2012 24 
Senior policy fellow at Friends of the Earth Jan. 2012 25 
A senior advisor to Trilemma UK and E3G Feb. 2012 26 
A board member of Energy UK July. 2012 27 
Senior policy fellow at Green peace July. 2012 28 
DECC EMR senior team member July. 2012 29 
Member of Energy & Climate Select Committee, Labour MP July. 2012 30 
A senior lawyer at Norton Rose Consultancy July. 2012 31 
Former minister in Department of Energy, Conservative MP  July. 2012 32 
Director of energy policy in one of the Big Six Aug. 2012 33 
DECC, EMR team Aug. 2012 34 
Head of energy in a leading lobby group for UK businesses  Aug. 2012 35 
Ofgem, Wholesale market team member Aug. 2012 36 
Ofgem, Wholesale market team member Aug. 2012 37 
Ofgem, Wholesale market team member Aug. 2012 38 
Former DECC Energy team senior member Aug. 2012 39 
Senior policy fellow at Consumer focus  Aug. 2012 40 
Member of CBI energy policy team Aug. 2012 41 
Former civil servant at DECC  Aug. 2012 42 
SPAD of former DECC Secretary of State Aug. 2012 43 
Head of energy policy at one of the Big Six Sep. 2012 44 
Formerly at DTI energy team Dec. 2012 45 
Former member of DECC ministerial team, Lib-Dem MP Dec. 2012 46 
Former member of DECC ministerial team, Conservative MP Feb. 2013 47 
Former civil servant and fellow at an energy consultancy Feb. 2013 48 
Former civil servant at DECC and Ofgem  Apr. 2013 49 
Former in energy industry and energy policy commentator Apr. 2013 50 
Former environmental campaigner and political analyst of energy 
governance  





Former civil servant and Senior analyst at Cornwall Energy May. 2013 52 
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Interview instrument: An Exemplary guideline for a Semi-Structured Interview  
 
NB1: Note that there is a presumption that this research should conduct two types of interviewees. First, 
who have a general analysis of the history, evolution and coalitions involved in the UK energy policy and 
perhaps EMR. Second, some specific policy makers engaged directly in the EMR formulation and are less 
likely to know about other aspects of energy policy, historical trends and other coalitions. The latter group 
is expected mostly from governmental organisations due to the less-theorised and neutral nature of civil 
servants. Obviously the following interview questions have been designed for the first typical group of 
interviewees. 
 
NB2: to clarify the general questions, they are sometimes followed by a list of likely alternatives and 




 Thank him/her for the time; remind him/her whether it is OK that we talk for one to 
two hours; and ask for the recording permission. 
 Briefly talk about yourself, your background, your research interests, the reasons for 
the interview, and how you will share the information. 
 Explain the aim of your research as the analysis of UK energy policy evolution since 
late 1990s with focus on the Electricity Market Reform as the case. 
 Describe the combination of Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) and Epistemic 
Community (EC) as research analytical framework and resultant presumptions 
particularly the fact that each policy results from long-term policy evolution and 
competition between different advocacy coalitions based on their different policy 





 Ask him about any likely question relevant to the introduction. 
 Demonstrate your knowledge about the interviewee's background, and then start 
with some introductory questions about her/himself, the history of engagement with 
energy policy, and the current position. 
 Recognise whether or not s/he is familiar with either TM or ACF; then decide about 
the level of generality or specificity of further questions. 
 
 
II. UK Energy Policy Changes and Evolution Patterns Influencing on 
the Formation of EMR 
 
1. Why did EMR happen in the UK 2011? Since late 1990s, which major policy 
changes have occurred in the UK energy policy that have had impact on the shape of 
EMR? Would you please preferably explain your answer distinctively for each of 
EMR mechanisms, if you think that they have different policy background? Do you 
conceptualise any of them as a sign of major policy change or energy paradigm 
shift? If yes, which ones and why? 
SQ: Which contextual-institutional factors have facilitated its development in the UK rather 
than somewhere else? What factors could be regarded as the most influential ones in the 
shape of current situation in EMR? Any external-landscape shock or crisis e.g. the credit 
crunch and economic crises (2009)? Role of change in socio-economic or political patterns 
e.g. change in the UK government (2010)? Role of changes in beliefs, discourses, or 
paradigms e.g. public attitude? Role of energy challenges e.g. oil peak and nuclear crises in 
Japan and Germany? Role of change in policy beliefs or membership? Role of new ideas, 
theoretical findings or academic disciplines? Role of failure in previous experiences like RO? 
SQ:What do you think about these events: Utility Act (2000); DTI White Paper (2003; 
2007) and the emergence of new trinity policy objectives: low-carbon, security and 
affordability; Renewable Obligation and EU Renewable Directive; the Creation of DECC 
(2008); Climate Change Act (2008); Creation of CCC (2008); Carbon Budgets; Ofgem's 
Project Discovery (2009); the Low Carbon Transition Plan (2009); etc?  
 
III. Policy Subsystem Definition and Coalitions Identification 
 
2. Taking into consideration the policy evolution affecting formation of EMR since 
2000, could you categorise divers actors involved in that policy process based on 
their different approaches, beliefs, paradigms, or discourses? Are there groups who 
have overall shared frame and competing with each other? Are distinctive advocacy 
coalitions recognisable in the process of EMR formulation?  
NB. Even though you think that in some cases coalition interests play more important role 




3. If yes, what are the main distinctive components of their belief, paradigm or 
discourse?  
SQ: How does each of them frame the major challenges confronting UK energy policy? 
How different do they prioritise the policy objectives and conceptualise their seriousness? 
What do they regard as the major causes of those challenges? What are their policy 
alternatives potentially could tackle the perceived challenges? What do they think about the 
role of government or market in problem solving? Do they support more interventionist 
approach or not?  
 





4. Do you agree with adequacy of all or some parts of dimensions below to categorise 
advocacy coalitions in the process of EMR? If yes, with what is their priority and 
inclusion? If no, what are your different suggestions? 
 The different priority of policy objectives (climate change, security, 
affordability, competition);  
 Political philosophy (de-politicised market-based vs politicised state 
interventionist);  
 Different electricity options: fossil fuels vs. nuclear vs. renewable. 
 Top-down centralised and large scale vs. bottom-up decentralised supply;  
 The importance of innovation. 
Coalitions' membership 
5. Who are their central members?  
SQ: Which actors, organisations, institutions and other types of EMR stakeholders etc have 
been more associated with diverse set of policy beliefs and paradigms? Please expand your 
view from only governmental department or traditional iron triangle concept to industrial 
companies; governmental departments; academics; consultancies; NGOs; and political 
parties. 
 
IV. The Electricity Market Reform 
 
Overall assessment 
6. In general, could Electricity Market Reform be conceived as a symbol of major 
policy change or paradigmatic shift?  
SQ: If yes, to what extent and in which aspects? Would you justify the rationales behind 
your answer? How could bridge between the development of EMR and previous policy 
changes? Is it a dependent of existing policy changes or a new departure point? Is there any 
difference between EMR’s White Paper (2011) and Energy Bill (2012)? 
 
7. Will EMR be sufficient to meet the UK electricity-specific policy objectives?  
SQ: How do you predict likely outcomes of EMR? What are the main achievements and 
challenges of the work of EMR so far? Is EMR able to fully de-carbonise the base-load of 
electricity generation? Does it meet the target of 30% renewable by 2020? Could EMR 
provide enough investment to keep lights on, regarding replacement of old generation and 
electrification as well as more intermittent supply?  
 
Coalition-based evaluation of EMR 
8. Who is the winner in the battle of EMR?  
SQ: While there are a lot of uncertainties in implementation, EMR is intellectually a major 
change. Thus it could be examined in terms of which coalition with which mix of beliefs is 
intellectually the winner of EMR. E.g. interventionists VS market-fans; nuclear VS 
renewable or gas; conservative VS Lib-dems; climate skeptics VS environmentalists; 
Treasury or Ofgem VS DECC or CCC; …   
 
The explanation of EMR’s specific feature 
9. How we could explain the dynamics behind these particular features of EMR?  
SQ: If you do not agree with these features in EMR, please explain your arguments. 
Otherwise to answer these questions, please think about different types of dynamics in 






a) A step change towards prioritisation of de-carbonisation target in 
electricity sector: Arguably EMR is generally in favor of environmentalists 
who were less powerful before it. Would you please explain which kind of 
internal and external mechanisms empowered environmentalist coalition to 
influence in policy process of EMR? Would you please explain historically 
why and how the objectives adopted, while free-market coalition was fully 
dominant at that time, and other coalitions were not too powerful to pose 
their target to policy process? Did this adoption an accident or just a political 
choice? Or this was a deliberate target setting? 
b) More interventionist approach: Also it is clear that EMR reflects more 
interventionist approach than what was before? Which dynamics enabled 
this approach to overcome the strong cross-sector commitment to the market 
in the battle of EMR, while free market coalition and epistemic community 
is still powerful?  
c) The gain of nuclear in EMR: What is your evaluation about nuclear in 
EMR? Do you agree with this argument that nuclear is clearly one of the 
winners of EMR? If yes, why that happened, while nuclear was not 
traditionally supported neither by environmentalist NGO's nor by market 
logic?  
d) Inadequate support for renewable: Also renewable directive is an 
important driver of EMR, such as third target. From historical point of view, 
why it was signed? Which coalition did support that? Do you think that 
EMR could meet renewable targets? Do you agree with relatively 
insufficient support of EMR for renewable? Do you conceive the gain of 
nuclear as a barrier for meeting the renewable targets?  
e) Fossil fuel and CCS advocates: Arguably nuclear lobby, renewable 
industries and deep environmentalists are satisfied with some parts of EMR. 
What about fossil fuel (oil & Gas) industry? Do they gain anything by EMR 
or are just looser, while EMR clearly pointed in CCS which is associated 
closely with fossil energies (gas and coal)? Could EMR rule out the fossil 
fuels entirely? 
f) Still centralised and top-down:  Do you agree that despite a lot of radical 
aspects of change, EMR still is incremental in terms of the dominance of 
centralised electricity supply? If yes, why? Which dynamics consolidate the 
status quo?   
g) Required capacity reinvestment and security concern: how do you 
evaluate the adequacy of EMR to facilitate re-investment to replace 
upcoming closure? In general, what are the impacts of EMR on the concern 
of security of supply? 
h) Current political consensus around the targets: Coalition government 
showed a continual approach with previous government around the policy 
objectives. What is the reason of this kind of consensus, while other 
coalition with powerful members like Treasury still exists and a lot of 
doubts about achievability of targets, reinforced by financial recession, are 
prompted? 
V. The Policy Change Drivers 
 
Specific change factors 
10. While your overall explanation of policy change features of EMR was asked before, 
this question is to ask you about a set of specific factors potentially are likely to 





SQ: If you think that one factor has been influential, please explain how and to what extent, 
compared to other factors. 
a. Political parties: What is the role of each of three political parties in the 
formation of EMR? To what extent EMR results from the party politics and 
how? 
b. The emergence of coalition government: Do you see any role for new 
government in the formation of EMR? In other words, which changes in EMR 
are envisaged if there was still labour government in power? What about if there 
was any of the conservative or lib-dem alone? In each sub-question, please 
explain how it has affected EMR. 
c. Coalition compromise and negotiated agreement: What are the specific 
effects of coalition nature of government, if any?  EMR shows some clear signs 
of compromise driven by coalition government. What happened exactly on that 
time and which factors facilitated coming to a mutual agreement.  
d. Civil servant change: Do you see any special role for civil servant in EMR 
more than merely realising politician dreams? Which likely changes in structure, 
culture or capability of energy civil servants paved the way of current shape of 
EMR? 
e. Energy policy style and institutions: Do you see any role for change in British 
policy style, such as more evidence-informed policy making, in the changes 
presented in EMR? Is consultation process has been undermined by Planning 
Act? If yes, how has it influenced EMR  
f. Within government challenge: Is EMR affected from conflicts amongst 
governmental and public bodies involved in electricity policy, i.e. DECC, 
Treasury, Ofgem and CCC? Is there any role for parliamentary committees e.g. 
climate and energy select committee? If yes how? 
g. Business interests and lobbying: How have business interests framed EMR? 
Which aspects of EMR results directly from business interests? Which lobby 
was more influential than others and why?  
h. NGOs’ ideas and campaigning: Similarly which aspects of EMR are shaped 
mainly by the impacts of NGOs and which type of NGOs? Please explain how 
they have affected EMR, if any? Do you see any impact from empowerment of 
NGOs in changing form of EMR?  
i. New theories and epistemic communities: It is acceptable that an epistemic 
community of Hayekian economists was supporting liberalised system. Do they 
still dominant after EMR, or any other epistemic community has won the EMR? 
If yes, who are they? Are still other groups of economist? Or other disciplines 
like STS and sociology? Are they the driver of EMR or just passive supporters? 
j. Policy learning from other countries: do you agree that learning from the 
experiences of other countries like Feed-in-Tariff in Germany or Capacity 
Mechanism in US has influenced the EMR formation? If yes please explain how 
and through which mechanisms? 
k. Financial recession: Is EMR framed by the consequences of financial 
recession? If yes how? Whether EMR is more interventionist because of market 
discrediting in financial crisis OR is less supportive for renewable in return? 
l. EU Renewable Directive: It is argued that signing renewable directive is very 
important in the shape of EMR. Would you please explain how and to what 
extent? If it was important, why EMR is not supportive for renewables as much 






The comparative priorities 
11. Would you please compare between the levels of influence that each factor 
has had? In other words, please determine the most influential ones from 
following dichotomies:  
a. Politician and civil servants: Who has mainly drafted EMR? To what 
extent the current form of EMR results from politician and political 
parties’ desire rather than civil servants arguments? 
b. Interests vs ideas: Does EMR represent interests more than beliefs and 
ideas? Whose lobbying was influential, industries or NGOs? Or even 
political parties? And Why? 
c. Political interests VS business interests: which forms of interests were 
more influential and in which level? Do you agree that political interests 
shaped the overall directions in policy objective level, while business 
interests framed the policy instruments and detail mechanisms? 
d. New theories and ideas VS policy failures and practicalities: Is EMR 
driven primarily by the emergence of a theory or results inevitably 
because of failing previous policies and the concern of missing targets?  
 
The prediction of future policy changes 
12. What is your prediction of any likely policy changes in response to the 
EMR's consequences and changes in other factors indicated above? 
 
VI. Conclusions and Closure 
 
 Mention some of the main points learned. Then ask interviewee to comment 
on the feedback in terms of any important points you may have missed. 
 Ask about the recommendations for further potential interviewees or 
documents could provide new insights into the research. 













Appendix B: The list of complementary figures  
 
Figure 6: A collapse in the UK energy RD&D expenditure after liberalisation (UKERC 2010) 
 
 
Figure 7: Planning scenario for meeting 2050 target  








Figure 8: The ambitious Renewable target for electricity sector in 2020 
(presented by Gaynor Hartnell, CEO of Renewable Energy Association, May 2012) 
 
 
Figure 9 : De-rated capacity mechanism 









Figure 10: A scenario for electricity mix by 2050 




Figure 11: The break down of cost per sector for meeting carbon target 










Figure 12: Investment required in electricity sector by 2020 (annual capex) 





Figure 13: Project Discovery five-folded options  







Figure 14: A comparison between EUETS and CPF 
(presented by Nigel Cornwall, April 2012) 
 
 
          
 
Figure 15: A comparison between Premium FiT, Fixed FiT and CfD 








Figure 16: Impact of targeted capacity mechanism on de-rated capacity margin  





Figure 17: Impact of EMR’s mechanisms on future energy price  



















Electricity generation mix in ‘Market Rules’ pathway 
 
Electricity generation mix in ‘Central Co-ordination’ Pathway 
 




Figure 20: Three scenarios for fuel mix based on different technological structure  







Figure 21: The public salience and newspaper coverage of environmental concern 





Figure 22: A comparative measure of important issues facing Britain, 1997-2011 











Figure 23: The increasing prospect of electricity share in total end use energy 
















Appendix C: The list of policy conferences and events   
Table 7: Westminster Seminar, 8
th
 December 2011 
Westminster Energy, Environment & Transport Forum Keynote Seminar: The UK’s emissions 









Table 8: Cornwall Energy, 17
th
 April 2012 





















Table 9: Westminster Seminar, 10
th
 May 2012 
Westminster Energy, Environment & Transport Forum Keynote Seminar: The UK’s Renewable 










Table 10: Westminster Ministerial Forum, 5
th
 July 2012 










Table 11: Westminster Seminar, 12th July 2012 
Westminster Energy, Environment & Transport Forum Keynote Seminar: Transforming the 








Table 12: Oxford UK Energy Policy Day, 31
st
 May 2013 
Will Britain have a secure, clean and cheap energy system in 2020/30...? If we can’t have 











Table 13: Westminster Seminar, 23
rd
 April 2013 
Westminster Energy, Environment & Transport Forum Keynote Seminar: Next steps for UK 










Table 14: Westminster Seminar, 16
th
 July 2013 
Westminster Energy, Environment & Transport Forum Keynote Seminar: Delivering Electricity 












Table 15: Cornwall energy, 1
st
 October 2013 







Appendix D: Different lists of policy stakeholders   
Table 16: Industrial companies and trade associations involved in the EMR policy process 
 The Name of 
stakeholder 
Field of work Category 
1 EDF Generator, nuclear Big Six 
2 Centrica Generator Big Six 
3 E.On Generator Big Six 
4 Scottish and Southern Energy  Energy generator Big Six 
5 Scottish power Energy company Big Six 
6 RWE npower Generator Big Six 
7 GE energy Generation supplier and delivery EngSC Business 
8 InterGen UK New independent generator EngSC Business 
9 International Power Independent generator  EngSC Business 
10  AES NI Independent generator  EngSC Business 
11 Endesa Ireland Power generator EngSC Business 
12 First utility Energy utility EngSC Business 
13 Smartest Energy Energy supplier EngSC Business 
14 Utilita Electricity Limited Energy company EngSC Business 
15 Viridian Power & Energy NI energy supplier EngSC Business 
16 Welsh power Energy company EngSC Business 
17 West Coast Energy  Energy company EngSC Business 
18 Aggreko Flexible power provider EngSC Business 
19 National grid Network Administer EngSC Business 
20 CE Electric Electricity Distributor  EngSC Business 
21 EirGrid NI Transmission and Market Operator  EngSC Business 
22 Electricity North-West Electricity distributer  EngSC Business 
23 EnerNOC Network operator  EngSC Business 
24 Statnett Transmission System Operator EngSC Business 
25 RLTec Demand side service provider EngSC Business 
26 Royal Bank of Scotland Financier  EngSC Business 
27 Siemens Energy infrastructure  EngSC Business 
28 Wärtsilä Corporation power generation 
technology developer 
EngSC Business 





30 Atkins Engineering and design consultant EngSC Business 
31 Banks Group Developer and constructor EngSC Business 
32 Carlton Power power station developer EngSC Business 
33 Petrofac  Energy infrastructure  EngSC Business 
34 Agri energy Cooking oil distributer EngSC Business 
35 Alstom UK  Plant installer  EngSC Business 
36 Deutsch Bank CCA Climate change investment EngSC Business 
37 Elexon Electricity Settlement service EngSC Business 
38 eMeter Smart meter software EngSC Business 
39 ECS Energy Curtailment Specialists EngSC Business 
40 Flexcitricity Smart grid EngSC Business 
41 Highview Power Storage utility-scale energy storage EngSC Business 
42 Marine Current Turbines  Technology developer EngSC Business 
43 Invesco Perpetual Investment company EngSC Business 
44 KiWi Power Demand side management EngSC Business 
45 Lloyds Bank Investor EngSC Business 
46 Nuclear Industry Association Nuclear Industry EngSC Trade Union 
47 EIC Energy industry supply chain EngSC Trade Union  
48 Advanced Power Generation 
technology Forum (APGTF) 
Industry-led stakeholder group EngSC Trade Union  
49 IGG Independent Generators Group  EngSC Trade Union  
50 ESTA -  Energy Services Association EngSC Trade Union  
51 EFET European Federation of Energy Traders EngSC Trade Union  
52 EIC Energy Industry Council EngSC Trade Union  
53 Peabody Energy Coal investor  Fossil Fuel Buz  
54 Scottish Coal Coal producer Fossil Fuel Buz  
55 Scottish Resources Group  Coal producer Fossil Fuel Buz  
56 Shell energy and petrochemicals company Fossil Fuel Buz  
57 Statoil Gas company Fossil Fuel Buz  
58  B9 Coal Coal CCS Fossil Fuel Buz  
59 BG Group Gas Supplier Fossil Fuel Buz  
60 BP Oil & gas producer Fossil Fuel Buz  
61 Calor Gas Ltd Gas service Fossil Fuel Buz  
62 ATH Resources Coal Producer Fossil Fuel Buz  
63 Ceres power Micro-CHP developer  Fossil Fuel Buz  





65 Eggborough Power Power Generator (Coal) Fossil Fuel Buz  
66 ESBI Generator  CCGT Fossil Fuel Buz  
67 ExxonMobile Oil & Gas  Fossil Fuel Buz  
68 CHPA Combined heat and Power Association F F Trade Union  
69 World Coal Association  F F Trade Union  
70 Oil & Gas UK Fossil fuel industry F F Trade Union  
71 CoalPro Coal Producers Confederation F F Trade Union  
72 CoalImp Coal users Assoc. F F Trade Union  
73 CDC Cornwall Development Company  RE Business  
74 Gaelectric Electricity Storage Renewable and storage RE Business 
75 Fred Olson Renewable Renewable generator RE Business 
76 Good energy RE supplier RE Business 
77 Green company PV solar investor RE Business 
78 Green power RE supplier RE Business 
79 Hargreaves + Orchid RE from waste RE Business 
80 HES Biopower RE biopower RE Business 
81 HG capital RE investor RE Business 
82 Low-carbon Group RE producer and investor RE Business 
83 MIRAEL RE investor RE Business 
84 AvVail UK Waste energy, RE RE Business 
85 B9 energy offshore RE Ireland RE Business 
86 Blue NG Renewable RE Business 
87 BHA Hydropwer Association, RE RE Business 
88 Ecotricity RE company RE Business 
89 Element Power RE developer RE Business 
90 Eneco RE generator RE Business 
91 Energiekontor Wind farmer  RE Business 
92 Energy Developments RE company RE Business 
93 New Earth Energy (NEE) RE company RE Business 
94 Partnerships for Renewables RE provider RE Business 
95 MGT power RE generator RE Business 
96 Peel Energy Low-carbon (RE & CCS) generator  RE Business 
97 REG- Bio- Power RE company RE Business 
98 REG- Wind- Power RE company RE Business 
99 RES Renewable Energy Systems  RE Business 





101 Statkraft AS RE investor RE Business 
102 Summerleaze  Aggregate and RE company RE Business 
103 Vattenfall RE Energy supplier  RE Business 
104 Vestas Wind turbine manufacturer  RE Business 
105 Air fuel synthesis  Renewable  RE Business 
106 Air Products PLC Renewable  RE Business 
107 Aquamarine Power Renewable RE Business 
108 ADBA Biogas Association RE Business  
109 Covanta Energy Waste energy RE Business 
110 KTI energy CHP from waste RE Business 
111 REA RE Association RE Trade Union 
112 RenewableUK Renewable RE Trade Union 
113 ESA Environmental Services 
Association 
Waste managers’ association RE Trade Union 
114 IWEA Irish Wind Energy Association  RE Trade Union 
115 Low-carbon finance group RE investor association RE Trade Union 
116 Scottish Renewables RE industries association  RE Trade Union 
117 NIRIG Northern Ireland Renewables Industry 
Group  
RE Trade Union 
118 NOW National Offshore Wind Association of 
Ireland 
RE Trade Union 
119 Carbon Cycle  CCS CCS Business 
120 CCS TLM CCS developer CCS Business  
121 2Co Energy CCS deployment CCS Business 
122 Sheffield Forgemasters Steel manufacturer EI Business 
123 INEOS CHLOR  Energy intensive manufacturer of 
chlor-alkali 
EI Business 
124 MPA Mineral Products Association EI Trade Union 
125 EIUG Energy intensive EI Trade Union 
126 EEF  UK Steel manufacturer’s association  EI Trade Union 
127 CPI Confederation of paper industry EI Trade Union 
128 BGMC Glass Manufacturer's 
Confederation 
EI Trade Union 
129 BCC Ceramic Manufacturer's 
Confederation  
EI Trade Union 





131 Veolia Environmental 
Services  
Waste management  Business 
132 Viridor Waste management Business 
133 Wessex Water Services   Business  
134 BSG Sugar producer Business 
135 BT Communication service Business 
136 Co-operative Food retailer Business 
137 Argus media Price reporting agency Business 
138 Costain Group Engineering and delivery Business 
139 Crown Estate Estate managing Business  
140 EDP Renovaveis  Business 
141 Enza capital  Business 
142 GrowHow UK Fertiliser manufacturer Business 
143 Asda Retailer Business 
144 IMSL  producer of refined petroleum 
products 
Business  
145 Microsoft IT developer Business 
146 Kelda group Water service  Business 
147 NFPA Non-Fossil Purchasing Agency  Business 
148 CBI Industrial association Trade  Association 
149 CLA Country Land and Business Association  Trade Association 
150 CPA Construction Products Association  Trade association 
151 Water UK Water industry association Trade association 
152 WPIF Wood Panel Industries Federation  Trade association 
153 FDF Food and drink federation  Trade association 
154 Scotch Whiskey Association  Trade association  
155 NEPIC North East Process Industry Cluster 
(NEPIC) 
Trade association 
156 NLWA North London Waste Authority  Business  
 
 
Table 17: Governmental and public departments involved in the EMR policy process 
 The Name of stakeholder Field of work Category 
1 Committee of Climate Change Responsible for low carbon budgets Governmental 
department 





3 Scottish Government Devolved area Devolved Government 
4 Welsh Assembly Government  Devolved area Devolved government 
5 Scottish Environment Protection 
Agency  
Environmental regulator Local authority 
6 NIE Energy LTD Public procurement agency Local authority 
7 NI utility regulator Regulator Devolved department 
8 Highlands & Islands Enterprise  RE developer Local authority 
9 Hampshire County Council Local authority Local authority 
10  DTEI Northern Ireland Local authority Devolved department 
11 Cumbria County Council Local authority Local authority 
12 London Croydon Regional council Local authority 
13 Customer focus Statutory customer champion Statutory department  
14 Caroline locus mp Green MP MP 
15 Arc21 NI waste council Devolved department 
16 Scottish Enterprise Development agency Local authority 
17 NFLA Nuclear Free Local Authorities Local authorities 
18 IACC Isle of Anglesey County Council Local authority 
19 Isle of Man Government  Local authority 




Table 18: Academic, research institutes and consultancies involved in the EMR policy process 
 The Name of stakeholder Field of work Category 
1 Cambridge university EPRG Academic 
2 ISRS Infrastructure security Research institute 
3 Institute of Civil Engineering Civil Engineer Association Research institute 
4 Exeter university Energy Policy Academic 
5 Edinburgh University  Academic 
6 UKERC Research Centre Research institute 
7 SEG SPRU Academic 
8 AMEC Consultant Consultancy 
9 ICEPT Grantham Institute  
Imperial college 
Academic 





11 CO2Sense Environmental consultancy Consultancy  
12 Blizzard Energy consultant  Consultancy  
13 Fichtner  Consulting Engineers  RE engineering consultant Consultancy 
14 Oxera  Oxera Consultancy 
15 JR Power Plant Site location Consultancy 
16 London analytics   Consultancy 
17 Low-carbon innovation centre East Angelia University  Academic 
18 McGrigors LLP Energy lawyer Consultancy  
19 SWAN centre Newcastle university Academic 
20 Norton Rose LLP Law firm Consultancy  
21 Poyry  Consultancy 
22 Regulatory Policy Institute Think tank Consultancy  
23 Respect Energy   Consultancy  
24 Scottish Industrial Advisory 
Group on Thermal Generation 
and CCS  
Advisor Consultancy  
25 Cornwall Energy Advisor Consultancy  




Table 19: Different NGOs and civil society activists involved in the EMR policy process 
 The Name of stakeholder Field of work Category 
1 FoE Environmentalist NGO NGO 
2 Energy Institute Broad Association Civil society 
3 Green Alliance Environmentalist NGO 
4 Green Peace Environmentalist NGO 
5 Institution of Mechanical Engineers Mechanical engineer association Civil society 
6 WWF Environmentalist NGO 
7 SONE Nuclear supporters Civil society 
8 REA Renewable association Civil society 
9 ACE Energy efficiency campaign Civil society 
10  CPRE  Campaign to Protect Rural England Civil society 
11 Transform UK Environmental campaign  Civil society  





13 Common Good Party  Civil society 
14 ESN Electricity Storage Network Civil Society 
15 IET,RAE,IChemM Engineering institutions and 
association  
Civil society 
16 Institute of Directors Political organization Civil society 
17 IESIS Engineering organization Civil society 
18 John Muir Trust Wild land charity NGO 
19 MEUC Major Energy Users' Council  Civil society 
20 National Rights to Fuel Campaign  Fuel poverty campaign  NGO 
21 Prospect Trade union Civil society 
22 RICS Royal Institution of Chartered 
Surveyors 
Civil society 
23 Tees Valley  Tees development Civil society 
24 TU Trade union congress Civil society 
24 TUC Clean Coal Task Group Trade union congress Civil society 
25 UK District Energy Association (UKDEA) Decentralized energy association Civil society 
27 UKHFCA UK Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Association Civil society 
28 UFUNI Ulster Farmers Union (UFUNI) Civil society 
29 UNISON Energy industry trade union Civil society 
30 NFLA Nuclear Free Local Authorities Civil society 
31 Customer focus Statutory customer champion Civil society 
32 Bio fuel Watch Anti bio-fuel NGO 




Table 20: Respondents to the consultation call for BETTA in December 2001 (Ofgem 2002) 
 The Name of Respondent Organization 
1 Alcan Smelting and Power UK 
2 Association of Electricity Producers 
3 BOC Gases 
4 British Energy plc 
5 British Wind Energy Association 
6 Centrica plc 





8 DTI Engineering Inspectorate 
9 EDF Energy Merchants Limited 
10  Edison Mission Marketing & Services Limited 
11 ELEXON Limited 
12 energywatch 
13 Grangemouth CHP Limited 
14 Health & Safety Executive 
15 Institution of Electrical Engineers 
16 LE Group 
17 Magnox Electric plc 
18 Natural Power Consultants Ltd 
19 Powergen UK plc 
20 Scottish and Southern Energy plc 
21 Scottish Electricity Settlements 
22 ScottishPower UK plc 
23 SEEBOARD plc 
24 The National Grid Company plc 
24 TXU Energy Limited 
25 Wisenergy 
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